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My dear fellow, you have got it wrong. The play is a success. 
The only question is whether the . . . audience will be one. 
Oscar Wilde 
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Foreword 
Before Reading in Its Own Terms 
JAMES PHELAN 
Starting Points 
While writing this foreword, I assumed that I should yield to the 
inevitable and title it "Before Reading Before Reading" or perhaps 
"Before Reading Squared/71 have now, however, decided to resist 
the inevitable in favor of the literal—and its implied challenge of 
giving a new spin to the common phrase "reading a book in its own 
terms." Here's why: As Peter J. Rabinowitz explains early in the in­
troduction, the book's purpose is "to explore . .  . the ways in which 
Western readers' prior knowledge of conventions of reading shapes 
their experiences and evaluations of the narratives they confront" 
(3). But much in Rabinowitz's exploration of conventions, I gradu­
ally realized, can apply not just to narratives but also to critical 
texts. Consequently, Before Reading itself provides the most useful 
terms and concepts to illuminate Rabinowitz's distinctive theoreti­
cal project. 
The reading of Rabinowitz's title refers to what he calls "autho­
rial reading," the activity by which actual readers seek to enter an 
author's hypothetical, ideal audience. This foreword is an exercise 
in authorial reading, but one with an edge. By looking at Before 
Reading through the lenses the book itself provides, I hope not 
merely to summarize the book accurately but also to extend its in­
sights and thus, paradoxically, sharpen our vision of the thing itself. 
Those lenses, I shall suggest, offer a way of seeing both the strate­
gies by which Rabinowitz has constructed his complex argument 
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and the significance of those strategies. This vision, in turn, enables 
us to comprehend more fully and appreciate more keenly the con­
clusions, the methods, the purposes, and the implications of Before 
Reading.1 
To start with the conclusions, the book offers three main theses: 
(1) Readers operate with a broad range of tacit conventions that sig­
nificantly influence their experience and evaluation of narrative. (2) 
This range of conventions can be usefully grouped under four differ­
ent readerly activities—attending to the most important details, as­
signing larger meanings to details, perceiving the text's developing 
shape, and finding systems of unity among the details. Rabinowitz 
labels the conventions governing these activities the rules of no­
tice, signification, configuration, and coherence. (3) The way in 
which readers apply these rules has political consequences because 
those applications are affected—again often tacitly—by readers' 
ideologies. The interaction between convention and ideology illu­
minates the politics of interpretation, especially such phenomena 
as motives for misreading and the dynamics of canon formation. 
To move from this general overview of the content to a more de­
tailed analysis of the book's methods and purposes, let us turn to an 
analysis of how the rules illuminate the book itself. 
Notice 
The key perception behind Rabinowitz's formulation of the rules 
of notice clearly applies to critical texts: readers give greater atten­
tion to some parts of texts than others. Consequently, the specific 
rules of notice he identifies can be applied to non-narrative texts 
with very little modification. Rabinowitz focuses on "two interre­
lated aspects of noticeability: concentration and scaffolding" (53), 
1. In adopting this approach to Before Reading, I am choosing to get inside the 
book's workings as it appeared in 1987 rather than to emphasize my location in 
1997 and so stand outside it and discuss how it might be different if Rabinowitz 
were writing it today. My choice of approach indicates that I believe the book holds 
up very well ten years later. Some of the issues that loom large in it—the need to 
shake off the shackles of the New Criticism, the need for canon reformation—do 
not loom as large in contemporary critical discourse, though it is arguable that they 
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that is, places where writers expect or direct readers to pay special 
attention, and the arrangement of those places into a structure on 
which readers can hang an interpretation. 
More specifically, Rabinowitz identifies three kinds of noticea­
bility. (1) Basic gestures: these include—listen up!—explicit textual 
signals such as outright claims for importance, repetition ("concen­
tration and scaffolding are interrelated aspects of noticeability"), 
and figurative language (these parenthetical remarks are as subtle 
as heavy metal music). (2) Privileged positions: these are "titles, be­
ginnings and endings (not only of whole texts but of subsections as 
well—volumes, chapters, episodes), epigraphs, and descriptive sub­
titles" (58) as well as key moments in the unfolding of plots. (3) 
Ruptures: these are of two kinds, intratextual and extratextual. In­
tratextual ruptures break patterns and continuities of style, charac­
terization, theme, or plot. Extratextual ruptures either transgress 
the social norms the text initially assumes or invokes, or, through 
implicit or explicit intertextual reference, modify or even violate 
established literary norms. The "shocking novel" breaks certain 
proprieties defined by the larger society; the genre-bending narra­
tive seeks to alter established generic norms. With critical texts, 
then, intratextual ruptures would break continuities of argument or 
style (I might disrupt this foreword by suddenly exclaiming, "Before 
Reading rules!" and then saying no more). Extratextual ruptures 
would modify or violate the conventions of critical argument, 
would revise or even repudiate received critical opinion. Attending 
to extratextual ruptures in Before Reading will mean addressing its 
implicit and explicit intertexts. 
The scaffolding of notice in Before Reading is provided by its 
careful organizational divisions: a general introduction and two 
parts, the first given over to narrative conventions, the second to 
the politics of interpretation. Each part is further broken down into 
should. I would venture to say that if he were writing the book today, Rabinowitz 
would choose different non-canonical texts to focus on in his discussion of the poli­
tics of interpretation—I imagine a text by an ethnic writer and one particularly illu­
minated by the insights of queer theory. But I believe that the essentials of his 
argument about conventions, politics, and their interrelationship would not need to 
change. 
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chapters and each chapter into titled subsections. A look at just two 
of the privileged positions—the title and the introduction—in com­
bination with extratextual rules of rupture will illustrate the inter­
relation between scaffolding and concentration in Before Reading. 
The book's main title is deliberately arresting—and slightly, al­
beit appropriately, misleading. By 1987, the reader- response move­
ment had been in full swing for two decades, and it had produced 
books and essays on The Dynamics of Literary Response, "The 
Semiotics of Reading/7 Interpretive Conventions, The Implied 
Reader, The Resisting Reader, Readings and Feelings, and even on 
the question Is There a Text in This Class! Rabinowitz's title is ar­
resting because it indicates that the book is both continuous with 
and slightly disruptive of this tradition. It declares its interest in 
reading but identifies a spatiotemporal location that none of this 
previous work had noticed—and claims it to be deserving of a book-
length treatment. The subtitle, however, pulls back from this mild 
disruption (no blurb for Before Reading would ever say "the outra­
geous new book from the shocking critic in upstate New York!") 
and offers what by 1987 is more familiar fare: "Narrative Conven­
tions and the Politics of Interpretation." At the same time, the jux­
taposition of these two concepts is intriguing, since previous 
discussions of conventions, such as those of Jonathan Culler and 
Steven Mailloux, had not made such a strong link to politics, and 
previous discussions of politics, such as those of Judith Fetterley, 
did not develop from an initial description of such formal matters as 
conventions but rather went right to the clashes and convergences 
between the critic's ideology and that found in the text. 
The title is slightly misleading because the spatiotemporal loca­
tion it identifies has very permeable borders or, to put it another 
way, because Rabinowitz necessarily moves from "before reading" 
to "during reading" and even sometimes to "after reading." That 
movement is necessary because Rabinowitz cannot show the im­
portance of narrative conventions unless he also shows how they 
shape both the writing and reading of texts, and he cannot show 
that shaping unless he analyzes what happens during and after read­
ing. But even as the title doesn't fully capture the scope of 
Rabinowitz's concerns, its inaccuracy appropriately functions to fo­
cus our attention on what is most new and significant within that 
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scope, the territory of "before," the land in which our knowledge of 
conventions resides. 
The next privileged position, the introduction, lays out Rabin­
owitz7s major principles and methods and defines his project both 
with and against prevailing critical norms. His most important 
methodological decision is to focus on authorial reading. This deci­
sion not only determines the scope of the book but also makes a ma­
jor intervention in the reader-response movement. In order to appre­
ciate that intervention, we should consider the prior history of 
Anglo-American reader-response theory.2 The story begins with the 
rise of the New Criticism in the 1940s and 1950s and gets interest­
ing with its gradual loss of influence in the late 1960s. This loss of 
influence was a result both of reactions against it by Anglo-Ameri-
can critics and of the arrival of theory in England and America from 
the European continent, especially structuralism (itself influenced 
by Russian formalism of the 1920s) and then post-structuralism 
from France. The Anglo-American reactions came in the form of at­
tacks on the twin pillars supporting the New Critical doctrine of the 
autonomy of the text: "The Affective Fallacy/7 which ruled readers' 
responses irrelevant to sound interpretation, and "The Intentional 
Fallacy/7 which ruled authorial intention similarly irrelevant. In 
Validity in Interpretation, E. D Hirsch, Jr., sought to overturn The 
Intentional Fallacy by arguing that reading for intention was the 
only way to arrive at a valid interpretation. In The Dynamics of Lit­
erary Response and Surprised by Sin: The Reader in Paradise Lost, 
Norman Holland and Stanley Fish, respectively, countered the ar­
gument of The Affective Fallacy, with Holland analyzing the way 
texts activate a reader's fantasies and Fish maintaining that the 
reader's work of processing Paradise Lost was equivalent to the 
7poem s meaning. In the twenty years between these three books and 
Before Reading, the reader-response movement and the case for au­
thorial intention proceeded along nonintersecting tracks. Reader-
response theorists, buttressed by structuralist and especially post-
structuralist doctrines about texts as polysemous entities, explored 
2. What follows is obviously a schematic history, one that focuses on major texts 
and events and one that ignores such developments as Hans Robert Jauss's work on 
reception theory. 
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and celebrated the liberation of the reader, first, from the tyranny of 
The Affective Fallacy, and, second, from the imperative of reading 
for authorial intention. Roland Barthes, in fact, explicitly linked the 
Death of the Author and the birth of the reader. In the face of such 
developments, Hirsch's arguments became increasingly unpopular 
in advanced theoretical circles. 
Before Reading intervenes in this history with a bold new move: a 
synthesis of the two kinds of attacks on the New Critical ortho­
doxy. This synthesis emerges from Rabinowitz's recognition, pace 
Barthes, that the reader-response movement need not be hostile to 
work concerned with authorial intention, that since most actual 
readers do try to understand "what the author is saying/' reader-
response theory should account for such reading.3 Rabinowitz is 
careful to point out, however, that his concept of authorial reading 
has significant differences from Hirsch's theory of reading for au­
thorial intention. These differences derive from Rabinowitz's con­
cern with conventions and rules, with what readers know and do 
before they read. Unlike authorial intentions, these conventions 
are the property of communities rather than individuals; they are 
socially constructed concepts available to authors and readers. 
Reading in the authorial audience, then, involves not an effort to 
decipher the writer's individual conscious intention but an effort to 
determine which conventions the writer is working with or against. 
When the reader's inferences about the conventions operating in a 
text match the author's implications about those conventions, suc­
cessful authorial reading occurs. 
In this way, Rabinowitz's model of interpretation assumes the 
possibility of—and places considerable value upon—reciprocity be­
tween authors and their audiences. However, because the conven­
tions are social constructs and because readers' decisions about 
3. Rabinowitz's use of the relation between reader response and authorial reading 
is generally compatible with the positions taken by the Chicago neo-Aristotelians 
during this period, especially as evident in the work of Wayne Booth, but none of 
these critics, including Booth, ever made the explicit connection between authorial 
reading and reader response that Rabinowitz does in Before Reading. In this con­
nection, though, it is interesting to observe that Rabinowitz's first article, "Truth in 
Fiction: A Re-examination of Audiences" (1976), appeared in Critical Inquiry, at 
that time a new journal from Chicago, edited by Sheldon Sacks and co-edited by 
Booth. 
XIV 
Foreword 
which conventions a text is employing are affected by their starting 
points, readers' inferences and an author's implications may very 
well diverge. Furthermore, in some of these cases, the divergence 
may never be discovered because the interpretation the reader con­
structs will adequately account for the text. Such interpretations, 
in Rabinowitz's view, are not invalid readings in need of correction 
as they would be for Hirsch; instead, they are fascinating examples 
of how both conventions and texts operate. I will return to this 
point during my discussion of coherence. 
The second important methodological point of the introduction 
plays off not just the New Criticism but many other theoretical 
projects as well. Rabinowitz deliberately chooses an eclectic corpus 
of texts, one that crosses the borders of genre, nationality, time pe­
riod, and especially canonicity. In this way, he ensures that his gen­
eralizations about the grounds of interpretation will apply widely 
rather than narrowly. In this way, as I shall discuss below, he also 
implicitly invites us to invoke a rule of signification. 
Rabinowitz's most important principle is that the link between 
the two concepts of his subtitle is so tight as to be unbreakable. In 
adopting this principle, Before Reading claims kin with many other 
books and articles of the 1980s concerned with exposing the inter­
connections among literature, criticism, and politics (representa­
tive titles include The Politics of Interpretation, Criticism and 
Social Change, and "The Ideology of Speech Act Theory"). These 
works all contested the norms of the New Criticism, whose legacy 
was still strong in 1987 (and, indeed, is still strong as I write this 
foreword in 1997) and whose emphases on the autonomy of the in­
dividual text and the importance of theme tended to depoliticize in­
terpretation. Rabinowitz;s contestation works like this: the social 
construction of conventions means that any interpretation will in­
evitably be tied to politics (defined as "the system of power relation­
ships among groups" [5]) in two ways: "it is partially caused by . .  . 
the political systems around it, and in turn it situates itself with re­
spect to those systems" (6).4 The placement of this principle in the 
4. Of course, by the late 1980s and early 1990s the defenders of New Critical doc­
trine and the attackers of the contemporary university mounted a campaign against 
what they saw as the substitution of literary criticism for tests of political correct­
ness. And so the culture wars began. 
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introduction is a crucial move because part 1 of the book, the long­
est section, does not discuss politics but focuses on identifying and 
explaining narrative conventions. The placement sets up our expec­
tation that Rabinowitz will make the link before the book is over. I 
will return to this point during my discussion of configuration. 
The second key principle in the introduction also plays off New 
Critical norms. Where the New Critics made the interpretation of 
individual texts the main task of criticism, Rabinowitz will focus 
not on interpretations but on "the grounds of interpretation/7 not 
on the meanings of texts but on how they come to mean (8). In this 
respect, his approach dovetails nicely with that of Jonathan Culler, 
who in 1976 issued a call for critics to get "beyond interpretation." 
Culler, however, focuses less on conventions and the territory of 
"before" than on what readers do during and after reading. 
Signification 
Assigning significance to textual details, Rabinowitz explains, 
entails a kind of translation, a movement "from what appears to be 
said to what is really said, or at least from one level (which, if not 
more literal, is more immediate or more close at hand) to another 
(which is more distant, more mediated)" (77). Signification, in other 
words, works by assigning new, generally more abstract, meanings 
to textual details. Writers of critical texts do not rely upon rules of 
signification to the same extent that writers of narrative do, since 
the conventions of criticism dictate that critics should say what 
they mean (albeit in appropriate, and too often opaque, critical jar­
gon) and to mean what they say. Readers seeking puzzles, plots, and 
moral dramas—and the interpretive task of assigning significa-
tion—know that they are far more likely to find what they seek in 
literature than in criticism and theory. Nevertheless, some of 
Rabinowitz's findings about signification do shed light on his book. 
Rabinowitz identifies five kinds of rules of signification: rules of 
figurative language (discussed only briefly), of source, of moral judg­
ment, of realism, and of cause. Of these, the rules of realism and of 
cause are not easily made relevant to Before Reading, but those of 
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source and moral judgment—provided we reconceive it as critical 
judgment—do apply, and the rule of figurative language plays a spe­
cial role. 
In narrative texts, rules of source guide our decisions about the 
authority and reliability of information, according to whether the 
information comes from characters, narrators, or implied authors. 
In critical texts, rules of source operate in conjunction with rules of 
critical judgment to establish the authority and reliability of the in­
formation provided by the source. Like most critical texts, Before 
Reading invokes two kinds of sources: works of literature and other 
works of criticism. With regard to the latter, the rules of critical 
judgment allow us to tell the good guys from the bad guys, that is, to 
distinguish between the critical sources authors position them­
selves with and those they position themselves against. The first 
rule of critical judgment we might call the rule of first impressions: 
the initial citation of a source is a reliable, although not infallible, 
guide to the critic's opinion of that source. In Rabinowitz's case, for 
example, when he cites with approval Mary Louise Pratt's criticism 
of reader-response theory, noting that she "was disturbed by what 
she saw as a tendency to depoliticize the study of literature" (3), he 
is not just making a local point but establishing Pratt as one of his 
authoritative sources. After this early citation in connection with a 
major point in his argument, the rule of first impressions tells us 
that we should expect any further citations of Pratt to be citations 
of her authority. And that is just what happens (see 8,11, 24-25,45, 
78,117-18,151-52). 
Rabinowitz's three references to John Cawelti show a different 
operation of the rule of first impressions. Rabinowitz initially uses 
Cawelti as a source when he wants to establish the claim that the 
formulaic detective story has a political function; he cites with ap­
proval Cawelti's point that the formula reassures the audience that 
human actions are rational and that "guilt is specific not ambigu­
ous" (197). Shortly thereafter, as Rabinowitz makes his case about 
the common misreading of Raymond Chandler's The Big Sleep, he 
writes, "Even John Cawelti touts Marlowe in The Big Sleep as a 
hero who 'confronts, exposes, and destroys [the novel's] web of con­
spiracy and perversion'" (200, emphasis added). Then in the third ci­
tation, where Rabinowitz is opposing Cawelti's view, he writes 
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"John Cawelti, claiming that there is a single criminal in the hard­
boiled formula .. . goes on to name Carmen as the criminal in The 
Big Sleep'1 (203). The rule of first impressions dictates this progres­
sion from approval to "even John Cawelti" to simply "John 
Cawelti": the "even" signals Rabinowitz's acknowledgment that 
he will be overturning the effect of the first citation, but once that 
is accomplished Cawelti can simply be lumped with the other 
misreaders. 
Similarly, when Rabinowitz says early on that "New Criticism 
tended to obscure . . . relations between interpretation and politics" 
(6), the rule of first impressions tells us that he is not just making a 
local point but also establishing the New Criticism as an unreliable 
source. And all the references to the New Criticism are consistent 
with this initial treatment; all show that Rabinowitz is positioning 
himself against its norms. But in order to see more clearly how the 
New Criticism signifies within Before Reading, we need to attend 
to the interaction of this rule of first impressions with the rule of 
figurative language and with the extratextual rule of rupture. 
The most prominent use of figurative language is Rabinowitz's 
announcement that he conceives of the literary text as an unas­
sembled swing set. He builds up to this announcement with a half-
ironic declaration: "Every literary theoretician these days needs a 
governing metaphor about texts: text as seduction, text as fabric, 
text as abyss, text as system. I suppose that my metaphor would 
have to be text as unassembled swing set" (37-38).In restricting the 
list to metaphors current in the 1980s, Rabinowitz leaves unspoken 
a very important intertext, indeed, the most famous modern textual 
metaphor, that championed in the title of W. K. Wimsatt, Jr.'s New 
Critical manifesto, The Verbal loon. It is in this book that Wimsatt 
and Monroe Beardsley erected those twin pillars of New Critical or­
thodoxy, The Intentional Fallacy and The Affective Fallacy, which I 
discussed above. Rabinowitz's choice of metaphor contributes to 
his contestation of these orthodoxies, as we can see by thematizing 
it. Where the New Critical metaphor treats the text as sacred, 
something to be worshiped as much as read, Rabinowitz's metaphor 
treats it as something to be used for pleasure and play. Furthermore, 
where the verbal icon is always already whole and inviolate, the 
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swing set needs the user to complete it. Indeed, Rabinowitz's meta­
phor itself is playful, an effort both to participate in and to puncture 
the convention of developing a metaphor, especially the solemnity 
associated with the most famous metaphor of all. 
Rules of critical judgment also apply to Rabinowitz's second 
main source, his eclectic corpus of literary works. I noted above 
that the range of his selections works to ensure that his conclusions 
are widely applicable. But that very interest in having the conclu­
sions be as applicable for popular fiction as for serious fiction indi­
cates that he wants us to suspend our usual judgments about the 
automatic inferiority of popular fiction to canonical fiction. The 
relevant rule of critical judgment is what we might call the rule of 
equal respect: works treated with equal respect by the critic should 
be regarded as equally valuable by the reader. 
Once we recognize the operation of the rule of equal respect, then 
we can also recognize much that remains implicit in the significa­
tion Rabinowitz assigns to his non-canonical sources. His most ex­
tended examples in his discussion of the politics of interpretation 
are two non-canonical texts, Chandler's The Big Sleep and Margaret 
Ayer Barnes's Edna His Wife. With Chandler's text, Rabinowitz ex­
plains the interactions between ideology and convention in com­
mon misreadings of it. These misreadings assume a popular novel 
could not make Chandler's thematic point about the ineradicability 
of society's evil; they scapegoat Carmen Sternwood as the main lo­
cus of evil on the basis of a masculinist convention that says readers 
should accentuate the negative traits of a female character. With 
Barnes's text, Rabinowitz contends that a masculinist bias affecting 
all four rules of reading renders the positive features of the novel al­
most invisible. The rule of equal respect helps us to see that while 
making these specific arguments, Rabinowitz wants to do more 
than just comment on the processes of misreading and canon for­
mation. In treating these and other non-canonical texts with the re­
spect usually reserved for works of high culture, Rabinowitz 
signifies that he wants Before Reading to intervene in processes of 
interpreting non-canonical fiction and of canon formation. The im­
plicit message of part 2 is that the critical institution should re­
read or rediscover not just Chandler and Barnes but a whole host of 
xix 
Foreword 
non-canonical authors. In this way, Rabinowitz makes good on his 
promise in the introduction to have Before Reading be "one more 
tool to change the world" (9). 
Configuration 
Rules of configuration apply to the text as a developing entity, to 
the evolving pattern of readerly expectations. Rabinowitz identifies 
two metarules of configuration—something will happen, but not 
just anything will happen (117)—and three more specific rules: un­
dermining, conventions by which situations or characters get set up 
only to be knocked down; balance with regard to focus, conventions 
that allow us to recognize that there is a limit on what may happen 
within the world of the narrative,- and balance with regard to action, 
conventions that govern our expectations about what will happen. 
As with the rules of signification, the rules of configuration for 
reading narrative need to be modified for reading critical texts be­
cause of the difference between following an unfolding plot and 
tracking a developing argument. The rules of undermining, in par­
ticular, apply to narrative more readily than to critical argument. In 
critical arguments, readers tend to interpret such building up and 
tearing down as erecting and destroying straw men. Rabinowitz, 
happily, does not argue against any straw men. 
Rabinowitz's insights about rules of balance as they apply to fo­
cus and to action do have analogies in the configuration of critical 
argument. Just as focus in narrative puts some restrictions on what 
can happen in the narrative world, so focus in critical argument 
puts some limits on the range of issues taken up in the argument. 
And just as assumptions about the balance of actions influence our 
expectations about plots, so too do our assumptions about logical 
sequence affect our expectations about the direction of critical ar­
guments. 
Thus, the rules of balance related to focus help us understand that 
Rabinowitz's concern is with authorial reading rather than, say, re­
sistant reading or reading as a feminist, a Marxist, a psychoanalyst, 
or any other "ist." The rules of balance related to action help us un­
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derstand the argument of Before Reading as a plot in three acts. Act 
1 is the general introduction, which signals that the sequence of the 
argument will involve what Rabinowitz calls the other-shoe rule, 
namely, that the engagement of one issue (narrative conventions) 
entails the engagement of another, related issue (the politics of in­
terpretation). Interestingly, as we have seen in the discussion of no­
tice, Rabinowitz first has to make the case that conventions and 
politics constitute a genuine pair, a right shoe that is not complete 
without a left. Then, in act 2 (or part 1), he drops that right shoe and 
walks it along an orderly path. In moving from notice to significa­
tion to configuration to coherence, he is moving from the early to 
the final stages of interpretation: notice deals with initial matters of 
emphasis, signification with translating those matters and other de­
tails into larger meanings, configuration with the developing shape 
of the whole text, coherence with its overall meanings as seen retro­
spectively. In act 3 (or part 2), Rabinowitz drops the left shoe as he 
builds on the findings about conventions to make his case about 
politics. The sequence in act 3 does not follow the steps of a single 
process, but in moving from the issue of misreading to that of canon 
formation, this act moves from an analysis of how politics affects 
the act of interpretation to how it affects a large institutional prac­
tice. The discussion of Edna His Wife also brings closure to the ar­
gument, because Rabinowitz addresses the way in which mascu­
linist bias can affect the application of each of the four rules. 
Thinking about configuration at a more local level, we can see 
how the rule of balance regarding focus affects Rabinowitz's place­
ment and deployment of one of the book's most important—and 
most widely influential—concepts, that of the narrative audience. 
The narrative audience is, in a sense, the authorial audience moved 
inside the world of the narrative; just as an author has an ideal audi­
ence, so too does a narrator. In the authorial audience, we know that 
the events and characters of fiction are not real; in the narrative au­
dience, we believe that they are. Furthermore, different fictions will 
ask us to take on different beliefs in our narrative audience role: in 
science fiction, for example, the narrative audience is frequently 
asked to believe many things that the authorial audience does not. 
Thus, one important way to understand the role of belief in any 
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narrative is to examine the relation between the beliefs of the au­
thorial audience and those of the narrative audience.5 
The rule of balance with regard to focus means that Rabinowitz 
must do more than lay out this concept: he needs to make it func­
tion within his developing argument about narrative conventions 
and authorial reading. He does that very effectively by showing that 
the concept of narrative audience is crucial to understanding how 
the rule of realism works. When the only difference in belief be­
tween the narrative audience and the authorial audience is the be­
lief in the reality of the characters and events, we are in the 
presence of a realistic narrative. When the beliefs of the two audi­
ences diverge, the narrative is no longer realistic. 
Coherence 
As noted above, rules of coherence guide readers' interpretations 
of texts as completed wholes. Rabinowitz explains that academic 
criticism gives the greatest value to the not obviously coherent 
text, that is, to works in which the critic must overcome some 
recalcitrant material to explain the implicit coherence. Conse­
quently, he identifies three main rules: for filling in apparent gaps 
in the text; for taking apparently surplus significations and showing 
their relevance to general patterns,- and for taking disparate materi­
als and relating them through naming, bundling, or thematizing. 
Once again, the difference between narrative texts and critical texts 
matters. Rabinowitz astutely notes that in the realm of narrative, 
readers, especially academics, gravitate toward the not-quite-coher-
ent text. In the realm of criticism, however, readers regard the not-
quite-coherent critical text as seriously deficient. 
At the same time, any complex critical argument addressing a 
5. Rabinowitz distinguishes the concept of narrative audience from the concept 
of narratee developed by Gerald Prince by emphasizing that the narratee is a figure 
different from the reader, while the narrative audience is a role that the actual 
reader takes on. But when he talks about the narrative audience as "the imaginary 
[one] for which the narrator is writing" (95), the distinction becomes less clear. I 
have tried to sort out the relation between the two concepts, arguing that they 
should be seen as complementary rather than competing: the narratee is the 
narrator's addressee, while the narrative audience is the observer role we enter 
within the world of the fiction. See chapter 7 of my Narrative as Rhetoric. 
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range of issues is likely to introduce ideas whose relation may not 
be entirely clear or, indeed, may even appear incompatible. In the 
case of Before Reading, the relation between Rabinowitz's ideas 
about authorial reading and his ideas about the reader's activity, in­
cluding the influence of ideology on interpretation, may appear not-
quite-coherent. If literary works can successfully convey the inten­
tions of their authors, and if Rabinowitz wants to reassert the 
importance of authorial reading, then doesn't his attention not just 
to readerly activity but to the inescapable role of ideology in inter­
pretation work against those ideas? Doesn't authorial reading re­
quire us to escape from our own ideologies in order to recognize 
those of the author and the text? 
Perhaps the best way to recognize that Rabinowitz's positions re­
main coherent is to recognize that he is working with a variation of 
the rule of parallelism: authors' activities in writing are parallel to 
readers' activities in interpreting, but because both authors and 
readers are real people not ideal constructs, we should not expect 
the parallelism to be perfect. To put it another way, Rabinowitz re­
jects a coherence of the either/or in favor of a coherence of the both/ 
and. In the discussion of notice, I observed that he rejects the either/ 
or logic that led earlier reader theorists to assume that an emphasis 
on reader response was necessarily antithetical to an interest in au­
thorial reading. Here we can see that he rejects the either/or logic 
that views author-reader communication as either perfect or impos­
sible. For him such communication is possible and desirable—but 
far from automatic. 
Rabinowitz's embrace of this both/and coherence helps us see 
what is perhaps the most revolutionary point in the whole book: his 
complication of the concept of literary form. Form, in his view, is 
more than just the identifiable features of a text, more even than an 
intrinsic principle that organizes those features into "these words 
in this order." Form also includes another dimension, one that ex­
ists in the interaction of an author's design and a reader's perception 
of that design, an interaction dependent on their mutual awareness 
of socially constructed conventions of writing and reading. Thus, 
form is not just a property of the text, the author's mind, or the 
reader's activity. It is something shared among author, text, reader, 
and culture. 
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Strikingly, the playful metaphor of the unassembled swing set 
embodies the both/and coherence of Rabinowitz's argument and of 
his new conception of form. Just like that swing set, a text is pack­
aged so that it can be put together into a functional whole. Just as 
the swing set may contain ambiguous directions, so may the text. 
When that happens, there will be more than one way to put it to­
gether, though the way chosen by any individual reader will be de­
termined less by the directions than by the reader's starting point. 
Just as the swing set may fall into the hands of an especially deter­
mined but relatively unhandy assembler, so too may the text. When 
that happens, the assembler is likely to fashion something that 
works, though not in the way it was designed to and probably not as 
smoothly. Furthermore, the assembler won't recognize that there is 
another way to assemble the elements of the package until another 
assembler comes along and points that out. When presented with 
the reassembled materials, the determined but unhandy assembler 
should be able to recognize the superiority of this new alternative, 
but in some cases he may remain unconvinced. 
Just as the swing set may fall into the hands of an especially cre­
ative assembler who may see possibilities in it that were not appar­
ent to the designer, so too may the text. When that happens, the text 
is likely to become a more complicated object than it was designed 
to be; whether that complication makes it function better will vary 
from case to case. 
In short, Rabinowitz's conception of author-reader communica­
tion complexly but coherently unites the ideal and the real. His vi­
sion of the ideal reaffirms the possibility of successful interpersonal 
communication through the medium of the text. His vision of the 
real leads him not to deplore failures to attain the ideal but to seek 
to understand how such failures shed light on ourselves, our cul­
ture, and our politics. 
The Rules in Concert: 
The Conclusion of Before Reading 
As in narrative, the rules of notice, signification, configuration, 
and coherence can operate in concert in critical texts. Perhaps the 
best example of this convergence in Before Reading occurs in the fi­
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nal two pages of the book, where Rabinowitz sketches a case against 
close reading, contending that the privileging of close reading 
means we value only certain kinds of texts, especially those already 
canonized, and that it limits the number and range of texts we read. 
He obviously chooses a privileged position for this case: beginnings 
and endings are the two parts of any text that receive the greatest 
notice. Once again he relies on the rules of critical judgment: his ac­
curate identification of the privileging of close reading as a dogma of 
New Criticism is, by this point in the book, enough to make that 
privileging suspect. Furthermore, by going after what is arguably 
the most enduring legacy of that critical movement, he is complet­
ing with a flourish his pattern of contesting New Critical orthodox­
ies. Finally, the case for reading a wider range of texts coheres very 
well with both his explicit and implicit earlier arguments about the 
importance of canon reform. Indeed, because of the way Rabino­
witz^ conclusion enacts the convergence of notice, signification, 
configuration, and coherence, it seems a perfect way to end. 
If Before Reading is itself an unassembled swing set, then this 
foreword has been effort both to assemble it and to climb on and 
start swinging. But to return to the point of my first paragraph, the 
assembled swing set itself has the shape of yet more directions for 
assembly. Thus, swinging on the set has turned out to mean per­
forming further analysis of its assembly. Happily, this fate is not 
something that all assemblers of Before Reading must face,- it is 
rather a consequence of my starting point, the decision to apply the 
book's findings to its own construction. I hope that my efforts at as­
sembly and at swinging will provide new readers of the book with a 
deeper appreciation for its artful construction and launch them into 
some healthy and rewarding swings of their own. A book with a 
construction as sturdy as Before Reading is ready to support count­
less swingers. 
xxv 
Foreword 
Works Cited 
Bleich, David. Readings and Feelings: An Introduction to Subjective Criticism. 
Urbana: National Council of Teachers of English, 1975. 
Barnes, Margaret Ayer. Edna His Wife: An American Idyll. Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1935. 
Barthes, Roland. "The Death of the Author." In Image, Music, Text, trans, and 
ed. Stephen Heath, 142-48. New York: Hill and Wang, 1977. 
Cawelti, John G. Adventure, Mystery, and Romance. Chicago: University of Chi­
cago Press, 1976. 
Chandler, Raymond. The Big Sleep. New York: Pocket Books, 1950. 
Culler, Jonathan. "Beyond Interpretation: The Prospects of Contemporary Criti-
cism/7 Comparative Literature 28 (1976): 244-56. 
. "Semiotics as a Theory of Reading." In The Pursuit of Signs. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1981. 
Fetterley, Judith. The Resisting Reader: A Feminist Approach to American Fic­
tion. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978. 
Fish, Stanley. Is There a Text in This Classk The Authority of Interpretive Com­
munities. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980. 
. Surprised by Sin: The Reader in "Paradise Lost" Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1967. 
Hirsch, E. D., Jr. Validity in Interpretation. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1980. 
Holland, Norman. The Dynamics of Literary Response. New York: Norton, 
1975. 
Iser, Wolfgang. The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response. Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 1978. 
Lentricchia, Frank. Criticism and Social Change. Chicago: University of Chi­
cago Press, 1983. 
Mailloux, Steven. Interpretive Conventions: The Reader in the Study of Ameri­
can Fiction. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982. 
Mitchell, W, J. T., ed. The Politics of Interpretation. Chicago: University of Chi­
cago Press, 1983. 
Phelan, James. Narrative as Rhetoric. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 
1996. 
Pratt, Mary Louise. "The Ideology of Speech-Act Theory." Centrum, n.s., 1 
(Spring 1981): 5-18. 
Prince, Gerald. "Introduction to the Study of the Narratee." Trans. Francis Mari­
ner. In Reader-Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-Structuralism, ed. Jane 
Tompkins, 7-25. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980. 
Rabinowitz, Peter J. Before Reading. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987. 
. "Truth in Fiction: A Re-examination of Audience/' Critical Inquiry 4 
(1976): 121-41. 
Wimsatt, W. K., Jr., and Monroe C. Beardsley. "The Affective Fallacy." In W. K. 
Wimsatt, Jr., The Verbal Icon, 21-39. New York: Noonday, 1958. 
. "The Intentional Fallacy." In W. K. Wimsatt, Jr., The Verbal Icon, 2-18. 
New York: Noonday, 1958. 
XXVI 
Acknowledgments 
Although I didn't know it at the time, this book began in 
twelfth-grade English, on the day that Mr. Ducharme was absent 
and the teacher from our junior year returned from retirement as a 
substitute. As soon as she found that we were studying Hamlet, 
her face lit up. "Let's recite!" she exclaimed, and launched into 
"O, what a rogue and peasant slave am I!" No one joined her. She 
gave a puzzled look and tried, "O that this too too sullied flesh 
would melt/' only to find, once again, that she was reciting alone. 
"Do you know 'To be or not to be?'" she asked. We shook our 
heads. "Well, then, what speeches have you learned?" When we 
told her that we hadn't memorized any, she was utterly be­
wildered. "But, then, what have you been doing in class?" 
That moment crystallized what had been so exciting about sen­
ior English: reading was no longer an act of memorization ("How 
many stab wounds had Caesar's body?" is the question that sums 
up my first encounter with Shakespeare in eighth grade), but as an 
activity in which we did things with texts. We did some pretty 
sophisticated things, too, and although I no longer remember all of 
them—and no longer practice many that I do remember—I have 
no doubt that it was the energy of that class that drew me away 
from nuclear physics to a career in literary studies. Because he 
showed me what it really meant to read, I respectfully dedicate this 
book to Edward Ducharme. 
Edward Ducharme has not read any of the manuscript, but he 
was also my first teacher to take writing seriously, and I have so 
internalized his cynical red-pencil marks that even now, twenty­
xxvii 
Acknowledgments 
five years later, some of his imprint can be found in these pages. 
Other colleagues have had a more direct hand in the text that 
follows. Wayne Booth, who taught me to read criticism in much 
the same way that Ducharme taught me to read literature, went 
over an early draft of the book and, with his usual acuity, ques­
tioned some of the weaker links in the argument. Steven Mailloux 
also provided a painstaking reading of the text, offering a large 
number of suggestions that led me to clarify the precise nature of 
the claims I was making and to place them in a broader critical 
perspective. Sophie Sorkin helped streamline the style and pointed 
out embarrassing ambiguities in the writing. Janice Radway collab­
orated in an even more direct way. Not only did she, too, read an 
early draft, but she also contributed to the formulation of some of 
the theoretical arguments about misreading at the beginning of the 
section of Chapter 6 titled "Scapegoating Carmen/' arguments 
that originated in a presentation we made jointly at the American 
Studies Association convention in 1983. She has generously al­
lowed me to borrow from that paper here. Nancy Sorkin Rabino­
witz read so many versions of the manuscript and criticized them 
so thoroughly that at times it is hard to tell whose voice is emerg­
ing from these pages. 
I am also grateful to Rachel Arnedt, Teresa Noelle Roberts, 
Megan Wolf, and Jennifer Wynn for their assistance in finding arti­
cles and correcting footnotes, as well as to the librarians of Hamil­
ton College, especially Lynn Mayo and Joan Wolek. In addition, I 
thank all those supportive friends who, over the years, have com­
mented on the papers and articles that eventually found their way 
into this book. The book would certainly not have turned out as it 
did without the prodding of Don Bialostosky, Barbara Burns, Pa­
tricia Cholakian, Rouben Cholakian, Ann Coiro, Christopher 
Fynsk, Susan Hanson, Douglas Herrmann, Roberta Krueger, Sharon 
O'Brien, Jay Reise, Elizabeth Ring, Carla Stout, and many others. 
Rachel Rabinowitz did her part, too, ceaselessly encouraging me to 
return to the keyboard to "play more computer games." 
Most of all, though, I thank Michael Samuel Rabinowitz. It was 
watching him learn how to read and listening to his patient expla­
nations of the process that gave me my sharpest insights into how 
we make sense out of books. 
xxviii 
Acknowledgments 
Research for this book was facilitated by a Margaret Scott Bundy 
Fellowship from Hamilton College. I am also grateful for permis­
sion to reprint those sections that were previously published in 
different form. Portions of Chapter i and of the fourth section of 
Chapter 3 originally appeared in "Truth in Fiction: A Reexamina­
tion of Audiences/' Critical Inquiry 4 (Autumn 1977); portions of 
the fourth section of Chapter 3 and a brief snippet in the fourth 
section of Chapter 5 originally appeared in "Assertion and As­
sumption: Fictional Patterns and the External World/' PMLA 96 
(May 1981); portions of Chapter 1 and of the first and third sections 
of Chapter 6 started out in "The Turn of the Glass Key: Popular 
Fiction as a Reading Strategy/7 Critical Inquiry 11 (March 1985); 
and portions of Chapter 1 and Chapter 7 appeared in "Shifting 
Stands, Shifting Standards: Reading, Interpretation, and Literary 
Judgment/' Arethusa 19 (Fall 1986). 
PETER J. RABINOWITZ 
Clinton, New York 
xxix 

INTRODUCTION 
Beyond Readings/Before Reading 
For literature to happen, the reader is quite as vital as the 
author. 
Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory 
Literature is political. It is painful to have to insist on this fact, 
but the necessity of such insistence indicates the dimensions 
of the problem. 
Judith Fetterley, The Resisting Reader 
Whatever critical affiliations we may proclaim, we are all New 
Critics, in that it requires a strenuous effort to escape notions 
of the autonomy of the literary work, the importance of dem­
onstrating its unity, and the requirement of "close reading/' 
Jonathan Culler, The Pursuit of Signs 
As its subtitle suggests, this book has a double focus. On the one 
hand, it is intended as a contribution to the continuing project of 
developing a coherent theory of how people read narrative—a pro­
ject that has engaged critics as diverse as Wayne Booth and Roland 
Barthes, Judith Fetterley and Wolfgang Iser. It starts from the as­
sumption that one can study narrative structure not only in terms 
of concrete textual features but also in terms of the shared in­
terpretive strategies by which readers make sense of them. More 
specifically, the book focuses on a particular temporal moment in 
the act of interpretation. Very roughly, one can divide interpreta­
tion into three phases; while their boundaries are often fuzzy, and 
while much valuable criticism tends to merge them unsystemati­
cally, it is possible to discriminate among them both in theory and 
in practice. One can study interpretation in terms of what happens 
after reading has finished, taking more or less completed in­
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terpretations as a starting point (David Bleich, for instance, toward 
the end of Readings and Feelings, studies the ways in which com­
munities negotiate among interpretations that individuals have 
already produced).1 One can also look at what happens while the 
process of reading is taking place (as Kenneth Burke, in his pioneer­
ing essay "Psychology and Form/' charts the changing moment-to-
moment experience of a text).2 In this book, I concentrate pri­
marily on an earlier phase, moving one step further back to see 
what happens before the act of reading even starts. Readers need to 
stand somewhere before they pick up a book, and the nature of that 
"somewhere," I argue, significantly influences the ways in which 
they interpret (and consequently evaluate) texts.3 Thus, while I 
will often need, in the course of my argument, to describe what 
readers do both while they read and after they finish reading, my 
fundamental concern will be with the ways in which those ac­
tivities are already limited by decisions made before the book is 
even begun. 
Needless to say, any complete discussion of this subject would 
have to account for the ways that, for instance, readers' medical 
presuppositions shape readings of such texts as The Magic Moun­
tain and The Death of Ivan Ilych, the ways that historical knowl­
edge shapes readings of Civil War novels (for example, Gone with 
the Wind or Margaret Walker's Jubilee), the ways that attitudes 
1. Esp. 80-95. (N.B. In the notes that follow, full references are given only to 
literary texts and to those works of criticism that are not listed in the Selected 
Bibliography; other citations are given in shortened form.) 
2. This approach was later taken up in different form by Stanley Fish in his 
"affective stylistics" ("Literature in the Reader: Affective Stylistics," in Is There a 
Textl 21-67), and by Roland Barthes in portions of S/Z. 
3. As Jane Tompkins puts it, "Every reader is embedded in some network of 
circumstances or other when he or she picks up a literary work. Thus it is never the 
case that a work stands or falls 'on its own merits7 since the merits—or demerits— 
that the reader perceives will always be a function of the situation in which he or 
/she reads;  [Sensational Designs, 8—9). At this point in her book, Tompkins takes a 
stronger position than I do with regard to how far the reader's context determines 
the apparent features of a text. As her argument progresses, however, she moves to a 
less radically contextual position, writing as if texts really had features in and of 
themselves which are simply rendered more or less visible according to the reader's 
perspective. See, for instance, her claim that "it is the fact of these dissimilarities 
and what they may or may not mean for the future of American society that form 
the true subject of The Last of the Mohicans" (104, emphasis in the original). 
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toward imperialism shape readings of Kipling and Mahasveta Devi, 
or the ways that attitudes toward women shape readings of prac­
tically everything. It would also have to account for the ways that 
readers' knowledge of Shakespeare influences their readings of The 
Sound and the Fury, the ways that fear of death by burial helps 
form experiences of 'The Fall of the House of Usher/7 the ways 
that knowledge of comic tradition influences readings of Catch-22. 
It would also have to account for the differences (including psycho­
logical, gender, historical, cultural, racial, economic) among read­
ers, both as individuals and as classes. As Janice Radway has point­
ed out in Reading the Romance, for instance, the initial 
assumptions (and as a consequence, the very processes of reading) 
are different for the women who read paperback romances and for 
academic critics. This is all, obviously, too much for a single work, 
and my aim here will be considerably narrower: to explore, 
through concrete analysis of particular texts, the ways in which 
Western readers' prior knowledge of conventions of reading shapes 
their experiences and evaluations of the narratives they confront. 
In other words, this book is neither a complete theory of reading 
nor a complete taxonomy of narrative conventions, and it focuses 
less on the abstract possibilities of reading and writing than on 
what readers and writers have in fact done with narratives. Despite 
this strong emphasis on practical criticism, though, I do see Before 
Reading as part of ongoing theoretical conversations centered 
around reading and narrative, and I am therefore mindful of the 
criticism lodged against much reader-oriented theory a few years 
ago by Mary Louise Pratt in 'Interpretive Strategies/Strategic In­
terpretations." Pratt was disturbed by what she saw as a tendency 
among reader critics to depoliticize the study of literature—and 
the second aim of this book is to help reverse that tendency by 
showing how study of reading and reading conventions can in fact 
help uncover the political presuppositions behind our literary prac­
tices. In particular, looking at readers' starting points can help us 
understand how interpretation comes about and what its implica­
tions are—not the implications of the particular texts at hand, but 
the implications of the very means we use as we go about making 
sense of them. In other words, in arguing that literature is political, 
I will be less concerned with the attitudes of particular authors 
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than with the ways in which the very act of interpretation is inev­
itably a political act. 
This position—that interpretation is political—remains more 
controversial than it ought to be. To be sure, in the past few years, 
partly because of the pressure of feminist scholars, the study of 
literature has become more self-consciously political. Nonethe­
less, as Fetterley points out, those who argue for the political 
nature of literary study still meet considerable resistance in many 
quarters. For all the increased interest in the "politics of in-
terpretation"—as evidenced, for instance, by a special issue of 
Critical Inquiry (September 1982) devoted exclusively to the sub-
ject—the recognition that no reading can be politically neutral is 
far from universal. Indeed, Edward W. Said goes so far as to claim 
that "an implicit consensus has been building for the past decade 
in which the study of literature is considered to be profoundly, 
even constitutively non-political"—and though one can debate 
whether this consensus has in fact been gaining ground, there is 
little doubt that it still has considerable sway in the academy.4 
The persistence of the belief that it is possible (and even proper) 
to develop a nonpolitical interpretive practice stems in part, from 
the continuing influence of New Critical assumptions. Recently, 
of course, it has become increasingly common to pledge dis-alle-
giance from New Criticism: feminists, Marxists, structuralists, 
Derrideans, Lacanians, and subjectivists all agree (if on nothing 
else) that it has outlived its usefulness and that we are living, in 
Frank Lentricchia's phrase, "After the New Criticism." Yet deeply 
ingrained ideologies are no more easily escaped when they are 
aesthetic than when they are political, and New Criticism remains 
a pedal point beneath our literary studies. It is not only, as Lentric­
chia points out, that one can find the "traces or scars" of New 
Criticism in the work of contemporary theorists.5 Beyond that, 
New Criticism, in fairly unmodified form, still provides, among 
other things, the basis for secondary and undergraduate education 
in America, including the education that molded most American 
4. Said, "Opponents, Audiences/7 12. 
5. Lentricchia, After the New Criticism, xiii. As he neatly puts it, New Crit­
icism "is dead in the way that an imposing and repressive father-figure is dead/' 
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"post—New Critics" and that continues to mold the students they 
now teach. And it continues as a lingua franca among literary 
scholars even today. No matter how forcefully contemporary crit­
ics insist on their distance from their forefathers (and I use the 
masculine advisedly), most of them maintain that distance only, as 
Jonathan Culler puts it, "with strenuous effort." 
In order to understand how New Critical principles represented 
what Richard Ohmann calls "a flight from politics,"6 let me begin 
by explaining more precisely what I mean by the politics of in­
terpretation, since the phrase has come to mean different things to 
different people: note, for instance, the bewildering variety of defi­
nitions proposed in the special issue of Critical Inquiry. In this 
book, I will be using the term politics in a more limited way than, 
say, E. D. Hirsch, Jr., does in that collection, when he broadly 
equates politics and values; I will be using it in a less restricted 
sense than Walter Benn Michaels does, when he suggests that pol­
itics is at stake only when one is talking about free choice.7 Pol­
itics, as used here, refers to the systems of power relations among 
groups (genders, races, nationalities, social classes, among others) 
in any social situation—systems that may be in part formalized 
(for instance, through law), but that are always in part invisible. 
(Indeed, one of the functions of ideology—and literature helps in 
this function—is to naturalize these power relationships. As 
Gayatri Spivak puts it, "Ideology in action is what a group takes to 
be natural and self-evident.")8 And in my examination of the pol­
itics of interpretation, I will focus not so much, as Richard 
Ohmann and Steven Mailloux have so effectively done,9 on the 
specific academic politics that have led certain interpretive prac­
tices to prevail, but more broadly on some of the ways in which 
any interpretive practice is always politically engaged. More spe­
cifically, I hope that my arguments will help us recognize that any 
interpretive practice is intertwined with politics as I have defined 
6. Ohmann, English in America, 79. 
7. Hirsch, "Politics of Theories of Interpretation"; Michaels, "Is There a Politics 
of Interpretation?" 
8. Spivak, "Politics of Interpretations/7 259. 
9. See, for instance, Ohmann, English in America, and Mailloux, "Rhetorical 
Hermeneutics." 
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it in at least two ways: it is partially caused by (although not 
completely determined by) the political systems around it, and in 
turn it situates itself with respect to those systems (for instance, by 
reinforcing or by contesting them). 
New Criticism obscured these relations between interpretation 
and politics in several ways. Most obviously, New Criticism tend­
ed to dehistoricize literary texts. David Daiches' claim that "ide­
ally . . . every poem, as a self-contained work of art, should be 
regarded as though it were contemporary and anonymous"10 may 
be an exaggerated version of a New Critical principle. But it is an 
exaggerated version of a principle still embedded in much academ­
ic practice, and it makes discussion of extratextual political rela­
tionships (including those that influenced the writer and his or her 
intended readers, as well as those that affect modern readers) by 
definition nonliterary. 
But New Criticism depoliticized the study of literature in other, 
more subtle ways, too. Most important for my purposes was its 
treatment of reading, specifically its blurring of the distinction 
between the activity of the critic and that of the reader. True, New 
Critical theory suggested that the function of criticism was to 
describe the formal unity of a text; but in practice, especially when 
New Critics were studying fiction, description often gave way to 
interpretation. Literary critics, to a large extent, were considered 
expert readers who were expected to produce model interpreta­
tions, and academic publication turned more and more into the 
production of new readings. 
This move from description to explication resulted, in part, from 
the New Critics' conception of theme, which they defined in such 
a way that it was quite close to what, in everyday speech, is called 
meaning. According to Cleanth Brooks and Robert Perm Warren in 
their extremely influential Understanding Fiction, for instance, 
theme is "what a piece of fiction stacks up to/ ' "the pervasive and 
unifying view of life which is embodied in the total narrative."11 
Theme or idea was not simply one literary element among others; 
rather it was the dominant force in the New Critics' view of fic­
10. Daiches, Critical Approaches, 310. 
11. 273. 
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tion, in much the same way that "end" was the shaping force in 
Aristotle's view of tragedy. Thus, despite claims to the contrary, 
there was a covert hierarchy in Brooks and Warren's first article of 
faith, "that the structure of a piece of fiction, in so far as that piece 
of fiction is successful, must involve a vital and functional rela­
tionship between the idea and the other elements in that struc­
ture." As a consequence, they insisted "that to be good, a piece of 
fiction must involve an idea of some real significance for mature 
and thoughtful human beings/' and they therefore tended to 
equate aesthetic and philosophical value, broadly construed.12 It 
may have often been labeled formalism, but New Critical analysis 
of fiction in fact steered more toward interpretation than toward 
formal description. 
As Culler has argued, this emphasis on interpretation offered 
enormous pedagogical benefits, for it brought a refreshing democ­
racy to the classroom.13 The teacher was no longer a scholar whose 
task was to dispense information that students could never accu­
mulate on their own; instead, he or she became the first among 
equals, engaged in the sharing of a learnable skill. This, especially 
when combined with New Criticism's ahistorical slant, tended to 
make the individual student count by promising that he or she too 
could, with practice, read well. But the scholarly impact was less 
salutary, for by equating the positions of the critic and the reader, 
New Criticism offered no perspective from which the act of read­
ing itself could be critically examined. 
Explication, of course, is not necessarily inimical to political 
analysis, and it would not be fair to say that New Criticism refused 
to touch at all on such concerns. But to the extent that they did 
treat politics, New Critics remained focused on the world view 
manifested by an individual author in the themes of a specific text 
or texts. Thus, while they were able and willing to discuss the 
value of the particular ideas expressed in a narrative, their analyses 
12. Ibid., xvii. 
13. Culler, Pursuit of Signs, esp. 3-5. Even among critics antagonistic to New 
Criticism, there is widespread appreciation of its democratic tendencies. See 
Ohmann's claim that New Criticism "at least aimed toward a democracy of critical 
ideas, available to all" [English in America, 85), and Said's claim that "New Crit­
icism, for all its elitism, was strangely populist in intention" ("Opponents, Au­
diences," 4-5). 
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did not touch on the broader area of the politics of interpretation 
itself, did not touch on the ways that interpretive strategies, for 
instance, might be considered among the "practices" and "rituals" 
that Louis Althusser sees as part of the "material existence" of 
ideology.14 For those shared interpretive practices were viewed as 
the basis, not the subject matter, for inquiry. New Criticism, in the 
end, was a style, not an analysis, of reading. 
Of course, since Aristotle, there have always been critics whose 
work led, in Culler's phrase, "beyond interpretation" to an exam­
ination of the grounds of interpretation itself—to a study not of 
what a work means but of how it comes to mean. But when New 
Criticism dominated the American academy, such directions for 
study were the exception rather than the rule. It is only since 
perhaps the 1960s or 1970s that noninterpretive criticism has be­
gun to reassert itself and that broader ideological questions, be­
yond the ideas of the author, have again become widely available 
as areas for extensive exploration. Not accidentally, this shift away 
from interpretation has gone hand in hand with a growing interest 
in reading—reading not as the end of criticism but as its very 
subject matter. 
As Pratt's critiques make clear, however, the study of reading 
and interpretation as activities in their own right doesn't neces­
sarily lead to a recognition of the politics of interpretation. Thus, 
for instance, although Wolfgang Iser does talk about the ways in 
which ideological commitment influences readers, he treats ide­
ology much as the New Critics did, as something that simply 
interferes with proper reading.15 And it might not at first seem that 
my central interest here—narrative conventions—would yield a 
particularly fruitful political harvest. Indeed, much of my descrip­
tion of reading conventions per se (Chapters 2-5) may not initially 
appear to bear directly on politics at all. But as Hayden White puts 
it, the politics of interpretation "arises in those interpretive prac­
14. Althusser, 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses/' esp. 155-59. 
15. Specifically, Iser claims that commitment reduces the reader's ability "to 
accept the basic theme-and-horizon structure of comprehension which regulates 
the text-reader interaction7' (The Act of Reading, 202)—as if the kind of commit­
ment to prior norms that he espouses were not an ideological commitment of its 
own. 
8 
Introduction 
tices which are ostensibly most remote from overtly political con­
cerns, practices which are carried out under the aegis of a purely 
disinterested search for the truth/'16 Conventions, in other words, 
are one of the grounds on which the politics of art is mapped out; 
often invisible, they serve as enabling conditions for literature's 
ideological structures. Thus, study of literary conventions can help 
illuminate the connections between politics on the one hand and 
interpretation and evaluation, as the academy currently practices 
them, on the other. 
The last two chapters reveal some of those connections. Let me 
say from the outset that I do not offer my analyses in a spirit of 
purely disinterested pursuit of knowledge. Rather, I hope to pro­
vide one more tool to help us change our world. As Spivak puts it, 
"One cannot. . . 'choose' to step out of ideology. The most respon­
sible 'choice' seems to be to know it as best one can, recognize it as 
best one can, and through one's necessarily inadequate interpreta­
tion, to work to change it."17 Study of conventions, that is, can 
help us escape some of the more confining effects of our culture by 
unmasking them, and can thus help us transform both reading and 
teaching into more liberating activities than they currently are. 
Not that I am proposing a specific program of social changes; nor, 
for that matter, am I attempting anything like an exhaustive ac­
count of the connections between literary conventions and politi­
cal power. Rather, my analyses of specific texts and the ways read­
ers approach them are intended as exemplifications of a kind of 
criticism that can be used more generally to make literature a 
source of social transformation. Thus, for instance, while I try to 
reveal some of the ways in which present practices of canon forma­
tion in the American academy influence our view of women's 
16. White, "Politics of Historical Interpretation/' 113. Although I agree with 
White about where politics is found, however, I do not follow his lead with regard to 
what it is. "This 'polities' has to do with the kind of authority the interpreter 
claims vis-a-vis the established political authorities . . . on the one side, and vis-a-
vis other interpreters . .  . on the other, as the basis of whatever rights he conceives 
himself to possess and whatever duties he feels obliged to discharge as a profes­
sional seeker of truth" (emphasis in original). This notion of politics seems quite 
restricted; it has little to do, say, with the activities of a nonprofessional reader as 
he or she happens to be "interpreting" a Harlequin Romance on the subway. 
17. Spivak, "Politics of Interpretations," 263. 
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literature (and hence influence our gender relations), I would hope 
that the analysis might not only change what and how we read, but 
might also encourage a change in the way we live. I would hope, as 
well, that the analysis would be expanded by others to deal with 
the ways in which our academic practice marginalizes or excludes 
other types of literature (and hence other groups): literature from 
what is called the third world, for instance. 
A word about my choice of texts. There is a complex rela­
tionship, not only between what you value and what you read, but 
also between what you read and how you read. As Geoffrey 
Hartman has argued, 'We do not possess a careful study of theories 
of criticism in the light of their text-milieu: how theory depends 
on a canon, on a limited group of texts, often culture-specific or 
national."18 Still, even without that kind of study, it seems safe to 
claim that the relationship between a theory and the texts called 
upon to exemplify it works both ways. Once you know a reader's 
critical principles, you can, within limits, predict what texts he or 
she will gravitate toward. Given the theoretical perspective of The 
Rhetoric of Fiction, it is not surprising that Wayne Booth refers to 
Jane Austen and Henry James more often than he does to Gertrude 
Stein. But you can also infer critical principles from a critic's basic 
reading list. 'To take the metaphysical poets as one's base or 
touchstone," notes Hartman, "and to extend their 'poetics' toward 
modern poetry and then all poetry, will produce a very different 
result from working from Cervantes toward Pyncheon, or from 
Holderlin toward Heidegger.//19 Or—he might have added—from 
Ann Radcliffe toward Joyce Carol Oates. 
I will speak in more detail in Chapter 7 about how the rela­
tionships among what you value, what you read, and how you read 
(specifically, the interpretive strategies you use to make sense of 
texts) help perpetuate canons. Meanwhile, let me point out that in 
choosing my examples for this book, I have been wary of the ways 
in which a presupposed set of exemplary texts can distort the theo­
ries built upon it. Thus, although I have drawn my examples 
18. Hartman, Criticism in the Wilderness, 5. See also Eagleton's claim that 
"most literary theories . . . unconsciously 'foreground' a particular literary genre, 
and derive their general pronouncements from this" {Literary Theory, 51). 
19. Hartman, Criticism in the Wilderness, 299. 
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largely from narrative fiction of the nineteenth and twentieth cen­
turies, I have tried to make sure that they do not fall within the 
boundaries of any generally recognized text-milieu. My hope is 
that in making Chandler dance with Chekhov, Robbe-Grillet with 
Southworth, I have been able to sidestep at least one limitation of 
most contemporary practice. 
I have been especially attentive to the noncanonical, including 
(but not limited to) popular fiction, for three reasons. First—and 
this is intended as a descriptive, not an evaluative, claim—the 
academy tends to favor complexity; as a result, the modern classics 
of our culture tend to be elaborate. Therefore, if one wants to 
examine literature that is more formulaic because its underlying 
principles are easier to spot, one is almost forced to study the 
noncanonical. Second, any study of reading will depend, implicitly 
or explicitly, in part on records of readings by others, including 
those public readings that take the form of articles and reviews. 
And it helps if those records are fundamentally accurate. Non-
canonical literature has been less subject to willfully eccentric 
reading than the canon has, because it has (until recently) been less 
frequently studied in academic journals, which encourage novelty 
even at the expense of sincerity. Third, and most important, it is 
impossible to examine the mechanism of literary evaluation itself 
without studying both texts that are highly regarded by our literary 
judges and texts that are generally deemed inferior. Mary Louise 
Pratt has demonstrated how arguments about the distinction be­
tween 'literary" and "nonliterary" language have been flawed by 
critics' tendency to scrutinize only the first half of the dichoto-
my.20 The same charge could be leveled against much study of so-
called literary quality: it tends to take, as its evidence, those works 
that are deemed good to begin with, assuming that the qualities 
discovered in them are the cause of that goodness. But there is no 
reason to believe that canonical texts are simply high-quality rep­
resentatives of literature as whole, or that their goodness resides in 
discoverable features within them. Indeed, as I argue in Chapter 7, 
texts become canonized in part because they work with particular 
reading strategies. But if canonical texts are studied by themselves, 
20. Pratt, Toward a Speech Act Theory, esp. chap. 1. 
II 
Introduction 
those strategies are never put to the test. Instead, they are im­
plicitly universalized—treated as the way to read—a process that 
in the end serves to justify the initial canonical choice rather than 
to examine it. 
As it is, my selection of texts—tied as it is to my own experi-
ences—is narrower than it ought to be. Even beyond the focus on 
narrative (a narrow focus to begin with), even beyond the historical 
limits, there is little discussion of folklore, of oral literature, of 
literature from Asia, Africa, or Latin America, or even from parts of 
Europe with which I am unfamiliar. The conclusions I draw will 
therefore need to be refined or developed by others with different 
areas of expertise. Still, I hope that the book that follows will be 
one more step in the academy's slow retreat from the position that 
professional readings of Moby Dick and Ulysses are appropriate 
paradigms for the experience of reading narrative. 
Let me point out, too, that the range of texts is more restricted in 
the last chapter and a half, where I engage in more sustained analy­
ses of particular novels. Here, where I try to draw inferences about 
culture from the ways that people read texts, it seems appropriate 
to center on texts from the culture with which I have had the most 
experience—but also from a period from which I have some histor­
ical distance. I have therefore chosen my examples from American 
fiction of the 1920s and 1930s. However, although this is the most 
textually concentrated part of my argument, my concerns are 
methodological even here: I am less interested in the texts them­
selves than in providing concrete instances of a type of analysis 
through which we can become more self-conscious about what lies 
behind the ways we appropriate them. I therefore hope that my 
arguments will be of use even to readers with little interest in 
those novels or that period. 
I have so far, rather disingenuously, used the words reading, 
reader, and convention as if they were unproblematic. Of course, 
they are not, as the various types of reader criticism now current 
make clear. Before getting to the conventions of reading in detail, it 
is therefore necessary to take a shorter detour to survey the process 
of reading more generally, to explain more fully what reading is, 
who readers are, and what kind of conventions they depend on as 
they read and interpret. 
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Starting Points 
Any commentary on a particular poem must attend to more 
than is present in the verbal structure itself. 
Robert Scholes, Structuralism in Literature 
What Is Reading* 
Many of us had friends in high school who were, through their 
religious training, capable of "reading" Hebrew or Latin in the 
limited sense that they could pick up a text and make the appropri­
ate sounds at the appropriate places. But they could not be said to 
"know how to read" in a fuller (and more generally recognized) 
sense—for the ability to read is usually construed (and is so used in 
this book) to involve something more than the ability to parrot, 
something more than phonetics and memory. It is, rather, some­
how involved with "understanding."1 
But what is understanding? How can we tell whether someone 
does or does not understand? As long as understanding is viewed 
strictly as a subjective phenomenon, there may be no answer. It is 
probably impossible to determine precisely what the subjective 
phenomenon of understanding involves—and because no one can 
ever know what is happening in another's mind, it is impossible to 
determine whether someone else is understanding. Most people, 
however, have certain implicit but nonetheless objective stan-
i. See Louise M. Rosenblatt's discussion of this distinction, couched in some­
what different terms, in Literature as Exploration, especially chap. 3. See also 
Gerald Prince's claim, "Identifying a series of symbols as specific graphemes (corre­
sponding to specific sounds) is not the same as extracting meaning from them and I 
would not say, except as a joke, that I read German (or Rumanian or Russian) very 
well but that I did not understand it" [Narratology, 104). 
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dards for determining understanding, for in our culture certain 
behaviors count as an indication that someone understands an 
utterance. Specifically, we rely on two commonsense means of 
verification: action and paraphrase. If a parent tells a child, "It's 
time for bed," the child can demonstrate understanding either by 
starting to put away his or her toys (action) or by asking, 'Is it 
really eight o'clock?" (paraphrase). 
As long as we are dealing with nonpoetic utterances, this may 
not seem a controversial claim. But when we deal with literature, 
we come up against the critical tradition of "the autonomous 
text." This traditional wisdom has many formulations,2 but the 
most common in the American academy are variations of the New 
Critical axiom that a text says what it says in the only way it can 
say it. The text means what it is. Thus, a New Critic would view 
neither a paraphrase nor the act of sitting in at a lunch counter as a 
verification of the proper understanding of Chester Himes' // He 
Hollers Let Him Go. One is a different text altogether; the other is 
irrelevant to literature considered "as literature/' Indeed, one of 
the most persistent residues of our New Critical heritage is our 
readiness to assume that when we speak of ethical effects, we are 
speaking of something extraliterary. 
It would seem to follow logically that the only way for a reader 
to prove understanding of a text's meaning would be to repeat the 
text verbatim—in other words, that there would be no proper 
grounds for distinguishing mastery from memory. In fact, though, 
no practicing critics take such an extreme view,- no matter what a 
critic's theoretical position may be, he or she always falls back on 
action or paraphrase as verifications of understanding. I will leave 
for some other book the vexed relationship between action and 
understanding (although I believe one can argue that there is a 
sense in which a racist whose actions were neither changed nor 
examined after reading If He Hollers had not "understood" the 
book) and limit myself here to the issue of paraphrase. Paraphrase 
is a difficult term, in part because it is entangled with the concept 
of synonymity. And if one uses the word paraphrase to mean an 
"absolutely synonymous" utterance, then no artistic text of any 
2. For a good survey, see Frank Lentricchia, After the New Criticism. 
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merit or complexity can be paraphrased.3 Indeed, since the mean­
ing of any utterance depends on its context—at least if meaning is 
taken broadly to include tone, emphasis, and connotation—then 
no utterance is ever synonymous even with itself: you cannot step 
into the same meaning twice.4 
But paraphrase need not imply identity of meaning; it can also be 
used in the wider sense of an imitation or transformation, with the 
recognition that imitations are by definition imperfect. Indeed, the 
prtiixpara-, in some of its meanings, suggests both imperfection (as 
in paialexia) and close resemblance without identity (as in para­
typhoid). In this sense, a paraphrase is a translation into new terms 
that need not be judged in an on/off binary fashion in terms of 
equivalence (synonymous/nonsynonymous), but that can rather be 
evaluated along a continuum of greater or lesser adequacy or appro­
priateness. It is for this reason that ''It's time for bed" could be 
paraphrased "It's eight o'clock"—not because "It's eight o'clock" is 
an exact synonym, but because in the given context, it comes closer 
to imitating the original sentence than most other sentences that 
could be uttered. 
Whatever their theories, almost all critics act on the twin princi­
ples that paraphrases can be more or less adequate, and that, as 
Gerald Graff puts it, the act of paraphrasing or transforming is a 
"normal and unavoidable aspect of the reading process."5 Roland 
Barthes claims that "to read is to struggle to name, to subject the 
sentences of the text to a semantic transformation"; E. D. Hirsch, 
Jr., defines interpretation as construing something else from the 
signs physically present in the text; Susan Sontag describes Beck-
ett's plays as "delicate dramas of the withdrawn consciousness" in 
the middle of her argument against interpretation. All these critics 
admit, in their different ways, that to read—in the sense of to 
3. See David Lodge: "I believe it can be convincingly argued that novels are non-
paraphrasable" [Language of Fiction, 19). For a different position, see E. D. Hirsch, 
Jr., Aims of Interpretation, chap. 4. For a detailed account of the problems of para­
phrase, see James Phelan, Worlds from Words, See also Barbara Foley's discussion in 
Telling the Truth, 45-46. 
4. For an exploration of this phenomenon, see Jorge Luis Borges, "Pierre Menard, 
Author of Don Quixote/7 in Ficciones, trans. Anthony Kerrigan (New York: Grove, 
1962), 45-55-
5. Graff, ''Literature as Assertions/' 99. 
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understand—a text is to imitate it in some way, to produce some­
thing "around" (para) it that is new but that bears some clear 
relationship to the original text.6 
Indeed, the very institution of interpretive criticism betrays a 
belief that understanding is manifested in restating—and in mak­
ing those restatements public. The question, then, is not whether 
works can be paraphrased, but rather how one determines what 
constitutes an adequate or acceptable transformation of the origi­
nal. Paraphrases differ, after all, not only in their accuracy, but also 
in their emphasis and in their perspective. Different kinds of imita­
tions are adequate under different circumstances, since the im-
itator's decisions about which features are essential and which are 
secondary will depend in part on his or her purposes. A doctor's 
standards for adequacy, when judging an anatomical chart that 
serves as his or her "imitation" of the human body, will differ 
substantially from a dressmaker's when judging a mannequin, and 
these are in turn different from those of a grandparent when judg­
ing a photo of a grandchild. Likewise, paraphrases will differ ac­
cording to the context and the conventions surrounding them. In 
S warm's love affair with Odette, the phrase faire cattleya ("to do a 
cattleya") served as an equivalent for "the act of physical posses-
sion."7 In a household where snacks are the custom before going to 
bed, the sentence "Let's get down the Cheerios" might be an ap­
propriate paraphrase for "It's time for bed."8 
6. Barthes, S/Z, 92; Hirsch, Aims of Interpretation, 75; Sontag, "Against In­
terpretation/' in Against Interpretation and Other Essays (New York: Dell/Laurel, 
1969), 18; see also her claim that "the task of interpretation is virtually one of 
translation" (15). This view is very widespread. Janice Radway remarks that an 
analyst's attempt to determine the significance that the act of reading has for a 
particular reader always involves the "activity of translation" [Reading the Ro­
mance, 9). Terence Hawkes uses the convenient notion of "recoding" [Struc­
turalism and Semiotics, 104). Steven Mailloux discusses interpretation as "accept­
able and approximating translation" [Interpretive Conventions, 146). See also 
Prince's discussion of the various ways one can "give an account of a particular 
text" ["La Nausee and Closure," 182—90, esp. 188-90). 
7. Marcel Proust, Swann's Way, trans. C. K. Scott Moncrieff (New York: Modern 
Library, 1934), 336. 
8. For a discussion of this point from a different perspective, see Stanley Fish, 
"Normal Circumstances, Literal Language, Direct Speech Acts, the Ordinary, the 
Everyday, the Obvious, What Goes without Saying, and Other Special Cases," in Is 
There a Textl 268-92. 
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For this reason, different kinds of reading involve different kinds 
of transformation and different standards of adequacy. Does the 
paraphrase more or less adequately imitate the latent psychosexual 
content of the original text? Does the paraphrase take into account 
the socioeconomic conditions under which the text was produced? 
Does the paraphrase maintain or at least represent the essential 
formal features of the original text? Whatever their origins, though, 
these standards for adequacy inevitably bring some extratextual 
context into the judgment of understanding. As Robert Scholes puts 
it, 'The critic who 'recovers7 the meaning of any given work always 
does so by establishing a relationship between the work and some 
system of ideas outside it."9 Or, in Annette Kolodny's terms, "We 
appropriate meaning from a text according to what we need (or 
desire) or, in other words, according to the critical assumptions or 
predispositions (conscious or not) that we bring to it."10 
Furthermore, this act of recovery is always both rule governed 
and reductive. Whether sitting on a beach or in a library, a reader 
can only make sense of a text in the same way he or she makes 
sense of anything else in the world: by applying a series of strat­
egies to simplify it—by highlighting, by making symbolic, and by 
otherwise patterning it. It is perhaps worth stressing the reductive 
aspect of this process. Since all imitation is imperfect and in­
complete, understanding—in the sense of being able to para-
phrase—always involves the ability to ignore. Although many crit­
ics argue that in literature everything is significant, we know from 
experience that when we read literature (as opposed to the single 
sentences so many critics offer as examples), it is impossible to 
keep track of, much less account for, all the details of a text. As 
Michael Riffaterre's criticism of Jakobson makes abundantly clear, 
readers need to ignore or play down many textual features when 
they read lyric poetry;x l they need to ignore even more in longer 
9. Scholes, Structuralism in Literature, 9. 
10. Kolodny, "Dancing through the Minefield/7 11. 
11. Riffaterre, "Describing Poetic Structures." See also Jonathan Culler's discus­
sion of Jakobson in Structuralist Poetics, chap. 3; and Fish, "What Is Stylistics and 
Why Are They Saying Such Terrible Things about It?" in 7s There a Text} 68-96. 
For a discussion of authorial memory and control with respect to revision—and the 
subsequent problems of producing correct texts in the first place—see Hershel 
Parker, Flawed Texts and Verbal Icons. 
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works like novels. As the Gestalt psychologists have shown us 
(and as Borges has reminded us in a more fanciful way),12 percep­
tion involves simplification, which in turn involves some organiz­
ing principle, some hierarchy of attention and importance. The 
reader who pays no more attention to Hamlet's soliloquies than to 
Bernardo's opening sally has not yet grasped what most other read­
ers have considered the play's basic figure/ground dichotomy. 
Who Is Reading} 
There can be no reading without a reader—but the term reader is 
slippery, not only because all individual readers read differently, 
but also because for almost all of them, there are several different 
ways of appropriating a text. This fact has been recognized, at least 
implicitly, by the large number of critics whose models of reading 
are multitiered. Usually, a two-leveled opposition is posited, al­
though different critics use different terms. For Hirsch, it is "sig­
nificance" and "meaning." For Wayne Booth, it is "understand­
ing" and "overstanding." For Tzvetan Todorov, there are three 
terms: "interpretation," "description," and "reading."13 Many 
other critics, despite the recent arguments of Fish, remain wedded, 
in one form or another, to the distinction between literal meaning 
and interpretation. 
These distinctions all discriminate among activities that a read­
er can engage in under different circumstances or for different pur­
poses. I would like to start with a different kind of distinction, one 
that discriminates among simultaneous roles that the audience of 
a text can play. There are three of these roles that will be central to 
my argument, but I will reserve the third for Chapter 3 and will 
only outline the first two here. First, there is the actual audience. 
This consists of the flesh-and-blood people who read the book. 
This is the audience that booksellers are most concerned with— 
but it happens to be the audience over which an author has no 
guaranteed control. Each member of the actual audience is differ­
12. Borges, 'Tunes the Memorious/' in Ficciones, 107-15. 
13. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, esp. 8; Booth, Critical Understanding, 
passim; Todorov, Poetics of Prose, 238-46. 
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ent, and each reads in his or her own way, with a distance from 
other readers depending upon such variables as class, gender, race, 
personality, training, culture, and historical situation. 
This difference among readers has always posed a problem for 
writers, one that has grown with increased literacy and the corre­
spondingly increased heterogeneity of the reading public. An au­
thor has, in most cases, no firm knowledge of the actual readers 
who will pick up his or her book. Yet he or she cannot begin to fill 
up a blank page without making assumptions about the readers' 
beliefs, knowledge, and familiarity with conventions. As a result, 
authors are forced to guess; they design their books rhetorically for 
some more or less specific hypothetical audience, which I call the 
authorial audience. Artistic choices are based upon these assump-
tions—conscious or unconscious—about readers, and to a certain 
extent, artistic success depends on their shrewdness, on the degree 
to which actual and authorial audience overlap. Some assumptions 
are quite specific. William Demby's Catacombs, for instance, 
takes place in the early 1960s, and it achieves its sense of impend­
ing doom only if the reader already knows that John F. Kennedy 
will be assassinated when the events of the novel reach November 
22,1963. One of the Encyclopedia Brown mysteries is soluble only 
by the reader who knows that skydivers always wear two para­
chutes. Other assumptions are more general: ''Rip van Winkle" 
assumes readers who know that during the Revolution, the Ameri­
can colonies became independent of England. Some assumptions 
are historical: Flaubert assumes considerable knowledge of the rev­
olution of 1848 in Sentimental Education. Some are sociological: 
at least one critic has argued convincingly that The Turn of the 
Screw makes proper sense only to a reader who knows something 
about the conduct deemed proper to governesses in the nineteenth 
century.14 Some authors rely on our precise knowledge of cultural 
fads (Peter Cameron, in 'Tear of Math/7 assumes that his audience 
will draw the proper conclusions about a character when he tells 
us that she eats a "tabbouleh-and-pita bread sandwich"),15 others 
on our knowledge of more widespread cultural conventions (in 
14- Elliott M. Schrero, "Exposure in The Turn of the Screw/' Modem Philology 
78 (February 1981): 261-74. 
15. New Yorker, March n  , 1985, 42. 
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Nabokov's Lolita, the refusal of the Enchanted Hunters to accept 
Humbert Humbert as a guest when he first shows up makes sense 
only if readers recognize both that they have garbled his name so 
that it sounds Jewish, and that the phrase in their advertising, 
"Near Churches/' is a code phrase for "No Jews").16 Some authors 
presume that we have a knowledge of specific previous texts (Stop­
pard assumes that his readers know Hamlet before reading Rosen­
crantz and GuUdenstern Are Dead). Sometimes authors assume 
that our higher motives will triumph (Dostoyevsky assumes that 
we are capable of sympathy for the sufferings of Raskolnikov in 
Crime and Punishment even though he is a murderer). Sometimes 
authors—even the same authors—assume that we will be influ­
enced by our baser prejudices (in The Idiot we are expected to be 
distrustful of Ganya because his teeth are "altogether too dazzling 
and even"),17 The potential range of assumptions an author can 
make, in other words, is infinite. 
The notion of the authorial audience is clearly tied to authorial 
intention, but it gets around some of the problems that have tradi­
tionally hampered the discussion of intention by treating it as a 
matter of social convention rather than of individual psychology. 
In other words, my perspective allows us to treat the reader's at­
tempt to read as the author intended, not as a search for the 
author's private psyche, but rather as the joining of a particular 
social/interpretive community; that is, the acceptance of the au-
thor's invitation to read in a particular socially constituted way 
that is shared by the author and his or her expected readers. Indeed, 
authorial reading is not only a way of reading but, perhaps equally 
important, a way of talking about how you read—that is, the result 
of a community agreement that allows discussion of a certain sort 
to take place by treating meanings in a particular way (as found 
rather than made). In this sense, what Susan R. Suleiman says 
16. Although I have taught this novel several times, none of my students—com-
ing as they do from a cultural context quite different from that of the authorial 
audience—has caught this, or any of the other references to anti-Semitism in the 
novel. 
17. Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Idiot, trans. David Magarshack (Baltimore: Pen­
guin, *955)/ 48 (pt. i, chap. 2). In Dickens7 Dombey and Son, we are expected to 
distrust Carker for the same reason. 
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about the notions of the implied author and the implied reader 
(which are themselves only variant formulations of the notion of 
authorial intention) applies to the authorial audience as well: they 
are, she says, "necessary fictions, guaranteeing the consistency of a 
specific reading without guaranteeing its validity in any absolute 
sense/'18 But it is crucial to note that this is not just an arbitrary 
convention invented by academics for their own convenience—it 
is a broader social usage, one that is shared by authors as well as 
their readers, including their nonprofessional readers. My position 
here is thus very close to that of Foley, who rightly sees fiction "as 
a contract designed by an intending author who invites his or her 
audience to adopt certain paradigms for understanding reality/719 
In other words, as Terry Eagleton argues, intention is best seen not 
in terms of "essentially private 'mental acts/ " but rather in terms 
of social practice.20 
By thinking in terms of the authorial audience rather than pri­
vate intention, furthermore, we are reminded of the constraints 
within which writers write. For despite the theoretically infinite 
number of potential authorial audiences, it does not follow that 
authors have total control over the act of writing, any more than 
that readers have total control over the act of interpretation. In a 
trivial sense, of course, they do: authors can put down whatever 
marks they wish on the page; readers can construe them however 
they wish. But once authors and readers accept the communal na­
18. Suleiman, "Introduction," n  . 
19. Foley, Telling the Truth, 43. 
20. Eagleton, Literary Theory, 114. See also Patrocinio P. Schweickart's claim 
that validity is not "a property inherent in an interpretation, but rather . .  . a claim 
implicit in the act of propounding an interpretation"—that is, that validity is "con­
tingent on the agreement of others" ("Reading Ourselves/' 56). Fish argues similar­
ly that authorial intention "is not private but a form of conventional behavior" 
("Working on the Chain Gang," 213); Hirsch, with less enthusiasm, notes that "we 
can circumvent the whole question of author psychology by adopting a semiotic 
account of interpretation. Instead of referring an interpretation back to an original 
author, we could . . . refer it back to an original code or convention system" ("Pol­
itics of Theories of Interpretation," 239). Hirsch insists that this would not really be 
an adequate account, but I suspect it is as adequate as any that relies on actual 
psychology. It is worth remembering that this is not simply a matter of arbitrary 
definitions; as Mailloux's arguments in "Rhetorical Hermeneutics" make clear, the 
very act of treating readings in this way has serious effects on the ways in which 
people subsequently do read—on what counts as evidence, for instance. 
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ture of writing and reading, they give up some of that freedom. Spe­
cifically, once he or she has made certain initial decisions, any 
writer who wishes to communicate—even if he or she wishes to 
communicate ambiguity—has limited the range of subsequent 
choices. 
Some of those limitations spring from what might be called 
brute facts. Writers of realistic historical novels, for instance, 
shackle themselves to events that are independent of their imag­
inations. As Suleiman has argued: 
The most obvious . . . difference between fictional and historical 
characters in a novel is that the latter impose greater constraints on 
the novelist who wants to be a "painter of his time." He cannot make 
Napoleon die—or win the battle—at Waterloo, just as he cannot 
make Hugo the court poet of Napoleon HI. . .  . And if the novelist 
chooses to place in the foreground events as well-known and public 
as the Boulanger affair or the Panama scandal, then he will have to 
bend to similar constraints even as far as the activities of the fictional 
characters are concerned.21 
Thus, once Margaret Mitchell chose to write Gone with the Wind 
as a historical novel about the Civil War, she relinquished control 
over certain areas of her text. She could have saved Melanie had 
she wished, or killed off Rhett, but there was no way to give victo­
ry to the South or to preserve Atlanta from the flames. 
More central to my argument, though, are conventional limita­
tions on choice. There are no brute facts preventing an author from 
writing a religious parable in which a cross represented Judaism, 
but it would not communicate successfully. As Mary Pratt puts it, 
"Although the fictional discourse in a work of literature may in 
theory take any form at all, readers have certain expectations about 
what form it will take, and they can be expected to decode the 
work according to those assumptions unless they are overtly invit­
ed or required to do otherwise*' (italics in original).22 The writer 
21. Suleiman, Authoritarian Fictions, 120. 
22. Pratt, Toward a Speech Act Theory, 204. Pratt's own strong critique of 
speech-act theory (including her own work) can be found in "The Ideology of 
Speech-Act Theory." I think that my definition of fictionality (Chapter 3) solves 
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who wishes to be understood—even to be understood by a small 
group of readers—has to work within such conventional restraints. 
Despite these limitations, however, there is still an incalculable 
number of possible authorial audiences; and since the structure of 
a work is designed with the authorial audience in mind, actual 
readers must come to share its characteristics as they read if they 
are to experience the text as the author wished.23 Reading as au­
thorial audience therefore involves a kind of distancing from the 
actual audience, from one's own immediate needs and interests. 
This distancing, however, must be distinguished sharply from the 
apparently similar kind of objectivity, represented in its baldest 
form by Dr. Blimber, in Dickens' Dombey and Son, who claimed 
"that all the fancies of the poets, and lessons of the sages, were a 
mere collection of words and grammar, and had no other meaning 
in the world."24 Of course, few critics subscribe to Blimberism in 
its purest form, yet many critical windows are draped with rem­
nants from Blimber's school. Northrop Frye insists that "the fun­
damental act of criticism is a disinterested response to a work of 
literature in which all one's beliefs, engagements, commitments, 
prejudices, stampedings of pity and terror, are ordered to be 
quiet."25 Similarly, the reader postulated by Stanley Fish's once-
popular "Affective Stylistics" is psychologically blank and politi­
cally unaware, an automaton who approaches each new sentence 
with the same anesthetized mind.26 In a radically different critical 
some of the questions that Pratt raises; while my book tends to focus on a type of 
reading that includes an attempt at author-reader cooperation, I have accepted 
many of the arguments on which her critique is based, and have tried not to "nor­
malize" this particular kind of reading, nor to define others as "deviant" (see "The 
Valuefs] of Authorial Reading" below). Even if one accepts her new position, 
though, much of Pratt's earlier work remains useful as a description of certain kinds 
of reading. 
23. See Booth's discussion of this process in Rhetoric of Fiction, esp. 138-41. 
24. Charles Dickens, Dombey and Son (New York: Dutton/Everyman's Library, 
1907), 134-35 (chap. 11). 
25. Frye, Well-Tempered Critic, 140. Frye backs off a bit from the implications of 
this statement by distinguishing later between the pure disinterested critical act 
and the act of ordinary reading. 
26. Fish, "Literature in the Reader: Affective Stylistics," in Is There a Textl 2 1 ­
67. Indeed, as Culler has pointed out, he or she does not even learn from reading; see 
Pursuit of Signs, 130. 
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tradition, Gerald Prince's degree-zero narratee—whom he assumes 
to be the addressee of the text except where "an indication to the 
contrary is supplied in the narration intended for him"—has no 
"personality or social characteristics/' and although he (appar­
ently, the degree-zero narratee is male) knows grammar and the 
denotations of words, he knows neither connotations nor conven­
tions. He is, in other words, capable of reading a text without any 
distorting presuppositions; neither his "character" nor his "posi­
tion in society . . . colors his perception of the events described to 
him."27 
Authorial reading, however, is quite different. It does not escape 
"distorting presuppositions." Rather, it recognizes that distorting 
presuppositions lie at the heart of the reading process. To read as 
authorial audience is to read in an impersonal way, but only in a 
special and limited sense. The authorial audience has knowledge 
and beliefs that may well be extrapeisonal—that is, not shared by 
the actual individual reader (I, for instance, do not personally share 
the racist perspective of the authorial audience of Ian Fleming's 
Live and Let Die). The authorial audience's knowledge and beliefs 
may even be extracommunal—that is, not shared by any commu­
nity (and we all belong to several) of which the actual reader is a 
member at the historical moment of reading (what current com­
munity shares the belief in Zeus characteristic of the authorial 
audience of the Odysseyl). But these authorial audiences, what­
ever their distance from actual readers, certainly have their own 
engagements and prejudices. To join the authorial audience, then, 
you should not ask what a pure reading of a given text would be. 
Rather, you need to ask what sort of corrupted reader this particu­
lar author wrote for: what were that reader's beliefs, engagements, 
commitments, prejudices, and stampedings of pity and terror? 
The reader, in other words, can read as the author intended only 
by being in the right place to begin with—and that can come about 
only through an intuitive mix of experience and faith, knowledge 
27. Prince, "Introduction/710-11. But see also his claim, 'There may frequently 
be points in my reading where . .  . I have to rely not only on my linguistic knowl­
edge and the textual information supplied but also on my mastery of logical opera­
tions, my familiarity with interpretive conventions and my knowledge of the 
world'' (Narratology, 128). 
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and hunch—plus a certain amount of luck. There is consequently 
no ideal point of departure that will work for any and all books. 
And since each point of departure involves its own corruptions, 
commitments, and prejudices, every authorial reading has signifi­
cant ideological strands. As I suggested earlier, my primary con­
cern here is with a particular aspect of the authorial audience's 
corruptions: the literary conventions that it applies to the text in 
order to transform it. As such critics as Culler are now making 
clearer, reading (especially the reading of literature) is not only not 
a natural activity—it is not even a logical consequence of knowl­
edge of the linguistic system and its written signs. It is, rather, a 
separately learned, conventional activity. 
In other words, literary conventions are not in the text waiting 
to be uncovered, but in fact precede the text and make discovery-
possible in the first place.28 Note, however, that I speak here of 
discovery, not creation. The notion of reading as authorial au­
dience is closer to what Steven Mailloux calls "textual realism" 
(the belief that "meaning-full texts exist independent of interpreta­
tion") than to what he calls "readerly idealism" (the belief that 
"meaning is made, not found," since "textual facts are never prior 
to or independent of the hermeneutic activity of readers and crit-
ics").29 True, I share the idealists7 belief that texts are incomplete 
when we get them and must be put together according to the 
28. As Culler argues, 'Th e implication that the ideal reader is a tabula rasa on 
which the text inscribes itself not only makes nonsense of the whole process of 
literary education and conceals the conventions and norms which make possible 
the production of meaning but also insures the bankruptcy of literary theory, whose 
speculations on the properties of literary texts become ancillary and ex post facto 
generalizations which are explicitly denied any role in the activity of reading" 
(Pursuit of Signs, 121). See also Mailloux's claim that "a reader's understanding of 
authorial intention always depends on shared communicative conventions, but the 
success of the intention to achieve certain perlocutionary effects is not guaranteed 
by those conventions, only made possible by them" [Interpretive Conventions, 
106). This notion of reading is confirmed by research into cognitive psychology. See, 
for instance, Mary Crawford and Roger Chaffin's claim that "understanding is a 
product of both the text and the prior knowledge and viewpoint that the reader 
brings to it" ("Reader's Construction of Meaning," 3). 
29. Mailloux, "Rhetorical Hermeneutics," 622. Mailloux attacks both schools 
and argues against doing "Theory" at all. Although I do not follow this path, I find 
his alternative—a study of the institutional politics of interpretation—a profitable 
one as well. 
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principles of the reader's interpretive community, but in the case 
of successful authorial reading, the author and readers are mem­
bers of the same community, so while the reader does in fact en­
gage in an act of production, he or she makes what the author 
intended to be found. Of course, as I will discuss in more detail in 
Chapters 6 and 7, not all attempts at authorial reading are suc­
cessful. Even readers who try to find out what an author intends 
may thus in fact make something the author never expected; in 
such cases, though, the readers will still act as if they have in fact 
found the meaning of the text. 
I am not arguing that we do not use logic to interpret literary 
texts. Given that Edna Losser is twenty in 1900 when Margaret 
Ayer Barnes' Edna His Wife opens, we can reasonably infer—as the 
author intended us to—that she is in her fifties when the novel 
ends, in the early 1930s. But such inferences are not sufficient for a 
complete authorial reading. Nor am I arguing that one cannot de­
scribe the features of literary artifacts or the rules that govern 
reading according to 'logical'' categories. Thus, for instance, 
Gerald Prince is quite correct when he claims, "Should an event A 
precede an event B in time, the two may be temporally adjacent, or 
proximate, or distant/'30 Similarly, we can claim, with some preci­
sion, that in any book, the rule that we should eliminate likely 
suspects either applies or does not apply. But providing a logical 
classification of all possibilities is quite different from providing a 
logical system that explains which of those possibilities will be 
actualized in a given novel. A reader who picks up Ellery Queen's 
Tragedy of X for the first time knows to eliminate obvious sus­
pects, not because of some systematic understanding of possible 
literary types, but rather because it is the conventional thing to do 
in that kind of book. For this reason, discussions of the actual 
conventions of reading will always appear arbitrary and ad hoc 
compared to the classifications of structuralists.31 
Knowledge of these conventions is a major part of what Culler 
30. Prince, Narratology, 64. 
31. For a different perspective, see Todorov's discussion of the difference between 
logical ("theoretical") and historical genres [Fantastic, chap.. 1 
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calls "literary competence."32 It is not simply that we need to 
know conventions in order to read Joyce; even the simplest literary 
artifact (say, a comic strip) calls nonlinguistic conventions (such as 
the left-to-right spatial representation of the passage of time) into 
play.33 As Janice Radway puts it, "Comprehension is . .  . a process 
of sign production where the reader actively attributes significance 
to signifiers on the basis of previously learned cultural codes."34 
As I will demonstrate, the reliance of reading on conventions 
that precede the text has enormous consequences for the processes 
of interpretation and evaluation, in many ways the central ac­
tivities of the academic literary community. 
The Value(s) of Authorial Reading 
In this book, I will focus primarily on authorial reading. In so 
doing, I am not claiming that this is either the only or even the best 
way to read. I do not agree with Steven Knapp and Walter Benn 
Michaels that "the meaning of a text is simply identical to the 
author's intended meaning" or that "authorial intention is the 
necessary object of interpretation."35 And I do not agree with 
Wayne Booth and E. D. Hirsch, Jr., who often suggest that there is a 
32. Culler, Structuralist Poetics, esp. chap. 6. Conventions are also one aspect of 
Hans Robert Jauss' notion of "horizon of expectations/' See, for instance, Toward 
an Aesthetic of Reception. For a strong critique of Culler's notion of competence, 
see Pratt, "Interpretive Strategies/Strategic Interpretations/' esp. 215-21. Pratt 
points out that, as Culler uses the concept, literary competence can end up as a 
theoretical justification for the mainstream practices of academic criticism. Liter­
ary competence, however, need not be restricted to what the academy believes it to 
be,- as I hope will be clear in Chapters 6 and 7, my own stress on actual authorial 
intention, rather than on received opinion about the "right" way to read "good" 
books, helps avoid this problem. 
33. For a good unpacking of the conventions of the comic strip, see Seymour 
Chatman, Story and Discourse, 37—41. 
34. Radway, Reading the Romance, 7. Radway sees this as a process of "making" 
meaning, but as I have argued, reading as authorial audience at least attempts to 
"find" a meaning that is in some sense already there. 
35. Knapp and Michaels, "Against Theory," 724, and "A Reply to Our Critics," 
796. For a series of incisive responses to Knapp and Michaels, see Critical Inquiry 9 
(June 1983): 7*5-89-
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moral imperative to read as the author intended.36 At the same 
time, I would argue that authorial reading is more than just an­
other among a large set of equally valid and equally important 
ways of approaching a text. Authorial reading has a special status 
for at least two reasons. 
First, while Knapp and Michaels are wrong that "the object of all 
reading is always the historical author's intention" (italics add-
ed),37 it is true that most people actually do read—or attempt to 
read—this way most of the time. Of course, different individuals 
may disagree about what the author's intention is, just as they may 
react differently to it once they think they have found it. Nonethe­
less, the initial question most commonly asked of a literary text in 
our culture is, What is the author saying? The critical revolutions 
of the 1970s and 1980s may have deluded us, but the millions of 
readers of Len Deighton's SS-GB or Judith Krantz's Scruples were 
interested neither in deconstructing texts nor in discovering their 
underlying semiotic codes. In fact, even among the most jaded 
readers—academics—the majority still attempts to read as au­
thorial audience. Authorial reading continues to provide the basis 
for most academic articles and papers—and, even more, for class­
room teaching. 
Second, the perhaps more important for critical theory, reading 
as authorial audience provides the foundation for many other types 
of reading. True, some approaches to texts skip over the authorial 
audience entirely: certain kinds of structuralist or stylistic studies, 
for instance, or the kind of subjective reading proposed by David 
Bleich in Readings and Feelings.38 But then again, many types of 
reading depend for their power on a prior understanding of the 
36. See Booth: "It is simply self-maiming to pretend that any blissful improvisa­
tion on [Henry fames'] words, sentences, or themes . . . can equal the value of his 
making" [Critical Understanding, 284). See also Hirsch, Aims of Interpretation. For 
positions that oppose Booth's, see, for instance, Barbara Herrnstein Smith, On the 
Margins of Discourse, esp. chap. 6; and "English 692" [Joanna Brent, Rita Conley, et 
al.], "Poem Opening: An Invitation to Transactive Criticism," College English 40 
(September 1978): 2—16. 
37. Knapp and Michaels, "A Reply to Our Critics," 798. 
38. Esp. 80—95. For a further development of Bleich's ideas, see also his Subjec­
tive Criticism. 
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authorial meaning.39 The manifest/latent distinction of certain 
Freudian studies, for instance, collapses if we don't have a manifest 
meaning to begin with. Georg Lukacs' Marxist analysis of Balzac 
depends on the distinction between what Balzac wanted to see and 
what he really did see.40 Most important—if importance has any 
connection to the power of a critical movement to make us recog­
nize the world with new eyes—we see the same dependence on 
authorial intention in much feminist criticism. Judith Fetterley's 
"resisting reader" can come into being only if there is something 
to resist.41 
Two examples may clarify how certain kinds of political 
criticism can be strengthened if they are built on a foundation of 
authorial reading. Imagine a critic who wanted to uncover 
Natasha's victimization in War and Peace—to show how Russian 
society restricts the development of her natural talents, how it 
curbs and punishes her spirit and individuality. Such a critic could 
well point out Natasha's unjust fate—even explain its social, psy­
chological, and historical causes—without any reference to au­
thorial intention. But if—and only if—the critic works through an 
authorial reading of the text, the scope of this political analysis can 
be enlarged to explore the contradiction between the authorial 
audience and the critic. For only by starting with an authorial 
reading could the critic analyze the social, historical, and biograph­
ical implications of the fact that from Tolstoy's point of view (and 
from the point of view of the authorial audience, as well as of 
39. Booth has called such readings "parasitical" ("M. H. Abrams," 441). See J. 
HilHs Miller's response, "Critic as Host." 
40. Lukacs claims, for instance, that Balzac was faced with a contradiction be­
tween the torments of "the transition to the capitalist system of production" and 
his awareness that this "transformation was not only socially inevitable, but at the 
same time progressive. This contradiction in his experience Balzac attempted to 
force into a system based on a Catholic legitimism and tricked out with Utopian 
conceptions of English Toryism. But this system was contradicted all the time by 
the social realities of his day and the Balzacian vision which mirrored them" [Stud­
ies in European Realism, 12-13; emphasis added). 
41. See also Mailloux's claim that "every feminist and nonfeminist approach 
must posit some kind of reading experience upon which to base its interpretation. 
Only after a reader-response description is completed or assumed can a feminist 
critique begin" [Interpretive Conventions, 89). 
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millions of actual readers), Natasha does not suffer in the end. 
Indeed, her victimization is worse than invisible—it is construed 
as a reward.42 Without this grounding in an authorial reading, 
Tolstoy's misogynist text is indistinguishable from feminist irony. 
Similarly, reading Jane Eyre in the context of Jean Rhys' Wide 
Sargasso Sea—and Mary Wollstonecraft's Maria—provides a use­
ful perspective that underscores the inhumanity of Rochester's— 
and Jane's—treatment of Bertha and suggests that we look behind 
her function as a convenient Gothic plot device to consider her as a 
significant character who has been driven mad by her social and 
economic conditions. But again, with authorial reading one can go 
further to explore the extent to which Bronte was herself unable to 
see the oppression behind that convention.43 
Thus, in arguing for the importance of reading as authorial au­
dience, I am not suggesting that it is either the final reading or the 
most important. Were I teaching either Tolstoy or Bronte, I would 
be disappointed in a student who could produce an authorial read­
ing but who could not, in Terry Eagleton's phrase, "show the text 
as it cannot know itself"44—that is, move beyond that reading to 
look at the work critically from some perspective other than the 
one called for by the author. But while authorial reading without 
further critique is often incomplete, so is a critical reading without 
an understanding of the authorial audience as its base. 
So far, I have argued the importance of authorial reading on the 
grounds that many readers try to engage in it, and that it is a 
necessary precondition for many other kinds of reading. But it does 
not logically follow that it is actually possible. Indeed, I would 
argue that in a sense it is not. I am not referring here to the prob­
lems of interpretation that arise because authors simply fail at the 
act of writing, or because, when editors are allowed to muddle with 
42. See, in this regard, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's discussion of the " 'happy end­
ing' " of Our Mutual Friend and what it really means for Lizzie [Between Men: 
English literature and Male Homosocial Desire [New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1985L 178). 
43. For a different perspective on this problem, considered in the context of Euro­
pean imperialism, see Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Three Women's Texts and a 
Critique of Imperialism," Critical Inquiry 12 (Autumn 1985): 243—61. 
44. Eagleton, Criticism and Ideology, 43. 
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finished texts, authors, as Hershel Parker puts it, "very often lose 
authority, with the result that familiar literary texts at some 
points have no meaning, only partially authorial meaning, or quite 
adventitious meaning unintended by the author or anyone else."45 
Even beyond this, even among the most polished and accurately 
edited of texts, there are many (perhaps all) where neither schol­
arship nor imagination is sufficient to allow us to recover the text 
in the sense of experiencing the full response that the author 
intended us to have as we read. This impossibility stems directly 
from the actual/authorial split. These audiences differ in, among 
other things, the knowledge and belief they bring to a text. To the 
extent that the knowledge distinguishing the authorial from the 
actual audience is positive or additive (that is, to the extent that 
the authorial audience knows something that the actual audience 
does not), the gap can often be bridged through education. The 
reader of The Catacombs who does not know the date of Ken-
nedy's assassination can be informed. But knowledge can also be 
negative. That is, sometimes actual readers can respond to a text as 
authorial audience only by not knowing something that they in 
fact know—not knowing, as they read John Steinbeck's In Du­
bious Battle, the actual (often unidealistic) course that the Ameri­
can labor movement would eventually follow,- not knowing, as 
they read U.S.A., that Dos Passos would later shift his political 
views. As for beliefs—they are usually neither additive nor nega­
tive, but substitutive: it was difficult for some college-age readers 
in the late 1960s to accept the passion with which Clarissa pro­
tected her virginity. 
The problems of recovery caused by the actual/authorial split 
have a musical equivalent: what I call the authentic-performance 
paradox. Many performing groups assume that by recreating the 
physical sounds that a composer had available, they come closer to 
recreating the intended musical experiences. But do contemporary 
listeners really move closer to Beethoven's intended experiences 
when they listen to his sonatas on a Conrad Graf fortepiano? In at 
least one way, they take a significant step away from Beethoven. I 
am not convinced by those structuralists who argue that binary 
45. Parker, Flawed Texts and Verbal Icons, 4. 
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oppositions underlie all of our perceptions of the world, but struc­
turalists are surely right that we see things not in themselves but 
rather in terms of their relations, and specifically in terms of op­
positions determined largely by culturally imposed categories that 
may change radically over time. Thus, when I hear Beethoven on 
an early-nineteenth-century fortepiano (and I think this experience 
is shared by many contemporary listeners), I hear it first and fore­
most against modern sounds. That is, the sound is defined by me 
(and hence experienced by me) partly in terms of its being not-that-
of-a-modern-piano. That component of the listening experience 
was obviously not envisioned by Beethoven. Similarly, the range of 
choices that Mozart faced now seems restricted in ways that it did 
not in 1790, since we now know what Beethoven, Wagner, Schoen­
berg, and Jay Reise have added to available harmonic and formal 
vocabulary.46 
In other words, we live in a world with a history and with tra­
ditions, and it is impossible to experience what an author wanted 
us to because it is impossible to forget all that has happened be­
tween the time when a text was written and the time when it is 
read. What reasonably educated member of our culture can read 
Hamlet—even for the first time—without being influenced by the 
traditions of interpretation encrusted on it? Of course, tradition is 
a factor in authorial reading as well; the tradition of literature out 
of which Hamlet grew is, to some extent, part of Shakespeare's 
assumed starting point. But the traditions coming afterward are 
assuredly not, and modern readers are more likely to be familiar 
with the latter (which cannot be erased) than with the former. 
Thus, while books do sometimes have the power to take readers 
out of themselves, that power is limited. Nor is that limitation 
necessarily to be lamented. Despite romantic notions about the 
beneficial consequences of great art, books are in fact capable of 
moving readers in immoral as well as in moral directions. In the 
climactic chapter of Thomas Dixon, Jr.'s once-popular The Leop-
ard's Spots, for instance, our hero, entering a chaotic Democratic 
convention, makes a stunning speech that unites the party, gains 
46. For a fuller discussion of this problem/ see my "Circumstantial Evidence: 
Music Analysis and Theories of Reading/' Mosaic 18 (Fall 1985): 159-73. 
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him the nomination for the governorship, provides the first step 
toward the routing of the Republicans—and, happily, wins over 
the father of the woman he loves. Few of the readers who pick up 
this text have trouble recognizing that, for the authorial audience, 
this is an inspiring moment—especially since Dixon gives clear 
signals as to how we should react: 
Two thousand men went mad. With one common impulse they 
sprang to their feet, screaming, shouting, cheering, shaking each 
other's hands, crying and laughing. With the sullen roar of crashing 
thunder another whirlwind of cheers swept the crowd, shook the 
earth, and pierced the sky with its challenge. Wave after wave of 
applause swept the building and flung their rumbling echoes among 
the stars.47 
But should the actual reader respond emotionally, as the author 
intended, to the content of the speech? 
"Shall we longer tolerate negro inspectors of white schools, and 
negroes in charge of white institutions? Shall we longer tolerate the 
arrest of white women by negro officers and their trial before negro 
magistrates? 
"Let the manhood of the Aryan race with its four thousand years of 
authentic history answer that question!" [436] 
"The African has held one fourth of this globe for 3000 years. He 
has never taken one step in progress or rescued one jungle from the 
ape and the adder, except as the slave of a superior race . . . and he has 
not produced one man who has added a feather's weight to the pro­
gress of humanity." [437] 
The ability to "forget" the viciousness of this passage is not an 
ability to be nourished, even if it increases our aesthetic enjoyment 
of this text. And New Critical dogma to the contrary, it is not 
simply in works of lesser aesthetic quality that this problem 
47. Thomas Dixon, Jr., The Leopard's Spots: A Romance of the White Man's 
Burden, 1865—1900 (New York: Doubleday, Page, 1902), 443 (bk. 3, chap 13). Fur­
ther references to this edition are made in the text. 
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emerges.48 The ability to forget the ways that women have been 
abused is not a moral asset either, even if it increases our enjoy­
ment of the way Don Giovanni makes a laughingstock of Donna 
Elvira, or our pleasure in Rochester's final release from the burden 
of a mad wife. 
But while it is neither always possible nor always desirable to 
experience a text as an author intended, it does not follow that all 
interpretation need be subjective or idiosyncratic. We can, after all, 
describe what we cannot experience—and we can often determine 
what the authorial audience's response is without sharing it fully, 
A reader can, for instance, know what the authorial audience of 
The Leopard's Spots finds the speech gratifying, or that the au­
thorial audience of fane Eyre finds Bertha unsympathetic—even if, 
as actual audience, the gratification or the lack of sympathy are 
problematic. This is important because, as I have argued, authorial 
reading has a special status against which other readings can be 
measured (although not necessarily negatively); it is a kind of 
norm (although not necessarily a positive value), in that it serves as 
a point of orientation (although not necessarily as an ultimate 
destination). In short, authorial reading—in the sense of under­
standing the values of the authorial audience—has its own kind of 
validity, even if, in the end, actual readers share neither the experi­
ences nor the values presumed by the author. 
The Difficulties of Authorial Reading 
Any discussion of reading must eventually come to grips with a 
fundamental fact: texts are often ambiguous. This claim of ambi­
guity, of course, is itself ambiguous, for it means several different 
48. Thus, for instance, Brooks and Warren admit that there are some works that 
"offend us at too deep a level" for us to accept them. "But always we should be 
careful that we have made the imaginative effort to understand what values may be 
there, and what common ground might, with more effort, be found." It is signifi­
cant, though, that they hasten to add, "Furthermore, in the end, we may find that 
we have rejected the story not because of its theme as such, but because we have 
found the story unconvincing" [Understanding Fiction, 276). 
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things. It means, for instance, that readers from different in­
terpretive communities—readers who are using the text for differ­
ent ends—may well find different things in it, and may well call on 
different kinds of evidence to support their claims: Marxists and 
Freudians may well see The Trial as different texts that are both 
contained within the same marks on the page. It also means, as 
many deconstructionist readings have made clear, that the nature 
of our linguistic system is such that actual readers may find mean­
ings in a text that subvert the meaning apparently intended by the 
author. It means, in addition, that authors often attempt to com­
municate ambiguity itself—thus, even readers in the same in­
terpretive community may well see different things in The Trial 
since Kafka was consciously trying to confuse. 
The actual/authorial distinction, however, suggests yet another 
type of ambiguity. Even among readers attempting to read as au­
thorial audience (whatever they may call it)—that is, even among 
readers who share ties to the same critical methodologies—there 
are bound to be disagreements that literary theory can explain but 
never erase. For even within a given interpretive community, in­
terpretation depends radically on the reader's starting point, which 
will influence (although not necessarily determine) his or her read­
ing experience. And the proper starting point is always, as I have 
suggested, presupposed by the text, not contained within it. 
To be sure, it is often claimed that texts provide their own rules 
for unlocking their meanings. "What attitude are we to take to­
ward Walter Mitty?" ask Brooks and Warren. "The reader will 
need no special help in deciding how to 'take' this story . . . The 
action of the story serves to suggest the proper blend of sympathy 
and amusement."49 And it is true that we often apply rules of 
interpretation with so little thought that the act of literary percep­
tion appears to be automatic; furthermore, texts do, to some ex­
tent, give directions for their own decoding. But the phrase "give 
directions" is revealing. Every literary theoretician these days 
needs a governing metaphor about texts: text as seduction, text as 
fabric, text as abyss, text as system. I suppose that my metaphor 
49. Ibid., 63. 
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would have to be text as unassembled swing set. It's a concrete 
thing that, when completed, offers opportunities (more or less re­
stricted depending on the particular swing set involved) for free 
play, but you have to assemble it first. It comes with rudimentary 
directions, but you have to know what directions are, as well as 
how to perform basic tasks.50 It comes with its own materials, but 
you must have certain tools of your own at hand. Most important, 
the instructions are virtually meaningless unless you know, be­
forehand, what sort of an object you are aiming at. If you have 
never seen a swing set before, your chances of riding on the trapeze 
without cracking open your head are slight. 
The same is true of reading. You must be somewhere to begin 
with. Even when a text gives some fairly explicit guidance, you 
need to know how to recognize it and how to apply it. The moment 
I pick up Vanessa James' Harlequin romance, The Fire and the Ice, 
and find a story that begins with an erotically charged confronta­
tion between a journalist heroine and her new boss (a wealthy 
playboy she had attacked in print two years earlier), I know a great 
deal about what to expect—but that is only because I have met the 
genre and its conventions before. One can well appreciate the kind 
of insensitive reading that led such critics as I. A. Richards to 
launch an attack on stock responses—but the fact remains that 
50. See Gerald Graff's comment that "the reason most students are baffled by 
what we ask them to do is that they do not know what kind of thing it is that they 
are supposed to say about literary works, and they can't infer those kinds of things 
from the literary works themselves, because literary works themselves don't tell 
one what it is one is supposed to say about them" ("Joys of Not Reading"). See also 
Eagleton's remark, "The competent reader is the one who can apply to the text 
certain rules; but what are the rules for applying rules?" [Literary Theory, 125). 
Wolfgang Iser also relies heavily on the notion of giving directions,- see, in particu­
lar, The Act of Reading. Iser, however, stresses what the text offers, rather than 
what the reader is presumed to bring; that is, he starts with a reader who already 
incorporates all the rules I am discussing here. And by suggesting that all worth­
while texts develop their own codes (see, for instance, 21), he smudges the line 
between the text's directions and the readerly presuppositions that allow those 
directions to work. He thus minimizes the different types of presuppositions re­
quired by different texts. Despite his theoretical insistence that "the reader's role 
can be fulfilled in different ways, according to historical or individual circum­
stances" (37), he rarely discusses different possible approaches to a text (for an 
exception, see his 201-2). As a consequence, his analyses, and especially his view of 
the canon, differ radically from mine. 
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without some stock responses to begin with, reading is impos-
sible.51 
Now suppose you are given something to assemble and a set of 
directions. If you make a mistake in construction, you may even­
tually find yourself in a self-contradictory position, one where you 
cannot go further—where following the directions is made impos­
sible by the material reality ("attach the dowel to the holes in 
posts A and B"—where the posts are six inches further apart than 
the dowel is long). At this point, you have to reconsider your whole 
"interpretation/' often starting over again from scratch. So it is 
with reading. The reader of Crime and Punishment who assumed 
that the rule of the least likely suspect applied and that, as in 
Agatha Christie's A.B.C. Murders, our protagonist had been 
framed—such a reader would eventually reach an interpretive dead 
end. And unless the reader were exceptionally dull witted or strong 
willed, he or she would eventually have to rethink what had been 
done so far.52 
But sometimes erroneous assembly produces something inter­
nally consistent: the swing set holds up, but the swings are three 
inches closer to the ground than the manufacturer had in mind. 
And that can happen in reading as well. That is, there is a signifi­
cant number of texts (perhaps all texts) where two or more starting 
points can result in conflicting, but equally coherent and con­
sistent, meanings—using the word broadly to include the step-by-
step experience of tension and relaxation, surprise, confusion, and 
euphoria. Jane Austen fans will remember the scene in Emma 
where Emma and Harriet have a conversation in which neither 
understands the other—although both think they are commu-
nicating—because they are beginning with different assumptions 
about the referent of the pronoun "he." This kind of misunder­
standing comes up in our conversations with authors, too—more 
51. See, for instance, Richards, Practical Criticism: A Study of Literary Judgment 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World/Harvest, 1964), 223—40, esp. 232. See also 
Rosenblatt, Literature as Exploration,, 113—23. 
52. For an amusing exploration of this issue, see James Thurber's story about an 
attempt to read Macbeth as if it were a classical detective story: "The Macbeth 
Murder Mystery/' in The Thurber Carnival (New York: Modern Library, 1957), 60­
63. 
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often than we may believe.53 An example may show more specifi­
cally what I mean. 
On the surface, Agatha Christie's Mystery of the Blue Train is a 
commonplace member of the genre "classical British detective sto­
ry/' It has a murder; it has an adequate collection of readily identi­
fiable cardboard characters, most with plausible motives and ques­
tionable alibis,- it has trains and timetables, jewels and false jewels, 
accusations and false accusations, disguises and discrepancies; 
and, of course, it has an eccentric detective. A reader experienced 
in the genre will know fairly quickly what to fasten on to. Of 
particular importance will be such details as who has seen the 
victim after the train has left the Gare de Lyon. Such a reader, from 
his or her experience with other similar novels, will also know that 
in detective stories, "there must be no love interest/754 He or she 
will therefore rightfully dismiss as window dressing the romantic 
story of the pure and simple Katherine Grey, who has just inher­
ited a fortune from the crotchety old woman to whom she was a 
companion. 
Read in this way, the book works well. As we expect, some of 
the apparent clues turn out to be important, others to be red her­
rings, and there is the expected unexpected twist so that the aver­
age reader will, at the end, experience that very special emotion 
that only a good classical English detective story can offer: the rush 
of "Oh! I should have caught that!" I have taught the novel several 
times as a model of the genre, and most students have enjoyed it 
and been both surprised and pleased by the ending. 
I had two students, however, who used a different point of depar-
53.I thus disagree with Monroe C. Beardsley's claim that "the more complicated 
a text, the more difficult it becomes (in general) to devise two disparate and incom­
patible readings that are equally faithful to it" ("Textual Meaning and Authorial 
Meaning/7 171)- One problem with Beardsley's position is that he does not take 
sufficient account of the differing conceptions of what it means to be "faithful" to a 
given text. In this regard, see Thomas S. Kuhn's observation that when philosophers 
and historians read the same texts, they read them differently. "Undoubtedly the 
two had looked at the same signs, but they had been trained (programmed if you 
will) to process them differently" (The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scien­
tific Tradition and Change [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977], 6). 
54. S. S. Van Dine, "Twenty Rules for Writing Detective Stories," in The Art of 
the Mystery Story: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Howard Haycraft (New 
York: Grossett and Dunlap/Universal Library, 1947), 189. 
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ture. The rule that love interest is secondary, after all, is not in the 
text. Nor, for that matter, is it an article of faith of any regularly 
constituted interpretive community. Rather, it is brought to bear 
on the text from the outside. And without a prior decision to apply 
that rule, there is no textually imposed reason not to pay more 
attention to Katherine Grey, especially since her actions are given 
considerable prominence, as is her perspective on the events. In 
fact, it is possible to treat the novel as a kind of romance. From this 
standpoint, the timing of the trains becomes a secondary consid­
eration, and a different stock pattern emerges: a sympathetic and 
lovely young woman is wooed by two apparently suitable suitors. 
From our knowledge of such texts as Sense and Sensibility and 
War and Peace, we expect that one of them will be eliminated. But 
we wouldn't be satisfied if one were simply bumped off (like 
Tolstoy's Andrei) or one were simply rejected, for we like them 
both, and this is not the sort of novel in which the tragedy of life or 
even the sadness of having to make difficult decisions seems a 
major theme. The best solution, therefore, is to have one of them 
lose our respect, like Austen's Willoughby,- he must turn out to be 
a scoundrel beneath the surface. Given the subject matter of the 
story, the most appropriate resolution would be to have one of the 
suitors turn out to be the killer. The author, in fact, fulfills the 
expectations raised by this pattern; indeed, so that we can main­
tain our love and respect for Katherine, Christie goes so far as to 
assure us that she has known the truth for some time. When 
Knighton turns out to be the villain, then, the reader starting off 
from this romance premise experiences something quite different 
from the surprise that the detective reader experiences: a satisfy­
ing, Austenesque confirmation of expectations. 
These two readings of the book—and given the radically differ­
ent effects they produce, they have to be considered two distinct 
readings—do not stem from differences in critical methodology. 
And for this reason, they are (in contrast, say, to Freudian and 
Marxist readings of The Trial) irreconcilable. The argument that 
Joseph K.'s experiences represent his inner psychodrama does not 
necessarily contradict the claim that they reflect the irrationality 
of modern-day society; one can well believe both simultaneously. 
But one cannot simultaneously be surprised and not surprised by 
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the ending of The Mystery of the Blue Train. Each reading confers a 
different meaning on the text, and each is consistent and coherent 
in itself. 
How can we explain this double-barreled detective story? We 
could, perhaps conclude that all texts are open, that they are all 
susceptible to multiple (even infinite) equally correct readings. Al­
ternatively, we could claim that this novel plays on the conflict 
between knowledge and ignorance, and that it thus either speaks 
the truth through paradox or artfully deconstructs the genres to 
which it appears to belong. We might also conclude that it is a poor 
text. But there is another perfectly reasonable claim one could 
make: that it is a detective story that does not provide enough 
internal evidence for the actual reader to determine correctly the 
nature of the authorial audience. This does not make it any less of 
a mystery story—but to read it correctly (in the sense of success­
fully joining the authorial audience), you have to know what its 
genre is before you read it. In other words, it is a text that readily 
opens itself up to misreadings—a term that I use to refer not to 
readings that simply skirt the authorial audience, but rather to 
readings that attempt to incorporate the strategies of the authorial 
audience, but fail to do so. In this regard, as we shall see, it is far 
from an unusual case. 
In Chapters 6 and 7,1 have a great deal to say about the implica­
tions of such misreadings, especially about the ways in which they 
interact with ideology. But before doing so, I need to look more 
closely at the kinds of conventions on which competing authorial 
readings are apt to be based. 
Rules of Reading 
The term convention may appear, at first, somewhat restricted— 
for many people, when they think of literary conventions, think of 
formulas of plot and character. Conventions, however, inform our 
reading in far more complex ways. There are any number of ways of 
classifying them, and I would like to suggest now a four-part system. 
Let me make it clear from the outset that this framework is neither 
exhaustive nor privileged. That is, I intend neither to provide a 
complete taxonomy of interpretive conventions nor to oust other 
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systems that have been offered (my scheme, for instance, comple­
ments, rather than replaces, the typology suggested by Steven Mail-
loux).55 Rather, I am offering what I hope will be a useful if rough 
sorting out of an extremely thorny area—a system that is not only 
convenient for organizing the ways that we can think abc t nar­
rative conventions, but that also serves to illuminate some of the 
relationships between them. Specifically, the system sets out four 
types of rules. These rules govern operations or activities that, from 
the author's perspective, it is appropriate for the reader to perform 
when transforming texts—and indeed, that it is even necessary for 
the reader to perform if he or she is to end up with the expected 
meaning. And they are, from the other end, what readers implicitly 
call upon when they argue for or against a particular paraphrase of a 
text. The rules, in other words, serve as a kind of assumed contract 
between author and reader—they specify the grounds on which the 
intended reading should take place. They are, of course, socially 
constructed—and they can vary with genre, culture, history, and 
text. And readers do not always apply them as authors hope they 
will—even if they are trying to do so, which they sometimes are 
not.56 Indeed, as I will argue in Chapter 7, canonization is, in large 
part, a matter of misapplication. But even when readers do not apply 
the specific rules the author had in mind, in our culture virtually all 
readers apply some rules in each of the four categories whenever 
they approach a text. 
First, there are what I call rules of notice. Despite repeated 
claims by critics that everything counts in literature (especially 
poetry), we know from experience that there are always more de­
tails in a text—particularly a novel—than we can ever hope to 
55. See, for instance, the distinction Mailloux proposes among traditional, reg­
ulative, and constitutive conventions, as well as among social, linguistic, literary, 
and authorial conventions and conventions within individual works [Interpretive 
Conventions, esp. chap. 5). See also the distinction among linguistic, pragmatic, 
and literary conventions in Ellen Schauber and Ellen Spolsky, ''Reader, Language, 
and Character"; and the classification of codes in Barthes, S/Z. 
56. See, for instance, Umberto Eco's claim that "we must keep in mind a princi­
ple, characteristic of any examination of mass communication media . . . : the 
message which has been evolved by an educated elite (in a cultural group or a kind 
of communications headquarters, which takes its lead from the political or eco­
nomic group in power) is expressed at the outset in terms of a fixed code, but it is 
caught by divers groups of receivers and deciphered on the basis of other codes" 
(Role of the Reader, 141). 
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keep track of, much less account for. We have learned to tame this 
multiplicity with a number of implicit rules, shared by readers and 
writers alike, that give priority to certain kinds of details, and that 
thus help us sort out figures from ground by making a hierarchy of 
importance. Some rules of notice cover a wide spectrum of texts: 
for instance, there is the simple rule that titles are privileged. This 
may seem trivial, but it is a tremendous help for the first-time 
viewer of Hamlet. In the opening scenes, there are so many charac­
ters that he or she would not know where to focus attention with­
out some cue. Similarly, the first and last sentences of most texts 
are privileged; that is, any interpretation of a ttxt that cannot 
account for those sentences is generally deemed more defective 
than a reading that cannot account for some random sentence in 
the middle. Other rules of notice are specific to smaller groups of 
texts. For instance, when we are given some apparently obscure 
detail about a character's grandmother in a novel by Faulkner, we 
are supposed to pay more attention to it than we would in one by 
Dostoyevsky. 
Second, there are rules of signification. These are the rules that 
tell us how to recast or symbolize or draw the significance from the 
elements that the first set of rules has brought to our attention. 
Included here are rules for determining symbolic meaning (the 
rules that tell us when to invoke the religious connotations of 
words, for instance); rules for distinguishing degrees of realism in 
fiction (the rules that allow us to discriminate, for instance, among 
the degrees and types of realism in the various representations of 
Napoleon in War and Peace, Anthony Burgess' Napoleon Sym­
phony, and Woody Allen's Love and Death)} the rule that allows 
us, in fiction, to assume that post hoc is propter hoc,- rules that 
permit us to assume that characters have psychologies and to draw 
conclusions about those psychologies from their actions. 
Third, there are rules of configuration. Certain clumps of literary 
features tend to occur together; because of our familiarity with 
such groupings, we know how to assemble disparate elements in 
order to make patterns emerge. We can thus both develop expecta­
tions and experience a sense of completion. Our ability to perceive 
form—in Kenneth Burke's sense of the creation and satisfaction of 
appetites ("Psychology and Form")—involves applying rules of 
configuration. As Barbara Herrnstein Smith's Poetic Closure dem­
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onstrates, so does our ability to experience closure. And so does 
our recognition of the plot patterns and formulas so often illumi­
nated in traditional genre studies. One need not get much further 
than the opening scenes of Philip Barry's Holiday to know how it 
is going to end. But that is not because it signals its own unique 
form; rather, it is because we know how to put together a few 
elements—a charming man, a rigid fiancee, an attractively zany 
fiancee's sister—and see an emerging pattern.57 
Finally, there are rules of coherence. The most general rule here, 
familiar in part through such critics as Wayne Booth and Mary 
Louise Pratt,58 states that we should read a text in such a way that 
it becomes the best text possible. Of course, as Pratt notes, "this is 
not to say . . . that we do or should assume all literary works to be 
somehow perfect. It means only that in literary works . . . the 
range of deviations which will be construed as intentional is much 
larger" than in "many other speech contexts."59 From this follow 
more specific rules that deal with textual disjunctives, permitting 
us to repair apparent inconsistencies by transforming them into 
metaphors, subtleties, and ironies. Even deconstructive readings, 
which widen rather than bridge textual gaps, often find some over­
arching theme or philosophical point in terms of which the discon­
tinuities make sense.60 
Now while there is a certain logical order to these rules, I am not 
57. In the film version, there is an added signal, since we assume that the charac­
ters played by Cary Grant and Katharine Hepburn will be the ones who get roman­
tically entangled. 
58. See, for instance, Booth, Critical Understanding, esp. chap. 7; Pratt, Toward a 
Speech Act Theory, esp. chap. 5. 
59. Pratt, Toward a Speech Act Theory, 170. See also Ronald Dworkin's rather 
more extravagant claim that "an interpretation of a piece of literature attempts to 
show which way of reading (or speaking or directing or acting) the text reveals it as 
the best work of art. Different theories or schools or traditions of interpretation 
disagree . . . because they assume significantly different normative theories about 
what literature is and what it is for and about what makes one work of literature 
better than another'' ("Law as Interpretation," 183). In subsuming all interpretation 
under rules coherence, Dworkin is not the only critic to privilege this category of 
rules. 
60. Thus, it is not surprising that Serge Doubrovsky, writing in 1966 of what was 
then "the new criticism" in France—and what now appears to have been the initial 
stage of what eventually grew into post-structuralism—argues as follows: "Unity, 
totality, coherence: I believe that to be a motto common to all the new critics or, if 
you prefer, their common postulate" [New Criticism in France, 119). 
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suggesting that we read a text by applying them one after another. 
Reading is a more complex holistic process in which various rules 
interact with one another in ways that we may never understand, 
even though we seem to have little difficulty putting them into 
practice intuitively. Thus, for instance, rules of notice would seem 
to precede rules of configuration, since we cannot perceive a pat­
tern until we notice the elements out of which it is formed. But 
one of the ways elements become visible is that they form parts of 
a recongizable pattern. Thus, when Lisa is stabbed in the breast 
near the end of D. H. Thomas' White Hotel, the authorial audience 
notices that it is the left rather than the right breast in part because 
her left breast has been mentioned so many times in the novel 
(repetition is one of the basic means of attracting attention). But it 
is noticeable for another reason as well: the reference fills out a 
basic configurational pattern in the novel centering around the 
theme of clairvoyance. 
In addition, a given convention may well be capable of refor­
mulation so that it fits into more than one of the four categories. 
Take, for instance, the way we are expected to respond to the 
conventional use of literary parallels. It involves a rule of notice (it 
is appropriate to pay attention to textual elements that parallel one 
another), but it is also a rule of signification (parallel forms suggest 
parallel meanings), a rule of configuration (given an element A, 
there is a good chance that there will be an element A' parallel to 
it), and a rule of coherence (given elements A and B, their mutual 
presence can be explained to the extent that we are able to in­
terpret them as parallel to one another). The division of conven­
tions into these four types, therefore, is intended neither as a de­
scriptive model of the way the human mind actually reads nor as 
an absolute and exhaustive classification. It is, rather, a practical 
analytic device, of value to the extent that it is useful for answer­
ing particular questions. 
Let us now consider each of these types of convention in turn. 
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Rules of Notice 
I do not see how Mr. Stauffer can reject the proposition that 
every word in a good poem counts and still continue to use the 
term "poem" in a meaningful sense. 
Cleanth Brooks, Well Wrought Urn 
The Hierarchy of Detail 
In his essay "How Readers Make Meaning/' Robert Crosman 
presents an interpretation of "A Rose for Emily" worked out by 
one of his students.1 The analysis is unusual: while it accounts for 
many details in Faulkner's story that are usually passed over, it 
does not come to terms with the ending, for the student fails to 
mention, much less catch the implications of, the famous "long 
strand of iron-gray hair" on the pillow.2 Nonetheless, argues 
Crosman, the interpretation is valid; it may fail to incorporate 
certain textual features, but that is true of any interpretation. 
While more traditional readings of the story all account for the last 
sentence, they skim over elements that his student vividly illumi­
nates. 
In one sense, I agree with Crosman: no interpretation can possi­
bly account for all the details in a text. This position, however, 
runs against the current of a strong critical tradition based on two 
1. Crosman, "How Readers Make Meaning/' See also his ''Do Readers Make 
Meaning?"—especially his claim for the validity of an interpretation of Pound's "In 
a Station of the Metro" "as a statement that we should drink milk regularly" (153). 
2. Faulkner, "A Rose for Emily," in Selected Short Stones of William Faulkner 
(New York: Modern Library, n.d.), 61. 
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of what Susan Horton aptly calls "interpretive fictions": that "the 
'best' interpretation can avoid leaving out as much as it takes in" 
and "that everything in the text means or ought to be forced into 
meaning."3 These interpretive fictions have held a firm grip on 
contemporary criticism, especially from the New Critics onward. 
Wimsatt and Beardsley, for instance, claim that "poetry succeeds 
because all or most of what is said or implied is relevant; what is 
irrelevant has been excluded, like lumps from pudding and 'bugs' 
from machinery."4 Similarly, Barthes' exhaustive analysis of Bal-
zac's "Sarrasine" assumes that "everything signifies something."5 
Wayne Booth seems to agree in principle: in a discussion of appar­
ently irrelevant features in Tom Jones, he notes that "if we really 
want to defend the book as art, we must somehow account for 
these 'extraneous' elements."6 And Jakobson and Levi-Strauss' fa­
mous analysis of Baudelaire's "Les Chats" is in harmony with this 
critical chorus, for it too hinges on an implicit assumption that all 
features of a text are fair game for the critic.7 
There is, however, a countertradition as well, one that admits 
(sometimes grudgingly) that everything in a text is not really 
important. One variant of this countertradition assumes that texts 
are, in fact, abridgeable. To be sure, such condensations as those 
produced by the Reader's Digest have no academic standing. Still, 
3. Horton, Interpreting Interpreting, 5. 
4. W. K. Wimsatt, Jr., and Monroe C. Beardsley, 'The Intentional Fallacy/7 4. 
5. Roland Barthes, S/Z, 51. See also his claim that "a narrative is made up solely 
of functions: everything, in one way or another, is significant. . . . There are no 
wasted units'7 ("Introduction to the Structure of Narrative/' 244—45). He does ad­
mit later on, however, that not everything is equally important (247-48), a position 
also hinted at later in S/Z (see, for instance, 112). 
6. Booth, Rhetoric of Fiction, 216. 
7. Roman Jakobson and Claude Levi-Strauss, "Charles Baudelaire's 'Les Chats.'" 
In a very different tradition, see also Forster's claim that "the plot-maker expects us 
to remember, we expect him to leave no loose ends. Every action or word in a plot 
ought to count" [Aspects of the Novel, 61). And in a different tradition yet, see Ronald 
Dworkin's "Law as Interpretation." Even Jane Tompkins—while self-consciously 
aware that her "contextual reading" of Wieland is a "product of modern critical 
assumptions"—justifies her interpretation as "more satisfactory . . . because it is 
able to account for portions of the text that have hitherto been seen as irrelevant, 
inadvertant, or simply 'bad'" [Sensational Designs, 43). For attacks on Jakobson 
and Levi-Strauss by Michael Riffaterre and Jonathan Culler, see above, Chapter 1, 
note 11. 
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the shortened Clarissa is more common in colleges and univer­
sities than is the complete novel; the Norton Anthologies, like the 
other collections that have served up the world of literature to 
college and high school students, tantalize with selections from 
longer works,- many volumes in the widely used French series 
"Classiques Larousses" offer extiaits rather than full texts. Such 
texts are not chopped up at random; behind their publication is the 
assumption that abridgement must be done according to certain 
rules, according to a systematic assessment of what is more impor­
tant and what is less so. 
This countertradition has its theoreticicans as well. Gary Saul 
Morson, for instance, argues that "to identify the structure of a 
work is to construct a hierarchy of relevance that makes some of 
its details central and others peripheral/'8 Tzvetan Todorov, simi­
larly, argues against "a general refusal to privilege any part of the 
work whatever; we must not assume that there is only a monoto­
nous reading which attributes an equal importance to every sen­
tence of the text, to every part of the sentence."9 
This countertradition, I believe, is the one that accords more 
fully with the way people actually read and write. Of course, any­
thing in a text can be made to "mean" by an ingenious reader— 
even accidents of pagination. It would not be hard to give meaning, 
for instance, to the fact that in the original French edition, the 
murder in Robbe-Grillet's Voyeur appears to take place on a blank 
page that would be 88 if it were numbered, for the number 8 has 
been a motif throughout the novel.10 But giving meaning is not the 
same as finding it or construing it; and to the degree that a novel is 
an attempt by a novelist to convey some more or less precise 
meaning, it is impossible for all of its features to bear weight. It is 
impossible because of limitations in both writers and readers. 
8. Morson, Boundaries of Genre, 42. He goes on to claim that "the way readers 
go about this process of ordering . .  . is not a constant. Different genres, for in­
stance, imply different rules for ordering, and readers in different periods may esti­
mate importance in different ways." In this regard, see Jane Tompkins' contention 
that Richard Adams was unable to notice a particular phrase in Hawthorne "be­
cause there is nothing in his interpretive assumptions that would make it notice­
able" (Sensational Designs, 15). 
9. Todorov, Poetics of Prose, 239. 
10. Alain Robbe-Grillet, Le Voyeur (Paris: Minuit, 1955). 
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There are many reasons why writers cannot write so that every­
thing carries an intended meaning. As producers in an economic 
system, they sometimes have to fill space for nonartistic reasons 
(one thinks, in particular, of large, popular blockbusters, in both 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries), and their works are often 
altered by other hands.11 Furthermore, as flawed humans like the 
rest of us, they sometimes lose their grip on the specifics of their 
texts. Dostoyevsky, especially when under the pressure of a dead­
line, was notoriously sloppy; in The Idiot, he was even able to 
change the name of a character between the third and fourth chap­
ters of part 3, where Lieutenant Molovtsov becomes Kurmyshov. 
And even so painstaking a writer as Raymond Chandler, in wrap­
ping up the plot of The Big Sleep, forgot to give his readers the real 
story behind the mysterious death of the chauffeur, Owen Taylor. 
Indeed, in his later years, he could not recall it himself. "I re­
member/' he wrote to Hamish Hamilton, "several years ago when 
Howard Hawks was making The Big Sleep, the movie, he and 
Bogart got into an argument as to whether one of the characters 
was murdered or committed suicide. They sent me a wire asking 
me, and dammit I didn't know either."12 
The hmitations on an author's control over the details of a text, 
though, do not arise solely from economic pressures or from the 
human limits of memory. Such control is in fact mathematically 
impossible. As composer Ernst Kfenek points out, if you try to 
organize a piece of music totally, you end up paradoxically with 
the equivalent of chance. For as soon as a composer asserts full 
control over one aspect of the score (say, melody), he or she relin­
11. For a fuller discussion of textual corruption, see Hershel Parker, Flawed Texts 
and Verbal Icons. 
12. Chandler, letter to Hamish Hamilton, March 21,1949, in Raymond Chandler 
Speaking, ed. Dorothy Gardiner and Kathrine Sorley Walker (Freeport, N.Y.: Books 
for Libraries, 1971), 221. Stephen Knight views the situation differently: "Chandler 
may well have forgotten and the others may not have read the novel carefully 
enough, but the explanation is there. He committed suicide; the lump on his head 
was given him previously by Joe Brody" [Form and Ideology, 150). He is right about 
the lump, at least to the extent that Brody says that he sapped Taylor. But Knight 
does not explain why he believes Brody or why he is sure it was suicide even if 
Brody is telling the truth. Indeed, given the limitations of the first-person point of 
view, it would be impossible for the novel to tell us definitively that it was suicide. 
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quishes control over another (for instance, harmony).13 What is 
true for music, where each note has a fairly restricted range of 
features (e.g., pitch, timbre, duration), is even truer for literature, 
where each word has a far greater range of potential relationships 
to the words around it (e.g., phonetic, syntactic, connotative, de­
notative), as well as to other works of literature and to the outside 
world. A writer who aims at the most precise semantic distinc­
tions cannot simultaneously maintain full control over the text's 
rhythms; once you have decided to write a play in palindromes, 
you severely limit your opportunities for subtle gradations of tone. 
All art is a matter of choice, and the most fundamental choice an 
author faces is the choice of where to direct his or her attention. 
What is true of writers is true of readers as well. If one assumes 
that all features of a text are to receive close attention from an 
interpreter, then a text (even a lyric poem, certainly a novel) be­
comes an infinite and impenetrable web of relationships. In the 
end, such a view not only makes everything equally important, but 
also makes everything equally unimportant: only boredom can 
result. As Roland Barthes puts it, "Read slowly, read all of a novel 
by Zola, and the book will drop from your hands." But Zola would 
never have expected us to read that way. Thus, while Barthes is 
right that "we do not read everything with the same intensity of 
reading; a rhythm is established/' he is wrong to see such reading 
as necessarily "casual, unconcerned with the integrity of the 
text/'14 That rhythm—if we catch the one the author intended—is 
very much a part of the integrity of the text. 
In other words, since the attention of the author is not directed 
equally to all details in a text, then neither should the attention of 
the authorial audience be. The reader trying to recover authorial 
intention should, rather, try to duplicate the angle of the author's 
attention. Thus, while, as Crosman claims, no interpretation can 
account for all the details of a text, it does not follow that all 
partial interpretations are equally valid, since not all details equal­
ly deserve explication. This notion fits our commonsense experi­
13. Kfenek, "Extent and Limits of Serial Techniques/' in Problems of Modern 
Music: The Princeton Seminar in Advanced Musical Studies, ed. Paul Henry Lang 
(New York: Norton, 1962), 72—94. 
14. Barthes, Pleasure of the Text, iz, 10-11 (emphasis in the Original). 
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ence with texts: except perhaps when we are reading academically, 
we tend to read hierarchically, in the sense that we assume that, 
for any given text, certain features are more important than others. 
John D. MacDonald begins Darker than Amber as follows: 
We were about to give up and call it a night when somebody dropped 
the girl off the bridge. 
They came to a yelping stop overhead, out of sight, dumped her 
over the bridge rail and took off. 
It was a hot Monday night in June. With mood. It was past mid­
night and just past the tide changes. A billion bugs were vectoring in 
on us as the wind began to die. 
It seemed to be a very final way of busting up a romance.15 
Then follow more than four pages of flashback to Travis McGee's 
fishing expedition and his attempt to help a friend recover from a 
failed marriage. Most readers who are likely to pick up this novel 
will recognize that these four pages are a detour from what is really 
important. Not that the detour has no function—it does serve to 
heighten our anticipation. But MacDonald's rhetorical device 
works only for the reader who views the events described as a 
deflection from what he or she really wants to know. No reader 
who pays as much attention to the fact that the fishermen had 
"lost seven"—rather than six or eight—"amid the pilings'7 (n) as 
to the description of McGee's attempt to free the victim from the 
cement block wired to her ankles will be able to experience the 
intended dramatic curve. 
Basic Gestures of Noticeability 
"I begin now to understand you all, except Miss Price," said Miss 
Crawford. . . . "Pray, is she out, or is she not? .  . ." 
Edmund, to whom this was chiefly addressed, replied, "I believe I 
know what you mean—but I will not undertake to answer the ques­
tion. My cousin is grown up . .  . but the outs and not outs are beyond 
me." 
15. MacDonald, Darker than Amber (New York: Fawcett, 1966), 7. 
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"And yet in general, nothing can be more easily ascertained. The 
distinction is so broad. Manners as well as appearance are, generally 
speaking, so totally different. Till now, I could not have supposed it 
possible to be mistaken as to a girl's being out or not. A girl not out, 
has always the same sort of dress; a close bonnet, for instance, looks 
very demure, and never says a word."16 
A text, then, has a hierarchical organization of details: we do not 
attend to everything equally. To be sure, there are many forms of 
attention. Some features of a text are rich or evocative, others are 
strange, others surprising, others climactic. But whatever their 
specific character, their weight in our reading experience is vari­
able. This chapter centers on two interrelated aspects of noticeabil­
ity: concentration and scaffolding. First, rules of notice tell us 
where to concentrate our attention. Some details are, quite simply, 
more skimmable than others. You can get through War and Peace 
without paying very much attention to the clothing that the char­
acters wear, and you will still have a reasonable experience of the 
text. But if you nod off during the discussions of Napoleon's pro­
gress, your response—in particular, your failure to share the grow­
ing tension—will be far from the one Tolstoy intended. 
Second, the stressed features in a text serve as a basic structure 
on which to build an interpretation. As authorial audience, we read 
with the prior understanding that we are more expected to account 
for a detail that is stressed by a rule of notice than for a detail that 
is not. And both while we read and after we have finished, we 
shape our interpretations to conform to this basic understanding. 
Interpretations start, at least, with the most noticeable details. 
Communication can exist only if author and receiver agree be­
forehand about what is worthy of notice. And like Miss Crawford's 
distinction between "out" and "not out," this agreement requires 
precise cultural articulation. One need not subscribe to Miss 
Crawford's social code to feel that, in literature, it is—as she 
says—"very inconvenient indeed" when an author fails to give the 
proper signals and allows those details which should be "not no­
ticeable" to "give themselves the same airs and take the same 
16. Jane Austen, Mansfield Park, ed. R. W. Chapman, 3d ed. (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1934), 48-49 (vol. 1, chap. 5). 
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liberties as if they were"—or vice versa. For there are two ways in 
which communication can fail on the question of notice: the irrel­
evant can appear to be prominent, or the crucial can pass by 
unnoticed. 
Sometimes, of course, authors are quite explicit, even forceful, 
in the ways they direct us. They may simply tell us in so many 
words that something is important. James Cain's chatty narrators 
are especially given to telling us where to direct our attention: 
"After the coop was built/' Leonard Borland tells us in Career in C 
Major, "Craig dug in at his farm up-state, and that left me alone. I 
want you to remember that, because if I made a fool of myself, I 
was wide open for that, with nothing to do and nobody to do it 
with." Or, later on, when describing the fiasco during Rigoletto: "I 
want you to get it straight now, what happened."17 But this is not 
simply a Cainian device. Almost all authors do the same thing to a 
greater or lesser extent. "Trumpets, please! Or still better, that 
tattoo which goes with a breathless acrobatic stunt. Incredible!"18 
So Hermann, in Nabokov's Despair, announces his "discovery" 
that Felix is his double. "The adventure that befell us on the way," 
we are told by Anton Lavrent'evich, the narrator of The Possessed, 
"was also a surprising one"—just to make sure we approach it in 
the right frame of mind.19 
Only slightly more subtly, a detail can be emphasized through 
repetition. Thus, Naomi Schor's reading of Poe's "Mystery of 
Marie Rouget" starts out from the fact that the peculiar state of 
Marie's outer skirts is emphasized "by a combination of repetition 
and italicization. . . . For the reader, the hitch appears as a kind of 
marker, a signal, in a word: a detail jutting out above the plane 
surface of the text, providing the would-be interpreter or literary 
detective with a 'handle' on the text."20 Similarly, the authorial 
17. Cain, Career in C Major, in Three of a Kind (Philadelphia: Blakiston, 1944), 4, 
109 (chaps. 1, 10). 
18. Vladimir Nabokov, Despair (New York: Pocket, 1968), 5 (chap. 1). 
19. Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Possessed, trans. Constance Garnett (New York: 
Modern Library, 1936), 442 (pt. 2, chap. 10). 
20. Schor, "Female Paranoia/' 218. 
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audience of The Great Gatsby knows that Daisy's green light, like 
the ash heap and the billboard advertising Dr. Eckleburg, is impor­
tant because it is mentioned so frequently.21 
Certain semantic gestures serve as markers of stress as well— 
the use, for instance, of words like "immediately" or "realized." 
"He stood still as he suddenly remembered/' notes the narrator in 
Francis Steegmuller's Blue Harpsichord. "'Damn it—I've gone 
and left my thesis at Cynthia's' "22—and the authorial audience 
knows that this event is worth attention because of "suddenly" 
and (since it stands out in this particular text) "damn." Notice can 
also be directed through syntax. "It was after an August afternoon 
in a Times Square picture-house that Edna met Myrtle Throgmor­
ton at the Schrafft's on West Forty-Second Street," writes Margaret 
Ayer Barnes in Edna His Wife; and because the sentence begins "It 
was" rather than simply "After an August afternoon," this particu­
lar August afternoon is singled out as especially important.23 Simi­
larly, an author may underscore importance by having a character 
perform the same actions he or she expects of the reader. After 
Inspector Roderick Alleyn reads through an entry in Arthur 
Rubrick's diary [Died in the Wool), Ngaio Marsh tells us that "Al­
leyn read this passage through again"—a clear sign to the reader 
that it contains something worth close consideration.24 And in 
Charles W. Chesnutt's "Po' Sandy," if we use Annie's responses to 
Uncle Julius' tale-within-a-tale as a model for our own reading, we 
will know what we should invest with our primary attention. 
Metaphors and similes, too, can underline in fairly straightfor­
21. Thus, James E. Miller, Jr., is able to say, "By now the signal is unmistakable" 
when the word "ashen" appears in Nick's attempt to imagine what Gatsby's death 
must have been like ("Fitzgerald's Gatsby: The World as Ash Heap/' in The Twen­
ties: Fiction, Poetry, Drama, ed. Warren B. French [Deland, Fla.: Everett/Edwards, 
1975], 190). See also F. H. Longman, who emphasizes roses and the color white in 
Gatsby because of "verbal recurrence" ("Style in The Great Gatsby," Southern 
Review [University of Adelaide] 6 [1973]: 58). 
22. Steegmuller, Blue Harpsichord (New York: Carroll and Graf, 1984), 18 (pt. 1, 
chap. 2). 
23. Barnes, Edna His Wife: An American Idyll (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1935), 
533 (Pt. 4, chap. 5.4). 
24. Marsh, Died in the Wool (New York: Berkley Medallion, 1961), 215. 
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ward ways. In The Ambassadors, Henry James describes one of 
Strether's discoveries as coming like "the click of a spring."25 John 
Barth announces the moment of Todd Andrews' revelation in The 
Floating Opera in a no less evident way: "For like that night in 
Baltimore when a dark alleyway turned me dazzled onto the bright 
flood of Monument Street, I now all at once found myself con­
fronted with a new and unsuspected world."26 
Typography can serve as a marker of stress as well. Todd's dis­
covery itself, for instance, is printed partly in italics. Changes in 
typeface help guide the reader's attention in Horace McCoy's They 
Shoot Horses, Don't TheyI just as Manuel Puig's use of typography 
in The Kiss of the Spider Woman highlights shifts in the narrative 
that are crucial if we are to follow its drift. In Nabokov's Lolita, 
Humbert Humbert chides a detective story for presenting its clues 
in italics, but the criticism is ironic, since many of the clues in 
Lolita itself are in italics, too. 
Still, such explicit markers of stress can go only so far in telling 
the authorial audience where to direct its attention. Authors need 
other—more implicit and often more economical—devices as 
well. Specifically, there are conventional rules for determining the 
primary objects of attention. True, different rules of notice apply to 
larger or smaller groups of texts. Some—for instance, the rule that 
tells the reader to attend to the first letter of each line of a poem, or 
to note what each line spells out when read in reverse—apply only 
to fairly limited types (acrostics and palindromes respectively). 
Others—such as the rules that stress beginnings and endings (see 
"Privileged Positions" below)—are more widespread. But while 
the specific rules may vary with genre, cultural context, and au­
thor, the authorial audience is expected to share them, whatever 
they are, with the author before picking up a text. 
Let me stress, however, that while an author writes with the 
expectation that his or her readers have internalized certain rules, 
it does not follow that he or she is bound to follow those conven­
tionsrigidly. Quite often, rules will be twisted to special ends. One 
25. James, The Ambassadors, ed. S. P. Rosenbaum (New York: Norton, 1964), 
133 (bk. 5, chap. 2). 
26. Barth, The Floating Opera (New York: Avon, n.d.), 271 (chap. 29). 
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of the most striking is the kind of dislocation that occurs when you 
read a passage (or even a whole book) assuming one set of rules to 
be in effect, only to find that you have been tricked. In "A Double-
Barreled Detective Story/' for instance, Twain—assuming that his 
readers will apply the rule permitting us to skim nature descrip­
tions in a nineteenth-century detective story—begins his fourth 
chapter with the following evocation: 
It was a crisp and spicy morning in early October. The lilacs and 
laburnums, lit with the glory-fires of autumn, hung burning and 
flashing in the upper air, a fairy bridge provided by kind Nature for 
the wingless wild things that have their homes in the tree-tops and 
would visit together; the larch and the pomegranate flung their pur­
ple and yellow flames in brilliant broad splashes along the slanting 
sweep of the woodland; the sensuous fragrance of innumerable decid­
uous flowers rose upon the swooning atmosphere,- far in the empty 
sky a solitary oesophagus slept upon motionless wing; everywhere 
brooded stillness, serenity, and the peace of God.27 
This almost surrealistic description was intended as a trap for the 
unwary reader, but even Twain himself was surprised by the suc­
cess with which it worked, for it turned out that except for the 
presence of the oesophagus, nothing in the passage jarred any of his 
readers. Indeed, in order to make the joke effective, Twain had to 
resort to a footnote that ordered his readers to examine the para­
graph again carefully. 
The surprise ending of Nabokov's "Vane Sisters" also plays on 
confusion about the appropriate rules of notice. As I noted above, 
the rule that tells you to look at the first letter of every line (or 
every word) applies only to a small class of texts—and it is easy to 
miss the signals that the final paragraph of "The Vane Sisters" 
belongs to that group. The reader who fails to read acrostically, 
however, will misread the ending of the book, which has a buried 
message that inverts the stores apparent meaning. 
No matter how much a writer wishes to play with conventions, 
however, he or she can do so only if the readers share those conven­
27. Twain, "A Double-Baireled Detective Story/' in The Man That Corrupted 
Hadleybuig and Other Essays and Stories (New York: Haiper, 1906), 312-13. 
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tions to begin with. Indeed, the more a writer wishes to undermine 
tradition, the more imperative it is that the tradition be under­
stood to begin with. This may help explain why so-called serious 
avant-garde authors so frequently turn to formulaic popular fiction 
as a skeleton on which to hang their own works. In sum, whether a 
writer is twisting the rules or using them straightforwardly, he or 
she must work on the assumption that the reader has command 
over them to begin with, and regardless of the text, the reader 
reading without knowledge of the rules presupposed by the author 
is unlikely to uncover the intended meaning. The total number of 
rules of notice used in nineteenth- and twentieth-century novels 
is, of course, vast, and I cannot hope to discuss them exhaustively. 
I will, however, try to show something of their range by giving 
examples of three general types: rules of position, of intratextual 
disruption, and of extratextual deviation. 
Privileged Positions 
If you ask someone familiar with Pride and Prejudice to quote a 
line from the novel, the odds are that you will get the opening 
sentence. Similarly, most readers of The Great Gatsby have a 
stronger recollection of its final image than of most of the others in 
the text. This is not because those passages are inherently more 
brilliant or polished or interesting than their companions. Rather, 
out of all the aphorisms and images that these novels contain, 
these gain special attention because of their placement. For among 
the rules that apply quite broadly among nineteenth- and twen-
tieth-century European and American prose narratives are rules 
that privilege certain positions: titles,28 beginnings and endings 
(not only of whole texts, but of subsections as well—volumes, 
chapters, episodes), epigraphs, and descriptive subtitles. As Mar­
28. See also John Fisher's discussion of titles in "Entitling/' In some ways, Fish-
er's arguments support mine: 'The title tells us how to look at the work" (292), but 
he fails to deal with why this is so—that is, that we live in a community that has 
agreed to treat titles in certain ways, and that authors know this. See also Umberto 
Eco's enunciation of a rule that "(irony or other figure excepted), the title of a 
chapter usually announces the content of it" [Role of the Reader, 20). 
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ianna Torgovnick puts it, "It is difficult to recall all of a work after 
a completed reading, but climactic moments, dramatic scenes, and 
beginnings and endings remain in the memory and decisively 
shape our sense of a novel as a whole/'29 Placement in such a 
position does more than ensure that certain details will remain 
more firmly in our memory. Furthermore, such placement affects 
both concentration and scaffolding: our attention during the act of 
reading will, in part, be concentrated on what we have found in 
these positions, and our sense of the text's meaning will be influ­
enced by our assumption that the author expected us to end up 
with an interpretation that could account more fully for these 
details than for details elsewhere. 
The concentrating quality of a detail in a privileged position can 
be demonstrated by looking at Anna Karenina. The novel has a 
large cast of characters—so large that we might hardly notice 
Anna's arrival were the novel not named for her. But because of the 
title, we know from the beginning that we should look at the other 
characters in their relationship to her, rather than vice versa. Since 
they are the ground and she the figure, we pay more attention to 
her appearance and to the initial description of her character than 
we do to Dolly's. Of course, one could well argue that the novel is 
structured so that even without the title, we would eventually 
concentrate on Anna rather than on Dolly. That is undoubtedly 
true, but it does not contradict the importance of the title; it mere­
ly suggests that the title does more to orient our reading at the 
beginning of the book than in the middle and the end. And even so, 
our reading experience would be quite different if the title were 
Levin. Similarly, we know we are expected to pay special attention 
to the dog that Gerasim rescues halfway through Turgenev's 
29. Torgovnick, Closure in the Novel, 3-4. See also Gerald Prince's claim that 
"the beginning or the end of various sequences'' are "strategically important 
points" [Narratology, 72); and Barbara Gerber Sanders' justification of an analysis 
based primarily on the ends of chapters in The Great Gatsby: "Structurally, the 
beginnings and endings of chapters are strategic places for development of thematic 
images. . . . The reader's mind is, or should be, more alert at these transitions" 
("Structural Imagery in The Great Gatsby: Metaphor and Matrix," Linguistics in 
Literature 1, no. 1 [1978]: 57-58). Films differ markedly from novels in this regard, 
perhaps because filmmakers must take late arrivals into account. People will start 
films in the middle, but they will rarely do the same with books. 
59 
Narrative Conventions 
"Mumu" because she is the title character. The effect is all the 
stronger because until this point, the title has been a source of 
puzzlement. 
One way to highlight how titles concentrate the process of read­
ing is to consider cases where novels have alternate titles, or where 
alternate titles were seriously considered. When a novel's cover 
proclaims Pride and Prejudice, we are immediately alert to certain 
contrasts. While the book incorporates a number of other opposi­
tions as well (young/old, male/female, mother/daughter, rich/ 
poor, light/dark, city/country), no reading could ever control them 
all—and Austen's choice of title makes it clear where she wanted 
us to put our attention first. The resulting experience is quite 
different from the one that would have been encouraged had the 
novel been published under the title that Austen used for her first 
version, First Impressions. With the early title, we would have 
been more alert to the elements common to Darcy and Elizabeth 
than to their differences (the fact that both exhibit pride and preju­
dice is beside the point; the published title encourages us to look 
initially for contrasts rather than for unity), and we would be more 
prepared on first reading to see Elizabeth's reaction to Wickham as 
part of the same package as her reaction to Darcy. In addition, the 
title Pride and Prejudice prompts us to concentrate on character, 
whereas First Impressions encourages us to concentrate on plot— 
more specifically, on change. Pride and prejudice are static 
qualities that may or may not be transformed, but first impressions 
imply the existence of second (and different) impressions. 
Whatever one feels about the trial of Madame Bovary, therefore, 
the prosecutor Pinard had reasonable critical justification for start­
ing with the title in order to get at the novel's central meaning.30 
First sentences operate in a similar way. "All happy families re­
semble one another, but each unhappy family is unhappy in its 
own way"31—so begins Anna Karenina, and from the beginning, 
the authorial audience is encouraged to pay more attention to fam­
ily life than, say, to politics, which in this novel is subsidiary to 
30. Ernest Pinard, "Requisitoire de M. L'Avocat Imperial/' in Madame Bovaiy, 
by Gustave Flaubert (Paris: Librairie de France, 1921), 382. 
31. Leo Tolstoy, Anna Karenina, trans. Louise Maude and Aylmer Maude (New 
York: Norton, 1970). 
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individual action. The reader is further advised to see the novel in 
terms of a basic opposition between "happy" and "unhappy/' and, 
more explicitly, to see happiness as a form of one's unity with 
others and unhappiness as a form of difference. No one could argue 
that the first sentence is essential to the book in the sense that if it 
were not there we would feel its lack. But without that sentence, 
the didactic message of the novel would be slightly muted, and it 
would thus engender a different reading experience for the au­
thorial audience. 
Titles not only guide our reading process by telling us where to 
concentrate; they also provide a core around which to organize an 
interpretation. As a general rule, we approach a book with the 
expectation that we should formulate an interpretation to which 
the title is in fact appropriate. This retrospective process of in­
terpreting a completed book will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 5, but a few examples may be useful here. The title of 
James Cain's Postman Always Rings Twice does little to direct our 
attention as we are reading. There are no postmen in the novel, and 
while it is eventually obvious that the title is metaphoric, it is not 
immediately clear just what the import of the metaphor is. At the 
beginning of the novel, perhaps, after the first murder attempt 
fails, it might warn us to expect a second—as if the title were a 
twist on "Opportunity knocks but once." But by the end, we are 
encouraged to give a fatalistic reading of the text, because it is only 
in the context of such an interpretation that the title is appropri­
ate. It is not only that Frank and Cora fail, but that they had to fail. 
Ford Madox Ford's Some Do Not. . . provides a more elaborate 
example of how a title can serve as a skeleton on which to build an 
interpretation. As in all of the novels that make up Parade's End, 
the title has multiple meanings because the phrase is used in a 
number of different contexts. Its first appearance after the title 
comes in a privileged spot as well: a citation, at the end of a sec­
tion, typographically set off: 
" 'The gods to each ascribe a differing lot: 
Some enter at the portal. Some do not.' "32 
32. Ford, Some Do Not. . . , bound with No More Parades (New York: NAL/ 
Signet, 1964), 28 (pt. i, chap. 1). Further page references are given in the text. 
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The phrase returns near the close of part i (chap,  j , also in a 
privileged position, half a page from the end), after General Camp­
ion has run into Tietjens and Valentine's horse. When Tietjens 
decides to stay with the animal, the fly driver says, "'But I 
wouldn't leave my little wood 'ut nor miss my breakfast for no 
beast. . . . Some do and some . .  . do not'" (149; ellipses in origi­
nal). Later, when a "dark man" offers to help keep Tietjens out of 
the war, Tietjens tells him that he really wants to join the army; 
the dark man says, " 'Some do. Some do not'" (229; pt. 2, chap. 3). 
At the end of part 2, in chapter 5, after Valentine agrees to become 
Tietjens' mistress, the phrase becomes explicitly sexual: " That's 
women!' he said with the apparently imbecile enigmaticality of 
the old and the hardened. 'Some do!' He spat into the grass, said: 
'Ah!' then added: 'Some do not!'" (284). But a few pages later, he 
realizes, " 'We're the sort that. . . do not!'" (287, pt. 2, chap. 6; 
ellipses in original). 
The primary function of Ford's technique is not to create lin­
guistic paradox by showing the multiple meanings latent in the 
title's language (although it does do that). Rather, the repetition of 
the title pressures the authorial audience to tie together the con­
texts in which the phrase appears and to interpret a number of 
apparently separate concerns (optimistic hope for the future, prop­
er care for animals, willingness to fight in the war, and sexual 
honor) as in fact variations on a single theme. One might argue 
that the unity would be there without the title. Still, without the 
title to predispose the reader to notice its repetitions in the text, he 
or she would not be so likely to see them at all, much less to see 
them as contributing to a thematic unity. To put it another way: 
without the title, a reader who claimed to find this linguistic web 
uniting these disparate passages might reasonably be criticized for 
stretching things; with the title, a reader who refused to accept the 
connections could reasonably be accused of denseness. But this 
accusation carries weight only in a community where there is a 
prior agreement to privilege titles. 
Last sentences, of course, cannot serve to focus a reading experi­
ence (at least, not an initial reading experience). But they do often 
serve to scaffold our retrospective interpretation of the book. The 
final image of Dashiell Hammett's Glass Key is Ned Beaumont 
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staring at an empty doorway. Anywhere else in the novel, we 
might well slide over such a bland detail. By putting it at the end, 
though, Hammett is urging his reader to privilege that blankness 
and to tie it to all the other doors and entryways into mysterious 
psychological blanks that give the book much of its character. 
Not all novels privilege opening and closing sentences; different 
genres stress different points to different degrees. Still, it is telling 
that novels that do not privilege the opening often make some 
linguistic gesture to signal their departure from the general rule. 
The Postman Always Rings Twice is a case in point. The opening 
paragraph tells us how our narrator, Frank, has been thrown off a 
hay truck. It gives us a general sense of his character, but we can 
tell that it is intended as introductory material (like the introduc­
tion of a sonata-form movement), rather than as the beginning of 
the exposition, because of the way that Cain begins the second 
paragraph: 'That was when I hit this Twin Oaks Tavern."33 The 
syntactic device "that was when" serves to inform us that this is 
the important point of departure. 
At first, the claim that titles, openings, and closings are priv­
ileged may seem a trivial one—and in a sense it is, since it is one of 
the simplest rules of interpretation. Yet it is curious how often it 
can serve to answer interpretive disputes by supporting one read­
ing over another. The privileged nature of closing sentences surely 
answers Robert Crosman's arguments, outlined at the beginning of 
this chapter; the privileged nature of beginnings supports a femi-
nist-economic reading of Pride and Prejudice. Similarly, the open­
ing sentence of Little Women ("'Christmas won't be Christmas 
without any presents/ grumbled Jo, lying on the rug") encourages 
the authorial audience to see the novel in terms of the interaction 
between love, friendship, and family on the one hand, and econom­
ics on the other. And the fact that Norman Mailer begins his 
American Dream with a reference to John Kennedy supports an 
interpretation that sees the whole novel as lit by the Kennedy 
mystique—although the evidence for that claim would be feebler 
33. Cain, The Postman Always Rings Twice, in Cain x 3 (New York: Knopf, 
1969), 3 (chap. 1). For the rhetorical significance of the definite article in such 
contexts, see Walker Gibson, Tough, Sweet, Stuffy, esp. 37-40. 
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if the explicit mention of Kennedy came only in the middle of the 
novel.34 
So far, I have considered position in the most literal sense, as a 
feature of the text as a physical, printed artifact. But textual features 
have positions within plot structures too, and a novelist can direct 
attention by careful placement in this regard as well. Threats, 
warnings, and promises, for instance, are almost always noticeable 
because of their role in predicting the shape of a text. This will be 
clearer after Chapter 4, where I discuss configuration in more detail. 
Still, it is possible to give a few examples by relying on our common­
sense notions of novelistic structure. 
Few authors are so skillful at emphasis through placement as 
Dostoyevsky. His novels are full of small, superficially empty mo­
ments that the authorial audience charges with psychic energy 
because of their placement. One thinks of Raskolnikov and 
Razumikhin staring at one another in the dark corridor (Crime and 
Punishment) or of Kirillov's bizarre empty stare when Pyotr Step­
anovich goes to see if he is really going to shoot himself (The 
Possessed). Both moments exemplify a general rule: details at cli­
mactic moments (at peripeties, discoveries, revelations, recogni­
tions) receive special stress. This rule can in turn be broken down 
into more specific variants that are known to most experienced 
readers of nineteenth- and twentieth-century literature, even if 
they are really formulated explicitly. A few examples: (1) When a 
character's moral choice serves as the linchpin for the develop­
ment of the plot, then that character is to be read as an important 
character. On this basis, the reader of Ibsen's Doll's House can 
fairly assume that Krogstadt—whose decisions about whether to 
expose Nora's forgery determine much of the play's action—is 
intended to be a more important character than Mrs. Linde, who 
serves primarily as a sounding board for, and contrast to, Nora. 
34. Of course, the Kennedy reference also conjures up an image of violent death. 
Since Mailer had written the first version of the opening before Kennedy's as­
sassination, it was obviously not on his mind; still, one suspects that his decision to 
keep the reference (albeit with alterations) even in his postassassination revisions 
stemmed at least in part from the fact that the death imagery, too, fit in with the 
rest of the novel. For a detailed discussion of the editorial problems in this novel, 
see Parker, Flawed Texts and Verbal Icons, chap. 7. 
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(2) When an event changes a major character's relationship to other 
characters, that event is to be read as charged. Thus, in Marge 
Piercy's High Cost of Living, when the homosexual Bernard makes 
love to the protagonist, his lesbian friend Leslie, the act is a plot-
stressed event since we know that, whatever happens, their rela­
tionship will be permanently altered. (3) When an event or a detail 
answers a question around which a narrative has been based, it is 
emphasized. Thus, the gray hair in "A Rose for Emily" is stressed 
not only by its physical position, but by its plot position as well, 
for it provides the final bit of information about what has happened 
to Homer Barron. (4) In addition, there are positions that are 
stressed only in certain genres: the meeting around the fireside at 
the end of a detective story, for instance, attracts our special 
attention. 
Rules of Rupture 
Politics in the midst of imaginative concerns is like a pistol shot in 
the middle of a concert.35 
We tend to skim over the even and the unbroken; disruptions 
attract our notice. This explains why we notice the pyramid rising 
above the desert, and also why we notice certain details in literary 
works. Specifically, textual features stand out both when they dis­
rupt the continuity of the works in which they occur and when 
they deviate from the extratextual norms against which they are 
read. Thus, for instance, silences interjected into a dialogue attract 
notice ("'My name is Gagin, and this is my'—he hesitated for a 
moment—'my sister7 "),36 just as violations of conventional expec­
tations do (most detective story solutions are quickly forgotten, 
but almost everyone who has read Agatha Christie's Murder of 
Roger Ackroyd remembers its unconventional climax—a climax 
35. Stendhal, The Red and the Black: A Chronicle of the Nineteenth Century, 
trans. Lloyd C. Parks (New York: NAL/Signet, 1970), 378 (bk. 2, chap. 22). 
36. Ivan S. Turgenev, "Assya," in First Love and Other Tales, trans. David 
Magarshack (New York: Norton, 1968), 89 (chap. 2). 
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that I will not spoil for those who have not read the novel). Need­
less to say, however, the application of this general rule is prob­
lematic in particular cases. 
Let me begin with intratextual disruptions—breaks in a given 
text's continuity—since they are somewhat more straightforward. 
Continuity, to be sure, itself depends on rules of configuration; as I 
have pointed out, notice and configuration are interdependent. 
Still, even at this point, a few examples can be given. 
The blatantly irrelevant tends to be noticed. Any time a detail is 
mentioned when there seems to be no apparent reason for it, the 
surface of the text is ruptured; most of the time, such ruptures are 
appropriately treated as signals to pay attention. This is especially 
true when the irrelevance itself is explicitly mentioned: "Oh, 
yes—there had been one more episode, if one wanted to record 
every last detail: the visit to the milliner. But even Terence wasn't 
morbid about mere shopping encounters."37 But such explicitness 
is hardly required. We pay attention when Gatsby and Tom 
Buchanan switch cars, because it seems such a pointless turn in 
the plot that we feel sure it will have consequences. Even nontradi­
tional novels often make use of this rule. One of the most oft-
quoted passages in Robbe-Grillet's Erasers is his description of a 
tomato—a description made memorable by the specificity of its 
detail (excessive even in this densely detailed novel), and es­
pecially by the apparent irrelevance of much of it: "Above, a 
scarcely perceptible accident has occurred: a corner of the skin, 
stripped back from the flesh for a fraction of an inch, is slightly 
raised."38 
The inappropriate, too, tends to be noticed. There are numerous 
variations on this rule. For instance, inappropriate behavior by 
characters is always noticeable. Myshkin's verbal assault on Ca­
tholicism in Dostoyevsky's Idiot, for instance, stands out at least 
in part because a formal reception is an improper forum for such an 
impassioned outburst. A more specific variant applies to detective 
and spy novels: when a character displays a piece of knowledge 
37. Steegmuller, Blue Harpsichord, 28 (pt. 1, chap. 3). 
38. Alain Robbe-Grillet, The Erasers, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Grove, 
1964L 153 (chap. 3/Pt. 3). 
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that he or she has no apparent way of having obtained, the reader 
should watch that character. Indeed, mysteries are often solved 
because the criminal lets slip a piece of information that he or she 
could have only if he or she committed the crime. When Corky, in 
the Encyclopedia Brown story "The Case of the Knife in the Water­
melon/' lets slip that he knows how long a knife blade is—even 
though the knife is buried up to its handle in a watermelon—the 
careful reader can be sure that he is the guilty party. 
More often than not, the authorial audience is also to pay atten­
tion when a plot changes direction. This can occur in fairly literal 
ways, as when, in Robin Hood, Little John physically stops moving: 
So he strode whistling along the leafy forest path that led to Fosse 
Way, turning neither to the right hand nor to the left, until at last he 
came to where the path branched, leading on the one hand onward to 
Fosse Way, and on the other, as well Little John knew, to the merry 
Blue Board Inn. Here Little John suddenly ceased whistling and 
stopped in the middle of the path.39 
A less literal kind of change in direction is found in Aglaya's mar­
riage at the end of The Idiot. This attracts our notice at least partly 
because it disrupts the neat closure of the circle provided by the 
final meeting of Myshkin and Rogozhin (whose first meeting 
opened the novel), and by Myshkin's return to the "idiocy" that 
had plagued him before the novel began. Indeed, shifts in plot 
direction also include changes in a novel's perspective—the move 
from a waking state to a dream, for instance (for this reason, the 
dreams in Jane Eyre are given special attention by the authorial 
audience)—as well as shifts in narrative distance. Thus, when 
Gogol, toward the beginning of "Nevsky Prospect," suddenly 
moves from the generalized, distant description of the crowd to a 
more detailed, close-up description of Pirogov and Piskarev, the 
shift in perspective makes us pay special attention to these two 
characters. 
We similarly notice shifts in style. Dramatic effects in opera are 
often created in this way. For instance, when the Empress in the 
39. Howard Pyle, The Merry Adventures of Robin Hood (New York: Grosset and 
Dunlap, 1952), 89. 
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Strauss-Hofmannstahl Frau ohne Schatten (The Woman without a 
Shadow) thinks that the curse has been fulfilled, she switches from 
singing to heightened speech in order to express her despair.40 And 
any experienced operagoer, hearing that passage—even without 
knowing the plot or a word of German—would recognize it as a 
crucial juncture just because of the stylistic jolt. So it is in liter­
ature. The phrase "They ran" stands out in Faulkner's Intruder in 
the Dust because it is such a compact sentence following the long, 
stream-of-consciousness flow of the dreamlike fantasy of Miss 
Habersham caught in the traffic.41 Rhymed couplets in Shake-
speare's plays stand out for similar reasons. 
Deviations from norms outside the text in question are just as 
noticeable as breaks in a text's continuity, but here we run into 
more severe interpretive problems, for a number of reasons. 
What counts as a deviation will vary, for norms are radically 
context dependent. Indian musical tunings, which sound quite 
normal to someone raised in Delhi, seem strange and exotic when 
heard against the norms of American popular songs—at least, they 
did until they, too, became an American pop norm. The blandest 
American TV jingle would have the same shock value for an Indian 
unfamiliar with Western musical practice. In the same way, 
noticeability in fiction depends in part on what system of norms is 
invoked. 
To make matters more complicated, there are two different 
kinds of norms involved in literary texts. On the one hand, there 
are what might loosely be called "real world" norms: norms that 
readers bring to works from their social experiences outside art, 
rather than from their experiences with literature per se. Thus, for 
instance, any violation of an actual cultural taboo will attract a 
reader's notice—although, of course, what constitutes a taboo will 
vary from culture to culture. The riveting power of Nora's depar­
ture in A Doll's House derives only partly from its privileged posi­
40. Richard Strauss and Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Die Frau ohne Schatten (Lon­
don: Boosey and Hawkes, 1946); 571. 
41. William Faulkner, Intruder in the Dust (New York: Random House/Vintage, 
1972), 190 (chap. 9). See also Dennis Porter's analysis of the shift in sentence length 
as a way of "attention-grabbing" in the opening of Chandler's Big Sleep [Pursuit of 
Crime, 138-39). 
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tion. It is noticeable also because, in the social context in which 
Ibsen expected the play to be produced, the action itself was shock­
ing, even though it may seem less so now. In contrast, a contempo­
rary American reader of Chekhov's "Lady with the Dog," living in 
a social context where divorce is common, may be more surprised 
than Chekhov intended by Anna and Gurov's failure to consider 
this option. True, many texts teach their actual readers about the 
cultural perspective from which they are written. The social mean­
ing of Lydia's elopement with Wickham is discussed exhaustively 
in Pride and Prejudice. But that discussion itself makes sense only 
to readers who have at least some prior knowledge of the impor­
tance of marriage and propriety in that culture. 
In order to understand a text as the author intended, therefore, it 
is necessary to know in advance which social norms it was ex­
pected to be read against. But it is just as important to know the 
literary norms that serve as a text's background. Suppose, for ex­
ample, we pick up a mystery story and find the characters compar­
ing literature and life: 
"You confess that you read detective stories, Miss Grey. You must 
know that any one who has a perfect alibi is always open to grave 
suspicion/' 
"Do you think that real life is like that?" asked Katherine, smiling. 
"Why not? Fiction is founded on fact." 
"But is rather superior to it," suggested Katherine.42 
Are we to pay particular attention to that exchange and treat the 
novel as an inquiry into the ontology and epistemology of fictional 
discourse? The question cannot be answered in terms of how peo­
ple confronting violent crime really operate, or even in terms of 
42. Agatha Christie, The Mystery of the Blue Train (New York: Pocket, 1940), 
130 (chap. 21). See also Michael Innes, The Bloody Wood (New York: Berkley 
Medallion, 1966): "'What if we're slipping sedately into one of those well-bred 
English detective novels of the classical sort? Death at Charne House'" (62); and 
P. D. James, An Unsuitable Job for a Woman (New York: Warner, 1982): "But it 
didn't surprise her . .  . to hear that Sergeant Maskell. . . was tied up all morning. It 
was only in fiction that the people one wanted to interview were sitting ready at or 
in their office, with time, energy, and interest to spare. In real life, they were about 
their own business" (82, chap. 2). 
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how the authorial audience believes such people operate. Rather, 
the noticeability of this feature has to do with how such people 
behave in books. But what books? Different norms characterize 
different sets of narratives,- what stands out as deviant, therefore, 
depends not only on social context but also on the intertextual grid 
against which the text is read. Generally speaking, formulaic ele-
ments—elements that regularly recur without significant varia­
tion in comparable texts—are not noticeable unless they are tradi­
tionally points of stress—that is, unless they are given specifically 
formulaic emphases. (Thus, as I have suggested, the fireside chat of 
the detective story is stressed because that is precisely its for­
mulaic purpose—to point out an event worthy of special notice.) In 
a classical detective story, for instance, life-and-literature discus­
sions are formulaic in this sense; like the formulaic descriptions of 
clothing in popular romances and of the storms that so often beset 
Southworth heroines, they are intended not to attract notice, but 
rather to fill space. 
This is not to say that a sensitive cultural critic could not look at 
these formulas to unveil their implicit cultural values. Indeed, as I 
have suggested earlier, much of the most valuable political crit­
icism comes from the decoding made possible by reading in a con­
text that the author did not intend, a technique that often high­
lights precisely those elements of a text that the author and his or 
her intended readers took for granted—elements that can therefore 
reveal unexpected and unconscious aspects of the reigning ide­
ology. Such reading against the grain, though, depends on authorial 
reading for its political force; it is valuable not because it points 
out certain features, but because it points out certain features that 
the author did not intend to be particularly noticeable. 
What counts as a formula varies from genre to genre. The life-
and-literature discussions in Pirandello's plays are intended to be 
read against a different intertextual grid than those in Christie, and 
in this context they are no longer mere filler. It would be just as 
wrong to ignore them in a reading of his work as it would be to 
stress them in a reading of The Mystery of the Blue Train. Readers 
frequently stumble on this point, missing what is important or 
stressing the irrelevant because they are reading in the wrong con­
text. But the fault does not always lie with the readers. Authors 
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can fail to assess properly the background their actual readers are 
likely to call into play. 
For instance, writers (especially inexperienced writers) occasion­
ally rely on what appears to be a deviation from a formula but what 
has in fact already been used so often that it has become a formula 
in its own right. The confusion of the border line between life and 
art that was an effective overturning of dramatic conventions in 
Pirandello becomes just another formulaic gesture in the work of 
student playwrights, just as the double and triple crossing that was 
so startling in the early novels of Le Carre and Deighton is by now 
no longer able to surprise us. We almost expect the true villain to 
be the head of a major spy operation on the good guys' side.43 
The appropriate background group for a given text usually in­
cludes the previous works by the same author: the science fiction 
elements in Doris Lessing's later novels stand out more sharply 
against the stark realism of her earlier books, just as the return to 
realism in The Diaries of Jane Somers is especially noticeable in 
the context of that science fiction. The genre of the work in ques­
tion, as we have seen, also alerts readers to the intended back­
ground, especially when the genre is announced by the title (Din-
esen's Seven Gothic Tales, for instance); as a general rule, it is 
appropriate to give priority to deviations from works in the same 
genre over deviations from works in other genres. Still, every work 
has its own unique intended background (if only because every 
author has read a different selection of books). And although the 
variations in background may be so subtle as to be insignificant, 
interpretive questions often come down, in the end, to questions 
about choice of background group—a choice that the work itself 
cannot explicitly outline, and that will therefore depend to some 
extent on the reader's assumptions about the proper intertextual 
grid, assumptions made in part before even starting the book. 
43. Thus, the impact of a book depends on when you read it with respect to other 
books. As Robert Champigny points out, "Suppose that a reader comes across The 
Maltese Falcon after reading several stories in which the murderer is a client who 
tries to seduce the detective. The fact that The Maltese Falcon exemplifies this 
pattern may disappoint him, not because he assumes that it is historically improba­
ble (or probable) but because, in his eyes, the development of the story makes the 
denouement too likely. He may thus consider Hammett to be an imitator of authors 
who wrote after him" [What Will Have Happened, 32). 
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Thus, for instance, the reader who comes to Harriet Beecher 
Stowe's Dred with expectations drawn from experience with the 
works of Jane Austen is apt to be startled by the transformation of 
the heroine Nina. In the world of Austen, while characters change, 
the kind of flightiness exhibited by Nina in the opening chapters is 
unalterable,- Nina's metamorphosis into a wise, independent-
minded, and courageous woman appropriate for the virtuous 
Clayton to marry seems as unimaginable as Lydia's would be if she 
turned into an appropriate wife for Darcy. But such transforma­
tions were more common in the popular American women's nov­
els of the day than in Austen. Indeed, Nina Baym argues that one of 
the two basic variants of the "single tale" told in "the many novels 
by American women authors about women, written between 1820 
and 1870," starts with "a pampered heiress" who, after financial 
misfortune, "develops the capacity to survive and surmount her 
troubles."44 Thus, what may seem surprising and unusual to us 
may in fact be merely formulaic. (Nina's death halfway through 
the novel, in contrast, is remarkable through either lens.) 
In the case of Dred, modern readers can make a fairly reliable 
guess about authorial intention by looking at the historical context 
in which the novel was written and published. Sometimes, howev­
er, the available evidence is more ambiguous, with the result that 
recovery of the authorial meaning becomes more chancy. For in­
stance, as I have noted, the comparison between the so-called real 
world and the stylized world of detective novelists is a common 
gesture in detective stories. Thus, if a reader of Eric Ambler's Inter­
com Conspiracy has experience with the genre, he or she might 
not pay particular attention when Valerie Carter tells novelist 
Charles Latimer: 
"I think [your novels are] highly ingenious and much better written 
than most. Above all nobody in them is made to behave stupidly. . . . 
One of the things I can't stand in that sort of book is the character 
who gets trapped in a dangerous situation and is forced to run appall­
ing risks simply because he didn't, for some feebly contrived reason, 
go to the police when the trouble started. The author is assuming that 
the reader is a moron, and that's infuriating. 
44. Baym, Woman's Fiction, 11, 35. 
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"So, when my father began explaining why he couldn't go to the 
police and tell them what was going on, I became angry."45 
But since the theme is repeated as the novel progresses, the reader 
may begin to wonder about its intended importance. Is this simply 
an elaboration of a formulaic gesture? Or does The Intercom Con­
spiiacy really aim to question which vision is truer: that of the 
individual participant (with his or her actual experience, but with 
the concomitant limitations) or that of the novelist (with his or her 
greater scope but also greater distance). One can, of course, apply 
the standard rules of notice for detective stories. Or one can apply a 
basic rule of coherence (discussed in more detail in Chapter 5), and 
assume that it should be read to make the best novel possible. In 
the case of The Intercom Conspiracy, we have a fairly weak spy 
novel, although as a novel about fiction and history it is somewhat 
more interesting. However we choose to interpret it, though, we 
are engaging in guesswork. In order to read it as the author in­
tended, we have to know, before picking it up, what other texts 
Ambler wanted us to have in mind as we read. 
Even after we have decided on the proper norms for a work, it is 
not always easy in practice to know what constitutes a real devia­
tion. As I noted above, a textual element is formulaic if it regularly 
recurs without significant variation in comparable texts. But ascer­
taining what constitutes "regular" recurrence and "significant" 
variation is an act of judgment: one reader's significant variation is 
another's cliche. At the end of Pride and Prejudice, Lady Catherine 
is almost, but not quite, reconciled to Darcy's mismatch: "She 
condescended to wait on them at Pemberley, in spite of that pollu­
tion which its woods had received, not merely from the presence of 
such a mistress, but the visits of her uncle and aunt from the 
city."46 Does the authorial audience view this as a formulaic re­
iteration of traditional comedy's love-conquers-all happy ending, 
with its reconciliation of warring factions through marriage of the 
younger generation? Or does the authorial audience pay special 
attention to the slight twist ("she condescended . .  . in spite of that 
45. Ambler, The Intercom Conspiracy (New York: Bantam, 1970), 140. 
46. Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice, ed. R. W. Chapman, 3d ed. (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1965), 388 (vol. 3, chap. 19). 
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pollution") and stress instead the novel's failure to resolve prob­
lems as neatly as the traditional formula dictates? Obviously, dif­
ferent actual readers will read it differently. But those differences 
do not stem necessarily from Austen's highly developed sense of 
paradox (there is no reason to assume that she did not intend one or 
the other of those readings unambiguously). Nor, more important, 
do they necessarily stem from a difference in the general rule being 
applied. Rather, they may well arise from a difference in the way 
that a generally agreed upon rule is being applied in one specific 
instance.47 
To make matters more complex still, formulas are not as a rule 
given special attention, but specific references (parodies, quota­
/tions, allusions) are. Thus, the phrase "Look at Dick ; is not notice­
able in a children's reader, but it becomes so when it is used in 
Toni Morrison's Bluest Eye. It is not, however, always easy to tell a 
reference from a formula. Those who know Haydn's Symphony 
No. 13 may find citational significance in the fact that Mozart later 
used the opening theme of the finale to launch the last movement 
of his own Jupiter Symphony. In fact, though, the theme itself is a 
commonplace of counterpoint exercises, and there is no authorial 
significance to its appearance in both works. 
In general, the border line between reference and formula—like 
the border lines between deviations and norms more generally— 
can be pinpointed only in the context of a particular intertextual 
grid. Take, for instance, Raymond Chandler's decision to name his 
series detective Marlowe. One can easily read this as a reference to 
Conrad's Marlow and draw symbolic conclusions from the paral­
lels thus revealed between, say, The Big Sleep (the novel where 
Marlowe first appeared) and Heart of Darkness. But was Chandler 
really intending his readers to do that? The text itself does not 
provide an answer; the reader's interpretation, rather, will depend 
on his or her intertextual grid. If the reader groups The Big Sleep 
simply with traditional detective stories, then the connection be­
tween Philip Marlowe and Conrad's Marlow will appear to be pure­
ly coincidental (the name, after all, is not uncommon), not an 
47. For good examples of the ways in which the same general rules can be applied 
differently by different critics, see Culler, Pursuit of Signs, chap. 3. 
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instance of copying and hence no more noticeable than the occur­
rence of the same name in Bentley's Trent's Last Case, Ambler's 
Cause for Alarm, or Allingham's Mystery Mile. If, on the other 
hand, the reader groups it with the so-called serious British literary 
tradition, the name immediately becomes charged. Sometimes an 
author will make the reader's task easier by being fairly explicit 
about references to other texts—as when Peachum explains the 
arrival of the Royal Messenger to the audience in The Threepenny 
Opera in terms of dramatic tradition: Even though in reality 
"mounted messengers from the Queen come far too seldom/' Mac-
heath will not be hanged because "this is an opera, and we mean to 
do you proud."48 Sometimes, we can tell by context. Generally 
speaking, the importation of an apparently inappropriate formula 
(as the use of primer style in Morrison) signals a reference. Some­
times, we have to know the author. Only a reader familiar with 
Pushkin's style and wit will be comfortably sure that the com­
pletely formulaic last story in Belkin Tales is intended as a par-
ody.49 But there remain instances when even experienced actual 
readers will be baffled. It is not easy to be sure whether the appar­
ently formulaic marriage between Annella Wilder and Valerius 
Brightwell in Southworth's Allworth Abbey is intended as a sim­
ple closure or as an attack on the genre. (For a fuller discussion of 
this text, see Chapter 5.) 
Knowing where to direct our attention, however, is only the first 
step in literary interpretation. We also need to know how to con­
struct textual meanings out of the details we have found. This 
leads to the next set of rules: rules of signification. 
48- Bertolt Brecht, The Threepenny Opera, trans. Desmond Vesey and Eric 
Bentley (New York: Grove/Evergreen Black Cat, 1964), 96, 95 (act 3, sc. 3). 
49. For a good discussion of this point, see Morson, Boundaries of Genre, 110-13. 
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The Biggest Black Eyes I Ever 
Saw: Rules of Signification 
Our public is still so young and naive that it fails to understand 
a fable unless it finds a lesson at its end. It misses a humorous 
point and does not feel irony. . . . [It] resembles a provicial 
who, upon overhearing the conversation of two diplomats be­
longing to two warring Courts, is convinced that each envoy is 
betraying his government in the interests of a most tender and 
mutual friendship. 
Mikhail Lermontov, A Hero of Our Time 
Signification Defined 
Once we know, through rules of notice, what to attend to, we 
still have to face the problem of how to attend to it. Take the 
opening sentence of the third section of Faulkner's Sound and the 
Fury: "Once a bitch always a bitch, what I say."1 It is clearly 
noticeable. Not only does it begin a new section,- in addition, com­
ing after the elaborate grammatical and philosophical complexities 
of Quentin's internal monologue, it Kits us like a blast of cold air 
with its immediacy. Yet what does it mean? 
Out of context, Jason's remark may be somewhat obscure—but 
difficult as the novel is, the reader who has gotten this far in it will 
probably be able to make a variety of judgments about what the 
sentence means. He or she will know, for instance, that its referent 
is a woman, and not a dog; that the immediate source of the words 
i- William Faulkner, The Sound and the Fury, bound with As I Lay Dying (New 
York: Modern Library, n.d.), 198. 
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(that is, the dramatized speaker) is Jason (not Faulkner), who does 
not intend them to be ironic; that the act of making the statement 
reflects badly on Jason (at least, within the ideological norms ac­
cording to which Faulkner expected his reader to judge); that the 
statement is false; and that, despite the authorial audience's dis­
dain for the speaker, it sees certain factors in his life as causal 
contributions to his hatred of Quentin. 
In a critical climate in which the very word literal has come under 
attack, where every act of shaping—be it in the form of a novel or a 
philosophical discourse or a newspaper editorial—is claimed to be a 
fiction, it is hard to know precisely what to call the process of 
making these determinations without appearing to be naive.2 
Nonetheless, the process does take place: in reading (decoding, 
unpacking, interpreting) Faulkner's sentence, the reader moves 
from what appears to be said to what is really said, or at least from 
one level (which, if not literal, is more immediate or more close at 
hand) to another (which is more distant, more mediated). I call this 
activity signification. 
Authors can be quite explicit about the acts of signification that 
they intend readers to perform. It is not only in allegories and 
children's books (one thinks of Tom Swift) that characters' names 
serve as signposts of character: Dostoyevsky's Lev (from "lion") 
Nikolaevich Myshkin (from "mouse") trumpets his ambivalent 
character. (His name and patronymic may also refer, more subtly, 
to Tolstoy.) Alice Walker goes a step further and, in the opening of 
Meridian, gives us a detailed analysis of the implications of her 
heroine's name, providing a dictionary-style offering with twelve 
different meanings.3 Nor is it only in fables and fairy tales that we 
find ourselves confronted with explicit statements about what it 
all means. In Anna Karenina, just as Levin's brother Nikolai dies, 
2. For a strong attack on the notion of literal meaning, see Stanley Fish, "Nor­
mal Circumstances, Literal Language, Direct Speech Acts, the Ordinary, the Every­
day, the Obvious, What Goes without Saying, and Other Special Cases/7 in Is There 
a Texti 268—92. For critical perspectives on the general expansion of the term 
fiction, see Barbara Foley, Telling the Truth, esp. chap. 1, and Gerald Graff, Liter­
ature against Itself, chap. 6. 
3. Alice Walker, Meridian (New York: Simon and Schuster/Washington Square, 
1977), [13J. 
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the doctors discover that Kitty is pregnant. Lest we fail to recog­
nize the cosmic implications of this coincidence, Tolstoy tells us 
directly—in a privileged position, at the end of a chapter: "Scarce­
ly had the unexplained mystery of death been enacted before his 
eyes when another mystery just as inexplicable presented itself, 
calling to love and life/'4 
More often than not, though, authors rely on a set of unspoken 
agreements to get their readers to apply the correct rules of sig­
nification to texts. Rules of signification are vast in number, and 
teachers probably have more trouble teaching their students to 
understand them than teaching them other kinds of rules. It is 
perhaps for this reason that so much literary criticism is devoted to 
rules of signification. Most of it, however, has been focused on the 
fairly narrow area of figurative language, which critical schools as 
diverse as New Criticism and post-structuralism have seen as the 
essence of literary study. Cleanth Brooks, for instance, has argued 
that "the essence of poetry is metaphor/' a statement that—except 
for its privileging of metaphor over other figures—accords quite 
comfortably with J. Hillis Miller's insistence that the "center of 
our discipline . .  . is expertise in handling figurative language," 
and that the "teaching of reading" is therefore inevitably "the 
teaching of the interpretation of tropes."5 Given this imbalance, 
there seems little point in trying to add yet more to what has 
already been said, for instance, about the ways in which readers 
know how and when to read textual features metaphorically. In­
stead, in this chapter I turn my attention to some other rules of 
signification that have not already been so well mined—specifical-
ly, to sketch out a few of them in four further categories suggested 
by my analysis of the Faulkner phrase above: rules of source, rules 
of morality, rules of truth and realism, and rules of causation. 
4. Leo Tolstoi, Anna Karenina, trans. Louise Maude and Aylmer Maude (New 
York: Norton, 1970), 459 (pt. 5, chap. 20). 
5. Cleanth Brooks, Well Wrought Um, 248; J. Hillis Miller, "Function of Rhet­
orical Study/' 13. Geoffrey Hartman would seem to agree: "Could we not say that 
there must be [in critical thinking] a willingness to receive figurative language?" 
{Criticism in the Wilderness, 27). Mary Louise Pratt has made a compelling case 
against the notion that the use of figurative language distinguishes literary from 
nonliterary discourse {Toward a Speech Act Theory, esp. chap. 1). 
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Rules of Source 
Even the most rudimentary guides aimed at showing how to read 
literature include, fairly soon, the warning against confusion of 
author, narrator, and character. A study sheet devised by Hamilton 
College's English Department for students beginning their first 
literature survey, for instance, informs them that the question, 
Who is speaking? is one of the first that a reader must ask.6 Be­
cause this distinction is stressed so often, it is only the most naive 
reader who makes gross errors on this score—who confuses Jason 
with Faulkner, for instance. Indeed, as Wayne Booth argued long 
ago in The Rhetoric of Fiction (the classic study of author/narrator 
relations), modern readers, if anything, tend to err in the opposite 
direction by ironizing everything, refusing to hear the implied au-
thor's voice even when he or she is speaking directly.7 But in 
moments of stress—the furors surrounding the publications of 
Madame Bovary and Lolita, for instance—such niceties are often 
forgotten.8 And the hazy area where fiction and autobiography 
melt into one another (as in Remembrance of Things Past or Trop­
ic of Cancer) often finds even professional critics merging author 
and narrator. 
To be sure, there is often good reason for this kind of uncertain­
ty; some passages in Madame Bovary, for instance, are so clouded 
that it is impossible to be sure precisely whose words are repre­
sented in the text.9 Still, what is surprising is not that we often 
find it hard to determine source (after all, difficulty is to be ex­
pected when we have one person taking on the voice of another). 
Rather, what is surprising is how easily experienced readers often 
figure out who is speaking even when the voice changes mid­
stream. Indeed, even those authors, like Flaubert, who aim to mud­
dle our thinking on this score can do so only because they assume 
we have certain procedures at hand that can be confused. Booth, in 
6. Hamilton College Department of English, guidelines for English 200. 
7. Wayne Booth, Rhetoric of Fiction, esp. 364-74. 
8. For an interesting discussion of Madame Bovary in this context, see Hans 
Robert Jauss, Toward an Aesthetic of Reception, 42—44. See also Dominick 
LaCapra, Madame Bovary 022 Trial. 
9. See LaCapra, Madame Bovary on Trial esp. chap. 6. 
79 
Narrative Conventions 
A Rhetoric of Irony, has pointed to a number of devices that signal 
the presence of an ironic voice, including the proclamation of 
"known error/' factual conflicts within a work, stylistic clashes, 
and conflicts "between the beliefs expressed and the beliefs we 
hold and suspect the author of holding" (italics in original).10 
While the procedures are somewhat subtler when irony is not pre­
sent, similar signals operate in these cases as well. Take, for in­
stance, the following passage from "Down by the Riverside," the 
second story in Richard Wright's Uncle Tom's Children: 
He walked to the window and the half rotten planks sagged under his 
feet. He had never realized they were that shaky. He pulled back a 
tattered curtain, wishing the dull ache would leave his head. Ah been 
feverish all day. Feels like Ah got the flu.11 
Obviously, the speaker changes between the third and fourth sen­
tences, from the narrator to the aptly named protagonist, Mann. 
The shift is extremely well marked in the text—overdetermined, 
in fact—because it is signaled in at least three ways. 
Most obvious, there is a shift in person, from third to first. In 
traditional, realistic nineteenth-century novels, this is not an es­
pecially common device, except when the character's words—ei-
ther thought or spoken—are placed in quotation marks. But it is 
found more frequently in contemporary novels, many of which use 
it in fairly complex ways. Nadine Gordimer's Burger's Daughter 
shifts between Rosa's first-person narration (addressed to different 
narratees as the book progresses) and various third-person view­
points, in order to provide different perspectives on Rosa's life. 
Margaret Drabble's Waterfall also flickers between the first and 
third person—but here the different grammatical categories reflect 
not so much different people as different sides of the same speak­
10. Booth, Rhetoric of Irony, 57, 61, 67, 73. See also Pratt's discussion of vio­
lations of the Cooperative Principle, Toward a Speech Act Theory, esp. chap. 5. 
Wolfgang Iser gives a more extreme version of this notion in his discussion of pop 
art when he argues that "whenever art uses exaggerated effects of affirmation . . . 
their function is . .  . to negate what they are apparently affirming" {Act of Reading, 
Hi. 
11. Wright, Uncle Tom's Children (New York: Harper and Row/Perennial Li­
brary, 1965), 54­
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er.12 Much the same technique (with the added complication of a 
second narrator) is used in John Fowles' Daniel Martin. 
In addition to the shift in person, there is a shift in linguistic 
style to Black English. According to a basic rule of signification, 
such changes are usually to be interpreted as a sign that the nar­
rator is no longer speaking in his or her own voice. As Booth ar­
gues, this is a standard technique in ironic works, but it is used in 
nonironic discourse as well. Shifts in linguistic style are especially 
important in distinguishing the source of particular phrases in 
texts that use free indirect discourse (what the French call style 
indirect libre), since they can work with extreme efficiency, even 
within a single sentence. Sometimes, the signification of stylistic 
shifts is reinforced by typography. As Dominick LaCapra points 
out, "The type of cliche from which Flaubert as narrator and as 
writer tried to take maximal distance was that of ordinary bour­
geois stupidity. When this sort of cliche is employed in 'objective' 
narration in Madame Bovary, it is often (but not invariably) ital-
icized."13 Similarly, when the narrator, Vandyke Jennings, in 
Charlotte Perkins Gilman's Herland notes, "Terry, in his secret 
heart, had visions of a sort of sublimated summer resort—just 
Girls and Girls and Girls," the capitalization serves as a clue that 
the word "Girls" is Terry's, not Jennings'.14 This rule, for all its 
apparent sophistication, is learned quite early. Sue Alexander's 
Marc the Magnificent may be aimed at first graders, but they are 
expected to know that the passages in parentheses and italics rep­
resent a different level of Marc's consciousness. The rule is harder 
to apply, but no different in principle, when employed without 
typographical support. In Some Do Not. . .  , a reference to "Glor­
vina, who was the mother of two of Sylvia's absolutely most inti­
mate friends" clues us in to a shift in source through the phrase 
"absolutely most intimate friends," with its inappropriate exag-
.geration.15 
12. For a fuller discussion of this technique, see Nancy S. Rabinowitz, "Talc on 
the Scotch: Art and Morality in Margaret Drabble's The Waterfall," International 
Journal of Women's Studies 5 (May/June 1982): 236-45. 
13. LaCapra, Madame Bovary on Trial, m  . 
14. Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Herland (New York: Pantheon, 1979), 7 (chap. 1). 
15. Ford Madox Ford, Some Do Not. . . , bound with No More Parades (New 
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Wright makes his shift even clearer by accompanying the shift in 
person and style with a shift in tense, from past to present. It is not, 
of course, the case that a shift to the present necessarily indicates a 
shift from narrator to character. Sometimes it indicates a swing the 
opposite way, sometimes no shift at all. Indeed, Seymour Chatman 
even argues that it always signals a move to the narrator: "If we 
read in a narrative otherwise in the preterite a sentence like War is 
hell/ the generalization is thought to hold for the narrator, as well 
as (or even rather than) for the characters. But 'War was hell' must 
mean that a character thinks so."16 But as Chatman himself real­
izes, in his discussion of the opening of Pride and Prejudice, there 
are numerous other factors at hand—including the question of the 
possible irony of the sentence. The most we can say here is that 
tense shifts may be used in numerous ways, but that their presence 
alerts the reader to a possible change in source. 
The Wright passage, of course, does not begin to exhaust the 
conventional techniques for dealing with source. Among the fur­
ther factors that help us determine whose words we are hearing are 
perspective and knowledge. When a text suddenly changes its van­
tage point from a general perspective to the limited perspective of 
one of the characters—that is, when we are seeing what one of the 
characters sees—we can often assume that the words we are read­
ing represent what the character is saying or thinking. Thus, 
Nabokov opens Laughter in the Dark with an overview of the 
story, ending with the narrator's claim, "and although there is 
plenty of space on a gravestone to contain, bound in moss, the 
York: NAL/Signet, 1964), 170 (pt. 2, chap. 1). See David Lodge: "The novelist who 
uses [free indirect speech] is obliged to be particularly faithful to the linguistic 
quality of his character's consciousness" [Language of Fiction, 171). It is not always 
easy to distinguish the author's voice from the character's, however, when we are 
not sure of the standards being applied. Later on in Ford's series, Mark thinks—in 
style indirect libie—"Friend of Sylvia's friends in the government. To do her credit 
she would not stop with Jews. The only credit she had to her tail!" [Last Post, bound 
with A Man Could Stand Up [New York: NAL/Signet, 1964], 222 [pt. 1, chap. 4]). 
Since neither the narrator nor the implied author ever suggests that anti-Semitism 
is bad (indeed, all the Jewish and half-Jewish characters are devious), there is no way 
to know whether we should view this as an ironic criticism of Mark. 
16. Chatman, Story and Discourse, 82. For a fuller discussion of the ways that 
linguistic devices can illuminate perspective, see his chap. 4. 
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abridged version of a man's life, detail is always welcome." When 
he abruptly changes gears ("It so happened that one night Albinus 
had a beautiful idea"), we have reason to suspect that the word 
"beautiful" is Albinus', not the narrator's—a suspicion confirmed 
by the ironic undercutting in the following sentence ("True, it was 
not quite his own").17 Alternatively, when our vision of a scene is 
too large for a character to have, we can often assume that the 
accompanying words are those of the narrator or implied author. 
Note, for instance, the next-to-last paragraph of Crime and 
Punishment: 
She too had been greatly agitated that day, and at night she was taken 
ill again. But she was so happy—and so unexpectedly happy—that 
she was almost frightened of her happiness. Seven years, only seven 
years! At the beginning of their happiness at some moments they 
were both ready to look on those seven years as though they were 
seven days. He did not know that the new life would not be given him 
for nothing, that he would have to pay dearly for it, that it would cost 
him great striving, great suffering.18 
In the phrase "Seven years, only seven years!"—which is im­
plicitly in the present tense—we are clearly intended to hear 
Sonia's voice. The final words, however ("would cost him great 
striving, great suffering"), because they come from a vision of 
events that is beyond that available to the characters, must be 
assumed to represent the voice of the narrator. 
Similarly, general statements that are too wise for the characters 
can generally be assumed to come from the narrator, at least when 
the narrator is a reliable representative of authorial norms. "His 
frock-coat seemed to have been made for someone else, and he had 
a beard like a tradesman's," we read of Dymov in Chekhov's story 
"The Grasshopper." "Of course, if he had been a writer or an artist 
everyone would have said that his beard made him look like Zola." 
None of the characters in the story has that kind of self-under-
17. Vladimir Nabokov, Laughter in the Dark (New York: New Directions, i960), 
9­
18. Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Crime and Punishment, trans. Constance Garnett (New 
York: Random House/Vintage, 1950), 492 (epilogue, chap. 2). 
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standing—so we can only assume that it is the narrator speaking. 
Alternatively, statements that obviously cut against what Booth 
calls the "known facts" can usually be assumed in reliable narra­
tion to represent the thoughts of the characters. A little later in the 
same Chekhov story, we read: 
They had a wonderful life after their marriage. Olga Ivanovna covered 
the walls of her drawing-room with sketches, framed and unframed, 
by herself and her friends, and surrounded the grand piano and the 
furniture with an artistic jumble of Chinese parasols, easels, many-
colored drapes, daggers, small busts, photographs. . .  . In the dining-
room she hung cheap colored prints, bast shoes, and scythes on the 
wall, and grouped a scythe and a rake in the corner, thus achieving a 
dining-room a la russe. She draped the ceiling and walls of the bed­
room with dark cloth, to make it look like a cave.19 
Once we have read the description of Olga's paltry attempts at 
creating a chic environment, we can be fairly confident that the 
designation "wonderful" cannot be the narrator's. 
Good Guys and Bad Guys: 
Rules of Snap Moral Judgment 
"I didn't finish the book/' said Maggie. "As soon as I came to the 
blond-haired young lady reading in the park, I shut it up, and deter­
mined to read no further. I foresaw that that light-complexioned girl 
would win away all the love from Corinne and make her miserable. 
I'm determined to read no more books where the blond-haired wom­
en carry away all the happiness. I should begin to have a prejudice 
against them. If you could give me some story, now, where the dark 
woman triumphs, it would restore the balance/'20 
19. Anton Chekhov, 'The Grasshopper/' trans. Ivy Litvinov, in Anton Che-
khov's Short Stones, ed. Ralph Matlaw (New York: Norton, 1979), 70, 71 (chap. 1, 
20. George Eliot, The Mill on the Floss, ed. Gordon Haight (New York: Houghton 
Mifflin/Riverside, 1961), 290-91 (bk. 5, chap. 4). For an insightful discussion of this 
passage from a different perspective, see Nancy K. Miller, "Emphasis Added/7 
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Whether Wayne Booth is correct when he claims that "the emo­
tions and judgments of the implied author are . .  . the very stuff 
out of which great fiction is made/'21 there can be little doubt that 
the process of moral evaluation plays a central role in the reading 
of narrative fiction, and that for many readers, the greatest liter­
ature is that which forces them to probe the most difficult ethical 
questions with the greatest sensitivity [A Hero of Our Time, The 
Ambassadors, Anna Karenina, Remembrance of Things Past). 
Still, there are any number of reasons why an author might wish us 
to make quick judgments about his or her characters. Some nar-
ratives—for instance, adventure stories like the James Bond nov-
els—depend for their effect on our experiencing the triumph over 
evil rather than on our understanding its nature. In such cases, 
efficient techniques are necessary so that the reader can know 
quickly who stands where. Furthermore, morality in fiction is 
closely tied to configuration; that is, ethical character—as we are 
reminded by the history of both the words ethical (from ethos) and 
character (meaning both moral quality and personage)—is often 
defined in terms of the kinds of actions we expect a character to 
perform in the future. Authors often need quick ways to set those 
expectations up. And even in novels where the primary end is 
ethical exploration, authors may need devices to allow readers to 
judge characters quickly—either because the characters are too 
minor for full development, or because the author needs an initial 
scaffolding that can then be developed (or undercut ironically) as 
the novel progresses. Dostoyevsky's subtle probing of light and 
dark imagery in The Idiot has the impact it does only because we 
start to evaluate fair-haired Myshkin and dark-haired Rogozhin as 
soon as we see them. Similarly, Gogol's play with the traditional 
patterns of light and dark in his treatment of the prostitute and the 
pure wife in "Nevsky Prospect/' like Dashiell Hammett's reversal 
of the motif of the jolly fat man in The Maltese Falcon, can pro­
duce its intended effect only on readers who are prepared to make 
certain judgments to begin with. 
Authors will often tell us quite directly what we should think of 
their characters. Mr. John Dashwood, we learn at the beginning of 
21. Booth, Rhetoric of Fiction, 86. 
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Sense and Sensibility, "was not an ill-disposed young man, unless 
to be rather cold hearted, and rather selfish, is to be ill-disposed.//22 
In addition, though, authors make use of a number of rules that 
they assume we have learned, and that allow us to make the appro­
priate judgments ourselves. Many of these rules are closely related 
to the New Critical doctrine of consistency of character. Although 
I would not agree with Brooks and Warren when they insist that 
the "thoughts and actions" of characters "must ultimately be 
coherent,"23 it is certainly the case that when we read nineteenth-
and twentieth-century narratives, we tend, on the whole, to as­
sume a kind of consistency of character that hardly holds in life. 
This consistency, in fact, goes well beyond the meshing of 
thoughts and actions. There are many axes along which characters 
are generally assumed to be consistent, although most rules of 
snap moral judgment fall into one of two general classes: meta­
phorical rules of appearance and metonymic rules of enchainment. 
The most basic rule of appearance is that we are to judge charac­
ters by their exterior, until the text gives us sufficient reason to 
judge them in some other way. Physical appearance, in other 
words, can be assumed to stand metaphorically for inner quality. 
The ability to make this metaphoric leap is a part of what Jonathan 
Culler calls "symbolic recuperation," which, in contrast to "em­
pirical recuperation . . . operates where causal connections are ab­
sent. . . . We would presumably be unwilling to assume a causal 
connection between a perfect or a blemished complexion and a 
perfect or blemished moral character, but the symbolic code per­
mits such associations and enables us to take the former as the sign 
of the latter/'24 But while it is not a direct analogue of the way 
22. Jane Austen, Sense and Sensibility, ed. R. W. Chapman, 3d ed. (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1933), 5 (chap. 1). 
23. Cleanth Brooks and Robert Perm Warren, Understanding Fiction, 173. See 
also Gary Saul Morson's claim that one of the rules of a novel is that "the state­
ments, actions, and beliefs of any principal character (or the narrator) are to be 
understood as a reflection of his or her personality, and of the biographical events 
and social milieu that have shaped it." In this regard, he argues, novels differ from 
Utopias [Boundaries of Genie, 77). 
24. Culler, Structuralist Poetics, 225. 
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readers reason when dealing with their social realities, this sym­
bolic code is neither constant nor purely literary. Specific applica­
tions will vary by text, and these variations are often echoes (and 
sometimes reinforcements) of the cultural norms within which the 
text is operating. Thus, for instance, the particular visual cues 
intended to inspire distrust in one text will not necessarily have the 
same meaning in another. The Late George Apley's father moved 
out of his old Boston neighborhood because seeing "a man in his 
shirt sleeves" on the steps was enough to tell him "that the days of 
the South End were numbered/'25 But the relevance of that physical 
feature is not the same in 1986 as it was either a century earlier, 
when the event took place, or a half-century earlier, when the novel 
was written. Similarly, nineteenth-century authors who expected 
their readers to make character judgments based on hair color did 
not expect their readers to decode the image of the blond woman in 
the same ways that writers of mid-twentieth-century hardboiled 
American fiction did. Still, the basic rule—that character is more or 
less revealed in appearance—holds steadily. Even a novelist like 
Southworth who argues philosophically and politically that char­
acter and appearance do not reflect each other ("At some former 
period in the history of the human race characters and countenances 
may have been in harmony, but not now")26 is apt to find herself 
falling back on traditional literary markers of moral worth. 
Norham Montrose was, in form and features, the very counterpart of 
Malcolm, having the same tall, broad-shouldered, deep-chested, 
strong limbed athletic form, the same noble Roman features, and the 
same commanding presence. But in complexion and in temperament 
they were as opposite as day and night; for whereas Malcolm was fair 
as a Saxon, with clear, blue eyes, and light auburn hair, Norham was 
dark as a Spaniard, with jet-black eyes and raven-black hair and 
whiskers.27 
25. John P. Marquand, The Late George Apley: A Novel in the Form of a Memoir 
(New York: Modern Library, 1940), 25-26 (chap. 3). 
26. E[mma] D. E. N. Southworth, The Bride of Llewellyn (Chicago: Donohue, 
n.d.), 212 (chap. 30). 
27. Emma D. E. N. Southworth, Allworth Abbey; or, Eudora (New York: Hurst, 
1876), 139 (chap. 10). 
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Given the literary conventions according to which this text was 
expected to be read, in fact, both the phrase "in complexion and in 
temperament/' and, even more, the next sentence of the text 
("And where Malcolm was gracious, liberal and confiding, Nor-
ham was haughty, reserved and suspicious") are redundant. 
Eyes are among the more reliable visual guides to character in 
fiction. As the narrator of Owen Wister's Virginian puts it, "Out of 
the eyes of every stranger looks either a friend or an enemy, wait­
ing to be known."28 It is no accident that Wells gives the hero of 
The Time Machine gray eyes, for he wants us to know, from the 
beginning, that he is keen, intelligent, controlled. When we are 
told that Olga, the protagonist of Chekhov's "Darling," has "gen­
tle, soft eyes," or that Alyona Ivanovna, the pawnbroker in Crime 
and Punishment, has "sharp, malignant eyes," or that Cecil Car­
ver, in Career in C Major, "had the biggest black eyes I ever saw" 
(in contrast to the Social Register types, who are "all so cultured 
that even their eyeballs were lavender")—we know a great deal 
more about the characters than simply what they look like.29 
As a general rule, it is appropriate to treat the way characters 
sound much as we treat the way they look. Sometimes we are 
asked to judge by the quality of a voice per se (note Ippolit's 
squeaky voice in The Idiot or Daisy Buchanan's "low, thrilling 
voice," with its "fluctuating, feverish warmth," in The Great 
Gatsby).30 Sometimes it is the way that language is used that 
serves as a guide to character. Ring Lardner assumes we will judge 
this narrator as soon as he begins to speak: 
Mother says that when I start talking I never know when to stop. But 
I tell her the only time I get a chance is when she ain't around, so I 
have to make the most of it. I guess the fact is neither one of us would 
be welcome in a Quaker meeting, but as I tell Mother, what did God 
give us tongues for if He didn't want we should use them? Only she 
28. Wister, The Virginian (New York: Macmillan, 1902), 477 (chap. 35). 
29. Anton Pavlovich Chekhov, "The Darling/' in Lady with Lapdog and Other 
Stories, trans. David Magarshack (Baltimore: Penguin, 1964), 252; Dostoyevsky, 
Crime and Punishment, 4 (pt. 1, chap. 1); James M. Cain, Career in C Major, in 
Three of a Kind (Philadelphia: Blakiston, 1944), 17, 4 (chap. 3, 1). 
30. F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby (New York: Scribner's, 1925), 9, 97. 
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says He didn't give them to us to say the same thing over and over 
again, like I do, and repeat myself.31 
Once again, the specific conclusions to be drawn vary according to 
the context in which the book was intended to be read. Black 
English has different implications in Dixon's Leopard's Spots and 
in Wright's Uncle Tom's Children; in the Hardy Boys books, rough 
language is usually a sign of rough character, whereas in Chandler, 
refined English is intended to arouse suspicion. 
We are also, as I suggested above, asked to judge characters by 
their names. This is not only the case with clearly allegorical 
names (Dostoyevsky's Golyadkin, from "naked"), or only in dis­
plays of linguistic virtuosity (the famous guest list in The Great 
Gatsby). Names also often imply, more subtly, a class or ethnic 
aura that, in a particular context, will carry a particular moral 
valence.32 In Louise Meriwether's "Daddy Was a Number Run­
ner," for instance, it is significant that the black narrator's mother 
gets a job as a cleaning woman in the Bronx with someone named 
Mrs. Schwartz, although the same name would have an entirely 
different resonance in a text about Jewish life. 
In addition to metaphorical rules of appearance, which make it 
appropriate to assume that physical or verbal characteristics stand 
for moral qualities, we have metonymical rules of enchainment, 
which make it appropriate to assume that the presence of one 
moral quality is linked to the presence of another that lies more or 
less contiguous to it. 
We are not only asked, for instance, to judge characters accord­
ing to certain rules, but also to judge them according to how well 
they apply the rules. Thus, in mapping out the moral terrain of 
Southworth's AUworth Abbey, the reader is expected to judge peo­
31. Ring W. Lardner, "The Golden Honeymoon/7 in How to Write Short Stones 
[With Samples] (New York: Scribner's, 1925), 115. 
32. See Ruth Prigozy's argument that Fitzgerald was "intrigued with the pos­
sibilities of names as social indicators, symbolic reflectors of class status and even 
moral outlook" ("Gatsby's Guest List and Fitzgerald's Technique of Naming/7 
Fitzgerald/Hemingway Annual 1972, ed. Matthew J. Bruccoli and C. E. Frazer 
Clark, Jr. [Washington: Microcards, 1972], 99). 
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pie not only on their appearances but also on their ability to judge 
by appearance. 
The stranger listened with the deepest interest. At the conclusion of 
the narrative, he said: 
"The circumstances, indeed, seem to point out this young Eudora 
Leaton as the criminal; but from the glimpse I caught of her lovely 
face, she is just the last person in the world I should suspect of 
crime."33 
Southworth's purpose in providing the stranger's assessment is not 
to guide our judgment of Eudora; we already know that she is 
beautiful and that she has been unjustly charged with murder. 
Rather, its function is to allow us to judge the stranger, who by his 
correct analysis shows himself worthy of our trust. 
In another kind of chaining, many narratives also ask us, in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, to assume a kind of innocence 
by association: we trust the friends of our friends and the enemies 
of our enemies. We can well appreciate Daniel Martin's method of 
appraisal. 
I took a little to judging friends, and not only the ones I shared my bed 
with, by Phoebe's reaction . . . how much she would chat with them, 
how discreet or voluble she would be, how much put on her old 
maidservant self or show her real one. It was all rather absurd, per­
haps; but people got a bad mark if they didn't get on with Phoebe and 
learn to walk the delicate tightrope between giving her a hand in the 
kitchen and taking possession of it. [Ellipsis in original]34 
As with all narrative rules, authors frequently create their effects 
by tricking readers. The authorial audience of The Maltese Falcon 
at first trusts Brigid because she receives an unqualified endorse­
ment from Effie Perrine's "woman's intuition": 
"What do you think of Wonderly?" 
"I'm all for her," the girl replied without hesitation. 
33. Southworth, Allworth Abbey, 190 (chap. 14). 
34. John Fowles, Daniel Martin (New York: NAL/Signet, 1978), 367 ("West­
ward"). 
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"She's got too many names/' Spade mused, "Wonderly, Leblanc, 
and she says the right one's O'Shaughnessy." 
"I don't care if she's got all the names in the phone-book. That girl 
is all right and you know it."35 
In the end, of course, the authorial audience discovers that it has 
been fooled, an effect that helps drive home the antifeminism of 
the text by showing that even "good" women like Effie are not to 
be trusted. But Hammett can use this rhetorical technique only 
because he can assume that his readers will apply the rule in the 
first place. 
Similarly, we are often expected to assume that one moral failing 
naturally accompanies another. In Owen Wister's Virginian, for 
instance, we are expected to treat Balaam's failure to care properly 
for animals as a sign of a broader moral failing, just as in Charles W. 
Chesnutt's "Mars Jeems's Nightmare7' (from The Conjure Woman), 
we are expected to think ill of McLean's overall character when we 
see him beating his horse "furiously with a buggy whip."36 In 
Gatshy, we are surely not meant to be surprised when a man who 
has fixed the World Series—and who is Jewish and talks with an 
accent to boot—refuses to attend his friend's funeral. One could do a 
revealing cultural study by examining what flaws in particular are 
chosen—by what writers in what social contexts—as the material 
on which readers are asked to apply this rule. It is, I think, a sign of a 
particular kind of moral vision that Chekhov, for instance, so rarely 
invokes it. 
One specific variant of the linking of moral feelings is the rule 
that Space Invaders are to be distrusted. Thus, in the beginning of 
The Idiot, the authorial audience is apprehensive of Lebedev in 
part because he imposes himself on Myshkin and Rogozhin. This 
rule applies not only to physical space, but to emotional and liter­
ary space as well. Andrew Garve, in The Far Sands, relies on this 
rule to create suspense. The novel concerns a man who comes to 
wonder whether his wife is planning to kill him for his money (as 
35. Dashiell Hammett, The Maltese Falcon, in The Novels of Dashiell Hammett 
(New York: Knopf, 1965), 321 (chap. 4). 
36. Chesnutt, The Conjure Woman (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press/ 
Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1969), 69. 
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he thinks her identical twin did to her rich husband). It is therefore 
appropriate that Garve begins the novel, not after their marriage, 
but with him as a single man meeting her. The novel, in other 
words, is structured so that she enters the home space of his novel; 
she is thus especially subject to suspicion. 
Novelists may also expect readers to use allusions as a basis for 
chaining their judgments. Of course, readers are often asked to 
transfer judgments when characters are explicitly or implicitly 
compared to characters in a previous, familiar text—we should, for 
instance, have already made a judgment about the heroine of 
Leskov's "Lady Macbeth of the Mzensk District" before we have 
even gotten through the title. More interesting for my purposes, 
though, readers are often expected to link ethical quality and aes­
thetic taste. In many texts, we are asked to assume—until there is 
evidence to the contrary—that people with the correct aesthetic 
views are also morally correct, while those with aesthetic failings 
have moral failings as well. We should not be surprised when Mar­
ianne, in Sense and Sensibility, turns out to have—at least by the 
standards of the authorial audience—moral flaws that mirror her 
foolish views on art; and Willoughby is suspect as soon as he 
echoes Marianne's aesthetic creed. Similarly, our judgments of the 
characters in Remembrance of Things Past depend to a large ex­
tent on their responses to music—especially, of course, on their 
responses to Vinteuil. And in James Cain's Serenade, we know 
that down-and-out Howard Sharp can trust the feisty Captain Con­
ners to help him escape from Mexico, because Conners admires 
Beecham's conducting of the Beethoven Seventh and—even 
more—because Conners is susceptible to Sharp's demonstration 
that Mozart might be a greater composer than Beethoven.37 But it 
is not only in the works of such novelists as Austen, Proust, and 
Cain—whose very themes, in part, are the interconnection of art 
and morality—that readers are expected to respond in this way. In 
Farewell, My Lovely, Marlowe keeps referring to Galbraith, a Bay 
City cop, as "Hemingway"—because he " 'keeps saying the same 
thing over and over until you begin to believe it must be good.' "3 8 
37- Cain, Serenade (New York: Bantam, 1968), 56-58 (chap. 5). 
38. Raymond Chandler, Farewell, My Lovely (New York: Pocket, 1943), 128 
(chap. 24). 
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Galbraith's inability to understand the wisecrack is a point against 
him. 
Needless to say, this convention depends not only on the read-
er's prior understanding of the rule itself and the prior knowledge 
of the works in question, but also on the reader's sharing of the 
author's judgments about those works. Without some knowledge 
of Chekhov's expectations about his readers' views on literature, it 
is hard to know, in "The Teacher of Literature," precisely how to 
take Shebaldin's criticism of Nikitin for his lack of familiarity 
with Lessing, or how to interpret Nikitin's consequent despair. 
Jane Gray's dismissal of Jane Austen in Drabble's Waterfall raises 
similar interpretive questions. 
Truth and the Narrative Audience: 
The Rule of Realism 
When I said above that Jason's statement (in The Sound the Fury) 
was "false," what exactly did I mean? Questions about the status 
of literary truth are as old as literary criticism, but they have be­
come both more intricate and more compelling as literature has 
grown progressively more self-conscious and labyrinthine in its 
dealings with reality. One might perhaps read the Iliad or even 
Dickens' Hard Times without raising such issues. But such au­
thors as Doris Lessing (especially in The Golden Notebook), 
Nabokov, and Borges seem continually to remind their readers of 
the complex nature of literary truth. How, for instance, are we to 
deal with a passage like the following from William Demby's novel 
The Catacombs! 
When I began this novel, I secretly decided that, though I would 
exercise a strict selection of the facts to write down, be they "fiction­
al" facts or "true" facts taken from newspapers or directly observed 
events from my own life, once I had written something down I would 
neither edit nor censor it (myself).39 
What does this sentence mean? When an apparently fictional 
narrator (who, to confuse matters, has the same name as his author 
39. Demby, The Catacombs (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), 93 (chap. 6). 
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and is also writing a novel entitled The Catacombs) distinguishes 
between "fictional" and "true" facts, what is the status of the 
word "true"? It clearly does not mean the same as "fictional," for 
he opposes the two terms. Yet it cannot mean "true" in the sense 
that historians would use, for he calls what he is writing a novel, 
and even if he quotes accurately from newspapers, the events of a 
narrator's life are not historically true. 
This is but a small version of other more famous literary ques­
tions. What precisely do we mean when we ask whether the gov­
erness in Henry James' Turn of the Screw is really a trustworthy 
witness? Or when we ask whether Dostoyevsky's Golyadkin (The 
Double) really has a double? Or what really happened last year at 
Marienbad? 
To answer these questions, we must remember that all works of 
representational art—including novels—are imitations in the 
sense that they appear to be something that they are not. A piece of 
canvas, for example, appears to be the mayor or the Madonna; a 
tale about a nonexistent clerk and his overcoat appears to be a true 
account. As a result, the aesthetic experience of such works exists 
on two levels at once. We cannot treat the work either as what it is 
or as what it appears to be; we must be aware simultaneously of 
both aspects. A reader is hardly responding to the Sherlock Holmes 
stories as the author intended if he or she treats him as a historical 
being, makes pilgrimages to his home on Baker Street, and uses 
weather reports to determine when certain stories "actually" took 
place.40 Neither, however, is the reader who refuses to fear for 
Holmes' safety as he battles Moriarty, on the grounds that he is 
simply a fiction. 
In the proper reading of a novel, events that are portrayed must 
be treated as both true and untrue at the same time. One way of 
dealing with this duality is to add a third term to the distinction 
between actual and authorial audience. As I have noted, every 
author designs his or her work rhetorically for a specific hypo­
thetical audience. But since a novel is generally an imitation of 
some nonfictional form (usually history, including biography and 
40. For an encyclopedia/ presumably tongue-in-cheek, of this sort of reaction, see 
William S. Baring-Gould, The Annotated Sherlock Holmes, 2 vols. (New York: 
Clarkson N. Potter, 1967). 
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autobiography), the narrator of the novel (implicit or explicit) is 
generally an imitation of an author.41 He or she writes for an im­
itation audience (which I call the narrative audience) that also 
possesses particular knowledge. The narrator of War and Peace 
appears to be a historian. As such, he is writing for an audience 
that not only knows (as does the authorial audience) that Moscow 
was burned in 1812, but that also believes that Natasha, Pierre, and 
Andrei "really" existed, and that the events in their lives "really" 
took place. In order to read War and Peace, we must therefore do 
more than join Tolstoy's authorial audience; we must at the same 
time pretend to be a member of the imaginary narrative audience 
for which the narrator is writing. Whether they think about it or 
not, this is what all successful readers do when approaching the 
text. 
The nature of the narrative audience can perhaps be clarified by 
distinguishing it from some other apparently similar concepts. For 
instance, the narrative audience is quite different from the narrat­
tee, the person to whom the narrator is addressing himself or her-
self.42 The narratee is perceived by the reader as "out there/7 a 
separate person who often serves as a mediator between narrator 
and reader. The "narrative audience/7 in contrast, is a role which 
the text forces the reader to take on. The pretense involved in 
joining the narrative audience is also different from what Frank 
Kermode calls "experimental assent.7743 "Experimental assent77 is 
an activity on the part of the actual audience through which it 
relates the novel to reality, accepting the novel if it turns out to be 
"operationally effective/7 rejecting it otherwise. The pretense I am 
describing is closer to Coleridge7s "willing suspension of dis-
belief/7 except that I would argue not that disbelief is suspended 
but rather that it is both suspended and not suspended at the same 
time.44 
41. For a development of the notion of literature as "fictive discourse"—that is, 
as an imitation of utterances rather than of actions—see Barbara Herrnstein Smith, 
On the Margins of Discourse. 
42. See, for instance, Gerald Prince, "Introduction to the Study of the Narratee/' 
43. Kermode, The Sense of an Ending, 38-40. 
44.1 am not concerned here with the actual psychological processes by which a 
specific reader performs this act. This subject, however, is treated in Norman Hol-
land's Dynamics of Literary Response, Holland starts out with the same observa­
tion that I do: we both believe and do not believe a literary text. But since he is 
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One way to determine the characteristics of the narrative au­
dience is to ask, "What sort of reader would I have to pretend to 
be—what would I have to know and believe—if I wanted to take 
this work of fiction as real?" Normally, pretending to be a member 
of the narrative audience is a fairly simple task, especially when 
we are reading traditional realistic fiction: we temporarily take on 
certain minimal beliefs in addition to those we already hold. Thus, 
for a while we believe that a woman named Isabel Archer really 
existed, and thought and acted in a certain way,- or, on a broader 
scale, that Yoknapatawpha County and its inhabitants really exist. 
Sometimes, however, we must go even further and pretend to 
abandon our real beliefs and accept in their stead "facts" and be­
liefs that even more fundamentally contradict our perceptions of 
reality. In 1984, the narrative audience possesses "knowledge" of a 
series of "facts" about what was, at the time the book was written, 
"future" world history. In Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, the nar­
rative audience accepts what the authorial audience knows to be 
false scientific doctrine. 
If we do not pretend to be members of the narrative audience, or 
if we misapprehend the beliefs of that audience, we are apt to make 
invalid, even perverse, interpretations. For instance, the narrative 
audience of Cinderella accepts the existence of fairy godmothers 
(although the authorial audience does not share this belief). A read­
er who refuses to pretend to share that belief will see Cinderella as 
a psychotic young woman subject to hallucinations. 
concerned with the psychological actions of readers (particularly with their uncon­
scious fantasies) rather than with the conscious audience roles implied by a text, his 
resulting categories (intellecting reader/introjecting reader) differ markedly from 
mine. For another formulation of a similar dichotomy, see Pratt, Toward a Speech 
Act Theory, 174. See also Robin Feuer Miller's discussion of The Idiot, where she 
distinguishes between ''the narrator's reader (who reads for pleasure, in a chrono­
logical and unreflective fashion)" and "the implied reader (who reads more care­
fully, attempting to discover the implied author's message)" [Dostoevsky and The 
Idiot, 127). These simultaneous roles are distinguished more by attitudes and values 
than by issues of truth; thus, her "narrator's reader" is closer to what I have else­
where called the "ideal narrative audience" (the audience that the narrator wishes 
he or she were writing for) than to the narrative audience (see my "Truth in Fiction: 
Toward a Reexamination of Audiences," Critical Inquiry 4 [Autumn 1977]: 134­
36), and is therefore of use primarily in analyzing ironic texts. 
96 
Rules of Signification 
Although there are as many narrative audiences as there are 
novels, they tend to fall into groups, the members of which are 
quite similar. A reader does not really have to shift gears to move 
from War and Peace to Gone with the Wind, different as those 
novels are. Sometimes, however, a novelist is able to create a star­
tling tone or mood by demanding a narrative audience that is unex­
pected or unfamiliar. Kafka's Metamorphosis is a good example. 
What is striking about this novella is not simply its fantastic prem­
ise, which is no more fantastic than the basic premises of Alice in 
Wonderland. Nor can the peculiar quality of Kafka's tale be ex­
plained purely in terms of the characters' odd reactions to Gregor's 
transformation. What strikes me as most curious about the book is 
the unusual nature of the narrative audience. In Alice we are asked 
to pretend that White Rabbits wear watches, that Cheshire Cats 
fade away, and that Caterpillars smoke hookahs. This is readily 
done by joining a narrative audience of a sort that is familiar from 
our experience with fairy tales. In Metamorphosis, however, we 
are only asked to accept the single fantastic fact that Gregor has 
been transformed into a gigantic beetle; in all other respects the 
narrative audience is a normal, level-headed bourgeois audience. 
Furthermore, we are asked to accept this without surprise; con­
trast the matter-of-fact opening of Metamorphosis with the equiv­
alent passages in Alice or in Gogol's "Nose," where the narrative 
audiences are openly warned that the events portrayed will be 
strange and unusual. This curiously contradictory role—half mun­
dane, half fantastic—contributes greatly to the novella's disquiet­
ing tone. 
Although many critics have dealt with the implied audiences of 
texts, they have tended, on the whole, to ignore the distinction 
between authorial and narrative audiences—as Walker Gibson and 
Walter Ong do when they write, respectively, of "mock readers" 
and "fictionalized" audiences.45 Granted, both the authorial and 
45. Walker Gibson, "Authors, Speakers, Readers, and Mock Readers''; Walter J. 
Ong, "The Writer's Audience Is Always a Fiction." In fact, almost all critics who 
discuss the reader are discussing a hybrid form that crosses the lines I have set up. 
For example, Wolfgang Iser's discussions of the reader's discoveries [Implied Read­
er) are really studies of the narrative and authorial audiences combined. Only to­
ward the end of his book does he suggest a duality in the reader, hi Stanley Fish's 
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the narrative audiences are fictions (neither exists in the flesh), but 
they are fictions in radically different senses. When speaking of the 
authorial audience, we might more accurately use the term hypo­
thetical rather than the term fictional. As I have suggested, most 
authors, in determining their authorial audience, try—within the 
limitations imposed by their aesthetic aims—to approximate the 
actual audience as closely as possible. For to the extent that an 
authorial audience is invented, footnotes or other explanations 
will be required before the text can work. Thus, while some au­
thors (such as Joyce) are forced, because of the esoteric nature of 
their intentions, to idealize and write for an audience they know 
does not exist (or does not exist in significant numbers), few au­
thors intentionally strive for such a situation. As T. S. Eliot puts it, 
"When a poet deliberately restricts his public by his choice of style 
of writing or of subject-matter, this is a special situation demand­
ing explanation and extenuation, but I doubt whether this ever 
happens. . . . From one point of view, the poet aspires to the condi­
tion of the music-hall comedian. Being incapable of altering his 
wares to suit a prevailing taste, if there be any, he naturally desires 
a state of society in which they may become popular/746 
The distance between authorial and actual audiences, in sum, 
may be inevitable—but it is generally undesirable, and authors 
usually try to keep the gap narrow. The narrative audience, on the 
other hand, is truly a fiction; the author not only knows that the 
narrative audience is different from the actual and authorial au­
diences, but rejoices in this fact and expects his or her actual au­
dience to rejoice as well. For it is this difference that makes fiction 
Self-Consuming Artifacts, the reader seems to be a complex combination: at least 
two actual audiences (the current, informed audience, with Fish as representative,-
the historical audience at the time the work was written), the authorial audience, 
and—when he is writing about fiction—the narrative audience. A primary dif­
ference between Fish's model (in that early book) and mine is that his is horizontal 
(he is concerned with the progress of a unified reader through time) while mine is 
vertical (I am concerned with distinguishing the different levels on which a reader 
operates simultaneously). Prince's distinction between real readers, virtual readers, 
ideal readers, and narratees (even though it does not, as I have pointed out, deal 
precisely with differing roles played by the reader) leads to more subtle analyses 
("Introduction," 9). 
46. Eliot, Use of Poetry, 22. 
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fiction and makes the double-leveled aesthetic experience pos­
sible. 
From the authorial/narrative distinction emerges at least one 
fundamental reading convention: the rule of realism. Realism, of 
course, is a slippery concept. Although there are many ways to 
define it, recurring difficulties crop up whenever it is seen in terms 
of the relationship between the novel and some external, em­
pirically verifiable world. For that empirical reality is, to a large 
extent, a changing social construct; thus, with any such definition, 
the corpus of so-called realistic works varies according to changes 
in readers7 perceptions—it changes with each shift in scientific 
paradigms, with each shift in cultural norms. There is, to my 
mind, little value in a definition of realism that at best encourages 
us to dismiss older works as foolish and quaint—and at worst 
encourages us to twist them until they confirm our current preju­
dices, so that Hamlet is reduced to a verification of Freud, Poe to a 
confirmation of Lacan. Nor am I enthusiastic about a definition 
whereby Jules Verne, for instance, becomes more and more real­
istic as time goes on. 
There is, however, another approach to the problem. If we look 
instead at the relationship between the narrative and authorial 
audiences, we find that there is something constant in most of the 
fiction that has commonly been considered realistic. In The Por­
trait of a Lady, for instance, the narrative and authorial audiences 
are quite close; the narrative audience is asked to accept very little 
beyond the beliefs of the authorial audience and virtually nothing 
that seriously contradicts those beliefs. Thus, while the narrative 
audience believes that Isabel exists, this hardly conflicts with the 
authorial audience's prior experiences,- it is not improbable that 
such a person should exist and act as she does. Contrast this situa­
tion with that in novels generally thought to be antirealistic or 
fantastic. In Nathanael West's Dream Life of Balso Snell, for in­
stance, the narrative audience takes on a good deal more—beliefs 
that, like the belief that one could stumble on the Trojan Horse, do 
contradict the experiences of the authorial audience.47 
47. John W. Loofbourow's attempt to solve this problem is similar to mine, but 
is not entirely successful because he fails to distinguish between implied audi­
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Of course, defining realism in terms of the distance between the 
two audiences does not provide a quantitative measure; literary 
distances may exist along several axes at once (scientific, histor­
ical, ethical, and so on), and they do not submit easily to the tape 
measure. This approach, however, does have the advantage of 
treating the realism of a given text as something that remains 
constant despite historical change. Furthermore, this definition 
reaffirms that realism is not a box into which some works fall and 
others do not, but rather a tendency, and it suggests that all novels 
are more or less, but at least somewhat, realistic in the sense of 
reflecting the beliefs of their authorial audience. Indeed, there is a 
general rule of realism to which virtually all nineteenth- and twen-
tieth-century novels, at least those in the Western tradition, sub­
scribe: the authorial audience knows it is reading a work of art, 
while the narrative audience believes what it is reading is real; but 
we can assume that in other respects the narrative audience shares 
the beliefs, prejudices, desires, fears, and expectations of the au­
thorial audience, except where there is some evidence to the con­
trary, either in the text or in literary conventions. This principle 
can be broken down into two parts. First, there are areas of overlap 
between the two audiences, beliefs about reality that are common 
to both the authorial and the narrative levels; second, there is a 
more or less systematic way in which the areas of disagreement are 
mapped out. Let us look at these two claims in turn. 
(i) No matter how fantastic a novel's premises, no matter how 
unrealistic the setting, the authorial audience and the narrative 
audience must share some beliefs about reality in order for the 
situations and actions to have the consequences they do and for 
the plot to get from point A to point B. That's because every fic­
ences. He locates realism in "any work in which the artist's assumptions about 
'reality' are the same as those of his audience" ("Literary Realism Redefined/' 434). 
But since he lumps together the authorial and narrative audiences, his definition 
falls apart. Surely the author and the authorial audience of Alice in Wonderland 
have the same preconceptions about reality; only the narrative audience has a 
different view of the world. And since, as Loofbourow notes, Dickens does under­
mine many of the preconceptions of his readers, we end up with the curious anoma­
ly of realism that includes Carroll but excludes Dickens. For further development, 
see his "Realism in the Anglo-American Novel." 
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tional world, like every real world, requires a history, sociology, 
biology, mathematics, aesthetics, and ethics. The action of Gon-
charov's Oblomov, for instance, requires the institution of 
serfdom,- the scenes of mental torture in 1984 can work their terror 
only because even in that world, two plus two really does equal 
four. And while in theory the writer of fiction can remake the 
world as he or she pleases, in practice no writer can create an entire 
world from scratch. Such a novel would be infinite, incomprehen­
sible, or both.48 Thus, novelists always require their readers to 
make inferences about characters and actions; those inferences are 
possible only if there are at least some points at which the novel's 
inner world—the world of the narrative audience—is congruent 
with the world of the authorial audience. Take, for instance, 
Robbe-Grillet's Erasers. It is an extremely unrealistic novel. It 
takes place in an imaginary city, where imaginary terrorists are 
threatening an imaginary government; more significant, the nor­
mal laws of cause and effect have been suspended: doubles appear 
unexpectedly, time stops. Yet when some women make suggestive 
comments about what goes on in the clinic of the gynecologist, 
Juard, readers catch the meaning. They can make the proper in­
ferences, though, only because, fantastic as this world is, it is also 
assumed to coincide partially with that of the authorial audience— 
specifically, in the way in which abortions are handled. 
(2) The characteristics of the narrative audience—that is, the 
respects in which it differs from the authorial audience—must be 
48. Robert Scholes, working from a different critical perspective, comes to much 
the same conclusion; see "Towards a Semiotics of Literature/' See also Chatman, 
Story and Discourse, esp. 27-31, 138; and Champigny's claim that in fiction, "the 
introduction of fantastic elements has to be restricted; otherwise, narrative co­
herence would crumble, and the story would turn into a poem" (What Will Have 
Happened, 23). For a discussion of the same point from the perspective of the 
"schema" theory of cognitive psychology, see Mary Crawford and Roger Chaffin, 
"Cognitive Research," esp. 4-11. As they argue, inferences are crucial because "no 
text can explicitly state all the information required by the reader" (10)—and in­
ferences are possible because the reader comes to texts with "schema" which pro­
vide "default values" where the text has a gap (5). For a demonstration of the 
infinite regress that results when there are no unspoken assumptions and when, 
consequently, everything has to be stated explicitly, see Lewis Carroll, "What the 
Tortoise Said to Achilles," in Th& Complete Works of Lewis Carroll (New York: 
Random House/Vintage, 1976), 1225-30. 
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marked in some systematic way that is understood by author and 
reader alike. In other words, it is appropriate to assume that any 
novel is realistic (as defined above) unless there is evidence to the 
contrary. To use a comparison from music, realism is like the basic 
tempo from which nonrealism departs as a rubato,* all fiction is at 
heart realistic except insofar as it signals us to respond in some 
other fashion. The opening of Marcel Ayme's "Le Passe-muraille," 
for instance, clearly tells us that, in this story, the narrative au­
dience believes that it is possible to walk through walls. But since 
there is no signal that the narrative audience of S. S. Van Dine's 
Canary Murder Case believes in such a possibility, the narrative 
audience of that novel will not entertain this idea as a feasible 
explanation of how the famous Broadway beauty Margaret Odell 
was strangled in a locked room. 
The specific signals used to chart out the overlap of authorial 
and narrative audience range quite broadly. As a general rule, the 
more potentially verifiable (by the authorial audience) the nar­
rative audience's facts seem to be, the greater the overlap we 
should assume. Thus, in stories that take place in nonspecific or 
nonexistent times and places ("long, long ago in a distant king­
dom"), we are justified, other things being equal, in assuming a 
high degree of nonrealism. For example, the counterfactual foot­
notes filling in the background of the "Second Revolt" at the be­
ginning of Jack London's Iron Heel (in contrast, say, to Dickens' 
discussion of the legal system in Bleak House) provide no real 
links between the worlds of the authorial and narrative audiences; 
they must therefore be interpreted as a more sophisticated for­
mulation of "Once upon a time." As such, they are a signal that 
what follows will contain counterfactual descriptions that the nar­
rative audience should accept as true. In contrast, the more real­
istic details in the opening of John Marquand's Wickford Point set 
the reader up for a different kind of relationship between the au­
thorial and the narrative audiences, a relationship typical of 1930s 
American naturalism. The author's disclaimer that his characters 
and incidents are fictitious does not in itself prove that what fol­
lows will be a narrative that could easily be confused with fact. But 
when the disclaimer is followed by the quotes from reviews of 
Allen Southby's book, by the details of his scholarly background, 
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by the careful description of his letterhead, the characteristics of 
the narrative audience become increasingly clear. Given the first 
chapter, we are not expected to believe that Southby could turn 
into a dung beetle in the second. 
In even more extreme cases, authors introduce into their texts 
not only realistic details, but even historically true details. Take 
the description of the storm in James Cain's Mildred Pierce. Here, 
the author not only describes an event, but gives us the specific 
location (Los Angeles) and the specific date (New Year's Eve, 1933). 
As a general rule, when a newsworthy event is described with 
enough specificity that the reader could, in fact, look it up in a 
newspaper, the reader is—in the absence of signals to the con-
trary—justified in assuming that the event more or less coincides 
with historical fact and that the rest of the text—again, in the 
absence of counterindications—is highly realistic.49 
Some signals are genre bound. In John MacDonald's Travis 
McGee novels, for instance, the narrative audience is expected to 
take as true any generalizations made by the first-person narrator. 
Because, in this series, McGee stands as the author's representa­
tive, this can be seen as a specific variant of a general rule of 
detective stories, enunciated by Robert Champigny: "Since it can­
not be attributed to a mistaken or lying character, a free comment 
[an authorial or unattributed comment that does not come from 
the point of view of one of the characters] should provide the reader 
with a valid axiom."50 
Still, as the critical history of The Turn of the Screw has amply 
demonstrated, the signals of the degree of realism in a text are 
among the more difficult to interpret. Even in fairly straightfor­
ward detective stories, it is not always clear just what constitutes a 
"mistaken" character. In Josephine Tey's Man in the Queue, for 
instance, we are told by a police surgeon that because of the crush 
of a crowd, the mysterious victim could have been held erect for 
ten minutes after being stabbed, and in fact would probably not 
"even be aware that he had been struck."51 Outside this novel 
49. For a more detailed discussion of the use of verifiable facts in fictional texts, 
see Barbara Foley, Telling the Truth. 
50. Champigny, What Will Have Happened, 69. 
51. Tey, The Man in the Queue (New York: Pocket, 1977), 12 (chap. 1). 
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such a claim would seem preposterous, but in this context the 
narrative audience is apparently expected to accept it, for other­
wise the mystery is insoluble. Fair enough; but at the end of the 
novel, we find the narrative audience was not to believe the same 
police surgeon when he assured us that the murder could not have 
been done by a woman—although there is no apparent way of 
distinguishing the validity of the two claims. 
The problems get more complex still when we consider art that 
has, as its subject, the problem of perception—for instance, bor­
derline fantastic novels with possibly mad narrators—where the 
signals can be so confused that actual readers simply cannot agree 
on how to take them. Thus, for instance, interpretations of Dos-
toyevsky's Double differ depending on how readers respond to the 
signals and what beliefs they consequently assume the narrative 
audience to hold. Depending on the strategies chosen, The Double 
can be read either as a realistic novel about madness or as a fan­
tastic piece about doubles. 
Post Hoc and Propter Hoc: Rules of Cause 
The history of the novel—especially the realistic novel—has 
been tied closely to notions of causality and motivation. As Sey­
mour Chatman puts it, "It has been argued, since Aristotle, that 
events in narratives are radically correlative, enchaining, entailing. 
Their sequence, runs the traditional argument, is not simply linear 
but causative."52 The general expectation that narratives are 
causative informs reading processes in two separate and opposite 
ways. First, as we will discuss in more detail in Chapter 4, readers 
use their understanding of causation to move from cause to effect, 
in order to determine the future course of a novel they are reading. 
Knowledge, for instance, of the possible effects on health of severe 
drenching (at least in the early nineteenth century) helps the reader 
predict what will happen when Jane Bennet gets caught in a heavy 
rain on her way to visit the Bingleys in Pride and Prejudice. 
Second, readers move in the reverse way, from effect to cause, in 
order to determine why things are the way they are, or why charac­
52. Chatman, Story and Discourse, 45. 
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ters act as they do. When we are introduced to the protagonist 
Pozdnyshev at the beginning of Tolstoy's Kieutzer Sonata, we are 
told that his hair is prematurely gray—and we are thus prepared to 
assume that he has suffered some severe anguish. (This example 
reminds us of the ways reading conventions—in this case, sig­
nification and configuration—interact. Once we realize that 
Pozdnyshev has suffered, we expect the novel to proceed to tell us 
about it.) The ease with which readers are able to make such deter­
minations is one factor influencing the degree to which they find 
the book readable or comprehensible. Readers make these judg­
ments in a variety of ways, but three very general techniques are 
important here. 
(1) The authorial audience uses the realism rule to make a bridge 
between its visions of the external world and the novel at hand— 
that is, it generally assumes that the kinds of causal connections 
assumed to hold in the world around it will apply to the novel it is 
reading. In "A Rose for Emily," for instance, Faulkner assumes his 
readers7 knowledge of how human aging affects hair color; it is on 
this basis that he expects his readers to infer from the presence of 
the "iron-gray" hair on the pillow not only that Emily killed Ho­
mer Barron years ago, but also that she has continued to sleep with 
his corpse into her old age. 
(2) Sometimes an author cannot rely on the reader's conception 
of reality as a firm basis for cause-and-effect inferences. This may 
be, perhaps, because the author wishes to assert, in his or her 
fiction, a kind of causal relationship that does not, in fact, occur in 
reality. Or it may be because the author's notion of reality differs 
from that which he or she expects to find in the reader—this is 
especially common in historical periods when shared conceptions 
of reality are breaking down, or in books where writers are dealing 
with historical periods (past or present) the details of which they 
expect may be unfamiliar to their readers (present or future). In 
such cases, authors may wish to guide their readers through the 
use of maxims and other kinds of general statements. Chatman 
puts it well: 
Both factual and rhetorical generalizations serve the same basic func­
tions, for instance, the ornamental, and particularly the verisimi­
lar. . . . Generalizations and other comments often arise because of 
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the need for plausibility, since in troubled historical periods the codes 
are not strong enough to establish a seeming reality. Hence the great­
er prevalence of nonce-created, author-specific verisimilitude. . .  . If a 
parish priest's desires are not satisfied by a large inheritance but 
require a canonship, it is because "Everyone, even a priest, must have 
his hobbyhorse" (Le Cure de Tours). But if he is satisfied, another 
generalization can accommodate that: "A sot does not have enough 
spunk in him to be ambitious."53 
Thus, when Stendhal wants us to understand Julien Sorel's sud­
den suspicions about Madame de Renal's sincerity, he notes, 
"Such is, alas! the unhappy consequence of too much civilization! 
At twenty a young man's heart, if he has any breeding, is a thou­
sand leagues removed from that casualness without which love is 
often no more than the most tedious of duties/'54 When H. G. 
Wells wants to ensure our understanding of why the Time Trav-
eller's friends do not believe his initial claims, he notes, "But the 
Time Traveller had more than a touch of whim among his ele­
ments, and we distrusted him. Things that would have made the 
fame of a less clever man seemed tricks in his hands. It is a mistake 
to do things too easily."55 When Chester Himes wants to be sure 
that his white audience understands why a black junkman might 
side with a person he had never seen before against the police, he 
uses the maxim, "It was the code of Harlem for one brother to help 
another lie to white cops."56 The mainspring of the plot of South-
worth's AUworth Abbey is maxim-ally justified by the claim, in a 
privileged position, "Flight! In that one short syllable lies the only 
safety from a forbidden passion, and where flight is impossible, 
passion becomes destiny."57 
53. Ibid., 244—45. See also Gerald Graff's claim that "contrary to a popular view, 
modern literature tends to be more rather than less didactic than earlier literature, 
in part because the beliefs which earlier writers could assume they could presup­
pose as cultural givens in their readers now have to be made explicit" ("Literature 
as Assertions/' 96). For an important discussion of maxims, see also Nancy K. 
Miller, "Emphasis Added." 
54- Stendhal, The Red and the Black: A Chronicle of the Nineteenth Century, 
trans. Lloyd C. Parks (New York: NAL/Signet, 1970), 89 (bk. 1, chap. 13). 
55. Wells, The Time Machine, in Seven Science Fiction Novels of H. G. Wells 
(New York: Dover, n.d.), 11 (chap. 3). 
56. Himes, A Rage in Harlem (London: Allison and Busby, 1985), 82 (chap. 14). 
57. Southworth, AUworth Abbey, 46 (chap. 3). 
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Such generalizations are not always in the form of maxims about 
human psychology. Sometimes they may provide reminders—or 
authorial claims—about the differences between historical peri­
ods. Chandler's Philip Marlowe notes, ' 'Underneath a sheet of blue 
tissue paper in one corner I found something I didn't like. A seem­
ingly brand new peach-colored silk slip trimmed with lace." And 
lest readers in the future be unable to follow the inferential chain 
because, having forgotten what life was like during the war years, 
they do not know why Marlowe does not like what he finds, Chan­
dler adds an explanation: "Silk slips were not being left behind 
that year, not by any woman in her senses."58 
Generalizations and maxims intended to clarify causal relations, 
however, need to be differentiated from several other types of max­
ims. Some are merely descriptive or—to use Chatman's word— 
"ornamental." "She was dressed in a leopard-skin coat with a 
matching hat. Real skin, of course. She was not the sort of lady 
who worried too much about leopards."59 Some, given to us by a 
character or unreliable narrator rather than by a reliable narrator or 
implied author, serve not to create verisimilitude by describing the 
world, but rather to underscore the speaker's character by his or 
her distance from reality. When, in Heiland, Terry insists that 
" 'women like to be run after/ " we are supposed to take it as a sign 
of his limitations, not of Gilman's world view.60 Others serve as a 
way of expressing the author's or character's correct view of the 
world—they are, really, ends in themselves rather than means. 
"But sometimes Rennie liked to write pieces about trends that 
didn't really exist, to see if she could make them exist by writing 
about them. . . . Successes of this kind gave her an odd pleasure, 
half gleeful, half sour: people would do anything not to be thought 
outmoded."61 Still others serve as predictors and help us deter­
mine the narrative's configuration. These will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 4. 
(3) Beyond the realism rule and the use of maxims and gener­
alizations, authors also depend on their readers' assimilation of 
what I call the rule of temporal causation. Like the realism rule, 
58. Chandler, The Lady in the Lake (New York: Pocket, 1943)/ 65 (chap. 12). 
$9. Len Deighton, Berlin Game (New York: Knopf, 1985), 160-61 (chap. 12). 
60. Gilman, Heiland, 17 (chap. 2). 
61. Margaret Atwood, Bodily Harm (New York: Bantam, 1983), 25 (pt. 1). 
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this is a rule of literature, one that need not have its analogues in 
real experience. In its most basic form, the rule of temporal causa­
tion assures us that in nineteenth- and twentieth-century nar­
rative, it is appropriate to assume that temporally connected 
events are causally connected unless there is a signal to the con­
trary, and that the information necessary to determine the causal 
chain is available either in the authorial audience's prior knowl­
edge or in the text itself. As Gerald Prince puts it, "Given two 
events A and B, and unless the text explicitly indicates otherwise, 
a causal connection will be taken to exist between them if B tem­
porally follows A and is perceived as possibly resulting from it/'6  2 
From this perspective, E. M. Forster's famous distinction between 
story ("a narrative of events arranged in their time sequence") and 
plot ("a narrative of events, the emphasis falling on causality") 
needs to be reformulated. As he puts it, stressing the objective 
qualities of the text, " 'The king died, and then the queen died' is a 
story. 'The king died and then the queen died of grief is a plot."63 
From the reader's perspective, though, one can put it differently: if 
a work is known beforehand to be a novel, then we are invited to 
interpret "The king died and then the queen died" as "The king 
died and then the queen died of grief." Thus, Dostoyevsky writes, 
"The prince, however, heard them call him an idiot and he gave a 
start, but not because he had been called an idiot. He forgot 'the 
idiot' at once. He caught sight in the crowd, not far from where he 
was sitting, of a face."64 According to this rule, the reader is en­
titled to assume that he gave a start because he saw the face. 
This does not mean, of course, that a novelist cannot write a 
novel that resists traditional notions of causality, but special pre­
cautions must be taken to ensure that readers, generally used to 
62. Prince, Narratology, 39. A more specific version of this rule, later quoted by 
Prince, is proposed by Roland Barthes: "There is a strong presumption that the 
mainspring of the narrative activity is to be traced to that very confusion between 
consecutiveness and consequence, what-comes-tf/ter being read in a narrative as 
what-is-caused-by. Narrative would then be a systematic application of the logical 
fallacy denounced by scholasticism under the formula post hoc, ergo propter hoc" 
("Introduction/' 248). 
63. Forster, Aspects of the Novel, 60. 
64. Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Idiot, trans. David Magarshack (Baltimore: Pen­
guin, 1955), 384 (pt. 3, chap. 2). 
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texts that operate according to the rule of temporal causation, will 
not fill in causal links where none are intended. Robbe-Grillet may 
very well be consciously trying to resist the nineteenth-century 
realist notions of causality in his novels, but as the analyses of 
Bruce Morrissette make clear, it is possible to make sense of them 
through the application of traditional rules for determining causal 
connections.65 
Of course, even in the minimal narrative suggested by Forster, 
application of this rule is nowhere near so simple as I suggested. 
"The king died and then the queen died"—of grief? of remorse? of 
contagion? of relief? And the problems get more complex still 
when we deal with more extensive narratives. It is one thing to say 
that we can assume that the motives for Raskolnikov's murder of 
the pawnbroker lie somewhere in what we are told about the 
events leading up to it; it is quite another—as the conflicting read­
ings of Crime and Punishment make abundantly clear—to pick 
out the appropriate details for assigning the cause. Learning to 
read—realistic texts in particular—is to a large extent learning to 
apply this rule as sensitively as authors require. 
65. See Morrissette, The Novels of Robbe-Grillet, rev. ed. (Ithaca: Cornell Uni­
versity Press, 1975). For an opposing position, see Roland Barthes' foreword to 
Morrissette's study. For further discussion of their disagreement, see Stephen 
Heath, The Nouveau Roman: A Study in the Practice of Writing (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1972), esp. 119—21, 137—43. 
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The Black Cloud on the Horizon: 
Rules of Configuration 
Antigone is young. She would much rather live than die. But 
there is no help for it. When your name is Antigone, there is 
only one part you can play. 
Jean Anouilh, Antigone 
Configuration vs. Coherence 
Literary form—with its shadow twin, structure—has long been 
a vexed topic in critical discourse. At least part of the difficulty has 
stemmed from the frequent failure to distinguish carefully enough 
between the process of reading as it is taking place and the retro­
spective interpretation of that process once it has been completed. 
Thus, on the one hand, form refers sometimes to the reader's expe­
rience of an unfolding text during the act of reading. In Kenneth 
Burke's succinct phrase, "Form is the creation of an appetite in the 
mind of the auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that appetite/'1 
On the other hand, the term can refer to the total shape of the 
work, as perceived by a reader who has completed it and reworked 
its elements into a total pattern. Form in this second sense is not a 
process, but something already achieved. As Cleanth Brooks puts 
it, "The structure meant is a structure of meanings, evaluations, 
and interpretations,- and the principle of unity which informs it 
seems to be one of balancing and harmonizing connotations, at­
titudes, and meanings. . .  . It is a positive unity, not a negative; it 
i. Burke, "Psychology and Form/' 31. A similar notion of form as process is 
found in Stanley Fish, "Literature in the Reader/' in Is There a Texti 21-67. 
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represents not a residue but an achieved harmony" (emphasis add-
ed).2 I call these two kinds of form configuration and coherence 
respectively, and different sets of rules govern each. 
A reader applies previously learned rules of configuration while 
moving through the text. These rules are basically predictive—at 
least, on the level of discourse, although not necessarily on the 
level of story (that is, they permit us to make guesses about what 
will happen in the later parts of the text, whether the events de­
scribed are chronologically before or after those we have already 
read about).3 They are therefore always probabilistic. To put it 
another way, in a given literary context, when certain elements 
appear, rules of configuration activate certain expectations. Once 
activated, however, these expectations can be exploited in a num­
ber of different ways. Authors can make use of them not only to 
create a sense of resolution (that is, by completing the patterns that 
the rules lead readers to expect, either with or without detours) but 
also to create surprise (by reversing them, for instance, by deflect­
ing them, or by fulfilling them in some unanticipated way) or to 
irritate (by purposefully failing to fulfill them). It is important to 
stress this point: a rule of configuration can be just as important to 
the reading experience when the outcomes it predicts turn out not 
to take place as when they do. Eugene Narmour's remark about 
music applies just as well to literature: "The structure of a work is 
a result of its implications, its realizations, and its non-realiza-
tions."4 Thus, Raymond Chandler's Big Sleep was, at the time it 
was written, unusual among detective stories because the hero 
2. Brooks, Well Wrought Urn, 195. See also Mark Schorer's claim "that to speak 
of content as such is not to speak of art at all, but of experience; and that it is only 
when we speak of the achieved content, the form, the work of art as a work of art, 
that we speak as critics'' ("Technique as Discovery/' in Essays in Modem Literary 
Criticism, ed. Ray B. West, Jr. [New York: Rinehart, 1952], 190). 
3. Thus, the configuration/coherence distinction cuts across the story/plot dis­
tinction of E. M. Forster [Aspects of the Novel). Story and plot, of course, are textual 
categories, rather than classes of reader activities. More important, story is a matter 
of chronology, whereas configuration is a matter of order of presentation. Further­
more, application of rules of configuration involves an understanding not only of 
story but of plot as well, since readers often use their knowledge of causation to 
predict what will happen next. 
4. Narmour, Beyond Schenkerism: The Need for Alternatives in Music Analysis 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 184. 
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fails to restore order. But it does not follow that the rule of configu­
ration basic to the classical detective novel—the rule that leads us 
to expect justice to triumph in the end—is irrelevant to this text. 
Rather, as I shall argue in more detail in Chapter 6, the final pages 
have the shock value they do only because Chandler encourages us 
to invoke the rule and then intentionally undermines our 
expectations. 
Readers apply rules of coherence, in contrast, to the work as a 
completed totality (even though, of course, the rules have to be 
learned before the reading begins). Although a reader may posit 
certain coherences while moving through the work, he or she al­
ways does so by positing from some assumption about how the 
book will end. To put it otherwise: as we are reading, rules of 
configuration allow us to answer the question, "How will this, in 
all probability, work out?" while rules of coherence allow us to 
answer the question, "If it works out in that way, how will I 
account for this particular element?" Once we have finished the 
text, rules of configuration allow us to answer the question, "How 
did this particular element make me think, at the time I encoun­
tered it, that the text would work out?" whereas rules of coherence 
allow us to answer the question, "Given how it worked out, how 
can I account for these particular elements?" Rules of coherence 
allow us to make sense of, among other things, a text's failures to 
follow through on the configurations it seemed to promise— 
failures we cannot know about until the book is over. Thus while 
rules of configuration lead us to expect justice at the end of The Big 
Sleep, rules of coherence—which demand that the work fit to­
gether as a whole—allow us to interpret our frustration at the 
novel's irresolution in terms of Chandler's political message. 
Let me stress that, according to my model, rules of configuration 
govern the activities by which readers determine probability. My 
perspective thus differs significantly from that of theorists who use 
apparently similar rules to describe texts. When Vladimir Propp 
claims, in discussing "Function VII" of the folktale, that "interdic­
tions are always broken and, conversely, deceitful proposals are 
always accepted and fulfilled," he is not really enunciating a rule 
of configuration in my sense.5 At best, rules like Propp's reveal 
5. Propp, Morphology of the Folktale, 30. 
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consistent patterns in texts that have already been read; at worst, 
they lead to the kind of prescriptions for writers that Wayne Booth 
so rightly attacked in The Rhetoric of Fiction. Rules of configura­
tion, in contrast, do not tell writers what to do—at most, they tell 
writers the framework within which their readers are likely to 
respond. Writers may use this framework any way they wish, ei­
ther by accepting it, stretching it, or even ignoring it. Rules of 
configuration are prescriptive only in the following way: they map 
out the expectations that are likely to be activated by a text, and 
they suggest that if too many of these activated expectations are 
ignored, readers may find the results dull or chaotic. 
Basic Rules of Configuration 
In our current critical climate, academic writing tends to priv­
ilege novels that are surprising, experimental, avant-garde (or at 
least formerly avant-garde). For a variety of reasons, books that do 
not to a large extent forge their own paths are rarely accorded 
much attention in a college or university setting. But given that 
the Southworths and Dixons, the Ferbers and Robbinses out­
number the Melvilles and Coovers—and given that they're more 
widely read, as well—it is reasonable to claim that on the whole, 
novels are more or less predictable. Yes, it is hard, after one or two 
pages, to say very much about how the plot of Robbe-Grillet's In 
the Labyrinth is going to work itself out. But more often than not, 
readers have a good sense of the general course of future events 
before they have gotten very far into a narrative. 
How are we able to predict with reasonable assurance the trajec­
tory of a novel that we have not yet completed? It is surprising how 
much we depend on explicit guidance from the author or narrator. 
We may associate the "But the black cloud was already seen on the 
horizon"6 technique of writing with literature of the second rank; 
but in fact, all authors—good and bad, popular and serious—lean 
on it heavily, in one form or another. It is not only modern "cate­
gory" texts (Silhouette Romances, for instance) that announce the 
6. Thomas Dixon, Jr., The Leopard's Spots: A Romance of the White Man's 
Burden, 1865-1900 (New York: Doubleday, Page, 1902), 63 (chap. 9). 
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basic shape of their plots on their covers. Calling a play The Trag­
edy of Hamlet is not that much more subtle a way of warning us 
about how it is going to end. Nor, for that matter, is calling a novel 
The Death of Ivan Ilych. 
Tolstoy, in fact, guides us even more firmly and prepares us for 
his ending not only through his title but also through his order of 
presentation: he begins with Ivan Ilych;s funeral, and then narrates 
his life as a flashback. Similarly, Alice Walker begins Meridian 
with a chapter flagrantly called 'The Last Return/' which serves 
as a focal point toward which the other events of the novel— 
chronologically prior to it—are seen to be leading. 
Epigraphs are useful devices for guiding readers7 expectations, 
too. "Elle etait fille; elle etait amoureuse [She was a girl; she was in 
love]/' the citation from Malfilatre that opens chapter 3 of Push-
kin's Eugene Onegin, clearly raises expectations about the events 
to come.7 Alternatively, an author may preview the course of a 
story by comparing it to another familiar plot. In calling his story 
"Lady Macbeth of the Mzensk District," Leskov not only influ­
ences our evaluation of the main character, as I noted above; he 
also raises expectations about what will happen. Like Austen (who 
has her characters act out "Lovers' Vows" in Mansfield Park), 
Leskov may be more heavy-handed than Robbe-Grillet, with his 
concealed references to Oedipus in The Erasers. The underlying 
literary techniques, however, are similar in essence. 
Whether authors use prophetic titles, inverted chronologies, my­
thic patterns, or simply straightforward descriptions of what is to 
come ("I called Flossie first," says Marcus Gorman at the begin­
ning of William Kennedy's Legs, "for we'd had a thing of sorts 
between us, and I'll get to that"),8 their warnings can vary in par­
ticularity. Sometimes, an author will merely give us a foreboding, 
a generalized hint about the sort of future that awaits the charac­
ters in a narrative, leaving the reader in suspense as to the precise 
form it will take. Southworth, for instance, writes in The Hidden 
Hand: 
7. Alexander Pushkin, Eugene Onegin, trans. Walter Arndt (New York: Dutton, 
1963), 59­
8. Kennedy, Legs (New York: Penguin, 1983), 14. 
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Let them enjoy it! It was their last of comfort—that bright evening! 
Over that household was already gathering a cloud heavy and dark 
with calamity—calamity that must have overwhelmed the stability 
of any faith which was not as theirs was—stayed upon God.9 
"My last words/7 notes Pechorin in Lermontov's Hero of Our 
Time, "had been entirely out of place: at the time, I did not realize 
all their importance, but later had a chance to regret them."1 0 
Similarly, the Time Traveller of The Time Machine remarks, " 'I 
was to discover the atrocious folly of this proceeding, but it came 
to my mind as an ingenious move/  " n 
But an author can be more concrete in prefiguring the course of a 
narrative, as well. Dostoyevsky begins The Brothers Karamazov as 
follows: 
Alexey Fyodorovich Karamazov was the third son of Fyodor Pavlov­
ich Karamazov, a landowner well known in our district in his own 
day (and still remembered among us) owing to his tragic and obscure 
death, which happened exactly thirteen years ago, and which I shall 
describe in its proper place.12 
It is only a few paragraphs into the first chapter of So Big that 
Ferber sketches out the conclusion of the novel we have barely 
begun to read: 
In fact, he never became as big as the wide-stretched arms of her love 
and imagination would have had him. You would have thought she 
would have been satisfied when, in later years, he was the Dirk De-
Jong whose name you saw (engraved) at the top of heavy cream linen 
paper, so rich and thick and stiff as to have the effect of being starched 
and ironed by some costly American business process; whose clothes 
were made by Peter Peel, the English tailor; whose roadster ran on a 
9. Emma D. E. N. Southworth, The Hidden Hand (New York: Burt, n.d.j, 206 
(chap. 27). 
10. Mihail Lermontov, A Hero of Our Time, trans. Vladimir Nabokov and Dmitri 
Nabokov (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday/Anchor, 1958), 75 ("Taman"). 
11. H. G. Wells, The Time Machine, in Seven Science Fiction Novels of H. G. 
Wells (New York: Dover, n.d.), 59. 
12. Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, trans. Constance Garnett; rev. 
Ralph E. Matlaw (New York: Norton, 1976), 2 (bk. 1, chap. 1). 
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French chassis; whose cabinet held mellow Italian vermouth and 
Spanish sherry,- whose wants were served by a Japanese houseman; 
whose life, in short, was that of the successful citizen of the Republic. 
But she wasn't. Not only was she dissatisfied: she was at once re­
morseful and indignant, as though she, Selina Dejong, the vegetable 
pedler, had been partly to blame for this success of his, and partly 
cheated by it.13 
But widespread as such explicit prefiguring is, it is but one strand 
in a large network of techniques by which the authorial audience is 
prepared, while reading, for the shape of things to come. Most of 
these techniques provide foreknowledge implicitly, requiring read­
ers to decode information given to them by applying rules of con­
figuration. There are many such rules, often highly genre specific,-
as a result, we may tend to think of configuration—especially as it 
regards the course of action in a novel—in terms of total plot 
packages: the classical detective story, the Harlequin romance, the 
Russian fairy tale. But in fact, we perceive form as we read because 
we recognize far smaller building blocks. For this reason, a novel 
that may seem quite fresh in its total structure (for instance, its 
overall pattern of stress and resolution) can still seem orderly, fa­
miliar, even inevitable. 
Many rules of configuration are so much a part of our intuitive 
understanding of literature that they seem almost trivial when 
made explicit. Nonetheless, it is worth looking at a few of them to 
see the kind of blocks from which even sophisticated, large-scale 
literary structures are built. The task will be somewhat easier if we 
start at a high level of abstraction. Generally speaking, the events 
in nineteenth- and twentieth-century fictional narratives appear, 
at least the first time through, to be neither completely determined 
nor completely free. The text's "horizon of expectations" (to bor­
row a term made popular by Hans Robert Jauss) is neither infinite 
nor zero.14 As Umberto Eco puts it, "Every text, however 'open7 it 
is, is constituted, not as the place of all possibilities, but rather as 
the field of oriented possibilities."15 From this middle ground 
13. Edna Ferber, So Big, in Five Complete Novels (New York: Avenel, 1981), 4 
(chap. 1). 
14. See, for instance, Jauss, Toward an Aesthetic of Reception. 
15. Eco, Role of the Reader, 76. 
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come two metarules of configuration of which many of the more 
specific rules turn out to be special cases. First, it is appropriate to 
expect that something will happen. Second, it is appropriate to 
expect that not <mything can happen. Literary communication de­
pends heavily on these rules and their interaction. 
Recast as a statement about texts rather than readers, the first of 
these metarules—that something happens, that things change in a 
way that is not entirely the result of inertia—is, for some theorists, 
the fundamental characteristic of narrative. Gerald Prince, for in­
stance, defines narrative as "the representation of at least two real 
or fictive events or situations in a time sequence, neither of which 
presupposes or entails the other."16 Mary Louise Pratt introduces 
the useful notion of tellability: "Assertions whose relevance is 
tellability must represent states of affairs that are held to be un­
usual, contrary to expectations, or otherwise problematic."17 Nar­
ratives, the first metarule tells us, can reasonably be expected to be 
tellable. 
Thus, when we pick up a narrative text, we can assume that the 
final situation will not be identical to the initial situation—or, if it 
is (as happens not only in texts that start at the end, such as The 
Death of Ivan Ilych, but also, less literally, in circular narratives, 
such as "The Fisherman and His Wife," The Idiot, and Career in C 
Major), that it will reattain that initial situation through some 
movement of departure and return. If, for instance, a book begins, 
as Jane Austen's Emma does, 
Emma Woodhouse, handsome, clever, and rich, with a comfortable 
home and happy disposition, seemed to unite some of the best bless­
ings of existence,- and had lived nearly twenty-one years in the world 
with very little to distress or vex her 
—the first metarule allows us to predict that we will, in fact, read 
about events that distress or vex her. 
The first metarule (something will happen) opens up the pos­
sibilities of the text; the second (that something will happen ac­
16. Prince, Narratology, 4. See also Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren, who 
tell us that if "nothing 'happens/ "then we simply do not have fiction (Understand­
ing Fiction, 10). 
17. Pratt, Toward a Speech Act Theory, 136. 
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cording to some configuration) limits the range of those pos­
sibilities. We can experience a text as meaningful literature only if 
we assume, even before we pick it up, that it will be patterned in 
some more or less recognizable way: that it can be seen as an exam­
ple of or a variation of some preexisting genre category or plot type 
(even if it ultimately undermines it), that some rules of configura­
tion will apply to it (even if the expectations aroused by those rules 
are ultimately frustrated), that relations among textual elements 
that look like configurations can tenatively be treated as such.18 
To put it another way: events have a predictive value in fiction 
that they do not have in life. We can experience the ebb and flow of 
a text—its resolutions and surprises, its climaxes and anticlimax-
es—only if we assume while reading that the author has control 
over its shape, and that the future is in some recognizable way 
prefigured in the present. For instance, if a seemingly trivial fact is 
given notice in a text, if that fact does not have any apparent value 
for signification (for instance, as character revelation), and if there 
is a configuration in which that fact would have predictive value, 
then we should presume that that configuration holds, feeling the 
joy of confirmation when it does, the joy of frustration when it 
does not. If I mention to my wife in real life that our daughter is 
especially trusting and unsuspicious of strangers, my remark has 
no particular predictive value, except to the superstitious—indeed, 
superstition can perhaps be defined as the application of literary 
rules of configuration to reality. But the expression of the same 
sentiment sets up a different pattern of expectations in a novel. In 
Dixon's Leopard's Spots, Tom's first daughter has been killed 
when blacks tried to abduct her; he later expresses his fears about 
his second: 
"Lord, there's so many triflin' niggers loafin' round the county now 
stealing and doin' all sorts of devilment, I'm scared to death about 
that child. She don't seem any more afraid of 'em than she is of a cat." 
"I don't believe anybody would hurt Flora, Tom,—she's such a 
little angel/' said Gaston kissing the tears from the child's face.19 
18. One of the reasons that it is easier to read texts that have been published than 
those which have not is that the knowledge that the text has passed through editors 
helps assure us that this rule has been adhered to. For a good discussion of the 
importance of publication, see Pratt, Toward a Speech Act Theory, 116-25. 
19. Dixon, Leopard's Spots, 366 (bk. 3, chap. 4). 
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No experienced reader should be surprised when Flora in turn is 
abducted, raped, and murdered—especially given the racist prem­
ises of the novel. The only surprise is that Dixon dilutes the poten­
tial pleasure of the pattern he has set up by fulfilling his reader's 
expectations within two pages, instead of building up suspense. 
These two basic rules underlie many of the more specific rules of 
configuration, to which I will now turn. 
Rules of Undermining 
It is scarcely possible for a human being to be happier than was Lord 
Leaton at this time. In the prime of his manly life, blessed with a fair 
wife in the maturity of her matronly beauty, and a lovely daughter, 
just budding into womanhood, endowed with an ancient title, an 
immense fortune, and a wide popularity, Lord Leaton was the most 
contented man in England.20 
The first of the two metarules of configuration means, among 
other things, that readers can expect situations of inertia to be 
upset. Thus, for instance, when a work begins with a claim of a 
permanent and static state of affairs (as Emma begins with Emma's 
security) or a claim of an inevitable future (as the film War Games 
opens with the military's insistence that its computer cannot fail), 
we can expect the stability to be undermined. The precise applica­
tion depends, however, on a number of variables, (i) The proba­
bility that a state of affairs will change depends, in part, on the 
reliability of the person claiming it to be permanent. It makes a 
difference, for instance, whether a character or an omniscient nar­
rator makes the claim, as well as whether the fallibility of that 
character is itself an issue (as it is in War Games). Thus, when the 
omniscient narrator of Bleak House tells us that the case of Jarn­
dyce and Jarndyce is "perennially hopeless,"21 we are not intended 
to invoke the rule of undermining. 
20. Emma D. E. N. Southworth, Allworth Abbey; or, Eudora (New York: Hurst, 
1876), 27 (chap. 1). 
21. Charles Dickens, Bleak House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin/Riverside, 1956), 3 
(chap. 1). 
119 
Narrative Conventions 
(2) The content of a claim affects our judgment about the likeli­
hood of its reversal. Claims of perfect crimes and foolproof get-
rich-quick schemes are particularly unreliable. Thus, when Thom­
as Bass opens The Eudaemonic Pie with the confident belief that 
the computer in his shoe will turn him into a winner at Las Vegas, 
the authorial audience expects that something will go wrong, es­
pecially when his boast is given double notice (it appears at the end 
of the first chapter, and is printed in italics as well). 
Like a basketball player watching a free throw sail up and into the 
basket, I lean back on my heels and wait. I turn to the cocktail 
waitress and order a Tequila Sunrise. I watch the Filipino puff his 
cigar. I smile at the pit boss. I'm not even looking as the croupier calls 
out the number 13 and places his pyramid on top of my bet. Why 
would anyone play roulette, I think to myself, without wearing a 
computer in his shoel22 
Indeed, almost any assured statement of intention at the beginning 
of a narrative raises some doubt in the authorial audience as to 
whether it will in fact be carried out. 
Terence Kelly, a rising young professor of Latin at the university, was 
inaugurating a new way of life for himself on this particular Wednes­
day in November, 1946 which happened to be his twenty-fifth birth­
day. It was known to himself as "the new program/' and was a pro­
gram of detachment. "Hands off! Hands off other people! Let them 
alone!" So it might be expressed, in brief.23 
This is likely to be a novel about a man who finds himself en­
tangled. 
(3) Specific application of the rule depends on whether the initial 
situation or the predicted future is positive or negative. The way in 
which this factor influences the reading process, however, depends 
heavily on the novel's period and intended audience. For instance, 
22. Bass, The Eudaemonic Pie (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), 14. Although 
this book is not a novel, it does rely heavily on novelistic techniques for its ef-
fects—so much so that many of the early critics had difficulty believing it was true. 
23. Francis Steegmuller, Blue Harpsichord (New York: Carroll and Graf, 1984), 9 
(pt. i, chap. 1). 
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nineteenth- and twentieth-century European and American can­
onical fiction, especially after the rise in popularity of naturalistic 
techniques, has a strong streak of pessimism. In these texts, nega­
tive situations, such as economic deprivation, can be expected to 
be more stable than positive ones. Thus, it is reasonable for a 
reader to assume that the poverty of the Joads in Steinbeck's 
Grapes of Wrath has a good chance of continuing—in contrast to 
even the moderate middle-class comfort of Charles and Emma 
Bovary. American popular literature of the era, however, is aimed 
at different readers, and uses different generic patterns; on the 
whole, it is not so uniformly pessimistic. Thus, when we pick up 
Horatio Alger's Ragged Dick and find a chipper young street 
urchin polishing shoes, the authorial audience—which is radically 
different from Flaubert's—will expect his lot in life to improve. 
Under the general rule of undermining lie a number of more 
specific rules. For instance, the rule of the lure of the unfamiliar 
governs our expectations by suggesting that novels are more likely 
to move from the familiar to the unfamiliar (although perhaps back 
again at the end) than vice versa. Eric Ambler's State of Siege, for 
instance, begins as the hero, Steve Fraser, who has been working as 
an engineer on a dam project in Sunda, is about to return to Lon­
don. It would be highly unusual for a novel, particularly an adven­
ture story, to begin with a trip from the exotic back to the well 
known. And while, as it reads, the authorial audience has to enter­
tain the remote possibility that State of Siege will develop into a 
how-London-has-changed-while-I've-been-away novel, it is more 
prepared for what actually does happen—Fraser's departure is de­
layed, and his adventures take place against an Asian background. 
Even novels that seem to begin with returns rather than departures 
often actually move into the unfamiliar: although The Idiot begins 
with Myshkin's arrival back in Russia, from Myshkin's point of 
view it is still a trip from his familiar and protected Swiss habitat 
to a strange and threatening one. 
Similarly, we have the rule of chutzpah: When a character states 
with assurance that which he or she has no good reason to believe 
to be the case, we can expect that he or she will turn out to be 
wrong, especially if the claim is important for the outcome of the 
plot. When Oedipus claims to possess greater wisdom than the 
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oracle, it is reasonable to expect that he will be shown up. When, 
in Harriet E. Wilson's Our Nig, Mary Bellmont's illness arouses 
"no serious apprehensions'' in her parents, the authorial audience 
can reasonably expect the illness to grow severe.24 When Mrs. 
Norris, in Austen's Mansfield Park, says to Sir Thomas, during a 
discussion of whether to bring Fanny into the house, 
"You are thinking of your sons—but do not you know that of all 
tilings upon earth that is the least likely to happen,- brought up, as 
they would be, always together like brothers and sisters? It is morally 
impossible. I never knew an instance of it'725 
—the authorial audience is being asked to predict that the "moral­
ly impossible" marriage will in fact come to pass. Similarly: 
He lay again on the bed, his mind whirling with images born of a 
multitude of impulses. He could run away; he could remain; he could 
even go down and confess what he had done. The mere thought that 
these avenues of action were open to him made him feel free, that his 
life was his, that he held his future in his hands. But they would never 
think that he had done it; not a meek black boy like him.26 
So thinks Bigger Thomas in Richard Wright's Native Son as he 
contemplates the murder of Mary Dalton and his attempt to extort 
ten thousand dollars from her parents. And his very sense of free­
dom is intended to make the authorial audience feel all the more 
surely that he is hopelessly trapped—more hopelessly trapped than 
his predecessor, Big Boy (in "Big Boy Leaves Home," from Uncle 
Tom's Children), who feels less confident about his possibilities of 
escape from a similar situation. And even without any knowledge 
of the actual course of European history, a reader could reasonably 
expect Macmaster to be proven false when, in Some Do Not. . .
 f 
he says ("loftily"): " 'You're extraordinarily old-fashioned at times, 
24. Wilson, OUT Nig; ox, Sketches from the Life of a Free Black (New York: 
Random House, 1983), 106 (chap. 10). 
25. Austen, Mansfield Park, ed. R. W. Chapman, 3d ed. (London: Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1932), 6 (bk. 1, chap. 1). 
26. Wright, Native Son (New York: Harper and Row/Perennial, 1966), 179. 
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Chrissie. You ought to know as well as I do that a war is impossi-
ble—at any rate with this country in it.' "27 
Like most rules, the rule of chutzpah has generic and historical 
exceptions. Heroes of classical detective novels—especially heroes 
based on the Holmes/Poirot model—are allowed an unpunished 
arrogance denied to most other characters. So are heroes of myth 
and certain Party representatives in strict Socialist Realist texts. 
Indeed, the particular types of characters that a culture exempts 
from this rule is probably one of the more revealing markers of its 
ideology. 
Of course, Some Do Not. . . was written for readers who did 
know something about the course of European history, which 
brings us to another rule often invoked by novels set in particular 
time periods—the rule of imminent cataclysm. If a story begins at 
a specified moment right before a generally known upheaval (the 
French Revolution, World War II), we are probably being asked to 
read with the expectation that that upheaval will influence the 
course of the novel. Even without the hints that appeared on the 
paperback cover, the reader of The White Hotel could reasonably 
assume that the Holocaust would influence the working out of the 
plot. Any post-Holocaust book about European Jewish life in the 
late 1920s is probably intended to be read in the context of what we 
know historically took place—and the more stable and secure the 
political and economic position of those Jews appears to be, the 
more likely it is that we are expected to apply the rule of imminent 
cataclysm. Similarly, the authorial audience's expectations as it 
reads post-1929 American novels dealing with the lives of the well-
to-do before the stock market crash should in most cases be guided 
by knowledge that the market will collapse. 
Of course, authors are free to ignore this rule—although they 
make the reader's task easier if they signal that they are doing so. 
Stendhal's "Editor's Note" about the date of the composition of 
The Red and the Black ('This work was ready for publication 
when the crucial events of July occurred")28 does more than dis­
27. Ford Madox Ford, Some Do Not. . . , bound with No More Parades (New 
York: NAL/Signet, 1964), 26 (pt. 1, chap. 1). 
28. Stendhal, The Red and the Black, trans. Lloyd C. Parks (New York: 
NAL/Signet, 1970), unnumbered page. 
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sociate him from the events of 1830. It also serves to warn readers 
that they should not apply the rule of imminent cataclysm in their 
reading of the text that follows. But the very fact that Stendhal felt 
the need to mark his text in this way is an indication of how 
strongly this rule pulls on readers. 
The rule of imminent cataclysm, of course, applies only to 
works written after the cataclysm in question. Dirk Dejong's deci­
sion to become a bond salesman in So Big—published in 1924—is 
intended to set up entirely different expectations from Junior's 
decision to follow the same path in Margaret Ayer Barnes' Edna 
His Wife from a decade later. But this is one of those areas where 
actual readers may find it hard to recapture the experiences of the 
authorial audience. It is easy to say that the rule of imminent 
cataclysm does not apply in So Big—it is another thing for real 
readers to cleanse their minds of their knowledge of American 
history as they read, and to avoid predicting the shape of the text 
based on their knowledge of events about which the author knew 
nothing. Obviously, the problem is most severe with historically 
distant texts, but since the world is always changing, even recent 
texts may pose problems. Margaret Atwood's Bodily Harm was 
published in 1982, but within a year and a half, its references to 
Grenada took on substantially different connotations for most ac­
tual readers. 
Even in novels without such historical grounding, there is a 
parallel rule: If the course of action seems smooth, then anything 
that looks like a potential obstacle has a likelihood of turning into 
one. Much of our sense of anxiety as we read Native Son comes 
from Bigger Thomas' inability to burn Mary Dalton's bones after 
he has killed her. We see this as a possible obstacle to his success, 
and hence we expect it to trip him up. Similarly, the following 
passage in Zola's Therese Raquin not only tells us explicitly when 
the comfortable adultery of Therese and Laurent will end, but also 
warns us implicitly of what will push them into violent action: 
"This life of alternating excitement and calm went on for eight 
months. The lovers lived in perfect bliss. Therese was no longer 
bored, and had nothing left to wish for,- Laurent, sated, coddled, 
heavier than ever, had only one fear, that this delectable existence 
might come to an end."29 And if even potential obstacles are ab­
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sent, then readers should probably expect one to emerge. The more 
central the action in question is to the plot, the more likely the 
obstacle will be. In Bodily Harm, Lora asks Rennie to pick up a box 
at the airport for her in St. Antoine—a small Caribbean island just 
made independent of England and on the edge of an explosive elec­
tion. She assures her that the package does not contain drugs, and 
to Rennie it looks like a simple job with "no complications."30 But 
the authorial audience realizes that it would not be worth men­
tioning were it not likely to prove more complex than it seems, and 
it consequently awaits the outcome of the trip to the airport with 
trepidation—trepidation crucial to the intended reading experience. 
Let me stress once again that a rule of configuration can be 
important in a text both when the expectation it activates is fulfill­
ed and when it is not. The humor of the following passage by James 
Cain works only if we know the rule and are surprised when it does 
not apply: 
But pretty soon Captain Madeira, he come to me and says I was to go 
on duty. And what I was to do was to go with another guy, name of 
Shepler, to find the PC of the 157th Brigade, what was supposed to be 
one thousand yards west of where we was, and then report back. . . . 
So me and Shepler started out. And as the Brigade PC was supposed to 
be one thousand yards west, and where we was was in a trench, and 
the trench run east and west, it looked like all we had to do was to 
follow the trench right into where the sun was setting and it wouldn't 
be no hard job to find what we was looking for. 
And it weren't.31 
Rules of Balance: Focus 
Just as rules of undermining furnish the openness demanded by 
the first metarule of configuration, so the second metarule requires 
29. Emile Zola, Therese Raquin, trans. Leonard Tancock (New York: Penguin, 
1962), 75 (chap. 8). 
30. Margaret Atwood, Bodily Harm. (New York: Bantam, 1983), 96 (pt. 2). 
31. Cain, "The Taking of Montfaucon," in The Baby in the Icebox and Other 
Short Fiction (New York: Penguin, 1984), 105-6. 
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rules of order to limit the field of possibility. Among these are rules 
of balance. Whether or not the author is striving for formal elegance 
as an end in itself, most standard novels in our tradition are balanced 
in one way or another. Our knowledge of the various ways in which 
that balance can be manifested helps us predict the work's shape as 
we read, and thus share in its intended emotional curve. 
Balance can occur along several axes. Some of these relate to 
what might be called the general focus of the work—its content in 
the broadest sense. The focus of a work is usually announced in 
some conventional way, and by knowing rules of focus, the reader 
can determine the probable boundaries of the novelistic universe 
that he or she will inhabit. Among the more important axes of 
focus is central consciousness: most traditional novels maintain 
some consistency with regard to point of view. For instance, if a 
novel opens from a particular point of view, readers can reasonably 
expect that it will be dominated by that point of view or will at 
least close with it, unless there is a signal to the contrary, such as a 
frame-tale structure (as in Turgenev's First Love), a constant 
flickering of point of view (as in Bram Stoker's Dracula, James 
Hilton's 111 Wind, or Faulkner's As I Lay Dying), or an explicit 
warning from the narrator or author that the focus will shift. 
Like all rules of configuration, rules of focus are not prescriptions 
for producing well-made texts, but authors can use the knowledge 
that readers will apply them in order to shape readers7 experience. 
Thus, if readers expect the initial point of view to return at the end 
of the text (as in a musical ABA structure), authors can fulfill that 
expectation to create a sense of closure. Robbe-Grillet's In the 
Labyrinth, for instance, begins with the word "I"; even though 
overt references to the first-person narrator disappear—the first 
person emerges only once more before the end, at the beginning of 
the last chapter—the authorial audience feels a sense of fulfillment 
when the novel ends with the word "me." But that sense of fulfill­
ment comes about only because the expectations of return is acti­
vated in the first place. Granted, Robbe-Grillet, with his geo­
metrical obsessions and his love of formal ingenuity, is an extreme 
case. But far less precise writers—even fairly sloppy writers like 
Dostoyevsky—rely on their reader's application of rules of focus to 
support closure. Anton Lavrent'evich, the narrator of Dos­
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toyevsky's Possessed, offers a limited perspective on events at the 
beginning of the novel.32 But while he remains the nominal narrator 
throughout the text, his persona and limitations fade away for long 
passages in the middle, where we receive a great deal of information 
to which he could have no possible access. But when it comes time 
to wrap up the novel, Dostoyevsky not only resolves his major plot 
strands and sums up his major themes, but he also returns explicitly 
to Anton Lavrent'evich's perspective in the last chapter, where 
"sources" are once again cited for the details of his narration. 
Similarly, John O'Hara heightens the sense of closure in Appoint­
ment in Samaria by beginning with the thoughts of Luther 
Fliegler—who turns out to be a minor character—and then return­
ing to him for the closing paragraphs. Once again, authors may well 
choose to reverse the expectations they set up. Thus, the shift of 
narrator toward the end of Goethe's Sorrows of Young Werther is 
intended to wrench us emotionally, but it can work only for the 
reader who expects consistency in point of view strongly enough to 
feel the dislocation. 
It is remarkable, in fact, how strongly the assumption of this 
kind of consistency operates. I remember my sense of irritation 
while reading E. Phillips Oppenheim's once-classic spy thriller, 
The Great Impersonation. The novel begins from the point of view 
of Sir Everard Dominey, who is apparently killed in Africa at the 
end of the second chapter by his German look-alike, Baron von 
Ragastein. The novel goes on to center on his killer, who returns to 
England and takes Dominey's place in order to act as a spy. This 
shift in perspective gives the novel an odd, off kilter flavor, but the 
reader who follows his or her instincts, expecting some return of 
Dominey at the end, will paradoxically find that the novel's effect 
is dissipated when the expectation is fulfilled. For at the end of the 
book, we find that Dominey had in fact killed von Ragastein, and 
that he has been impersonating the German impersonating him in 
order to infiltrate the German spy network. Oppenheim had (un­
consciously, one presumes) followed this rule of balance even 
32. For a good discussion of the importance of that perspective, see Ralph E. 
Matlaw, "The Chronicler of The Possessed: Character and Function/' Dostoevsky 
Studies: Journal of the International Dostoevsky Society 5 (1984): 37-47-
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though in so doing he risked destroying his intended effect, for the 
reader who expects balance loses the intended shock. 
What applies to the perspective from which a novel is narrated 
applies as well to its central character or characters. Susan Sul­
eiman has made a strong claim that "it is only after having read the 
whole novel that one can fully distinguish major characters from 
secondary or minor ones."33 There is some slippage introduced by 
the word "fully" here—but we need to remember that in fact, 
most traditional novels rely on the reader's use of conventional 
rules to recognize the protagonists almost as soon as they enter the 
text. Such recognition is particularly easy, of course, in those 
works (especially common in the nineteenth century) that an­
nounce their central characters in their titles (fane Eyre, David 
Copperfield, Anna Karenina, Indiana). But even in our supposedly 
more sophisticated literary world today, non—avant garde novelists 
rely on fairly simple shared conventions to cast a spotlight on their 
protagonists. Showing up in a position privileged by a rule of notice 
is one way of attracting attention. In fact, merely being the first-
mentioned character in a novel is enough to arouse some expecta-
tion—weak, perhaps, but significant—of centrality. Bigger Thom­
as is mentioned by name twice before any other character is named 
in Native Son; he is also the first character we see. Note also the 
beginning of Marge Piercy's High Cost of Living: 
Leslie was balanced on the hard cushion of an antique chair designed 
for someone with a three-cornered behind. In front of her, too close, 
Hennessy straddled a chair backwards and loomed over her, telling 
loud anecdotes intended as far as she could guess as advertisements. 
"The minute Ted left the room, she walked over to me and stood 
there, just looking me up and down. Provocative. I could see she 
wasn't wearing a bra."34 
One can reasonably infer from her presence in the novel's first 
word that Leslie is more likely to be the center of the novel than 
Hennessy, Ted, or the anonymous "she." The presumption that 
Leslie is the (or a) main character is supported in several ways: the 
33. Suleiman, Authoritarian Fictions, 173. 
34. Piercy, The High Cost of Living (New York: Fawcett, 1978), 7 (chap. 1). 
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narrator assumes our greater familiarity with her (she is called by 
her first name, the only other present character by his last), the 
paragraph describes her space (which is being invaded by Hen­
nessy) from her point of view (it is her interpretation of Hennessy's 
motives that we are given), and Hennessy is so unattractive that an 
author is unlikely to demand that we keep him company for 288 
pages. Similarly, when a novel begins 
I first met her, this girl you'll find soon enough, when she fished me 
out of the Sacramento River on an occasion when I was showing more 
originality than sense 
—we can reasonably assume that "this girl" will be central to the 
novel and that the narrator will continue to show more originality 
than sense.35 
Thus, while novels may have several main characters, they 
rarely center on one of them for a long period of time at the begin­
ning and then switch, without preparation, to another—unless the 
change in focus is intended as an aesthetically significant jolt. Of 
course, sometimes such shifts are prepared for. For more than half 
of So Big, Selina Dejong is the primary character. But both the title 
and the opening two pages (privileged both) have made it clear that 
Dirk Dejong is a central subject as well. Thus, when his story 
eventually takes over from his mother's, we do not feel disori­
ented. Alice Walker uses a title in much the same way to prepare 
us for Grange Copeland's centrality in the second half of The Third 
Life of Grange Copeland, even though he has been all but absent 
from the novel until then. Similarly, Wuthehng Heights begins 
with the Cathy II/Hareton generation,- this leads the authorial au­
dience to expect that the story it is later told will not stop with 
Heathcliff and Cathy I, but will continue on to the "present." 
When such warnings are not given, disruptions of focus more 
often than not are used to startle us. In the final scene of Turgen-
ev's Rudin, for instance, the protagonist is suddenly seen from a 
distance as a minor actor on the French barricades in 1848—a shift 
that underscores Turgenev's criticism of Rudin's presumptuous 
35. Cain, Past All Dishonor (New York: Knopf, 1946), 1 (chap. 1). 
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self-importance. But Turgenev;s critique only works because we 
assume the rule of balance to be operative. Without the reader's 
expectation that Rudin will remain central, his final demotion 
produces no shock—and without the shock, there is nothing for 
the reader to interpret as a critique. 
Dostoyevsky's Gambler violates the rule in a radically different 
way. While it is quite common for a novel to begin in medias res 
with regard to its story, this one seems to begin right in the middle 
of its narration. The opening paragraph (as would be appropriate in 
a real journal) gives us few hints about who is who, or who is 
important: 
At last I have come back from my fortnight's absence. Our friends 
have already been two days in Roulettenberg. I imagined they were 
expecting me with the greatest eagerness; I was mistaken, however. 
The General had an extremely independent air, he talked to me con­
descendingly and sent me away to his sister. I even fancied that the 
General was a little ashamed to look at me. Marya Filippovna was 
tremendously busy and scarcely spoke to me; she took the money, 
however, counted it and listened to my whole report. They were 
expecting Mezentsov, the little Frenchman, and some Englishman; as 
usual, as soon as there was money there was a dinner party,- in the 
Moscow style. Polina Alexandrovna, seeing me, asked why I had been 
away so long, and without waiting for an answer went off somewhere. 
Of course, she did that on purpose. We must have an explanation, 
though. Things have accumulated.36 
The authorial audience can perhaps conclude that Polina will be 
important, but the rest of the cast is a jumble. In fact, some of 
those mentioned are crucial, others very minor. The effect is dis­
orienting, and unmoors us from the comfort of our world so that 
we can take in the madness of Alexei's. But Dostoyevsky can 
create his intended effect only because his authorial audience ap­
proaches the novel with expectations about how focus is an-
nounced—expectations that he can then fail to fulfill. 
Balance works with regard to subject matter as well. Just as we 
36. Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Gambler, trans. Constance Garnett, in Great Short 
Works of Dostoevsky, ed. Ronald Hingley (New York: Harper and Row/Perennial, 
1968), 381 (chap. 1). 
I3O 
Rules of Configuration 
usually have ways of knowing, fairly soon, who will be the main 
characters, so we have ways to tell what a novel is likely to be 
about. Once again, titles are occasionally clear signals (War and 
Peace} Gladkov's Soviet factory novel, Cement), but more usually, 
the text itself counts on shared conventions to inform us about 
what its primary subject!s) will be. In a sonata-form movement, an 
experienced listener can usually tell an introduction from the first 
subject (although occasionally he or she may be fooled—as in the 
long introduction to the Tchaikovsky First Piano Concerto); simi­
larly, an experienced reader knows how to tell when a significant 
subject has arrived in a novel—and expects that once it has arrived, 
it will remain important. To return to The High Cost of Living: the 
opening points to Leslie as a main character, but it also suggests 
that sex is likely to be a major topic in the subsequent text. It is not 
simply that sex is given a privileged position. The authorial au­
dience, reading the opening of James7 "Daisy Miller" ("At the little 
town of Vevey, in Switzerland, there is a particularly comfortable 
hotel; there are indeed many hotels, since the entertainment of 
tourists is the business of the place"),37 is not surprised when the 
novel does not go on to treat the trials and tribulations of the Swiss 
tourist industry. Nor does the authorial audience of The Sound 
and the Fury prepare itself, after the first page, to settle into a novel 
about golf. But sex is an interesting, even titillating, subject, as 
tourism and golf are not—and when a titillating subject is trum­
peted at the beginning of a text, it is reasonable to assume that it 
will be developed. What counts as interesting, of course, is in part 
socially determined, and therefore varies with historical and cul­
tural context. On this point, as on so many others, actual au­
diences may therefore not start out where their authors expect 
them to. Many actual readers of James Cain's Career in C Major, 
approaching it with expectations developed through reading The 
Postman Always Rings Twice, are probably surprised when opera 
does turn out to be the main subject rather than a mere prelude to 
bloodier matters. One reason why strict Socialist Realist texts 
seem virtually unreadable to many contemporary American read­
37. Henry fames, "Daisy Miller/' in The Novels and Tales of Henry fames (New 
York: Scribner's, 1909), 3 (chap. 1). 
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ers, in fact, may well be that their central concerns simply do not 
seem vital. 
Rules of Balance: Action 
Rules of balance regarding focus restrict the world that a novel 
will inhabit; rules of balance regarding action inform us about the 
events that will take place in the book to come. One of the most 
elementary rules is that it is reasonable to assume that repetitions 
will be continued until they are in some way blocked. Even very 
young readers get a sense of delight—of anticipation fulfilled— 
when the wolf phrases his request the same way ("Little pig, little 
pig, let me come in") for the third time. On a less literal level, the 
authorial audience expects the narrator's father in Sherwood An-
derson's "Egg" to fail as an "entertainer" in part because he has 
failed at everything else he has tried to do. 
Similarly, readers can usually start with the presumption that 
diverse strands of action will in some way be linked. In Farewell, 
My Lovely, Philip Marlowe has accidentally gotten entangled in 
the search for ex-convict Moose Malloy, who is wanted for murder. 
Suddenly, he is phoned by a stranger named Lindsay Marriott and 
offered some unspecified work. The authorial audience knows im­
mediately that these two plot lines will eventually merge; the 
surprise of the book is not in the fact of the interconnection, but 
rather in its specific nature. Similarly, as Carol Billman points out, 
even the young readers of Nancy Drew books know that "when 
two suspenseful plot lines are introduced in the first chapter . . . 
[they] will eventually intersect."38 This kind of structure, while 
especially transparent in detective stories, is found more generally 
as well. Fredric Jameson may be overstating the case, but he is 
making a shrewd observation when he argues that "the detective 
story plot merely follows the basic tendency of all literary plots or 
intrigue in general, which is marked by the resolution of multi­
plicity back into some primal unity."39 Once again, of course, the 
38. Billman, 'The Child Reader as Sleuth/7 Children's Literature in Education 
i$f no. 1 (1984): 33­
39. Jameson, "On Raymond Chandler/' 648. 
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rule can be as important in texts that do not fulfill expectations as 
in those that do. Chester Himes disorients us in Blind Man with a 
Pistol because we keep waiting for the parallel plots to merge; but 
the effect only works on a reader who knows the rule and builds 
false expectations on it. 
Some rules of action, though, are much more complex than the 
rules of repetition and parallel. As one example, let me turn to the 
variations on what I call the other-shoe rule: when one shoe drops, 
you should expect the other. To put it in musical terms: just as an 
experienced listener, hearing the opening phrase of the Mozart G 
Minor Symphony (K. 550), immediately develops expectations 
about how the second phrase is likely to sound, so when we read 
novels, we learn to predict what sorts of things are likely to follow 
from what is first presented. Readers have learned to expect liter­
ary events to come in patterns of antecedent and consequent. Ob­
viously, the other-shoe rule often involves notions of cause and 
effect, and in this way, it is related to the causal rules of significa­
tion discussed in Chapter 3. But whereas rules of signification 
allow us to determine the meaning of an event by moving from the 
effect to the cause, the other-shoe rule allows us to move in the 
other direction, to predict the consequences of an event by moving 
from cause to effect. 
One version of the other-shoe rule is that it is generally appropri­
ate to assume that events will produce results—that noticeable 
events that will not have consequences have probably been left 
out, unless they are included for their signification value, are in­
herently amusing, or are intentional red herrings. Like all rules of 
configuration, this one allows readers to develop a sense of antici­
pation, one that authors can foster and resolve, or frustrate. Push­
kin is able to create a sense of anxiety in Eugene Onegin because 
his authorial audience expects that Eugene's decision to flirt with 
Lensky's fiancee, Olga, will have serious consequences—we are 
intended, in other words, to experience Lensky's death in the ensu­
ing duel not as a surprise but as the fulfillment of an evil premoni­
tion. Alternatively, this rule can be invoked and not fulfilled in 
order to surprise. Only if Austen's readers apply this rule can her 
failure to provide the promised complications have the intended 
comic effect: 
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Elfrida had an intimate freind [sic] to whom, being on a visit to an 
Aunt, she wrote the following Letter. 
TO MISS DRUMMOND 
DEAR CHARLOTTE 
I should be obliged to you, if you would buy me, during your stay 
with Mrs Williamson, a new & fashionable Bonnet, to suit the com­
plexion of your 
E. FALKNOR 
Charlotte, whose character was a willingness to oblige every one, 
when she returned into the Country, brought her Freind the wished-
for Bonnet, & so ended this little adventure, much to the satisfaction 
of all parties.40 
Relationships follow antecedent/consequent patterns, too. As a 
general rule, we expect that strong attractions and dissonances 
between major characters in novels will have consequences; the 
more notice that such attractions and dissonances are given, the 
stronger our expectations will be. We should be especially alert to 
relational tensions introduced at the very beginning of a book. 
From the opening pages of The Idiot, we can confidently expect 
that the sharp contrast between Myshkin and Rogozhin—with its 
paradoxical overtones of attraction and repulsion—will continue 
to generate action in the novel, and we achieve a sense of comple­
tion when they finally join together in their homoerotic vigil over 
Nastasya's bed toward the end of the novel.41 Likewise, at the 
beginning of The Virginian, when the hero forces Trampas to back 
down after Trampas calls him a "son-of-a " (the event elicit­
ing the now-classic line, "When you call me that, smile"), we 
expect the antagonism between them to be resolved in the end, for 
"a public back-down is an unfinished thing."42 Similarly, the 
opening paragraph of The High Cost of Living discussed above 
suggests that the conflict between Leslie and Hennessy (or at least 
between what they represent in this scene) will bear some of the 
40. Jane Austen, "Frederic and Elfrida/7 in Minor Works, ed. R. W. Chapman, rev. 
B. C. Southam (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 4—5 (chap. 1). 
41. It is significant, though, that the novel does not end with this reconciliation, 
but rather with the epilogue, including Aglaya's marriage. The effect of that jarring 
post-resolution will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
42. Owen Wister, The Virginian (New York: Macmillan, 1902), 29-30 (chap. 2). 
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weight of the novel that follows. And no experienced reader of 
Pride and Prejudice has difficulty seeing, quite early in the text, 
that the working out of the relation between Elizabeth and Darcy 
will be central to the action. 
It is not only what people do in novels that sets up the anteced-
ent/consequent pattern; it is also what they say. As I suggested 
above, for instance, it is generally appropriate to assume that warn­
ings and promises will be followed up. When Leonard, in Cain's 
Career in C Major, is preparing for his career as an opera singer, his 
teacher/partner/lover Cecil warns him about "the bird/' When 
Leonard asks her what that is, she replies " 'Something you'll nev­
er forget, if you ever hear it.'//43 Under the circumstances, Cain 
expects us to read the rest of the book haunted by the fear that 
Leonard will in fact come to hear the bird. The reader who does not 
apply the proper rule here—who does not recognize the way that 
the warning is intended to color our experience of the text—will be 
unable to share the mounting suspense that lies at the heart of the 
novel's effect. 
Obviously, not all promises made in a text carry equal weight. 
Those made by minor characters, for instance, are less forceful 
than those made by major characters; those that promise events 
that will be significant for the plot—as we suspect it will turn out 
at the time the promise is made—are more forceful than those 
which promise something tangential. In the Cain example above, 
the warning is marked in several ways: It is stated by one of the 
two central characters, and it is repeated—with a clarification of 
its potential consequences. When Leonard asks, " 'Suppose they 
give me the bird?'" Cecil replies, " 'Then I'll have to get somebody 
else.'" Since the romantic relationship between Cecil and Leonard 
is crucial to the plot, the warning is thus doubly underscored by 
the repetition. In contrast, the promise made by Mary and Liz in 
The High Cost of Living, when Leslie comes over for dinner, has 
less impact: 
Every plate was different, from rummage sales, and "Everything 
comes from the land, everything!" except the cheap red wine in gal­
43. Cain, Careei in C Major, in Three of a Kind (Philadelphia: Blakiston, 1944), 
36 (chap. 5). 
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Ion jugs. "But we don't see why we can't make our own wine eventu­
ally. We have grapes started."44 
Mary and Liz are minor characters, to whom we have just been 
introduced; the question of the success or failure of their farm 
seems irrelevant to the concerns of the story, at least as it has 
developed so far. The authorial audience does not therefore take 
their remark to be a strong signal about how to approach the rest of 
the book. 
Maxims often function in the same way that warnings and 
promises do. Those that are given prominence in a novel—es-
pecially when they come toward the beginning—create the expec­
tation that they will be followed up. Some maxims, of course, are 
explicitly predictive in that they pose a specific link between the 
present and the future by telling what sorts of events follow from 
situations like the present one. "A man of tact, intelligence, and 
superior education moving in the midst of a mass of ignorant peo­
ple, ofttimes has a sway more absolute than that of monarchs.//45 
But even maxims that do not explicitly promise consequences of 
present situations can often be appropriately treated as predictive 
if they are neither justifications for actions that have just taken 
place nor guides to signification. Take the following: 
"It is a law of nature that we overlook, that intellectual versatility is 
the compensation for change, danger, and trouble. . . . Nature never 
appeals to intelligence until habit and instinct are useless. There is no 
intelligence where there is no change and no need of change. Only 
those animals partake of intelligence that have to meet a huge variety 
of needs and dangers."46 
Or, 
"Let me tell you this, as you don't seem to know it. The two go-
getting things in this white man's civilization are force and cunning. 
44. Piercy, High Cost, 120. 
45. Sutton E. Griggs, Imperium in Imperio (New York: Arno/New York Times, 
1969), 7 (chap. 1). 
46. Wells, Time Machine, 65. 
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When you have force or power you make people do things. When you 
haven't you use cunning/'47 
On the surface, they appear to be simply expressions of general 
truths rather than promises. But because of the conventional way 
in which such maxims are used in novels, it is appropriate to treat 
them as promises—that is, as promises that the truths they pro­
claim will be exemplified as the novel progresses. 
This is how the authorial audience treats the wisdom passed on 
to Selina in the first chapter of So Big, by her father, right before he 
dies (what more privileged position?): " 'There are only two kinds 
of people in the world that really count/" he tells her. '"One 
kind's wheat and the other kind's emeralds/"48 Obviously, the 
reader is intended to experience a sense of resolution when the 
maxim turns out to sum up the text at its recapitulation near the 
book's end. But that experience is not built into the text itself; it is 
available only to the reader who applies previously learned rules of 
configuration at the maxim's first appearance, and thus activates 
the expectations that the novel finally fulfills. 
Tasks and questions operate in a similar way. It is generally 
reasonable to expect important questions to be answered and ma­
jor tasks to be confronted, although (at least in nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century novels) failure to fulfill the task is more com­
mon than failure to answer questions. Assumptions that these 
rules operate is one of the necessary conditions to responding as 
intended, in particular to detective fiction. In one of the En­
cyclopedia Brown stories, for instance, we are told that a warning 
note has been typed on a piece of paper with "The quick brown 
fox" typed on the other side. In the real world, one can infer vir­
tually nothing from this fact. But since this is a story in which a 
definite solution is promised, we are entitled to assume that some­
thing can be inferred. Thus, we look at the clue not to ask, "What 
does this tell us?" but rather, "Since this is guaranteed to tell us 
something definite, what could that something definite be?" It is 
47. Claude McKay, Banjo: A Story without a Plot (New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich/Harvest, 1957), 241 (chap. 19). 
48. Ferber, So Big, 7 (chap. 1). 
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only in this very limited conventional context that the reader can 
conclude that the writer of the note had recently bought a new 
typewriter or repaired an old one.49 
Antecedents and consequents can work in reverse, as well. If a 
strange event is narrated, it is normally a signal for the narrative 
audience to look forward to an explanation of its causes. This is 
different from rules of signification regarding cause; in those cases, 
we assume the causal connections that are not given. In these 
configurative cases, in contrast, we do not have the ncessary infor­
mation to determine causes on our own,- we thus wait for the text 
to tell us the causes. A familiar form is the let-me-tell-you-why 
configurations found, for instance, in Pushkin's "Shot" (from the 
Belkin Tales) and Kuprin's "Idiot." In the latter, the narrator is 
surprised by Zimina's compassion toward an idiot stranger: "To 
tell the truth, I shouldn't have expected from him such sincere 
compassion towards a stranger's misfortune." This leads to a story: 
" 'If you'll allow me/ " says Zimina, " I'll tell you why the sight of 
an idiot moves me to such compassion.'"50 
Applying the other-shoe rule and its variants is not without its 
difficulties, however—for what constitutes a dropped shoe de­
pends on history and culture. In the nineteenth century, colds were 
not the minor inconvenience that they usually are today,- getting 
soaked in the rain therefore had more serious consequences. The 
contemporary reader who is not attuned to that historical dif­
ference is apt to be more surprised by the lengthy illnesses of Jane 
Bennet and Mr. Lockwood than Austen and Bronte intended. Simi­
larly, sexual relations between unmarried people implied a set of 
consequences in the nineteenth century (one thinks of Lydia and 
Wickham) that they no longer do. It may be poignant when Philip 
Marlowe and Linda Loring part simply as friends after their night 
together in Chandler's Long Goodbye, but it is neither shocking 
nor scandalous, and the authorial audience does not expect them 
to be punished in some way for their actions.51 Once again, learn­
49. Donald J. Sobol, 'The Case of the Litterbugs," in The Case of the Exploding 
Plumbing and Other Mysteries (New York: Scholastic, 1978), 40-45, 70. 
50. Alexander Kuprin, "The Idiot," in A Slav Soul and Other Stories, trans. Mr. 
and Mrs. Stephen Graham (London: Constable, 1916), 39-40. 
51. They do get married after Playback, but I doubt that that outcome was fore­
seen by Chandler when he wrote The Long Goodbye, and it certainly has no impact 
on the way the authorial audience reads the novel. 
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ing to read authorially involves learning historical and cultural 
norms. 
Correct application of the other-shoe rule depends on our under­
standing of genre as well. Virtually any event or statement can 
imply some consequences; authorial reading involves the ability to 
sort out those for which the consequences are likely to be vital in 
the text. To a large extent, this comes about through rules of 
notice: the important antecedents will usually be marked. But we 
also need to know what sorts of things are appropriate in what 
sorts of works: antecedents are often noticed because they have 
the potential to lead to consequences that the genre requires. 
Indeed, the whole notion of cause and effect in literature is radi­
cally genre bound. What is relevant to our ability to foresee textual 
turns is less our knowledge of what certain conditions lead to in 
reality than our knowledge of what they lead to in the kind of 
novel in which they are appearing. Antagonism is probably not, in 
fact, the most fertile breeding ground for true love, but it is the 
only breeding ground in at least one variant of the popular ro­
mance. Take, similarly, our ability to foresee the climax of John D. 
MacDonald's Girl in the Plain Brown Wrapper. Maureen Pearson 
Pike has apparently tried to commit suicide three times in three 
different ways (pills, slit wrists, hanging). It does not matter 
whether such a series of attempts is really psychologically possi­
ble. What matters is that Travis McGee has informed us, with 
scientific authority, that suicides rarely try to kill themselves even 
in two different ways, and in this genre, as I have noted, such 
absolute statements by the narrator are to be treated as true. This, 
in turn, leads us to believe that someone is really trying to murder 
her—not because, in reality, that is the usual cause of fishy sui­
cides, but because in this genre, anything that looks murder related 
should be treated as such. Furthermore, we suspect her husband, a 
man who has accumulated considerable wealth through somewhat 
questionable real estate deals. Again, this is not because of any­
thing in reality, but because of a rule of ethical enchainment that 
applies to Travis McGee novels: People who engage in shady finan­
cial transactions are to be treated as capable of murder. (This is one 
of those cases where signification and configuration merge: our 
sense of the character's ethics is really a matter of our expectations 
of what sorts of actions he or she is likely to perform.) When it is 
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hinted that maybe a jump will be next, we take it seriously; when 
we find out that there is to be an opening at her husband's new 
office on the top of " 'that big new building at the corner of Grove 
Boulevard and Lake Street? Twelve stories? Lots of windows?7"— 
then the authorial audience treats it as a signal from the author to 
approach that event with trepidation.52 In fact, if we know the 
genre well enough, we can even guess that McGee's race to the 
opening will not be fast enough to save her—the novel needs a 
mangled body more than it needs a heroic rescue. 
In ''Literature in the Reader: Affective Stylistics," Stanley Fish 
argues that the reader's experience (what "happens to, and with 
the participation of, the reader'7) is "the meaning" of a text.53 To a 
large extent he is right, and although he does not use my termi­
nology, his analyses show how this meaning is radically dependent 
on the reader making predictions about the text using rules of 
configuration. The reader he posits, to be sure, has such a limited 
repertoire of rules of configuration that he or she has a fairly lim­
ited set of responses. As I noted earlier, the effect of anticipation is 
for Fish—at least, in this essay—almost always the shock of sur­
prise. With a stronger understanding of configuration, of course, a 
reader may have a fuller set of textual responses—but in any case, 
the moment-to-moment curve of the text is ''meaningful" as an 
aesthetic experience only in the context of some rules of configura­
tion, and it can only be the curve that the author intended in the 
context of those rules expected of the authorial audience. 
Still, this is not the only kind of meaning that texts have. After 
we have finished them, we tend to think about them retroactively, 
reshaping them in the process. This activity opens up a different 
kind of literary form and calls upon the last set of rules—rules of 
coherence. 
52. MacDonald, The Girl in the Plain Brown Wrapper (New York: Fawcett, 1968), 
155. 
53. Fish, Is There a Texti 25. 
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The Austere Simplicity of 
Fiction: Rules of Coherence 
'I've lost my faith in pure coincidence. Everything in life tends 
to hang together in a pattern." 
Ross Macdonald, Black Money 
The Nature of Coherence 
Coherence (or its frequent surrogate, unity) has held a high rank 
in the critical court—especially during the 1940s and 1950s, when 
New Criticism dominated American academic practice. As 
Cleanth Brooks puts it, 'The primary concern of criticism is with 
the problem of unity—the kind of whole which the literary work 
forms or fails to form, and the relation of the various parts to each 
other in building up this whole."1 Or, as he and Robert Perm War­
ren put it when writing specifically about fiction, "Successful fic­
tion always involves a coherent relating of action, character, and 
meaning. . . . Most of the failures in fiction could be stated as 
failures in coherence."2 Similarly, for Murray Krieger, "The object 
whose creation the poet supervises wants above all to be one, a 
unified and complete whole."3 And despite our current romance 
with theory (in particular, with deconstruction), the majority of 
critical work being done today still aims at setting out the basic 
coherence of literary works, their "unity" or "basic pattern" or 
"overarching meaning." 
1. Brooks, "My Credo," 72. 
2. Brooks and Warren, Understanding Fiction, 27. See also Brooks' claim that 
bad poetry is "chaotic and incoherent/' whereas a good poem has "coherence of 
statement" and "unity of style" [Well Wrought Urn, 256, 76, 251). 
3. Krieger, Theory of Criticism, 32. 
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True, like form, coherence has been difficult to define, in part 
because it occurs along so many literary axes. At times, coherence 
is defined as a formal relation among elements in the text itself; 
that is how Culler, for instance, sees it when he lists "the binary 
opposition, the dialectical resolution of a binary opposition, [and] 
the displacement of an unresolved opposition by a third term" 
among the basic types of unity.4 Alternatively, coherence can be 
treated as a quality of the vision of the poet or of the world he or 
she describes. This seems to be what is happening when Eliot 
claims that if a poem is to interpose "no obstacle to the reader's 
enjoyment/' it needs to present a view of the world that "the mind 
of the reader can accept as coherent, mature, and founded on the 
facts of experience/'5 Sometimes, the term is used in more re­
stricted ways, as when Seymour Chatman uses it to refer to con­
sistency of reference: "Another restriction on selection and in­
ference is coherence. Narrative existents must remain the same 
from one event to the next. If they do not, some explanation (co­
vert or overt) must occur. If we have a story like 'Peter fell ill. Peter 
died. Peter was buried,' we assume that it is the same Peter in each 
case/'6 
Coherence not only means different things to different critics. 
To complicate matters, coherence as an aesthetic category is even 
more strongly colored by ideological overtones than notice, sig­
nification, and configuration. Of course, other literary conventions 
have ideological aspects as well. Rules of ethical enchainment, for 
instance, make sense in so-called realistic texts only if the reader 
begins with an assumption about the integrity of the human per­
sonality. But the ideological pull on coherence is greater than that 
on other types of convention. Indeed, to read the discourse of the 
New Critics, one sometimes wonders whether coherence is an 
aesthetic attribute at all. Although that discourse is often framed 
as a defense of ambiguity, in fact the New Critics had a limited 
tolerance for conflict and uncertainty. They tended to treat ambi­
guity not as an end in itself (that is, neither as a goal nor as a last 
4. Jonathan Culler, Structuralist Poetics, 174. 
5. T. S. Eliot, Use of Poetry, 87. 
6. Chatman, Story and Discourse, 30. 
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step), but rather as an obstacle eventually to be overcome through 
resolution. Thus, for all their praise of irony, Brooks and Warren, in 
Understanding Fiction, reject any irony that "preclude[s]" resolu­
tion, for such irony leads to "smug and futile skepticism/' Instead, 
they stand for an irony that "force[s] the resolution to take stock of 
as full a context as possible."7 
This insistence on resolution has its analogue in Brooks and 
Warren's views of human experience more generally. For many 
writers, from Aristotle on, the coherence of art is what separates it 
from life: "It was a little too pat/' notes Philip Marlowe in The Big 
Sleep. "It had the austere simplicity of fiction rather than the 
tangled woof of fact."8 But for the New Critics, coherence seems to 
be what binds art and life. Brooks puts it in cosmic terms: "Man's 
experience is indeed a seamless garment, no part of which can be 
separated from the rest/'9 But this almost metaphysical claim has 
social variants, too. The stress on conflict/resolution, for instance, 
privileges certain kinds of political values through its implicit ap­
preciation of compromise. The New Critics' vision of coherence 
has psychological implications as well, especially in their discus­
sion of fiction. According to Understanding Fiction, the very defi­
nition of fiction demands an acceptance of a common sense under­
standing of "human nature"—common sense, in this case, 
validating a bourgeois conception of the individual. The New Crit­
ics insist that "thoughts and actions must ultimately be co-
herent."10 More broadly, "the domain of fiction is . .  . the world of 
credible human beings. . . . What it excludes at either end is the 
world of pure abstraction: economic man, Mrs. Average House­
wife, the typical American, homo sapiens; and at the other ex­
treme, the mere freak, the psychological monster, the report from 
the psychiatrist's casebook/'11 New Critical discourse, further­
more, naturalizes this notion of the individual—that is, presents it 
7. Brooks and Warren, Understanding Fiction, xix. See also Mark Schorer on the 
ambiguity of Sons and Lovers ("Technique as Discovery/' in Essays in Modem 
Literary Criticism, ed. Ray B. West [New York: Rinehart, 1952], 197—98). 
8. Raymond Chandler, The Big Sleep (New York: Pocket, 1950), 157 (chap. 25). 
9. Brooks, "My Credo/7 74. 
10. Brooks and Warren, Understanding Fiction, 173. 
11. Ibid., 170. 
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as if it were coextensive with human experience in general. "Our 
judgment of probability and our notion of credibility in general are 
based firmly upon the way in which the human mind works and 
upon the experience that we have had as human beings" (emphasis 
added).12 It is therefore not accidental that in the New Critical 
view of fiction, the individual receives more stress than the social. 
Thus, as I suggested in my Introduction, when New Critics dis­
cuss coherence, they are often judging a work's content as much as 
its structure. For example, in explaining why an anecdote related 
by Francis Parkman does not count as fiction, Brooks and Warren 
end up criticizing not the structure of the episode, but its con-
tent—specifically, the view it offers of human character. Park-
man's point, they claim, is "to show that the characters of the 
plainsmen do not fit the 'standard rules of character7 which are 
accepted in more civilized societies. He is merely using the episode 
as a sociological example." To make the episode fiction, they im­
ply, an author would not only have to "develop . . . the character 
of Beckworth (which is exactly what Parkman does not do)" but 
would also have to arrive at a different conclusion, such as that 
"individuals cannot be judged by rule of thumb; every individual 
character is unique and has mixtures of good and evil in it."13 
Coherence, then, often serves as a vehicle by which ideological 
biases are smuggled into literary discussions disguised as objective 
aesthetic qualities. Beyond that, the very claim that coherence is 
valued turns out, in practice, to be paradoxical. Recent reader crit­
icism is making increasingly clear that when critics discuss co­
herence, their true subject is less a quality in the text or the author 
than an activity on the part of the readers (or, more particularly, 
their public representatives, literary critics)—what Susan Horton 
has aptly called "the critic's rage to pattern."14 
At first, the distinction between coherence as a textual property 
12. Ibid., 27. 
13. Ibid., 24. 
14. Horton, Interpreting Interpreting, 40. Culler similarly claims that the unity 
of texts "is produced not so much by intrinsic features of their parts as by the intent 
at totality of the interpretive process: the strength of the expectations which lead 
readers to look for certain forms of organization in a text and to find them" [Struc­
turalist Poetics, 91). See also Wolfgang Iser's notion of "consistency-building" in 
The Act of Reading, esp. 118-25. 
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and making coherent as a critical activity may seem simply an­
other front along which the objectivists and subjectivists (or for­
malists and reader critics) continue their endless skirmishes. Per­
haps it is. Yet it is an especially important area of conflict with 
serious implications for the process of canonization. For works 
differ markedly in the degree of activity they require in order to be 
made coherent. 
On the one hand, to return to the text-as-swing-set metaphor of 
Chapter i, we have essentially preassembled texts, where all that 
is left for the reader is grabbing on to the trapeze. These are the 
most extreme examples of what Roland Barthes calls "readerly 
texts" [textes lisibles)15—Harlequin Romances and Horatio Alger 
novels, for instance. Here, the rules of notice, signification, and 
(especially) configuration are working well. There seem to be no 
extraneous details or complicated symbolic patterns,- their endings 
easily and completely satisfy the desires and expectations aroused 
at their beginnings. They thus require no special rules of co-
herence—and no special effort—for the reader to make sense of 
them. For just as rules of notice presuppose that not all things are 
equally important, so rules of coherence presuppose that a work is 
not apparently coherent—that there are some surface incoher­
ences that need to be explained in some way, or at least made the 
subject of our critical discourse. But these preassembled texts lack 
such surface ruptures,- to their authorial audiences, they appear 
coherent simply on their face. Often, in fact, their coherence is 
explicitly trumpeted. Alexander Kuprin's story about a servant 
named Yasha, for instance, tells us point-blank how we should 
make sense out of Yasha's apparent inconsistencies. The last para­
graph reads: 
And now that I am nearly what may be called an old man, I go over 
my varied recollections now and then, and when I come to the 
thought of Yasha, every time I say to myself: "What a strange soul— 
faithful, pure, contradictory, absurd—and great. Was it not a truly 
Slav soul that dwelt in the body of Yasha?"16 
15. Barthes, S/Z, 4. 
16. Alexander Kuprin, "A Slav Soul/' in A Slav Soul and Other Stories, trans. Mr. 
and Mrs. Stephen Graham (London: Constable, 1916), 13. 
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Entitling the story "A Slav Soul" only binds its elements together 
more tightly. It is significant that such texts are rarely taken se­
riously in current academic critical discussion. 
Other texts, in contrast, are completely incoherent. These are 
the swing sets that arrive without the proper screws, with mis­
measured poles and warped seats. In the end, their inconsistencies 
are unmanageable, and there seems no sense to their structures or 
to their systems of signification. Such works are rarely the subject 
of critical discussion either. For the most part they remain un-
published—a sign that literature maintains higher quality control 
than many other industries. 
But between these lies a third category of works: works that 
leave us baffled and confused until we apply the proper procedures 
to them—works that are just pieces of wood and rope until we find 
the proper assembly techniques and apply the proper effort. 
Now if coherence itself were really viewed as a literary virtue, it 
would be the first type of text that received the greatest critical 
praise; in practice, however, the academy has by and large come to 
privilege the third, taking members of the first group seriously 
only when it is possible to prove that their true coherence is not 
the coherence that appears at first glance. Thus, while Brooks and 
Warren insist that a good story should "convey a definite 'point/ a 
definite idea or meaning," they hasten to add that it need not be 
(and rarely is) expressed explicitly.17 
Of course, not all reading communities share this preference for 
the not-yet-coherent. Contemporary readers of romances probably 
do not; nor, in all probability, did Homer's original audience. But at 
least the contemporary academic critical community seems to 
have adopted Barbara Herrnstein Smith's principle that "art inhab­
its the country between chaos and cliche."18 Whatever is said in 
critical pronouncements, the academy puts high value not on co­
herence per se, but rather on the activity of applying rules of co­
herence to works that are not evidently unified, but that can be 
made so through critical manipulation. 
Behind the valorizing of coherence, then, lies a preference for 
17- Brooks and Warren, Understanding Fiction, 23. 
18. Smith, Poetic Closure, 14. 
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works with disjunctures, with at least some surface ruptures and 
inconsistencies. This preference is just as strong in New Criticism 
as it is in post-structuralism. The two critical camps may be mov­
ing in opposite directions, the former trying to smooth over the 
gaps, the latter trying to widen them; but their differing critical 
activities tend to be nourished in the same literary soil. This is 
why post-structuralism, in contrast to feminism, has not led to any 
fundamental shift in the canon, even though it may shuffle the 
respective rankings of particular writers.19 
In arguing that coherence is more usefully discussed as an ac­
tivity by readers rather than a property of texts, I am not arguing 
that the coherence that results is unintended by the author. The 
conventions by which we make novels coherent can, like other 
literary conventions, be shared; and writers can plan their effects 
with the understanding that these rules of coherence will be ap­
plied. The gaps found in texts, in other words, are not necessarily 
either errors or even ambiguities—they may well be intended as 
opportunities for us to apply rules of coherence in some guided 
fashion. In fact, as we shall see, this is often one of the strongest 
ways an author can express his or her meaning. 
We can find those intended meanings, though, only if we assume 
that they are there. Indeed, the fundamental rule of coherence is 
parallel to the second metarule of configuration: We assume, to 
begin with, that the work is coherent and that apparent flaws in its 
construction are intentional and meaning bearing. As Northrop 
Frye puts it, "The primary understanding of any work of literature 
has to be based on an assumption of its unity. However mistaken 
such an assumption may eventually prove to be, nothing can be 
done unless we start with it as a heuristic principle/'20 
Rules of coherence are invoked whenever a text appears to resist 
such an assumption. I shall examine three sets of them, corre­
19. Culler has a different explanation of deconstruction's tendency to center on 
canonical texts; see On Deconstraction, 280. 
20- Frye, "Literary Criticism/' in The Aims and Methods of Scholarship in Mod­
ern Languages and Literatures, ed. James Thorpe (New York: Modern Language 
Association, 1963), 63. See also Gary Saul Morson: "To take a verbal text as a 
literary work . .  . is to assume in principle (1) that everything in the text is poten­
tially relevant to its design, and (2) that the design is complete in the text that we 
have" [Boundaries of Genre, 41). 
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sponding to three ways in which texts can appear to be incoher-
ent.21 First, texts can be insufficient—that is, they can be appar­
ently incoherent because of gaps in their fabric, holes that need to 
be filled in. Second, works can be overabundant—they can have a 
surplus of information that we need somehow to tame, including 
details that seem to contradict one another and that we need to 
reconcile. Finally, works can be simply disparate—and we need 
rules to help us bundle them together into convenient packages. 
These categories, to be sure, are rough—and it is not always clear 
whether a particular activity by a reader responds to one kind of 
apparent incoherence or another. Nonetheless, this classification 
provides us with a preliminary scaffolding for discussing some of 
the activities by which readers make works coherent. Let us look 
at each of these situations in turn. 
License to Fill 
Miss Binney stood in front of her class and began to read aloud from 
Mike Mulligan and His Steam Shovel. . . . [Ramona] listened quietly 
with the rest of the kindergarten to the story of Mike Mulligan's old-
fashioned steam shovel, which proved its worth by digging the base­
ment for the new town hall of Poppersville in a single day. . . . 
"Miss Binney .  . . —how did Mike Mulligan go to the bathroom 
/when he was digging the basement of the town hall?;
Miss Binney's smile seemed to last longer than smiles usually last. 
Ramona glanced uneasily around and saw that others were waiting 
with interest for the answer. . . . 
"Well—" said Miss Binney at last. "I don't really know, Ramona. 
The book doesn't tell us. . .  . The reason the book does not tell us . .  . 
is that it is not an important part of the story. The story is about 
digging the basement of the town hall, and that is what the book tells 
2r. For a different classification of the processes for making texts coherent, see 
Mary Louise Pratt, Toward a Speech Act Theory. Pratt has been especially suc­
cessful in working out the ways that assumptions of unity govern reading activities. 
22. Beverly Cleary, Ramona the Pest (New York: Dell, 1982), 22-24. 
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No work of literature can tell us everything that the characters 
do or think; instead, selected moments, thoughts, and events are 
flashed on the page. Chekhov's "Grasshopper," for instance, starts 
with the wedding of Olga Ivanovna and Dymov, followed by a 
general description of their life as newlyweds. But chapter 3 jumps 
to Whitmonday, chapter 4 to an evening in July, chapter 5 to Sep­
tember 2, and chapters 6 and 7 take place the next winter. How do 
we know what is going on in the interstices? 
Perhaps the most common procedure for dealing with such holes 
is to assume, with Miss Binney, that "the reason the book does not 
tell us . .  . is that it is not an important part of the story." Miss 
Binney is certainly correct that authors often leave out what is 
unimportant; one of the reasons actual readers interpret and evalu­
ate texts differently is that their perspectives on what is important 
differ: 
Miss Binney spoke as if this explanation ended the matter, but the 
kindergarten was not convinced. Ramona knew and the rest of the 
class knew that knowing how to go to the bathroom was important. 
They were surprised that Miss Binney did not understand, because 
she had showed them the bathroom the very first thing. Ramona 
could see there were some things she was not going to learn in school, 
and along with the rest of the class she stared reproachfully at Miss 
Binney.23 
But the Chekhov example cited above suggests that Miss Bin-
ney's claim is not universally true, even for authorial readers. De­
spite her arguments, and despite the claims of such critics as 
Robert Champigny ("In the case of a piece of fiction . . . filling gaps 
would amount to creating another fictional world"),24 there are 
many works of fiction where important events do occur in textual 
lacunae. One may think at first of classical detective stories, which 
ask the reader to use information at his or her disposal to close the 
crucial gap and figure out who done it. Such stories, though, while 
23. Ibid., 24—25. 
24. He continues: "One of the differences between fictional individuals and 'real' 
individuals is that a character cannot be assumed to exist outside what the text says 
about him" (Champigny, What Will Have Happened, 20). Champigny qualifies this 
position later in his text. 
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they may allow an opportunity to play with rules of coherence, do 
not finally depend on them, for they traditionally end with explicit 
solutions for those readers who have not been able to fill in the 
gaps on their own. In fact, the pleasure of the text in detective 
stories resides primarily in the reader's inability to figure out what 
has happened until told. More to the point is the early work of 
Robbe-Grillet where he takes his cue from this genre, but radi­
calizes it in a fundamental way. The solution to the mystery is 
never explicitly given in The Erasers, and the plot of The Voyeur 
centers around a blank moment in the middle of the text that the 
reader has to fill in on his or her own. 
But it is not only avant-garde novelists who demand that their 
readers fill in the blanks.25 Although the rape of Clarissa occurs 
between two chapters, Richardson assumes that we will be able to 
extrapolate from what we are told, logically and readily. Tolstoy 
leaves unarticulated the crucial part of a conversation between 
Dolly and Anna, expecting his readers to be able to peer behind his 
ellipsis: 
"I shall not have any more children." 
"How do you know you won't?" 
"I shan't, because I don't want them." 
And in spite of her agitation Anna smiled on noticing the naive 
expression of curiosity, surprise and terror on Dolly's face. 
"After my illness the doctor told me . . .  " 
"Impossible!" said Dolly, with wide-open eyes. To her this was one 
of those discoveries which leads to consequences and deductions so 
enormous that at the first moment one only feels that it is impossible 
to take it all in, but that one will have to think it over again and again. 
[Ellipsis in original]26 
25. Indeed, Iser would argue that such gap filling is characteristic of any real 
literary text. See, for instance, The Implied Reader. See also Stanley Fish's attack on 
Iser's position, "Why No One's Afraid of Wolfgang Iser/7 Diacritics n (Spring 
r98r): 2—13. Fish's objections might seem to apply to my arguments, too, but they 
dissolve when the distinction between authorial and actual readers is taken into 
account. 
26. Leo Tolstoy, Anna Karenina, trans. Louise Maude and Aylmer Maude (New 
York: Norton, 1970), 577 (pt. 6, chap. 23). 
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In such cases, what rules permit us to fill in the blanks as the 
author intended? 
First, there is a general rule of inertia. Although rules of configu­
ration lead us to expect that inertial situations will not last indefi­
nitely, we generally expect their undermining to be noted ex­
plicitly in the text. Thus we assume, unless we are given reason to 
believe otherwise, that events in the blank spots continue along 
the same path as the events preceding them. Since the affair be­
tween Olga Ivanovna and Ryabovsky in "The Grasshopper" is 
more stormy than sweet, therefore, we assume—in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary—that the same hostilities and recrimina­
tions and ambivalences continue in the gap between chapters 5 
and 6. Similarly, in Harriet E. Wilson's Our Nig, two years pass 
between chapter 3 (when Fredo is delivered to the Bellmonts and 
first discovers the virtual slavery in which she is to be held) and 
chapter 4. The authorial audience is not intended to think that 
nothing important has taken place,- rather, we are expected to as­
sume that the important events have been repetitions of the beat­
ings and degradation that we have already witnessed. 
Even when events change course within textual gaps, the au­
thorial audience can usually make correct inferences by applying 
the realism rule discussed in Chapter 3. Every literary text, as I've 
argued, depends on areas of congruence between the narrative and 
authorial audiences. As Seymour Chatman puts it, "We assume 
that a character has the requisite numbers of eyes, ears, arms, 
hands, fingers, and toes unless we are informed to the contrary."27 
And narrative gaps can be filled through reliance on the authorial 
audience's assumptions about the way things are. Thus, to cite 
Mary Pratt, "If we are not told how a character got from point A to 
27. Chatman, "Towards a Theory of Narrative/' New Literary History 6 (Winter 
1975): 304. Chatman's argument shows some of the ways in which problematic 
assumptions about the world may lie behind interpretive inferences: "If a girl is 
portrayed as 'blue-eyed/ 'blond/ and 'graceful/ we may assume further that her 
skin is fair and unblemished, that she speaks in a gentle voice, that her feet are 
relatively small, and so on. (The facts, of course may be other, but we have to be told 
so, and our inferential capacity remains undaunted. Indeed, we go on to infer a 
variety of details to account for the 'discrepancy/ too)" (304-5). This passage was 
revised when it appeared in Story and Discourse, 29. 
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point B, we assume he did so in some normal and untellable [that 
is, usual or unproblematic] way."28 When an author, for instance, 
finishes one chapter at night, with the sentence, "I needed a drink 
badly and the bars were closed/' and begins the next with the 
sentence, "I got up at nine, drank three cups of black coffee . . . ,  " 
we can reasonably assume (unless we are given reason to believe 
otherwise) that the narrator has spent most of the intervening time 
drinking alone in his apartment.29 Jane Austen plays with this rule 
for comic effect in Mansfield Park. After the novel's complications 
are resolved, and Edmund is finally on the verge of realizing that he 
is in love with Fanny, she writes: 
I purposely abstain from dates on this occasion, that every one may be 
at liberty to fix their own, aware that the cure of unconquerable 
passions, and the transfer of unchanging attachments, must vary 
much as to time in different people.—I only intreat every body to 
believe that exactly at the time when it was quite natural that it 
should be so, and not a week earlier, Edmund did cease to care about 
Miss Crawford, and became as anxious to marry Fanny, as Fanny 
herself could desire.30 
In particular, the realism rule allows us to fill in gaps through 
cause and effect; unless signaled otherwise, we assume that gaps 
contain those events that are most likely to produce the effects 
that we see in the events that are explicitly narrated. In The 
Postman Always Rings Twice, the idea of the murder is at first 
posed implicitly—but when Frank says, "They hang you for 
28. Pratt, Toward a Speech Act Theory, 158. 
29. Raymond Chandler, Farewell, My Lovely (New York: Pocket, 1943), 65 
(chaps. 12-13). 
30. Austen, Mansfield Park, ed. R. W. Chapman, 3d ed. (London: Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1932), 470 (vol. 3, chap. 17). Note a similar gesture in Tom Jones: "The 
reader will be pleased to remember t h a t . .  . we gave him a hint of our intention to 
pass over several large periods of time, in which nothing happened worthy of being 
recorded in a chronicle of this kind. 
"In so doing . . . we give him . .  . an opportunity of employing that wonderful 
sagacity, of which he is master, of filling up these vacant spaces of time with his 
own conjectures; for which purpose we have taken care to qualify him in the 
preceding pages" (Henry Fielding, Tom Jones [New York: Modern Library, n.d.], 74 
[bk. 3, chap. 1]). 
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that/ " the authorial audience can readily determine the subject of 
their plans, for only thoughts of murder could elicit that re-
sponse.31 We are expected to make a similar interpretive move in 
Southworth's Allworth Abbey. The happy marriage between Hol­
lis Elverton and Athenie de la Compte has been broken asunder by 
a visit from a mysterious stranger, which for unexplained reasons 
forces Elverton to abandon his wife and child, Alma. The mother 
turns against her daughter, who grows up virtually alone. When 
Athenie discovers that Alma is planning to marry Norham Mon­
trose, she tells her that such a marriage—indeed, that love and 
marriage, period—is impossible. Yet at first, she will not tell her 
why. She only tells her "'what the objection is not1": that Mon-
trose's birth, position, and character are all exemplary, that there is 
no feud between the families, that her parents loved each other and 
lived happily " 'up to that fatal evening/ " that neither had had a 
previous marriage that separated them. Finally, Athenie tells Alma 
that her " 'parents' marriage proved the most awful calamity that 
could have crushed any two human beings/" that Alma's birth 
was " 'a curse to Hollis Elverton—a curse to me, and deeper still, a 
curse to you/ " and that she is " 'not flesh and blood as others! but 
something set apart, accursed, that must not join heart or hand 
with any other human being.'" None of this makes sense to Alma, 
so finally Mrs. Elverton "whispered in her ear." We do not hear her 
explanation of the mystery, but we do see Alma's reaction: 
Alma sprang to her feet, gazed with dilated eyes and blanched cheeks 
in bewildering despair upon her mother's face, as though unable to 
receive at once the full horror of her words, and then drew her hands 
wildly to her head, reeled forward and fell senseless to the floor. 
Yet while Southworth refrains from telling us explicitly what the 
secret is, she certainly expects that her reader will, from the effects 
that have been produced, be able to infer that we are dealing with a 
case of incest. Indeed, the surprise twist of the plot is not the 
discovery that the relation between the Elvertons was incestuous, 
but the final revelation that it in fact was not—a revelation that 
31. James M. Cain, The Postman Always Rings Twice, in Cain x 3 (New York: 
Knopf, 1969L 13 (chap. 3). 
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produces the intended effect only if the reader has previously con­
cluded that incest was involved.32 
Rules of Surplus 
Novels not only leave gaps that we need to fill in; they also, on 
occasion, provide a surfeit—give notice to too much information. 
In the easiest cases, that information is simply unnecessary or 
extraneous. As a general rule, especially when we are dealing with 
the canonical texts of the Western tradition, we are not expected to 
assume that such extraneous information results from authorial 
oversight (like the unexplained death of the chauffeur, Owen Tay­
lor, in The Big Sleep). Instead, unless there is evidence to the con­
trary, we are intended to assume that the surplus is intentional and 
that we are supposed to interpret it in one way or another, trans­
forming the text so that it is no longer excessive. 
More specifically, when notice is given to apparently irrelevant 
textual features—features that do not contribute to plot or charac­
terization, for instance, or that do not serve some immediate func­
tion, like the provision of verisimilitude or local color—then they 
are to be treated as figurative. The repeated descriptions of the sign 
advertising Dr. Eckleburg—like the repeated description of the 
green light at the end of the Buchanans' dock—are thus legit­
imately treated as metaphors in The Great Gatsby, although there 
would be less justification for so doing if they did not have as much 
notice as they do. Similarly, while the description of Vevey at the 
beginning of "Daisy Miller" makes sense as local color—as a set-
ting—the famous description of the turtle crossing the road in the 
third chapter of Steinbeck's Grapes of Wrath does not, and must 
therefore be treated symbolically. More specifically, the authorial 
audience assumes a kind of parallelism—that the journey of the 
turtle is intended, in some way, to reflect on the journeys of the 
characters in the book. 
Surplus can be more difficult to manage, however, when it in­
32. Emma D. E. N. Southworth, Allwonh Abbey; or, Eudora (New York: Hurst, 
1876), 274-78 (chap. 20). 
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volves contradictory information. In Othello, the Moor offers two 
different histories for the crucial handkerchief. When talking to 
Desdemona (act 3, scene 4), he tells her that it was given to his 
mother by an Egyptian charmer,- in the climactic scene of the play, 
he tells Iago and Emilia that it was "an antique token/My father 
gave my mother" (act 5, scene 2). This is extra information with a 
vengeance,- how are we to account for the discrepancy? 
The most general rule in such cases is "trust the last." If, for 
instance, a text proffers a series of variations on the same story (as, 
say, Absalom, Absalom! and Anthony Berkeley's Poisoned Choco­
lates Case do), we are generally to accept the final version, rather 
than one in the middle, as the "correct" one. In part, this ties in 
with the rule of notice that endings are privileged—for, given the 
weight our culture puts on truth, that which gets the greatest 
attention in a text is most likely to be construed as true. It is for 
this reason that John Fowles realized the futility of giving The 
French Lieutenant's Woman its double ending: "I cannot give both 
versions at once, yet whichever is the second will seem, so strong 
is the tyranny of the last chapter, the final, the 'real' version."33 
The trust-the-last rule also fits neatly with a common configura­
tion, what Culler calls "the pattern of alethic reversal: first a false 
or inadequate vision, then its true or adequate counterpart."34 To 
put it otherwise, while nineteenth- and twentieth-century nar­
ratives on the whole tend to move from the familiar to the un­
familiar, the unfamiliar tends to be increasingly understood. 
To be sure, many narratives—Heart of Darkness comes readily 
to mind—move from clarity to ambiguity; but even here, the am­
biguity that Marlow confronts is intended to be taken as a truer 
vision than the false clarity at the beginning of the text. Intellec­
tually, therefore, such narratives generally move from darkness to 
light, even if they move temperamentally into gloom; in the West­
ern realistic tradition, characters are more likely to be correct after 
undergoing experiences worthy of narration than before them. Sus­
an Suleiman points out that in the roman a these, it is unlikely 
33. John Fowles, The French Lieutenant's Woman (New York: NAL/Signet, 
1970), 318 (chap. 55). 
34. Culler, Pursuit of Signs, 69 (italics in original). 
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"that a positive apprenticeship will be followed by its opposite. 
Once the truth has been found, it is inadmissible, in the 'exem­
plary' world of the roman a these, that it will be abandoned in 
favor of error."35 But this is also generally true of most other nine­
teenth- and twentieth-century narrative genres where discovering 
the truth is an issue. Thus Emma Woodhouse's final perception of 
herself—her recognition of her snobbish and meddlesome nature, 
her altered views on marriage and her relation to Mr. Knightley— 
is to be considered by the reader as wiser and more understanding 
than those views she holds at the beginning of the book. 
As with most other rules of reading, though, the proper applica­
tion of the trust-the-last rule is radically bound up with genre. 
Although most genres do incorporate this rule, there are types of 
novels that move in the opposite direction—novels in which char­
acters lose their grip on the truth, move backward in terms of self-
awareness. An extreme case is Orwell's 1984: surely, we are not 
expected to take Winston's final vision ("But it was all right, every­
thing was all right, the struggle was finished. He had won the 
victory over himself")36 as correct. But while extreme, 1984 mere­
ly exemplifies what we see in certain other texts. Indeed, many 
novels centering on characters who sell out (Balzac's Pere Goriot), 
go mad (Dostoyevsky's Gambler, Robbe-Grillet's Jealousy), or fall 
prey to vice and degradation [Madame Bovary) operate in a differ­
ent way. Such exceptions, though, are usually signaled, for in most 
of them, there is a strong disassociation of the voices and values of 
author and narrator (or main character). And we are generally not 
expected to accept the last vision in a text if it comes from a 
frankly unreliable character. 
In addition, regardless of genre, application of the trust-the-last 
rule depends on rhetorical context. That is, when the contradiction 
comes in the spoken words of a character—as opposed to his or her 
thoughts, or the statements of a reliable narrator—the cir­
cumstances in which the words are spoken also put pressure on 
whether we are to apply the rule of trust the last. In the example 
from Othello, of course, the rhetorical context seems to support, 
35. Suleiman, Authoritarian Fictions, 90-91. 
36. George Orwell, 1984 (New York: NAL/Signet, 1950), 245 (pt. 3, chap. 6). 
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rather than undermine, our tendency to believe the final version. 
The first story comes when Othello is trying to terrorize Des­
demona so that she will reveal her true feelings; the handkerchief 
is but a means to further the end of finding out the truth about her. 
But in the second account, the real subject of the discussion is the 
handkerchief itself—and Othello is trying to find out the truth 
about it. But in Lermontov's Hew of Our Time, where Pechorin 
describes himself in different terms virtually every time he 
searches his soul, there is no reason to give credence to any ver­
sion, for in each case, he has reason to lie either to himself or to his 
audience (for instance, when he is trying to impress the first nar­
rator with his worldliness or trying to seduce Princess Mary 
through self-laceration). Lermontov, of course, is aware of the 
problem raised by Fowles—of the tendency of the reader to apply 
the rule even where it is inappropriate. He has thus structured his 
novel so that the reader who tries to trust the last account is 
blocked. Specifically, he confuses the time scheme so that the 
chronologies of the narration and of the story do not correspond. 
We see Pechorin near the end of his life well before we read of his 
youthful adventures, so it is thus not at all clear what the "last" 
statement really is. Indeed, this temporal complexity is announced 
in the novel's paradoxical opening line ("In every book the preface 
is the first and also the last thing"), which introduces a preface 
where even the author's voice is ironized.37 This self-conscious 
thwarting of the traditional techniques for making determinations 
about the validity of various versions of self offered by the main 
character is one of the sources of the novel's psychological rich­
ness. 
A similar structure is used to confuse political issues in Sutton 
Griggs' 1899 novel, Imperium in Imperio. The core of the novel 
consists of a debate about the appropriate black responses to white 
oppression. After a notice from "Sutton E. Griggs" vouching for 
the "truthfulness" of the narrative, the narrator's voice is the first 
and last we hear, and he supports the conservative position es­
poused by Belton Piedmont rather than the more violent alter­
37. Mihail Lermontov, A Hero of Our Time, trans. Vladimir Nabokov and Dmitri 
Nabokov (New York: Doubleday/Anchor, 1958), 1 (Author's Introduction). 
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native posed by Bernard Belgrave. But since his opening words are 
"I am a traitor/' and since he has no active presence in the novel 
that can counteract the negative impression created by that decla­
ration, it is hard to know where we are expected to stand.38 
Contradictions can occur not only in the content of a text, but in 
its formal aspect as well, most specifically in the violation of con­
ventional configurations of closure. I will be able to deal with this 
more fully at the end of the next section of this chapter, where I 
talk about endings as conclusions. 
Rules of Naming, Bundling, and Thematizing 
Once done reading a text, readers usually try to tie it up in some 
way. If a text is short and simple, especially if it has a clear point, 
this may not prove difficult, any more than it is difficult to get a 
quart of milk from the checkout counter to your car. But a major 
text in our tradition is apt to be more cumbersome—and readers 
need some kind of packaging that allows them to treat it conven­
iently as a whole, just as they need paper bags and carts when doing 
more elaborate shopping. There are a number of ways in which 
texts can be packed up. 
For instance, as linguists and philosophers have long main­
tained, the process of naming serves to take the complex or un­
familiar and make it manageable by putting it in a category, in­
creasing its apparent coherence by stressing some features and 
downplaying others. The same process occurs in reading. Academ­
ic readers, in particular, name and thus classify works—for in­
stance, by appropriating them to particular generic categories, by 
elucidating their central theme, or by finding their governing met­
aphoric or mythic structure. Annette Kolodny suggests, for in­
stance, "the tantalizing possibility that metaphor, or symbolizing 
in general, . . . helps to give coherence to the otherwise inchoate 
succession of discrete sense data."39 These naming activities are 
38. Griggs, Impehum in Imperio (New York: Arno/New York Times, 1969), ii, 1 
("To the Public" and "Berl Trout's Dying Declaration"). For a good analysis of 
similar devices in Sartre, see Gerald Prince, "La Nausee and the Question of 
Closure," 182—90. 
39. Annette Kolodny, Lay of the Land, 148. 
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made easier by the fact that readers usually start with the assump­
tion that such a handle is there to be grasped in the first place. 
As a general rule, if a reasonable number of textual features unite 
it with another known textual pattern, then that pattern can legit­
imately be treated as an appropriate "name" for the artifact in 
question. The more features that can be subsumed under this 
name, the more appropriate it is, and the more coherent the bundle 
is deemed to be. Sometimes, as we have seen, authors themselves 
suggest the potential bundles: Joyce calls his novel Ulysses, and 
the parallels to the Odyssey that are thus uncovered are seen as 
proof of its coherence. More often, we have to find the names 
ourselves. It is important to realize that the very act of naming 
provides a sense of coherence; this is true even when, paradox­
ically, the name given is the name of some kind of chaos. Thus, we 
get a sense of some kind of order even when the narrator of 
William Kennedy's Legs points out the incoherences of his text: 
'I've often vacillated about whether Jack's life was tragic, comic, a 
bit of both, or merely a pathetic muddle. I admit the muddle theory 
moved me most at this point/'40 
Bundling can also be facilitated through the use of parallelisms. 
It is generally assumed, for instance, that parallels along one axis 
imply parallels along another. In poetry, for instance, parallel syn­
tax is usually assumed to imply parallel thoughts. Similarly, in 
fiction, Bruce R. Stark is able to argue that there is a thematic 
parallel between Daisy Faye and Ella Kay—the woman who cheat­
ed Jay Gatsby out of his inheritance from Dan Cody—at least 
partly because of the ''phonological equivalence" of their names.41 
Indeed, we are generally invited to assume that any elements— 
characters, plot lines, settings—that can be treated as parallel 
should be treated in that way. Of course, like all spatial metaphors, 
literary parallelism resists Euclidean exactness. Two elements can 
be called literary parallels if they are variations of the same theme, 
for instance, if they provide commentary on each other, or even if 
they serve as counterexamples of each other. Thus, for instance, 
since Chekhov wrote "The Man in the Case," "Gooseberries," and 
40, Kennedy, Legs (New York: Penguin, 1983), 166 ("Playing the Jack''). 
41. Stark, "The Intricate Pattern in The Great Gatsby/' Fitzgerald/Hemingway 
Annual 197s, ed. Matthew J. Bruccoli and C. E. Frazer Clark, Jr. (Washington: 
Microcards, 1975), 57-58. 
159 
Narrative Conventions 
"About Love" in the form of a trilogy, it is appropriate to see them 
as three different exemplifications of the same general theme—to 
see, for instance, the social forces that keep Alehin from declaring 
his love for Anna as a variant of the social and physical shells in 
which Belikov encases himself. The stories of Anna Karenina and 
Levin, in contrast, serve as exemplifications of the opposite trajec­
tories that lives can follow. Interpretive disagreement can often 
stem from the application of this rule—not only from dispute over 
whether the general rule ought to be applied, but also, once it is 
applied, from dispute about how to do so, about what sort of paral­
lels are in fact intended. Is the parallelism between Tom and Huck 
in Huckleberry Finn intended to make us see them as similar—or 
radically different? 
Because of the parallelism rule, collections of stories differ radi­
cally from novels. When formally discrete narratives are a novel— 
as the seven "stories" of Gloria Naylor's Women of Brewster Place 
are—we are entitled to see them as reflections of one another, as 
different ways of saying what is, in the end, the same story. When 
stories are merely collected as stories, however, there is no conven­
tion allowing us to treat them in that manner. Thus, it makes a 
tremendous difference in which way we consider such ambigu­
ously structured books as Jean Toomer's Cane or John Barth's Lost 
in the Funhouse. 
Perhaps the most important bundling technique, however, in­
volves the rule of conclusive endings. The ending of a text is not 
only to be noticed; there is also a widely applicable interpretive 
convention that permits us to read it in a special way, as a conclu­
sion, as a summing up of the work's meaning. Marianna Torgov­
nick puts it especially strongly: "An ending is the single place 
where an author most pressingly desires to make his points— 
whether those points are aesthetic, moral, social, political, epis­
temological, or even the determination not to make any point at 
all."42 I would phrase it differently: readers assume that authors 
put their best thoughts last, and thus assign a special value to the 
final pages of a text. It is particularly easy for the reader to do so, of 
course, when the ending is apparently congruent with the text that 
42. Torgovnick, Closure in the Novel, 19. 
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precedes—for instance, the moral of a traditional fable or the mar­
riage of a traditional paperback romance. As E. M. Forster puts it, 
"If it was not for death and marriage I do not know how the average 
novelist would conclude."43 Endings, however, are not always so 
neat, and when they are not, the reader is often expected to rein­
terpret the work so that the ending in fact serves as an appropriate 
conclusion. Take, for instance, Lucas Beauchamp's demand for a 
receipt at the end of Faulkner's Intruder in the Dust We not only 
notice it because of its privileged position, we are also expected to 
interpret the novel in such a way that it serves as a satisfactory 
summing up. In particular, it serves to undercut Gavin's political 
pronouncements—for the only way to turn that ending into a sum­
mation is to assume that Gavin, in contrast to Chick, has failed to 
attain the wisdom that would make him worthy of Lucas' trust 
and friendship. Similarly, Huckleberry Finn's decision to "light 
out for the Territory" could, taken out of context, be read as an 
introduction to adventures to come, but its placement in the novel 
we have requires us to read it as a conclusion—a final response— 
to what he has already experienced. 
This is the general reading strategy that allows readers to deal 
with the formal contradictions that I mentioned at the end of the 
previous section of this chapter. To exemplify the process, I would 
like to look at some of the ways that the expectations aroused by 
the second metarule of configuration—the metarule that leads us 
to expect balance in a text, to expect that the ending will somehow 
be prefigured in the beginning—can be apparently frustrated, and 
the interpretive operations that readers are likely to use to restore 
balance. Specifically, I will look at two ways in which balance can 
be upset: through violation (deceptive cadence) and through exag­
geration (excessive cadence). 
(i) Kenneth Burke suggests that formal excellence requires that a 
work's ending fulfill—perhaps after considerable teasing—the 
promises with which it begins. But novels often have endings that 
do not simply surprise (to surprise, after all, is not necessarily to 
contradict) but that seem, when we get to them, flagrantly to defy 
what has come before—which end, as Ives' Second Symphony 
43. Forster, Aspects of the Novel 66. 
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does, with what musicians call a deceptive cadence. Ambrose 
Bierce's "Dame Fortune and the Traveler" provides a transparent 
example: 
A weary Traveler who had lain down and fallen asleep on the brink of 
a deep well was discovered by Dame Fortune. 
"If this fool/' she said, "should have an uneasy dream and roll into 
the well men would say that I did it. It is painful to me to be unjustly 
accused, and I shall see that I am not." 
So saying she rolled the man into the well.44 
The fable's detour around the expected tag line—especially since it 
moves in the name of a kind of cynical realism—jolts the authorial 
audience into questioning the validity of the moral it expected. 
This is because, by the general rule of conclusive endings, readers 
are invited to revise their understanding of the beginning of the 
text so that the ending, which at first seems a surprise, turns out to 
be in fact prefigured. One common way of doing this is by 
"thematizing" the jolt so that it becomes the very subject of the 
text. Thus, Torgovnick argues about Sentimental Education: 
Any shift in time-scale at the end of a novel ordinarily involves a 
movement forward in time,- Flaubert parodically inverts this tradi­
tional element by having the novel end with an "incident" that had 
occurred before the beginning of the novel's action. The inversion has 
thematic value, for it indicates that our heroes' journey through life is 
regressive rather than progressive.45 
More generally, the undermining of a conventional ending tends to 
stress the conventionality of that closure, and hence makes us 
44. Bierce, Fantastic Fables, in The Collected Writings of Ambrose Bierce (New 
York: Citadel, 1963), 640. 
45. Torgovnick, Closure in the Novel, n5-1/ of course, would prefer to reword 
that final sentence: the inversion indicates regression because it is assumed be­
forehand to have thematic value. See also Jonathan Culler's claim that "The Waste 
Land can be unified by thematizing its formal discontinuities'' ("Prolegomena to a 
Theory of Reading," in Reader in the Text, ed. Suleiman and Crosman, 48; much of 
this essay ended up, in altered form, in chap. 3 of Pursuit of Signs). This interpretive 
technique is applied to ancient as well as to modern texts. See Alice M. Colby-
Hall's analysis of the "double ending" of Renaut's Bel Inconnu in the special issue 
of Yale French Studies devoted to closure ("Frustration and Fulfillment: The Dou­
ble Ending of the Bel Inconnu," Yale French Studies, no. 67 [1984]: 120-34). 
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aware of the gap between the authorial and narrative audiences. In 
works that present themselves as jests—works, like S. J. Per-
elman's parodies, that are intended primarily to charm—it is possi­
ble to interpret the opening of the gap as an end in itself, as a source 
of surprise and hence amusement. But in works that have greater 
pretentions to seriousness, we assume, in the absence of instruc­
tions to the contrary, that the undermining of a convention is to be 
read at least in part as a critique of that convention. 
There are, in general, two directions such a critique can take. If 
the primary subject of the work in question is art itself, then we 
can assume that the convention is being questioned from an aes­
thetic point of view. Pushkin's ostentatious refusal to wrap up the 
plot at the end of Eugene Onegin, for instance, seems—given the 
discussion of poetry throughout the text—to be a commentary on 
literary convention itself. 
If, on the other hand, the work seems to be trying to make a 
statement about the world, we will start off assuming that the 
convention is being criticized for its falseness when held up to the 
outside world—at least, the outside world assumed by the au­
thorial audience. Take, for instance, Mark Twain's Pudd'nhead 
Wilson. At first, the text may seem but a variant of the traditional 
Cinderella pattern. In this plot, an impoverished but deserving 
person is cruelly abused, even enslaved, but he or she endures and 
is eventually discovered (usually through some bizarre coinci­
dence, often involving switched infants) and rewarded with wealth 
and rank. Twain's novel tells the story of a black woman who, to 
save her child (who looks white) from being sold down the river, 
substitutes him for the son of one of the local aristocrats. In a 
climactic courtroom scene, the deception is uncovered, and the 
true freeman, the virtuous Valet de Chambers, who has spent the 
first two decades of his life as a slave, discovers that he is heir to a 
fortune. But just as we are about to delight in his success, there is 
an unexpected twist. 
The real heir suddenly found himself rich and free, but in a most 
embarrassing situation. He could neither read nor write, and his 
speech was the basest dialect of the negro quarter. His gait, his at­
titudes, his gestures, his bearing, his laugh—all were vulgar and un­
couth; his manners were the manners of a slave. Money and fine 
163 
Narrative Conventions 
clothes could not mend these defects or cover them up; they only 
made them the more glaring and the more pathetic. The poor fellow 
could not endure the terrors of the white man's parlor, and felt at 
home and at peace nowhere but in the kitchen. The family pew was 
misery to him, yet he could nevermore enter into the solacing refuge 
of the "nigger gallery"—that was closed to him for good and all.46 
This does more than joke about art; it forces the authorial audience 
to question the ideological assumptions behind the convention: 
the belief that if we could somehow make our fortunes, we could 
easily transcend any limitations in our upbringing. 
One of the primary targets for many nineteenth- and twentieth-
century novelists has been closure itself. The term closure, unfor­
tunately, has been confused by its application to at least two radi­
cally different concepts. On the one hand, closure can refer to the 
way a text calls on readers to apply rules of signification; in this 
sense, a text is "open" if its symbolic meanings are not restricted. 
Maeterlinck's play Pelleas and Melisande, with its vague but reso­
nant symbols, is open in this way, and it is presumably in this way 
that Renee Riese Hubert is using the term when she argues that 
"the modern work of art is essentially open, proposing a dialectic 
between the work and its interpreter/'47 But closure can also refer 
to the way that a text utilizes rules of configuration; in this sense, 
a work is ''open" when, for instance, the plot remains unresolved 
and incomplete even at the end. In this second meaning, Pelleas, 
where both the mismatch of Melisande's marriage to Golaud and 
the oddly innocent passion of her adulterous/incestuous love affair 
with Pelleas are rounded out by the deaths of the lovers, is a fairly 
closed text. 
In the argument that follows, I will be talking about this second 
kind of closure. More particularly, I would argue that many real­
istic writers prefer endings in which the full consequences of the 
46. Mark Twain, Pudd'nhead Wilson, in Pudd'nhead Wilson and Those Extraor­
dinary Twins (New York: Harper, 1899), 224 (Conclusion). It is, though, risky to 
talk about coherence in a work as textually tangled as this one; for a discussion of 
the problems, see Hershel Parker, Flawed Texts and Verbal Icons, chap. 5. 
47. Hubert, 'The Tableau-Poeme: Open Work/' Yale French Studies, no. 67 
(1984): 43. Hubert's claim, of course, applies only to a fairly restricted text-milieu. 
See also Gerald Prince's distinction between hermeneutic, proairetic, and tonal 
closure later in that same issue ["La Nausee and the Question of Closure/' 183). 
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events portrayed—even the consequences immediately pertinent 
to the narrative at hand—are neither worked out nor clearly im­
plied. Crime and Punishment, as I've noted, ends with Raskol­
nikov looking toward the future. 
At the beginning of their happiness at some moments they were both 
ready to look on those seven years as though they were seven days. 
He did not know that the new life would not be given him for noth­
ing, that he would have to pay dearly for it, that it would cost him 
great striving, great suffering. 
Now it is true that such unresolved endings are sometimes round­
ed off with a desultory closing of the door, such as the final para­
graph of Crime and Punishment, which follows the passage just 
cited. 
But that is the beginning of a new story—the story of the gradual 
renewal of a man, the story of his gradual regeneration, of his passing 
from one world into another, of his initiation into a new unknown 
life. That might be the subject of a new story, but our present story is 
ended.48 
Similarly, Robert O'Brien's book for young readers, The Secret of 
NIMH, ends with important unanswered questions about what has 
happened to some of the major characters, as well as about what 
will happen in the future. But it still includes the final gesture that 
brings down the curtain in so many children's stories: "They went 
to sleep."49 These easy assertions of well-roundedness, however, 
do not make these texts substantially different from texts that are 
more blatant in their failure to tell the whole story, such as 
Chekhov's "Lady with the Dog," which ends with the following 
paragraph: 
And it seemed to them that they were within an inch of arriving at a 
decision, and that then a new, beautiful life would begin. And they 
48. Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Crime and Punishment, trans. Constance Garnett (New 
York: Random House/Vintage, 1950), 492 (Epilogue, chap. 2). 
49. O'Brien, The Secret of NIMH (New York: Scholastic/Apple, 1982), 249 (Epi­
logue). The novel was originally entitled Mrs. Frisby and the Rats of NIMH, but was 
later renamed to conform to the title of the film version. 
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both realized that the end was still far, far away, and that the hardest, 
the most complicated part was only just beginning.50 
It is important to realize that such lack of closure does not mean 
lack of conclusion. By the rule of conclusive endings, the authorial 
audience will take these open endings and assume that open-ness 
itself is part of the point of the conclusion.51 It will not, however, 
treat these texts as it treats Eugene Onegin, for in Crime and 
Punishment, The Rats of NIMH, and "The Lady with the Dog," art 
itself is not the primary subject. Thus, the authorial audience is 
more likely to thematize the apparent incompleteness as an at­
tempt by the author to cast doubt on the social and philosophical 
implications of the traditional well-made story—most specifically, 
the implication that stories really do have endings, that lives ever 
reach a state of rest. "That is the story/7 writes Alice Walker in 
"Advancing Luna—and Ida B. Wells." "It has an 'unresolved7 end­
ing. That is because Freddie Pye and Luna are still alive, as am I."52 
Of course, different conventions have different ideological im-
plications—and even the same convention (or its overturn) may 
have different meanings in different texts, depending on when, 
where, by whom, and for whom it was written. Thus, for instance, 
when W. S. Gilbert mocked the Cinderella story in H.M.S. Pina­
fore, he may have been ridiculing certain class pretensions, but he 
apparently did not see the power of those class pretensions to warp 
personality beyond redemption. He may have thought that the 
lucky break was unlikely, but there is no textual indication that he 
did not believe that with luck the individual could transcend class. 
Twain sees the convention in radically different terms, for he sees 
class as forming the individual to begin with. Attacks on well-
roundedness, too, bear a different ideological weight in different 
contexts. "The Lady with the Dog," for instance, reflects 
50. Anton Chekhov, "The Lady with the Dog/' trans. Ivy Litvinov, in Anton 
Chekhov's Short Stories, ed. Ralph Matlaw (New York: Norton, 1979), 2-3$. 
51. Prince, although he uses almost the opposite terms, is describing the same 
paradox when he says that there can be "a closure of uncertainty (making sense of 
or exploiting inconclusiveness, hesitation, and contradiction)" ["La Nausee and the 
Question of Closure/7 188). 
52. Walker, "Advancing Luna—and Ida B. Wells," in You Can't Keep a Good 
Woman Down (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich/Harvest, 1982), 98. 
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Chekhov's sense that humans always have to deal with concrete 
particulars rather than generalities, and tkattlie course of an indi-
vidual's future is therefore always unpredictable, In Chandler's Big 
Sleep, as I will show in more detail at the end of Chapter 6, the 
attack on well-roundedness reflects a political critique of a certain 
notion of crime promulgated by the classical detective story. The 
novel violates the primary conventions of the genre, and the rule of 
conclusive endings allows the reader to treat these violations as a 
statement, specifically as an attack on the "vision of the world that 
the traditional conventions imply.53 
(2) So far, I have considered only deceptive cadences. Thematiz­
ing a text's conclusion is more complex still when a convention is 
undermined not by overthrowing it, but rather by following it in 
such an ostentatious way that it looks absurd—wliere the cadence 
is not deceptive, but excessive. Farce is particularly apt to use this 
mode. In Ludovic Halevy's libretto for Offenbach's Ba-Ta-Clan, 
which concerns a revolutionary conspiracy in China, tragedy is 
averted at the last moment when it turns oimt that all the major 
characters are secretly French. A more pointed example is the res­
cue of Macheath in Brecht's Threepenny Oj?eui. Even without 
Peachum's explicit criticism of the falseness of the ending ('In 
reality, their end [i.e., that of the poor] is generally bad. Mounted 
messengers from the Queen come far too seldom"),54 the intended 
reader would have little trouble concluding that he or she should 
take the arrival of the mounted messenger as a criticism of the lack 
of realism inherent in all such last-minute rescues. 
But the technique can be subtler as well. Southworth's Allworth 
Abbey provides a telling case. Annella Wilder ds one of those dash­
ing Southworth heroines like Capitola in The Miiden Hand—cou-
rageous, spirited, prepared for action while t i  e men wring their 
hands in despair unable to think of what to do- Ske seems destined 
for a life of independence. Yet when the romantic couples are being 
53. More generally, as Fredric Jameson puts it, the "corataminat[ion of] the cen­
tral murder" by the "random violence" of what he calls tlieIrsecondary plot" ("the 
search") in Chandler's novels in general is part of a stiatejgy oi "de-mystification of 
violent death" ("On Raymond Chandler," 648-49]. 
54. Bertolt Brecht, The Threepenny Opera, trans. r>esmond Vesey and Eric 
Bentley (New York: Grove/Evergreen Black Cat, 1964), 9*6. 
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united in that culminating series of marriages that ends so many 
comic novels, we find that Annella, too, has been paired up—with 
Valerius Brightwell. Annella has had no heterosexual romantic 
attachments in the course of the novel (in part because the men are 
so far beneath her in character and fortitude); and Brightwell, nei­
ther so bright as a button nor so deep as a well, has been entirely 
incidental to the plot until this point (he utters hardly a word and 
performs no actions at all). Their union thus seems flagrantly con-
trived—the conventional configuration of final marriages is fulfill­
ed to a degree that the plot itself does not demand, and the ar­
tificiality of the convention is thus foregrounded almost as much 
as it would have been if it had been reversed. The effect is that the 
reader begins to doubt all of the marriages—and perhaps the in­
stitution itself. 
Or is that the intended effect? Like all interpretations, this one 
requires the application of rules that preexist the text and that may 
not be appropriate to it. Surely, whether a given actual reader sees 
the ending of Allworth Abbey (or, for that matter, the formally 
similar ending of Sense and Sensibility) as subversive will depend 
to a large extent on his or her politics and prior opinion of the 
author's talents and outlook. If one takes the current deprecatory 
attitude toward Southworth and assumes that she didn't know 
what she was doing, one can conclude that the book is merely 
conventional. Similarly, if a given actual reader thinks that Chan­
dler was not a skilled novelist, he or she may not apply the rule of 
conclusive endings to his texts, and may, as Stephen Knight does, 
conclude that his novels are simply poorly plotted.55 Indeed, it is 
specifically because of his refusal to apply certain kinds of rules— 
in part because he sees Chandler as a popular novelist—that Luke 
Parsons can conclude that his novels are not a "serious indict­
/ment ; of American society (if they were, they would have been "a 
boon to the propagandists of the Kremlin"): "His books, after all, 
are detective stories. . . . Just because Mr. Chandler writes so well, 
we must take care not to apply to him inappropriate literary 
standards."56 
55. Knight, Form and Ideology, esp. 150-51. 
56. Luke Parsons, "On the Novels of Raymond Chandler/' Fortnightly Review, 
May 1954, 351. For a fuller analysis of this novel, see my "Rats behind the 
Wainscoting/' 
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Applying appropriate standards—there's the difficulty. For dis­
putes about appropriateness are bound to lead to disputes about 
interpretation and ultimately about evaluation. Let me now turn 
to this problem and show in more detail both how interpretive 
disagreements can arise and how, as cultural critics, we might 
learn from them. 
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THE POLITICS OF 
INTERPRETATION 

Through The Glass Key Darkly: 
Presupposition and Misunderstanding 
We must analyze the language of contemporary criticism it­
self, recognizing especially that hermeneutic systems are not 
universal, colorblind, apolitical, or neutral. 
Henry Louis Gates, Jr., 
"Writing 'Race' and the Difference It Makes" 
Presuppositions and the Ambiguity of Interpretation 
Even among critics not particularly concerned with detective 
fiction, Dashiell Hammett's fourth novel, The Glass Key (i931), is 
famous for carrying the so-called objective method to nearly ob­
sessive lengths: we are never told what the characters are thinking, 
only what they do and look like. Anyone's decisions about anyone 
else's intentions (which have life-and-death consequences in this 
underworld of ward politics) are interpretive decisions, dependent 
on correct presuppositions—on having the right interpretive key. 
The novel's title, in part, refers to this kind of key. Ned Beau­
mont, the protagonist, has to determine what kind of relationship 
to have—indeed, what kind of relationship he is already having— 
with Janet Henry. One of his major clues about what is going on in 
her mind is a dream that she tells him, a dream that climaxes in an 
attempt to lock a door against an onslaught of snakes. Dream in­
terpretation is difficult enough to begin with, and Janet Henry 
compounds the difficulty by telling the dream twice. In the first 
version, her attempt to lock the door succeeds; in the second, the 
key turns out to be made of glass and shatters. Ned Beaumont, in 
deciding which dream to use as his key, chooses the second (as do 
most readers)—but it is an intuitive choice, not a logical one. 
173 
The Politics of Interpretation 
If the model of the reading process I have advanced in the first 
five chapters of this book is correct, then Ned Beaumont's situa­
tion can serve as an emblem of the situation faced by any reader. 
Interpreting a book, too, requires us to make a choice about what 
key to use to unlock it, and that choice must often rest on the same 
kind of intuitive leap.1 Specifically, an actual reader's interpreta­
tion of a specific text is at least in part a product of the assump­
tions with which he or she approaches it, including assumptions 
about the rules appropriate for transforming it. In this chapter, I 
will show in more detail how presuppositions interact with in­
terpretation by examining more closely how readers might go 
about making sense of two specific novels—one a fairly arcane 
avant-garde text (Witold Gombrowicz' 1965 Cosmos) and one a 
novel aimed at a broader audience (The Glass Key). My aim is 
neither to propose new interpretations nor to guide readers to cor­
rect ones. Rather, my aim is to offer concrete examples of an ana­
lytical approach that clarifies the sources of certain ambiguities. 
This in turn allows us to see the misinterpretations produced by 
actual readers in particular cultural contexts as useful material for 
cultural analysis. Specifically, using The Big Sleep as my case in 
point, I will show how we can "read" misreadings in order to 
illuminate the political pressures implicit behind them. 
Before getting to actual cases, however, it is necessary both to 
reiterate how I am using the term misreading in this book and to 
distinguish among several kinds of misreadings. As I suggested in 
Chapter 1,1 am using the word in a specific and restricted way that 
refers not to interpretive practices that ignore authorial intention, 
but rather to interpretations in which the reader aims at joining 
the authorial audience, but fails. Whether a given interpretive 
transformation of a text is a misreading or not, in other words, is 
less a matter of how you transform the text than a matter of what 
activity you think you are performing at the time. Misreadings in 
1. Gary Saul Morson makes a similar claim about what he calls "boundary 
works/7 where "it is uncertain which of two mutually exclusive sets of conventions 
governs a work. . . . Doubly decodable, the same text becomes, in effect, two differ­
ent works" [Boundaries of Genre, 48). Morson tends to see this as a quality inhering 
in special genres—whereas, as I shall argue, it is characteristic of a wider variety of 
texts. 
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this sense, therefore, are failed attempts to join in one particular 
social practice, not successful attempts to engage in some different 
social practice. To give a concrete example: a Freudian analysis of 
Nabokov's Invitation to a Beheading is not a misreading (and in 
fact could be an extremely illuminating interpretive performance) 
if the interpreter is uninterested in reading the text as Nabokov 
wished; but a reader is misreading if he or she assumes that the 
application of the theories of the "Viennese witch-doctor" (as 
Nabokov called him)2 is part of the interpretive arsenal of the 
authorial audience. 
Misreadings in this sense can come about in several ways. I will 
set aside two of them at the outset: those that stem from actual 
misperceptions of the physical marks on the page (I had a student 
who, in reading the descriptions of Paul Madvig in The Glass Key, 
consistently misread the word "blond" as "blind") and those aris­
ing from fundamental ignorance of the meanings of words (my son, 
reading his first Hardy Boys book at the age of six, thought their 
father's name, Fenton Hardy, was an alias, because the book said 
that he had "made a name for himself" in the New York Police 
Department). Beyond that, misreadings fall generally into two cat­
egories. First, the reader can misapply the rules. Thus, for instance, 
a reader may know that a text's opening is noticeable, but may fail 
to recognize that the first words are introductory, and that the real 
opening comes later. Or a reader may understand that Dr. Eckle-
burg's sign in The Great Gatsby is intended as a metaphor, but 
may interpret it incorrectly as an image of hope. 
The second category is both more interesting and, as I shall 
show, more revealing. Certain acts of misreading result not from 
the misapplication of rules, but from the application of the wrong 
rules. As I have argued, not only are there a vast number of implicit 
conventions of reading to be learned before we can understand 
anything as complex as a novel; more significant, there are differ­
ent rules for processing different books. Indeed, if there is any 
analogy between literary and linguistic systems, we must view 
Life with Father and The Sound and the Fury not only as different 
2. Vladimir Nabokov, Invitation to a Beheading, trans. Dmitri Nabokov (New 
York: Capricorn, 1959), 8 (Foreword). 
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utterances, but also as manifestations of the equivalent of different 
languages. 
What makes a reader apply the wrong rules to a text? There are, 
of course, many reasons. Readers read within limits imposed by 
their cultural and economic environments; and as beings with sub­
jective concerns, they have the power to apply rules in a personal 
or eccentric fashion. Furthermore, even readers trying to recover 
the author's intended meaning may find themselves facing alter­
natives that are difficult, if not impossible, to decide among. There 
is always a variety of sets of rules that one can apply to a text; and 
while some texts are more or less resistant to certain kinds of 
misreadings, it is the case—more often than those of us committed 
to the notion of "better" and "worse" readings would like to be-
lieve—that a work will leave considerable leeway, and that several 
different interpretive strategies will work equally well. How this 
takes place can be seen by looking more closely at one common 
cause of this last kind of misreading: ambiguity of genre. My pur­
pose is not to suggest that this is the only or even the most impor­
tant source of misreading, but simply to offer, in some textual 
detail, an example of the kind of analysis my proposed model per­
mits, one that can be readily applied to other kinds of misreading 
as well.3 
We often think of genre designation as one of the last acts a 
reader performs—and to some extent it is true that a work's pre­
cise generic placement is often unclear until we have finished read­
ing it. But some preliminary generic judgment is always required 
even before we begin the process of reading. We can never interpret 
entirely outside generic structures: "reading"—even the reading of 
a first paragraph—is always "reading as." 
The notion that we always "read as" is fairly widespread in 
critical discourse. No one is apt to think it eccentric when Fernan­
do Ferrara says "just as one can study A Midsummer Night's 
3. For a discussion of possible misreadings of Pale Fire that are generated by the 
novel's ambiguity about the nature of its narrative audience, see my "Truth in 
Fiction: A Reexamination of Audiences," Critical Inquiry 4 (Autumn 1977): 121— 
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Dream as document, one can also study Das Kapital as fiction";4 
everyone who has worked on The Turn of the Screw has had to 
confront the question of whether it should be "read as" a ghost 
story. And the terms used to describe various modes of reading are 
often genre terms: a "ghost story." But critics do not always follow 
through on the implications of this terminology. For if we take this 
usage seriously, it suggests that genres can be seen not only in the 
traditional way as patterns or models that writers follow in con­
structing texts, but also from the other direction, as different pack­
ages of rules that readers apply in construing them, as ready-made 
strategies for reading.5 
This is not to deny the possibility that any text, examined in 
detail, calls into operation a specific and unique collection of rules,-
on a more general level of analysis, however, any work shares a 
large number of rules with other works of the same genre—there 
are, as the Chicago neo-Aristotelians insisted, kinds of works. Just 
as details can come in more or less familiar configurations, so rules 
come in generic packages: we often apply rule D because it is usual 
to do so in texts where we have already applied rules A, B, and C. 
And if we use the notion of genre as preformed bundles of opera­
tions performed by readers in order to recover the meanings of 
texts, rather than as sets of features found in the texts themselves, 
then we can see that correct reading requires, among other things, 
a correct initial assumption about the genre that a work belongs 
to—and that misreading follows in the wake of erroneous place­
ment. 
Two implications of this definition of genre need to be spelled 
out here. First, genre categories can overlap. Depending on what 
rules we choose to focus on, a given work may appear to fall into 
4. Ferrara, "Theory and Model for the Structural Analysis of Fiction/' New 
Literary History 5 (Winter 1974): 252. See also Barbara Herrnstein Smith's claim, 
"One's perception of and/or response to an event not only determine but are deter­
mined by how one classifies it: what we 'see/ and how we subsequently behave 
toward it, will depend on what we see something as" [On the Margins of Discourse, 
48). Likewise Stanley Fish: "'Social satire/ 'comedy of manners/ and 'piece of 
realism' are not labels applied mechanically to perspicuous instances; rather, they 
are names for ways of reading" ("Working on the Chain Gang," 204). 
5. Morson argues from a similar perspective; see Boundaries of Genre, viii—ix. 
177 
The Politics of Interpretation 
several different generic classes. Faulkner's Intruder in the Dust, 
for instance, asks to be read as a classical detective story. It calls on 
us to apply the genre's basic rule of notice that virtually any detail 
can turn out to be important; it also calls on us to use the genre's 
familiar rules of configuration to put together such elements as a 
murder, a false suspect, a detective, and a detective's sidekick in 
such a way that we are led to expect a certain kind of closure—one 
built on climactic surprise revelation—which the novel in fact 
provides. At the same time, Intruder is a personal-discovery 
novel—a didactic novel that jolts us into accepting a particular 
view of the world because it carries us toward a climax in which 
Chick suddenly acquires a key bit of knowledge that fundamen­
tally alters his world view.6 As such, it calls for application of that 
genre's usual rules, including the rule of signification requiring us 
to generalize from the protagonist's discoveries to larger political 
and philosophical statements. 
Second, genre categories can be broader or narrower. Depending 
on how many rules we choose to consider in our definitions, the 
categories that result can vary in their specificity from such broad 
classes as "epic" through such smaller groupings as Todorov's 
"fantastic"7 on to ever more precise categories. As a result, genres 
can even include one another: the class "escape fiction" includes 
the smaller grouping "classical detective fiction," which in turn 
includes the "classical locked-room mystery." 
My analyses of ambiguities in Cosmos, which involves fairly 
narrow generic categories, and The Glass Key, which involves genre 
on the broadest possible level, may help clarify the range of prob­
lems involved in choosing interpretive strategies. 
Getting to the Bottom of Things 
As my first case study, let me delineate some of the interpretive 
processes a reader is likely to call upon while trying to make sense 
6. For a fuller discussion of the way Faulkner combines these two generic struc­
tures, see my "Click of the Spring: The Detective Story as Parallel Structure in 
Dostoyevsky and Faulkner/7 Modem Philology 76 (May 1979): 355—69. 
7. See Tzvetan Todorov, Fantastic, esp. chap, i, with its incisive attack on 
Northrop Frye's genre categories. 
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out of Witold Gombrowicz' avant-garde novel from 1965. Cosmos' 
plot revolves around two young men who seek a quiet refuge in the 
Polish countryside. Their peace, however, is repeatedly shattered 
by trivial, but slightly off kilter, incidents which they probe in 
search of deeper significance. A crack in the ceiling, for instance, is 
interpreted as an arrow, which they feel compelled to follow. This 
arrow eventually leads them to a hanging twig, which in turn 
reminds them of a bird they had seen hanging some time before. As 
a consequence of such "events/7 they become convinced of the 
presence of an underlying order, although its precise nature re­
mains obscure. Their adventures grow more and more grotesque, 
and the novel climaxes when their landlord, a man who gets his 
erotic pleasures from what he calls "berging" (subtle masturbatory 
activities, such as rolling up tiny pieces of bread), takes his family 
on a picnic that secretly celebrates a love affair of nearly twenty-
seven years ago—an outing that culminates, for undisclosed rea­
sons, in the hanging (a suicide?) of his son-in-law. 
At first, the novel appears to belong to a genre that has flourished 
especially since the 1950s: the ironic-grasping-at-straws-in-the-
meaningless-abyss novel. Here, the protagonist, caught in a meta­
physical void, manufactures a meaning for his or her experiences— 
a meaning that the reader can see is false. The genre has its ante­
cedents at least as far back as Don Quixote, and it has developed by 
way of such texts as Turgenev's haunting Knock, Knock, Knock, 
the story of a nonentity who manages to reconstruct the world 
around him in such a way that he becomes a "fatal" romantic 
hero—a reconstruction that ultimately pushes him into suicide. In 
its most modern form, the genre is best exemplified by Butor's 
magisterial Passing Time [UEmploi du temps). In this novel, 
Jacques Revel tries to get to the bottom of events in part by weav­
ing them into the Theseus story—a myth that the authorial au­
dience recognizes as inappropriate. This mythologizing leads to 
the unraveling of Revel's life, as he incorrectly interprets the 
motives of others and looks forward to consequences that we know 
are not forthcoming. 
Cosmos seems to fit the same pattern: by the end of the book, 
the reader realizes that the events do not hold any deeper meta­
physical meaning. As Patricia Merivale puts it, the narrator "con­
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spicuously fail[s] to make a satisfying pattern. . . . [The title is] an 
ironic comment on this failure/'8 Despite its humor, then, this 
novel about a frustrated search for coherence offers a despairing 
vision of a decentered universe. 
Or does it? Is this initial assumption about Cosmos' genre really 
correct? Perhaps Gombrowicz' novel belongs to a countergenre— 
the there-is-a-bottom-to-the-abyss-after-all genre in which appar­
ent failures to find coherence in the world really do, in the end, 
succeed. In its simplest versions, the there-is-a-bottom coun­
tergenre distinguishes itself readily from the ironic-grasping genre, 
because the reader is explicitly shown the meaningful pattern be­
neath the apparent chaos. Thus, for instance, in O. Henry's "Fur­
nished Room/' the reader, privy to several points of view, accumu­
lates a total store of information not available to any of the 
individual characters, and is thus able to see a meaning behind 
events that seem random to those experiencing them. But not all 
members of this countergenre are so straightforward. In the variant 
represented by Nabokov's "Vane Sisters'' (and, in some critics' 
views, by The Real Life of Sebastian Knight and Pale Fire as well),9 a 
further twist is added by hiding the pattern from the reader. In "The 
Vane Sisters," as I have pointed out, the true meaning is announced 
in an acrostic that inverts the apparent message of the story. 
Knowing about the Vane-Sisters variant can easily produce in­
terpretive vertigo. For once readers start reading with the suspicion 
8. Merivale, "The Aesthetics of Perversion: Gothic Artifice in Henry James and 
Witold Gombrowicz," PMLA 93 (1978): 993. See also the claim by Edward Czer­
wirisky and Bronislawa Kast that ' 'Gombrowicz in his last novel, constructed a 
'cosmos of chaos' out of a world in which order, or at least a semblance of one, once 
existed" ("'Berging' Gombrowicz: A Reappraisal of 'Form-Fastening/" Polish Re­
view 23, no. 4 [1978]: 52). Czerwirisky and Kast see their view as a minority posi­
tion; it is, however, widely shared. George Gomori, for instance, claims that the 
hero "follows up the imaginary threads which lead nowhere" ("The Antinomies of 
Gombrowicz," Modern Language Review 73, no. 1 [1978]: 128); Ewa Thompson 
points out that the narrator's ideas are "grounded in incomplete evidence" and 
criticizes him for his naivete ("The Reductive Method in Witold Gombrowicz's 
Novels," in The Structural Analysis of Narrative Texts: Conference Papers, New 
York University Slavic Papers, vol. 3, ed. Andrej Kodjak, Michael J. Connolly, and 
Krystyna Pomorska [Columbus, Ohio: Slavica Publishers, 1980], 201). 
9. See, for instance, Susan Fromberg [Schaeffer], "Folding the Patterned Carpet: 
Form and Theme in the Novels of Vladimir Nabokov," Ph.D. diss., University of 
Chicago, 1968. 
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that an author might be hiding coherence not only from the char­
acters, but from the audience as well, it becomes nearly impossible 
to distinguish the ironic-grasping genre from the there-is-a-bottom 
countergenre in practice. As I have suggested, any trained academ­
ic reader, by the nature of his or her education, is skilled in apply­
ing rules of coherence, including rules of naming, and can thus find 
a pattern in virtually anything. If such a reader begins with the 
supposition that there might well be a hidden pattern, therefore, 
the chances are that one will be found, whether intended or not. 
And once it is found it is nearly impossible to determine whether it 
is imposed on, rather than invited by, the text. 
A reader looking for such a pattern, for instance, might well find, 
beneath the surface of Gombrowicz' novel, a concealed series of 
references to the Viennese composer Alban Berg, and especially to 
his 1926 composition for string quartet, the Lyric Suite. This al­
lusive web, when uncovered, is astonishingly powerful as an inter-
text for rules of naming, for it ties together many apparent surface 
disjunctures, thus ironically undercutting the naive reader who 
thinks that the apparent meaninglessness of the novel's events 
ironically undercuts the ever-hopeful protagonists. 
And what more appropriate vehicle for a secret message? For the 
Lyric Suite itself is a work with a coherence hidden from all but 
the initiated. Indeed, until recently, the piece was generally accept­
ed as absolute music with no programmatic content. It was only in 
1977 that George Perle turned up a copy of the score that the 
composer had annotated, revealing that the music was in fact an 
elaborate but covert love letter to Hanna Fuchs-Robetten, with 
whom Berg had had a brief affair and for whom he maintained a 
lasting passion. Several elements in the score that had seemed 
mere oddities until then—such as the quotations (from Tristan 
and Zemlinsky) and the pervasive use of the numbers 10, 23, and 
their multiples (for instance, in metronome markings and measure 
numbers)—turned out to have precise programmatic meaning (the 
quoted passages both deal with the burdens of passion; 10 refers to 
Hanna, 23 to Berg himself). Similar programmatic intentions deter­
mined the structure of the basic row and its constituent motifs 
(based in part on the initials of the lovers); and the last movement 
was revealed to be an accompaniment to a setting of Baudelaire's 
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"De Profundis Clamavi," although the vocal part is not in the 
published score. 
As I have suggested, the Berg piece successfully binds together a 
large number of textual elements that otherwise seem simply ran­
dom. Of course, the works are thematically related: both concern a 
brief affair that provides the secret center for a man's life. And the 
technical concerns of the novel and the quartet are related as well: 
the issues of permutation and combination that are constantly 
raised in Cosmos mirror, with uncanny accuracy, the problems of 
tone-row construction that so intrigued Berg. But more powerful 
still is the series of what appear to be explicit allusions to Berg, the 
Lyric Suite, and his life and works in general. The landlord's coin­
ing of the word "Berging" to refer to his secret, forbidden erotic 
activities is only the most evident of these allusions. Beyond that, 
many of the characters have names that tie them to Berg's circle of 
family and friends. These names are, for the most part, far from 
common, and do not therefore seem a likely result of mere coinci­
dence. One of the protagonists is named Fuks (the match with the 
name of Berg's beloved is even closer in the English translation, 
where it is Fuchs),10 while the landlord's daughter and Berg's wife 
share the name Helena/Helene. The landlord's family name is 
Wojtys (Berg's most famous work is Wozzeck, although the Gom­
browicz spelling is closer to Biichner's original Woyzeck, on which 
the opera was based). Two characters, Lulus and Lulusia, have 
names (and, perhaps, sexual mores) that echo Berg's other opera, 
Lulu. And the son-in-law is doubly knotted to Berg's Violin Con­
certo. Most obviously, he is named Ludwik (Louis in the En-
glish)—and Berg wrote the piece for his violinist friend, Louis 
Krasner. But he is tied to the concerto in another way as well. The 
concerto was intended as a requiem for Manon Gropius, the young 
daughter of Alma Mahler (for a while Hanna Fuchs-Robetten's sis­
10. Gombrowicz, Cosmos, trans. Eric Mosbacher, in Three Novels (New York: 
Grove, 1978). Mosbacher has translated not from the original Polish, but from 
earlier French and German translations, which may explain some of the name 
changes—although the change from Lulus and Lulusia to Lolo and Lola makes little 
sense. Although I have glanced through the Polish version, Kosmos (Paris: Instytut 
Literacki, 1970), I cannot say that my Polish is fluent enough that I could claim to 
have "read" the original. 
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ter-in-law) and architect Walter Gropius—and Louis happens to be 
an architect, too. In addition, the number of chapters (10) is the 
number that Berg used to represent Hanna in the score. The secret 
tryst turns out to have taken place just short of 27 years ago—just 
as the Lyric Suite was finished just short of 1927. Indeed, the picnic 
takes place one month and three days before the actual anniversa-
ry—an apparently pointless detail, except if it is seen as a veiled 
reference to Berg's number 13. 
My aim here is not to argue for one or another interpretation of 
the text. Rather, my point is that the experience of reading the 
novel depends radically on the reader's starting point. It is not 
simply a matter of whether the reader has some arcane bit of infor­
mation that adds a bit of resonance to the text: the whole meaning 
of the novel is reversed according to where the reader is before 
reading. Virtually any reader before 1977—and almost any non­
musical reader thereafter—is apt to see the novel as confused and 
unsettled. But anyone who knows Berg's history and is prepared, 
before reading the book, to entertain the possibility of a secret 
message, will easily be able to apply rules of coherence so that 
Cosmos resolves into a perverse puzzle in which the hidden solu­
tion completely inverts the surface meaning. Indeed, once you see 
this hidden solution, it is almost impossible to ignore it. True, the 
historical facts strongly suggest (although they can never fully 
prove) that Gombrowicz could not have intended it, since the affair 
between Alban and Hanna was a closely guarded secret at the time 
he wrote the book. Yet so powerful is the pull of patterning as we 
read that it is difficult to believe that the references are not really 
there, if you are predisposed to find them in the first place. 
Popular Fiction as a Genre 
One might argue, of course, that the interpretive problems I have 
pointed out in Cosmos stem from its postmodern sensibility, and 
from the ambiguous and closely intertwined nature of the two 
genres competing for the reader's allegiance. And, to be sure, 
Gombrowicz' chosen techniques serve to magnify the problems of 
reading. But they magnify them, they do not create them,- similar 
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difficulties are likely to occur, to a greater or lesser extent, when 
reading many other literary texts, and when dealing with any 
genres, even the ones that seem least problematic on the surface. 
To demonstrate the range of the problem, let me take up a case at 
the opposite end of the literary spectrum, The Glass Key, which 
involves a genre distinction of the broadest type: the distinction 
between what are generally thought of as ''popular" and "serious" 
(or "elite") texts. 
At first, the popular/serious distinction may not appear to be a 
genre distinction at all. But if one accepts the description of read­
ing and the definition of genre I have presented above, it follows 
that not all common genres have generic names. That is, by look­
ing at genres in terms of shared reading conventions—rather than 
in terms of the preformed textual types that the academy has clas-
sified—we find ourselves with the possibility of categories that are 
not traditionally treated as genres, but that have all the attributes 
of genres and that can illuminate our cultural practices if they are 
so considered. This is certainly true of the popular/serious distinc­
tion. Granted, this distinction is about the broadest possible, so the 
rules that apply are both extremely general and subject to numer­
ous exceptions. Still, we can say that, as a genre, popular liter-
ature—at least, if we restrict our discussion for the moment to 
American and British novels from the 1920s to the 1980s—seems 
to differ from so-called serious fiction in two ways. (Parallel dif­
ferences would no doubt hold for other countries and other periods, 
but for the sake of my argument here—the problems faced by a 
reader of a particular American text from the 1920s—such con­
cerns can be bracketed.) 
First, popular fiction emphasizes a different category of reading 
rules. Roland Barthes has made a similar claim, although of course 
in different terms, when distinguishing popular tales from the psy­
chological novel—one of the epitomes of serious fiction in the 
period I am discussing. "Some narratives," he writes, "are pre­
dominantly functional (such as popular tales), while some others 
are predominantly indicial (such as 'psychological7 novels)."11 In 
Barthes' own vocabulary, popular tales tend to be more metony­
11. Barthes, "Introduction," 247. 
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mic, while psychological novels are more metaphoric,- translated 
into more traditional terms, this means that popular tales are 
more plot oriented, psychological novels more character oriented. 
Recast in my terminology, his remarks suggest that when we read 
popular fiction, we tend to stress operations of configuration, 
while in reading psychological novels, we tend to emphasize op­
erations of signification.12 If an element is brought to our atten­
tion by a rule of notice in a work of pop fiction, therefore, we tend 
to consider it in terms of what it may tell us about plot outcome, 
rather than in terms of what it may reveal about the inner states of 
the characters and the world of the book. Thus, for instance, in 
Anthony Olcott's thriller, Murder at the Red October, the pro­
tagonist, Ivan—a security officer at a Moscow hotel—snatches a 
doll that he finds under the bed of a mysterious American who has 
been murdered, in order to give it to his girlfriend's daughter. It is a 
noticeable event, in part because it comes at the end of a chapter; 
but since this is a popular novel, we are expected to think of the 
theft in terms of what complications are likely to result, rather 
than in terms of what it reveals about Ivan's character. It is for this 
reason that Fredric Jameson is able to argue that certain chance 
perceptions of "the inessential" are possible in popular fiction, but 
not in "great literature/' where the reader is "obliged" to treat 
them as "directly infused with symbolic meaning/'13 
Pop and serious fiction differ not only according to which type of 
rule their readers put into effect more often, but also with respect 
to the particular rules that readers are asked to apply within each 
category. Take rules of notice. Although specific rules of notice 
vary considerably within subgenres, there are three general ways in 
which operations of notice differ radically between popular and 
serious texts. First, attention to textual nuances is greatly influ­
enced by the speed with which we read, and our current cultural 
12. The same claim, in only slightly different terms, is made by Billie Wahlstrom 
and Caren Deming, who argue that locations in works of popular fiction (like 
Spidennan) are "a device to amuse us and to provide some obvious plot complica­
tions/' whereas those in serious art (like Ulysses) have "a further metaphoric di­
mension" ("Chasing the Popular Arts through the Critical Forest/7 Journal of Popu­
lar Culture 13 [Spring 1980]: 421). 
13. Jameson, "On Raymond Chandler," 626. 
185 
The Politics of Interpretation 
context encourages us to zip through popular texts carelessly. In 
part, we see this in marketing strategies. The sales of certain popu­
lar titles in airports, train stations, and supermarkets, for instance, 
reflects a context in which speedy reading is assumed; so does the 
rapid turnover of the stock of romances.14 And these sales prac­
tices confirm more widely held assumptions about reading speed. 
The tendency of college students to divide literature into class­
room reading and summer reading is one manifestation of these 
assumptions. So is George P. Elliott's claim that the pace of the 
thriller "forbids that contemplation which is essential to reading 
great fiction."15 
Second, notice is also affected by the number of times we read a 
text—indeed, by the number of times we think it capable of being 
read. For if a reader accepts Wayne Booth's dictum that "we quite 
properly ask that the books we call great be able to stand up under 
repeated reading/'16 it will seriously affect the expectations, and 
hence the attentiveness, with which he or she approaches a given 
work, even the first time through. The printing of popular texts in 
cheap, nondurable editions, the stress on their newness—which, 
by implying that last month's novelties are no longer worth con­
sidering, also implies that this text will not be worth reading next 
month—all encourage a lack of attentiveness as we read. 
Third, as I have argued, what we attend to in a text is also 
influenced by the other works in our minds against which we read 
it. Particular details stand out as surprising, significant, climactic, 
or strange in part because they are seen in the context of a particu­
lar intertextual grid—a particular set of other works of art. And we 
tend to hold popular and elite fiction up against different back­
grounds. Thus, for instance, when Leon Howard asserts that "few 
detective novels invite comparison with specific works of 'serious' 
fiction,"17 he is not so much stating a "fact" about the properties 
14. For an excellent discussion of the marketing strategies of popular romances, 
see Janice Radway, Reading the Romance, esp. chap. 1. 
15. Elliott, "Country Full of Blondes/' Nation, April 23, 1960, 355-56. 
16. Booth, Rhetoric of Fiction, 256. See also Kenneth Burke's discussion of the 
kinds of texts that are rereadable in "Psychology and Form." 
17. Leon Howard, "Raymond Chandler's Not-So-Great Gatsby," Mystery and 
Detection Annual (1973): 1. 
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of detective stories as making a claim about the "proper" intertex­
tual grid on which to map them. As a consequence of such dif­
ferences in background, the same detail will be read differently, 
depending on the type of text in which it is found. When Turgenev 
gives the name Tatyana to the mother of his heroine in "Assya," 
we are expected to pay attention to his choice because the novel 
continues the literary tradition that includes Pushkin's Eugene 
Onegin, whose heroine Tatyana serves as a major model for wom­
en in nineteenth-century Russian fiction. But when Olcott gives 
the same name to the heroine of Murder at the Red October, we 
are not expected to register that fact as particularly important 
(even though Olcott himself is a brilliant scholar of Russian liter­
ature), because we are supposed to read it against a different back-
ground.18 Similarly, while readers are apt to look out for ciphers 
and anagrams in serious post-Joycean fiction (without such pre­
disposition, the anagrams in Fuentes' Death of Artemio Cruz 
would be invisible),19 we are not apt to do so in a popular spy 
novel—even one that, like Robert Littell's Amateur, concerns a 
code breaker who has discovered, encoded in The Tempest, proof 
that Bacon wrote Shakespeare's plays. 
Even when what is noticed is the same in popular and elite art 
(for instance, a title), there is often a difference in the rules of 
signification applied to it. As a general rule, titles in serious novels 
during the period under discussion are to be treated metaphorically 
or symbolically. More specifically, we are expected to treat them 
as one guide to the specific directions outward in which the novel­
ist intends us to read; as Wayne Booth points out, "It is interesting 
to note how much more importance titles and epigraphs take on in 
modern works, where they are often the only explicit commentary 
the reader is given."20 The title Absalom, Absalom!, for instance, 
serves, among other things, to remove the novel from a specifically 
18. Of all the claims about authorial meanings in this book, this is the only one 
that comes from personal communication with the actual author involved. 
19. See Santiago Tejerina-Canal, La Muerte de Artemio Cruz: Secreto Generative) 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, forthcoming). Since I do not read Spanish, I 
have not read this monograph; I have, however, discussed the issue of anagrams 
with its author. 
20. Booth, Rhetoric of Fiction, 198, n. 25. 
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Southern context and place it in a larger frame. It is for this reason 
that a teacher, at a loss for an exam question about a serious novel, 
can usually ask, "Why is the book called For Whom the Bell 
Tollsl" Or Their Eyes Were Watching Godl Or Gravity's Rainbowl 
But in reading popular novels, we are normally expected to treat 
their titles, on the whole, as broadly descriptive (they give clues 
about genre and general content) and discriminatory (they help 
distinguish one book from another so that we will know whether 
we have read it already). Indeed, mass-market books often depend 
as much on numbering as on title for identification—as I well 
remember from my years as a collector of Hardy Boys books. One 
could not reasonably ask students to write for an hour on the 
question, "Why is this book called The Drums of Fu Manchul" 
because Sax Rohmer chose his title with the expectation that its 
function for the reader would be more circumscribed. He expected 
his reader to be able to recognize from the jacket that his novel was 
an adventure story in a particular series and that it was a different 
book from The Mask of Fu Manchu-, he did not intend it to provide 
a springboard for generalization or metaphoric association, or to 
provide an authorial norm otherwise missing from the text. 
Rules of configuration differ for the two types of literature as 
well. As I have already suggested, popular novels tend on the whole 
to encourage activities of configuration rather than activities of 
signification. Furthermore, we read popular literature, in general, 
expecting less complex and ironic plot patterns. In addition—as I 
will demonstrate in detail later in this section—the particular con­
figurations you impose on or expect in a book depend, in part, on 
the books you are reading it against. 
Finally, in elite art, we demand—and seek out—greater and 
more elaborate forms of coherence. We are, for instance, more apt 
to look at apparent inconsistencies as examples of irony or under­
cutting, whereas in popular novels, we are apt to ignore them or 
treat them as flaws. This, too, has something to do with the speed 
of reading—as well as with the reader's tendency, in fiction pre­
sumed to be serious, to reread, to refine interpretations, and to 
exercise ingenuity. 
But as I have argued, correct determination of genre—and of the 
appropriate interpretive rules—is not automatic. It is not even 
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logical. That is, there is no way to determine by reason alone what 
rules apply in a particular case. When, in Dr. No, the villain cap­
tures James Bond and assures him that he will die, we should 
expect that the prediction will turn out false. That is not because 
there is any logical imperative to do so, but rather because we live 
in a community where it is conventional to apply the rule of 
chutzpah at such a moment in the plot in novels that present 
themselves as Fleming's does. But not all novels are so unam­
biguous in their self-presentation. 
I am not here taking the fashionable position that all books are, 
by their very nature, inherently undecipherable. Quite often, a text 
will give fairly precise signals as to how the author intended it to 
be taken. For instance, Erie Stanley Gardner's title The Case of the 
Sleepwalker's Niece nudges us into a pop strategy of reading by 
blocking a metaphorical interpretation, just as the title The Sound 
and the Fury, by forcing us both into metaphor and into Shake­
speare, steers us into the serious mode. The recurring religious 
imagery of Nathanael West's Miss Lonelyhearts—which begins 
with Shrike's poem in the very first paragraph—makes it nearly 
impossible for an experienced reader to infer that the author want­
ed it treated as a nonsymbolic popular tale; the flat, unresonant 
prose of most paperback romances discourages the kind of atten­
tiveness that is central to elite-novel reading strategies.21 
But other works are more confusing—even a work as apparently 
straightforward as Spillane's Vengeance Is Mine. Its title can be 
treated as a pop title, a marker to distinguish it from, yet relate it 
to, J, the Jury. But it can also be interpreted as a serious title, as a 
call to read the novel in the context of Tolstoy (whose Anna Ka­
renina starts with the same biblical citation)—and hence to notice 
its ironic religious implications and to adopt a critical attitude 
toward the arrogant hero who takes God's work on himself. 
Now the attempt to read as authorial audience is ideally a pro­
cess of matching presuppositions against unfolding text, and revis­
ing strategies if the text moves in unanticipated directions. And it 
would be comforting to believe that the reader who assumed at 
21. For an excellent discussion of this subfect, see Radway, Reading the Ro­
mance, chap. 6. 
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first that Vengeance Is Mine was the title of a serious ironic novel 
would soon find that reading corrected by other elements in the 
text. But as we have seen argued theoretically by such critics as 
Stanley Fish,22 and as we have seen demonstrated practically in 
the variety of readings put forward by our academic journals, it is 
not always easy for a text to win over a reader who is predisposed 
to finding in it meanings and values that the author did not 
intend—even (perhaps especially) when the reader is sincerely try­
ing to join the authorial audience. Given the frequent references to 
hell and damnation, to playing God, to "making" people,- given the 
antagonist's name, Juno, and the frequent references to Olympus,-
given what can be interpreted as its references to Balzac's "Sar­
rasine" (references especially noticeable in an intellectual climate 
greatly influenced by Barthes' S/Z)—it would not be hard to read 
the novel ironically. 
I am not claiming that such an ironic reading, if it were present­
ed as the interpretation of the authorial audience, would be a good 
one. Rather I am saying something quite different: Bad as it is as an 
authorial reading, it would not necessarily run against stumbling 
blocks in the text. In other words, the success of any genre place-
ment—that is, the degree to which any particular reading strategy 
makes sense of a text—is no guarantee that one has successfully 
joined the authorial audience. Vengeance Is Mine is a popular 
novel, and thus requires us to approach it with the proper presup­
positions. And there is a basic rule of coherence in popular liter­
ature: While subtle references or allusions to elite culture (for in­
stance, the discussions of opera in Mary Burchell's Harlequin 
romance, Masquerade with Music) may be read as enhancements 
for the pleasure of elite readers, those allusions cannot be read as a 
basic undermining of the apparent overall meaning of the text. The 
ironic reading of Spillane, whatever its textual grounding, would 
be wrong as an interpretation of the author's intentions, just as 
Samuel Rosenberg's ingenious reading of Sherlock Holmes, how­
ever successful, is probably wrong: Doyle most likely did not have 
Nietzsche in mind when he invented Moriarty.23 In neither case, 
22. See, in particular, the later essays in Fish, Is There a Textl 
23. Rosenberg, Naked Is the Best Disguise: The Death and Resurrection of Sher­
lock Holmes (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974). 
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though, does the text itself dictate conclusively what rules ought 
to be applied. Whether you hit upon the right reading will often 
depend on what you think it likely to be before you begin. Thus, as 
I have suggested before, whether we pay particular attention to the 
name Marlow that Eric Ambler gives his hero in Cause for Alarm 
I1939) or the name Marlowe that Chandler gave to his hero in The 
Big Sleep that same year will depend on whether we read their 
texts as popular thrillers (and hence against other popular thrillers) 
or as serious novels (and hence, perhaps, against the tradition that 
includes the works of Conrad). And to a large extent, the very act of 
connecting The Big Sleep to one or another of these literary tradi­
tions makes it into a particular kind of text for the reader process­
ing it. 
This brings me back, at last, to The Glass Key. As I noted at the 
beginning of this chapter, the novel itself raises the issue of how 
presuppositions influence interpretation. In analyzing the discus­
sions of Janet Henry's dream as a metaphor for reading, though, I 
had already made a decision to treat the novel as serious rather 
than as popular. But the book is nowhere near so transparent as I 
pretended it was; in fact, it holds itself open for placement in either 
broad genre. 
Take the opening sentence: "Green dice rolled across the green 
table, struck the rim together, and bounced back." Whether the 
novel is popular or serious, this is a privileged position, and in 
either genre it raises questions for the reader. But what questions it 
raises—that is, what expectations it nourishes, how it is experi-
enced—differ radically for each. If we assume that it is a popular 
detective story, we will tend to emphasize configurational ques­
tions: Who is throwing the dice? Will he or she win or lose? How 
will the outcome trigger future actions? If we approach it as if it 
were a serious novel, we will stress questions of signification: 
What is the role of chance in this novel? What are the symbolic 
implications of the phrase "bouncing back"? Yet the book that 
follows does not serve as a strong corrective for either of these 
readings. Whichever path we choose, the novel follows through; 
the game does generate much of the early action, but the images of 
chance and resilience are central to the novel's metaphoric struc­
ture. 
The Politics of Interpretation 
As I noted above, genres can overlap. One might therefore argue 
that these two reading strategies are not mutually exclusive, and 
that the good reader can ask all of these questions at once, reading 
the novel as a member of both classes simultaneously. Perhaps 
that is true of these initial questions (although I suspect only aca­
demics would actually read this novel in that way). But there are 
other consequences of genre placement that demand an either/or 
decision about reading strategy. This is clearest with regard to 
configuration. If we construe the book as a popular novel, subgenre 
"detective story/7 we will be on the lookout for a particular config-
uration—a problem, a false solution (often stemming from a false 
confession) about three-quarters of the way through,24 a correct 
solution about ten pages from the end, and a postclimax wrap-up of 
secondary importance. And if we look for that pattern, we will find 
it. Reading with these expectations, we will not for a moment 
believe Paul's "confession," and we will concentrate more on the 
solution than on the wrap-up. The book will not, even in this 
reading, be particularly jolly, but its despair will be muted by the 
reader's privileging of the positive results of Ned Beaumont's 
investigation. 
But if we read it as a serious novel, subgenre "personal-discovery 
novel" (under the spell of Proust, Conrad, and Faulkner), we will be 
alerted to another potential configuration, one in which the correct 
solution will come earlier than it would in a detective story, but 
will be followed by something even more important—an examina­
tion of its psychological and philosophical ramifications. If we are 
on the lookout for this configuration, we will find it, too, with a bit 
of a twist. Using this reading strategy, we are more likely to believe 
Paul's confession and be surprised by the arrival of a second solu­
tion; in any case, we will be more interested in the consequences 
of the truth than in the facts of the murder itself. In this reading, 
therefore, we will give less attention to the solution and will stress 
the novel's final image more strongly: Ned Beaumont staring at an 
empty doorway, a doorway we will tie metaphorically to the door 
in the dream and all the other doors and entryways into psycholog­
24. See Barbara Gerber Sanders' extreme claim that "the climax in the action 
traditionally occurs near the 3/4 point in novels" ("Structural Imagery in The Great 
Gatsby: Metaphor and Matrix/' Linguistics in Literature 1, no. 1 [1975]: 56). 
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ical blanks that give this book much of its troubling character 
when it is construed as a serious novel. 
Intellectually, perhaps, we can have it both ways and call the 
novel some kind of hybrid. But for any actual act of reading, we 
must choose one genre or the other (or some discrete third): we 
cannot be both surprised and not surprised, and we cannot both 
emphasize and de-emphasize the emptiness and lack of resolution 
of the final paragraph. In precisely the same way that initial genre 
choice substantially colors our experience of the avant-garde Cos­
mos, so it radically influences our reading of The Glass Key. 
Scapegoating Carmen: Reading Misreadings 
So far, my argument in this chapter has centered on one of the 
reasons—generic ambiguity—that texts are so often open to mis­
readings. As I have suggested before, though, my primary concern 
is not with exploring generic ambiguity itself, but with offering an 
exemplary kind of analysis that can be turned to other problems as 
well. Rather than pursue this direction further, therefore, either by 
hunting down additional specimens of generically ambiguous 
texts, or even by trying to build up a typology of misreadings (a 
project that threatens to be both endless and drab), I would like 
now to see how the examination of the presuppositions behind the 
reading process can help us answer a parallel, and I think more 
important, question, one that has hovered throughout. Given the 
potential ambiguity of texts, what makes a reader aiming at an 
authorial reading choose to apply one strategy rather than another? 
There are, of course, many possible reasons, often depending on 
the specific individual doing the reading. But sometimes particular 
misreadings are widespread rather than idiosyncratic—and I would 
argue that such persistent misreading usually has its origins, not in 
the readers as individuals, but in the culture that has taught them 
to read. We can therefore often uncover forces at work in a society 
by reading its misreadings, by studying the ways that readers have 
misappropriated the texts they live with. Specifically, to the extent 
that we can determine what rules readers actually do apply when 
they try unsuccessfully to recover an author's intentions, we can 
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illuminate the categories informing their thoughts, and conse­
quently the ideological pressures working on them. 
Why turn to im'sreadings? Can't the works themselves—or the 
authorial interpretations of them—give us cultural insights? Yes, 
but of a different kind—or, to be more accurate, of two different 
kinds. First of all, to the extent that a work provides messages, 
espouses values, criticizes or supports its culture, we can deter-
mine—within limits, of course—the author's vision of things. We 
can, for instance, determine Dostoyevsky's attitudes toward Ro­
man Catholicism by reading The Idiot, just as we can learn Pro-
ust's attitudes toward Wagner or (by a vastly more circuitous 
route) toward homosexuality by reading Remembrance of Things 
Past. A great deal of useful criticism is aimed at precisely such 
determinations. 
Second, and more subtly, determining the nature of the authorial 
audience—specifying the presuppositions on which a text is 
built—can inform us about what authors assumed about their 
readers. The gratuitous violence toward blacks in I, the Jury—a 
violence that the text apparently sees no need to justify—spot-
lights more than Mickey Spillane's racism; it also betrays the 
racist attitudes he routinely expected in his readers. And to the 
extent that authors are shrewd observers of their times, such as­
sumptions can be even more revealing than an author's own more 
or less explicit moralizing- Unfortunately, it is not always easy to 
tell when an author has been shrewd in this regard. I used to be­
lieve that the popular success of a novel could serve as at least 
partial evidence, but I have been forced to modify that point of 
view for two reasons. First, even if readers do read as an author 
intended, we cannot be sure of their own predilections. For what­
ever we feel about the status of authorial intention, it appears that 
until fairly recently, most people read texts at least as if they were 
trying to extract the author's meaning. To the extent that a partic­
ular past reading matches the author's intention (regardless of how 
it matches up with our own responses to the text), we can therefore 
never be sure how much it actually incorporates the ideology of 
the actual reader, and how much it merely represents that reader's 
attempt to join the authorial audience—to follow the instructions 
of the text, to "accept" (provisionally, perhaps) the ideology it calls 
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for. Thus, for instance, it would be hard to draw any conclusions 
about an actual reader's views on monarchy as a system of social 
organization from his or her acceptance of the rightfulness of Rich­
ard the Lionhearted's claim to the throne in Ivanhoe. Second, as I 
have argued above, texts can be popular without being understood. 
Thus, the commercial success of a work has no necessary bearing 
on the degree to which the author made the right guesses about his 
or her readers. Chandler's Big Sleep, for instance, was intended as a 
critique of a conservative political position, but his point was con­
sistently missed, even by his admirers. Thus, reading the novel 
tells us little about what his readers actually thought. 
But if we cannot learn about Chandler's readers from reading 
Chandler, we surely can learn about them by looking at how they 
misread Chandler. For a reader's attempt and failure to join the 
authorial audience implies that something is keeping him or her 
from applying interpretive strategies that the author, at least, be­
lieved to be more or less readily available. The source of that 
failure may lie in the reader (lack of experience, personal eccen­
tricity) or in the author (poor technique, unrealistic expectations 
about how readers would respond). But in any case, the mismatch 
itself provides a starting point for further investigation: it offers a 
possible instance of ideological interference by indicating a point 
in the culture where two individuals have different understandings 
about what presuppositions should underlie a reading of the text.25 
Let me illustrate this claim in more detail, showing how the 
strategies employed by critics when they read The Big Sleep (and 
critics are, after all, merely people who get paid to read under 
public scrutiny) can teach us something about the structure of 
misogyny, not the misogyny of the novel itself, but the misogyny 
of the world outside it. 
As I suggested in Chapter 5, The Big Sleep is a subversive book 
25. Some of these ideas were originally developed in colloboration with Janice 
Radway for a paper entitled "The Hidden Mind: Authorial Intention and Literary 
Texts as Historical Documents/' which was delivered at the American Studies 
Association meeting on November 4, 1983.1 am grateful for her permission to use 
them here. For Radway's own analysis of the problems involved in trying to learn 
about actual readers by looking at the texts they consume, see Reading the 
Romance. 
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that seeks to encourage a socially critical attitude by forcefully 
overturning the basic rules of the detective story genre (at least, its 
classical variant represented by such writers as Christie), thus forc­
ing its readers to apply rules of coherence that look beyond the 
conventions to their ideological implications. Those conventions, 
of course, have been widely discussed by critics from W. H. Auden 
to S. S. Van Dine, and different critics have listed them in different 
ways. Nonetheless, there are three rules that show up implicitly or 
explicitly on nearly every list. First, in S. S. Van Dine's words, 
/
'There must be but one culprit. ; Second, the detective must al­
ways win and restore order,- as Van Dine puts it, "The detective 
novel must have a detective in it; and a detective is not a detective 
unless he detects." And third, the crime must originate in some 
personal quirk, succeeding temporarily only because it operates 
behind a veil of deception,- the criminal, therefore, can always be 
unmasked through rational procedures—what Van Dine calls 
"logical deductions."26 In other words, the classical detective sto­
ry centers on a single villain whose transgressions stem from "a 
little kink in the brain somewhere,"27 a villain who can be (and is) 
brought to justice by a single detective through logic rather than 
force.28 
Stated in this way, of course, these are rules for the proper con­
struction of texts; but they have analogues in rules for reading, as 
well. Most obviously, they parallel rules of configuration, govern­
ing our expectations about what is likely to occur in a classical 
detective story (it is appropriate to expect that there will be a single 
villain, etc.). But they also serve as rules of signification. In a classi­
26. S. S. Van Dine, 'Twenty Rules for Writing Detective Stories/' in The Art of 
the Mystery Story: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Howard Haycraft (New 
York: Grossett and Dunlap/Universal Library, 1947), 190-91. 
27. Agatha Christie, The Mystery of the Blue Train (New York: Pocket, 1940), 
172. 
28. There are, of course, exceptions—but they make a point of their unusualness. 
Thus, Josephine Tey ends The Man in the Queue as follows: 
"Well/' I said to him, "it has been a queer case, but the queerest thing about it 
is that there isn't a villain in it." 
"Isn't there!" Grant said, with that twist to his mouth. 
Well, is there? [The Man in the Queue (New York: Pocket, 1977), 222 (chap. 
18)]. 
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cal detective story, we are normally asked to see the villain—that 
is, the cause of crime—as an individual; it runs against the grain of 
the genre to treat him or her as a metaphor for larger social prob­
lems. Likewise, the practitioners of the genre expect us to see the 
detective as a positive representation of the power of an individual 
to overcome evil, not as a symbol of the weakness of the solitary 
human being. 
This aesthetic formula is not innocent; it serves a political func­
tion, supporting what John Cawelti calls "the moral fantasy that 
human actions have a simple and rational explanation and that 
guilt is specific and not ambiguous/'29 Addressing the anxieties of 
a bourgeois audience troubled by the possibility of social revolu­
tion, Christie, for instance, puts fear to rest by insisting that evil is 
individual in nature and can therefore be uprooted without social 
change by a single competent person. As Stephen Knight puts it, 
the "meaning implicit in the organic structure" of writers like 
Doyle and Christie—where "criminal events [are] resolvable by a 
skilful, persevering agent"—"responds to bourgeois ideas of per­
sonal effort through diachronic time towards the improvement of 
one's moral and physical position."30 
Chandler's novel is quite different. Here, evil is multiple and 
social in origin, and the detective is unable to contain it. As E. M. 
Beekman puts it, "the artificial jungle of the hothouse grows into 
that of a perverse society of sex, money, murder, immorality and 
betrayal. . .  . A corrupt universe can house no justice."31 A rough 
outline of the story may make this break with convention clearer. 
Philip Marlowe is hired by General Sternwood to take care of 
Arthur Gwynn Geiger, a bisexual porn merchant who is blackmail­
29. Cawelti, Adventure, Mystery, and Romance, 132. But see Jameson's claim 
that the detective story is "a form without ideological content, without any overt 
political or social function7' ("On Raymond Chandler/' 625). 
30. Knight, Form and Ideology, 151. Knight, however, sees the role of the hero as 
less important in Christie than I do; see esp. his chap. 4. See also Geoffrey H. 
Hartman: Mystery stories "are exorcisms, stories with happy endings that could be 
classified with comedy because they settle the unsettling" ("Literature High and 
Low: The Case of the Mystery Story," in The Fate of Reading and Other Essays 
[Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975], 212). 
31. Beekman, "Raymond Chandler and an American Genre," Massachusetts Re­
view 14 (1973): 164. 
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ing Carmen, the general's younger daughter. Marlowe intuits, 
however, that Sternwood really wants him to trace the missing 
husband of his older daughter Vivian, a former bootlegger named 
Rusty Regan. Regan has mysteriously vanished, and there are ru­
mors that he has run off with Mona Grant, the wife of racketeer 
Eddie Mars. After three or four murders (depending on how you 
count the ambiguous death of the chauffeur) and some strong-
arming by the local authorities who want him to lay off the case, 
Marlowe finds Mona, but is himself caught by Mars' hit man, Lash 
Canino. Mona—whom he dubs "Silver-Wig"—helps him get 
away; he kills Canino and then goes back to the Sternwood man­
sion where it appears that the traditional denouement is to take 
place. 
But The Big Sleep has worked up to a traditional resolution only 
to retreat from it. Yes, we do discover something. Carmen, angry at 
Marlowe for repelling her attempts at seduction, tries to shoot 
him. We learn that she had murdered Regan for the same reason, 
and that Mars and Canino, who had helped get rid of the corpse in a 
sump, have been using their knowledge to put the screws on Viv­
ian. But by this point in the novel, so much has happened that 
Philip Marlowe's discovery of what had happened to Regan seems 
anticlimactic; it surely does not constitute a real answer to the 
questions that the novel has raised. Nor, for that matter, does 
Vivian's agreement, at Marlowe's insistence, to put her sister in an 
institution, really seem an adequate restoration of order. In Chan­
dler, as Beekman notes, "the purported solution does not tidy 
things up since there is no end to a waking nightmare."32 But lest 
we miss the hollowness of the denouement, Chandler purposefully 
exaggerates the irritation by preparing a configuration that never 
takes place; throughout the novel, he has built up a growing antag­
onism between Marlowe and Eddie Mars, only to leave it hanging 
at the end. 
We are made to expect this confrontation in a number of ways. 
First, as is evident even from the plot summary, the events of the 
novel are both complex and episodic, and are quite hard to tie 
together. But there is one link, other than Marlowe, holding it all 
32. Ibid. 
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together: Mars is involved, although often behind the scenes, in all 
of the action of the book. Indeed, The Big Sleep was put together by 
Chandler out of material scavenged from "Killer in the Rain" and 
'Th e Curtain," and Mars is the only character (other than Mar­
lowe, of course) in the novel with an equivalent in both of those 
early stories. (True, General Sternwood and Carmen are involved 
in incidents that originated in both of the stories; but as charac­
ters, they only have analogues in one or the other. Thus, the gener­
al takes on some of the plot function of Tony Dravec in "Killer," 
but they have no character resemblance.) Rules of balance there­
fore lead us to expect that these primary antagonists will in fact 
have it out. Second, Chandler uses a verbal trick to reinforce their 
position as antagonists: Mars' name is an echo of Marlowe's. 
Chandler was especially fond of this device; in the later novels, 
Marlowe is mirrored, in different ways, by such characters as Mrs. 
Murdock, Lindsay Marriott, Moose Malloy, and especially Paul 
Marston. In this case, the phonetic parallel is a signal for us to 
apply rules of signification and coherence to read Mars as Mar-
lowe's primary opponent. Third, Marlowe's most bitter and most 
extended—hence his most noticeable—verbal assault in the novel 
is directed at Mars. 
"You think he's just a gambler. I think he's a pornographer, a black­
mailer, a hot car broker, a killer by remote control, and a suborner of 
crooked cops. He's whatever looks good to him, whatever has the 
cabbage pinned to it. . .  . [Jones is] a dead little bird now, with his 
feathers ruffled and his neck limp and a pearl of blood on his beak. 
Canino killed him. But Eddie Mars wouldn't do that, would he, Sil-
ver-Wig? He never killed anybody. He just hires it done."33 
Marlowe unleashes this diatribe to Silver-Wig, and its vehemence 
grows partly from his growing involvement with her. This com­
petition for her affections, of course, further arouses our expecta­
tion of a showdown: there is a rule of balance that rivals have to 
meet. Finally, near the end of the novel, Chandler explicitly and 
S3. Raymond Chandler, The Big Sleep (New York: Pocket, 1950)/ 179-80, 182 
(chap. 28). Further references to this edition are made in the text. 
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ostentatiously drops the first shoe. After telling Vivian to seek 
professional care for Carmen, he tells her of his plans. 
"Forget Eddie. I l  l go see him after I get some rest. I'll handle Eddie." 
"He'll try to kill you/' 
"Yeah/' I said. "His best boy couldn't. I'll take a chance on the 
others." [213, chap. 32] 
Yet while the Howard Hawks film version ends dramatically as 
Mars is machine-gunned by his own thugs, the novel promises this 
confrontation only to fail to fulfill it. In fact, Marlowe never does 
"handle" Mars; instead, Chandler closes the novel with a despair­
ing meditation, in a privileged position. 
What did it matter where you lay once you were dead? In a dirty sump 
or in a marble tower on top of a high hill? You were dead, you were 
sleeping the big sleep, you were not bothered by things like that. Oil 
and water were the same as wind and air to you. You just sleep the big 
sleep, not caring about the nastiness of how you died or where you 
fell. Me, I was part of the nastiness now. Far more a part of it than 
Rusty Regan was. . . . 
On the way downtown I stopped at a bar and had a couple of double 
Scotches. They didn't do me any good. All they did was make me 
think of Silver-Wig, and I never saw her again. [213-14, chap. 32] 
Yet from the first reviews that greeted the novel, most critics 
have missed its irresolution. Thus, instead of interpreting it as a 
critique of the politics upheld by the traditions of the genre, they 
have instead read it as a heroic text, seeing not Marlowe's final 
despair, but rather his knightly—albeit muted—triumph. In other 
words, the text has been misread in such a way that it appears to 
provide a resolution. Even John Cawelti touts Marlowe in The Big 
Sleep as an example of a hero who "confronts, exposes, and de­
stroys this web of conspiracy and perversion."34 Philip Durham 
similarly decides that he was "the traditional American hero 
bringing fair play and justice where it could not be or had not been 
administered/735 Why have they done so? And how? 
34. Cawelti, Adventure, Mystery, and Romance, 149. 
35. Philip Durham, Down These Mean Streets a Man Must Go: Raymond 
Chandler's Knight (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963), 33. See 
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In part, the phenomenon can be explained by a tendency of read­
ers to find what they expect and want in a text. As I. A. Richards 
puts it, "When any person misreads . .  . it is because, as he is at 
that moment, he wants to. . .  . Every interpretation is motivated 
by some interest/'36 Readers are likely to expect and want this 
kind of resolution for a number of reasons. On one level, of course, 
experiences with previous detective stories have had their toll. In 
addition, as I have argued (and post-structuralist critiques of tradi­
tional reading practices would support this claim), there is a gener­
al tendency in most reading to apply rules of coherence in such a 
way that disjunctures are smoothed over so that texts are turned 
into unified wholes—that is, in a way that allows us to read so that 
we get the satisfaction of closure. This interpretative technique is 
taught explicitly in school; and it may be connected to an innate 
psychological drive for closure. 
But there are political reasons as well. Even if the desire for 
closure is cross-cultural, its particular manifestations are always 
social. We cannot explain why children's stories so often end with 
characters going to sleep simply by trotting out a generalized desire 
for closure. This particular closure is common under these circum-
stances—but less so in adult fiction—because in our culture chil-
dren's stories often serve the social function of preparing children 
to go to sleep. Similarly, Janice Radway has eloquently demon­
strated how the particular forms of closure found in popular ro­
mances respond to tensions within the structure of contemporary 
patriarchy.37 
I suspect that readers in our culture tend to seek out (or impose) 
this particular kind of resolution—explanation with punish-
ment—in The Big Sleep for much the same reason that they read 
detective stories in the first place: they want to be soothed, not 
irritated, and they do not want to confront Chandler's abyss and its 
demand for radical social change. As George P. Elliott puts it, we 
all have a malaise about the order of the world, and we like "to 
read a story which produces in the reader a safe version of the same 
also his claim, about Chandler's novels in general, that "the action and violence 
more or less covered up the fact that everything came out all right in the end7' (97). 
36. Richards, Practical Criticism: A Study of Literary Judgment (New York: Har-
court, Brace, and World/Harvest, 1964), 229. 
37. Radway, Reading the Romance, esp. chap. 4. 
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thing and which purges this induced tension",-38 and while this 
may be less true with so-called elite art, it is widely felt to be true 
of popular texts.39 It is thus not coincidental that the earliest re­
views not only passed over the novel's irresolution, but also ig­
nored Chandler's social analysis of evil. Almost uniformly, they 
stressed the theme of personal degeneracy rather than social cor­
ruption. The New Yorker, for instance, called it a "pretty terrifying 
story of degeneracy"; Ralph Partridge referred to the "full strength 
blend . .  . of sadism, eroticism, and alcoholism"; the Times Liter­
ary Supplement described the novel's plot as Marlowe's trying "to 
conceal from an aged general the misadventures of his two degen­
erate daughters."40 Even the more astute critics tended to see The 
Big Sleep as a collection of characters—mostly vicious, but at least 
individuals—rather than as a portrayal of a social situation. 
Most readers, in other words, seem to misread Chandler for the 
same reasons they misread most disturbing books—they want to 
defend themselves against unwelcome points of view. But the 
question of the readers' motives for reading the novel as they do is 
only half the question. Even if I am right about why they do so, we 
still have to confront the even more vexing question of how they 
do so. For while readers tend to find what they want to find in 
books, there are, for most readers, limits to the process. Behind any 
persistent interpretation must lie not only some persistent desire 
to read in that fashion,- at the same time, there must also be some 
coherent interpretive strategy, some approach to the text that 
makes that reading seem a plausible, even inevitable, consequence 
of the words on the page. For any interpretation, in other words, it 
38. Elliott, "Country Full of Blondes/' 356. For a different perspective on this 
problem, see Stephen Knight's claim that Chandler holds a "conservative and elitist 
position" {Form and Ideology, 136-38). 
39. See Russel Nye's claim that "popular art confirms the experience of the 
majority, in contrast to elite art, which tends to explore the new" (The Unembar­
rassed Muse: The Popular Arts in America [New York: Dial, 1970], 4). See also 
Donald Dunlop, "Popular Culture and Methodology," Journal of Popular Culture 9 
(Fall 1975): 375/23-383/31; Dwight Macdonald, "A Theory of Mass Culture," in 
Mass Culture: The Popular Arts in America, ed. Bernard Rosenberg and David 
Manning White (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press/Falcon's Wing, 1957), 59-73. 
40. "Mysteries," New Yorker, February 11, 1939, 84,- Ralph Partridge, "Death 
with a Difference," New Statesman and Nation, June 10, 1939, 910; "Detective 
Stories," Times Literary Supplement, March 11, 1939, 152. 
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ought ideally to be possible to trace the steps that allow readers to 
transform the text in that particular way. 
In this case, the process of interpretation involves treating the 
novel primarily as a popular novel (stressing the solution) rather 
than as a serious one (stressing the indecisive conclusion). In addi­
tion, it has to involve an act of scapegoating: in order to create a 
sense of resolution in a morally chaotic situation, someone must 
be seen as the wrongdoer and appropriately punished. And even for 
those critics who did not explicitly name anyone as the guilty 
party, it is clear who they must have had in mind. For given the 
novel's structure, there is only one possibility: if anyone's punish­
ment redeems the world, serves as an emblem of the triumph of 
justice, it has to be Carmen Sternwood's, since the discovery that 
she killed Rusty Regan is the closest thing to a standard, formulaic 
detective story conclusion that we find in this novel. Thus, for 
instance, John Cawelti, claiming that there is a single criminal 
(although one usually tied to a larger organization) in the hard­
boiled formula, goes on to name Carmen as the criminal in The Big 
Sleep.41 Stephen Knight obviously believes the same when he 
claims that "Chandler's ultimate villains are always women."42 
Dennis Porter, more explicitly, calls Carmen the "archcriminal" 
of the novel: "That the archcriminal turns out in the end to be the 
perverted baby doll who falls into Marlowe's arms on the fourth 
page of the novel has about it the swift and unanswerable finality 
of the best punch lines and, in the context, warrants the sustained 
darkness of mood with which the novel ends."43 At first, that may 
41. Cawelti, Adventure, Mystery, and Romance, 147-48. 
42. Knight, Form and Ideology, 157. See also Gavin Lambert's claim that 
Farewell, My Lovely, The Lady in the Lake, and The High Window are "dominated 
by portraits of a deadly female of the American species, combing [sic: combining?] 
the power-drive of one Sternwood sister and the psychosis of the other. . . . His 
novels are a notable addition to the popular mythology that represents death as a 
woman" [The Dangerous Edge [New York: Grossman, 1976]/ 220, 233). 
43. Dennis Porter, Pursuit of Crime, 143. Elsewhere, he claims that Marlowe's 
journey is "unnecessary as part of the effort to catch the criminal—Carmen even 
pretends to faint into Marlowe's arms in that first scene—but it is made indispensi­
ble for the moral education of the investigator and, even more importantly, for the 
appropriate aesthetic experience of the reader" (39, emphasis added). Porter does 
mention, however, that Chandler "points to the psychological and even so­
cioeconomic causes of crime" (41). One of the few critics to see Carmen as a victim 
is Hartman; see "Literature High and Low," 220-21. 
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seem a fairly reasonable interpretive move, but the more I think 
about it, the odder it seems. It is not simply that the text itself does 
not make this move inevitable; it does not even make it easy. Not 
only, as I have pointed out, does Chandler go out of his way to 
underscore Mars' villainy; in addition, he tries to block this poten­
tial reading by minimizing Carmen's role in the evil around her. 
Carmen is a fairly complicated character. On the one hand, to be 
sure, she has the characteristics that allowed the anonymous blurb 
writer for my printing to give her top billing: on the front cover as 
"a luscious mantrap/7 on the back as a "female . .  . as crooked as a 
snake—and twice as deadly/'44 Through the novel, she is de­
scribed in terms that recall serpents and rodents. We are told that 
"her breath hissed" (79, chap. 15), that "her small sharp teeth 
glinted" (142, chap. 24), and that her laughter reminds Marlowe 
twice of "rats behind the wainscoting" (60, chap. 12; 143, chap. 
24). And her name, taken from Merimee's novel (a Chandler favor­
ite), hardly conjures up notions of purity and fidelity. 
If that were all there were to her, of course, her transformation 
into a scapegoat would be unproblematic. But surely that is an 
incomplete description. After all, Merimee's Carmen, whatever 
her faults, is not a villain. As a smuggler, her crime is simply an 
attack on an irrational economic structure; as a woman, her crime 
is simply an attack on bourgeois, patriarchal respectability. In the 
end, she is a victim whose sacrifice solves nothing, although it 
salves male pride. This inherited role of victim, rather than villain, 
is emphasized by Chandler's imagery, too. His description of Car­
men as an animal is clouded by his constant references to her as an 
incapable child: Marlowe's first crack to the butler Norris is "you 
ought to wean her" (4, chap. 1), a remark that fits well with a 
recurring strand of babylike imagery: she sucks her thumb, "turn­
ing it around in her mouth like a baby with a comforter" (3, chap. 
1); her handwriting is "sprawling" and "moronic" (10, chap. 2); she 
is described at one point as looking "like a bad girl in the prin-
cipal's office" (59, chap. 12). She can, in fact, barely take care of 
herself: she is easy prey for blackmailers; she is incompetent with 
a pistol; after the climactic scene where she tries to shoot Mar­
44. Pocket Books, September 1967 printing. 
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lowe, she wets her pants (204, chap. 31). No wonder Marlowe never 
finds her sexually alluring. 
Indeed, although she is the person who actually shoots Regan, 
Chandler consistently suggests that she is just a pawn in the hands 
of people far more powerful than she is. And he further suggests, at 
least metaphorically, that her act (the result of a kind of psychotic 
epilepsy) is but the blossoming of a rottenness that comes to her 
from her family heritage, a sickness inherited from the oil fields 
that represent the source of "legitimate" wealth. Carmen, if any­
thing, is but the end of the line for her class, and her institu-
tionalization—far from threatening that class—only serves to bol­
ster it. Carmen, in sum, is neither as intelligent as Spillane's 
Charlotte Manning [I, the fury) nor as alluring as Pandora, neither 
as calculating as Temple Drake (Faulkner's Sanctuary) nor as self-
controlled as Brigid O'Shaughnessy (Hammett's Maltese Falcon). 
She is as pitiable as she is repulsive. 
I am not suggesting that Chandler's depiction of her is not mis­
ogynistic. It clearly is. But the nature of his misogyny is dismissal 
and ridicule. His Carmen is infantile; she is too weak to serve as a 
worthy foil if Marlowe is to be seen as a heroic figure. Yet as we 
have seen, readers have read her quite differently. Luke Parsons, for 
instance, suggests a total lack of sympathy on Chandler's part: "In 
Mr. Chandler's books this association of nymphomania with 
homicidal tendencies is especially marked. . . . And it is remark­
able that Marlowe witholds from them [the nymphomaniacs, in­
cluding Carmen] the compassion he would allow even a gangster 
or a millionaire. No doubt this is partly a convention. The plot 
must have its villainess."45 
It seems, then, that something happens to Carmen in the act of 
reading; many readers of the book apparently have, in their in­
terpretive arsenal, some strategy that allows them to increase her 
monstrosity so that they can put enough blame on her to make her 
punishment cathartic. The principle clearly has something to do 
with our culture's denigration of women, but it cannot be quite so 
simple as a rule of snap moral judgment that, wherever possible, 
45. Parsons, ''On the Novels of Raymond Chandler/' Fortnightly Review, May 
1954, 350. 
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we should consider a woman the guilty party. Indeed, there seems 
to be a rule precisely to the contrary, one sufficiently strong to 
enable Agatha Christie to base an entire novel (I will not spoil it by 
telling you which one) on the assumption that, unless specifically 
directed otherwise, readers will assume that all references to a 
"murderer" are references to a male. Yet there is obviously some 
convention that allows readers to turn against Carmen with spe­
cial vehemence. 
Let me propose here, rather briefly, a candidate for this conven­
tion: a rule of enchainment that I call the rule of the dominant 
negative. When a female character is described as a complex com­
bination of contradictory traits, the reader should give priority to 
the most negative qualities and should in fact interpret her very 
complexity as a negative factor on its own. Like all interpretive 
rules, of course, this one has its exceptions. Not all writers depend 
on it, not all readers apply it (particularly with rising conscious­
ness about women's positions in our society), and not even the 
standard, male-centered readings of male texts depend on it regu­
larly. There are certainly cases where women of ambiguous char­
acter are viewed in a positive light even in traditional academic 
readings of canonical texts. But there is no doubt that complexity 
in a woman is viewed with more suspicion than complexity in a 
man is. We still live in a literary culture whose norms encourage 
us to admire King Lear for his involved character, but to demand 
that our women be as pure as Cordelia. Hamlet, avenging his fa-
ther's murder, is a sympathetic hero, even though he waffles and 
even though his sword runs through a couple or more or less inno­
cent victims along the way,- Clytemnestra, avenging her daughter's 
murder, is a snake, even though her resolve is stronger and her aim 
truer. Thus, as Leland S. Person, Jr., points out, critics have tended 
to malign Daisy Buchanan for failing Gatsby, even though "no 
woman, no human being, could ever approximate the platonic ide­
al he has invented."46 
The rule of the dominant negative is an indirect consequence of 
46. Person, "'Herstory' and Daisy Buchanan/' American Literature 50 (May 
1978): 251. 
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our polarized view of woman. In our culture, we have a number of 
categories in which to place women, but they tend to fall into pairs 
of binary oppositions: madonna/whore, good girl/bad girl, vic-
tim/villain. This tendency to dichotomize leads to a particular 
horror of those who refuse to stay put, for such border straddlers 
seem to threaten the very order of the universe. Thus, innocent 
traits in a "guilty" woman serve not to redeem her but to confirm 
her guilt, doubling the charge against her.47 Males do not face the 
same difficulty, however. Since they are viewed as free subjects 
rather than as objects, they are not fundamentally ordered in clear 
dichotomies,- thus, a combination of attributes is not automatical­
ly seen as a crossing of boundaries and a threatening of order. Men, 
in other words, can be rich as characters,- women, on the whole, 
have the choice of being pure or being monstrous. 
The rule of the dominant negative helps explain many things 
about our culture. In particular, it explains our tendency to blame 
the victim when she is a woman. We are used to sympathizing 
with male murderers (Raskolnikov, Pozdnyshev in The Kreutzer 
Sonata) who have redeeming character traits; but when a woman 
(say, Emma Bovary) is victimized, we often find ourselves looking 
at her character to find out why she brought it on herself. Only the 
purest female victims (Drusilla in Southworth's Changed Brides 
and The Bride's Fate) can have the sympathy they deserve; this 
tendency in our society helps prevent us from, among other things, 
effectively coping with rape. 
I do not want to put too much weight on the particulars of this 
explanation of the misreadings of The Big Sleep. For in setting out 
this hypothesis, my interest is less in The Big Sleep and its specific 
readers than in a general methodological procedure. My primary 
point is that whatever the specific interpretive strategy that per­
mits it to happen, the scapegoating of Carmen does not take place 
in the novel; rather, it is an act that readers perform, not idiosyn­
cratically or individualistically, but according to reading strategies 
47. For a good discussion of Clytemnestra in these terms, see Nancy S. Rabino­
witz, "From Force to Persuasion: Aeschylus' Oresteia as Cosmogonic Myth/7 
Ramus io, no. 2 (1981): 159-91. 
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that their society has taught them and reaffirmed in them before 
they begin the book. Reading readers, then—whether they be pro­
fessional critics or friends—is not simply a way of getting a better 
understanding of a text; it can also help reveal the structures of 
thought that control us. 
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Some Have Greatness 
Thrust upon Them: The 
Politics of Canon Formation 
To answer that the best novels survive is to beg the question. 
Excellence is a constantly changing, socially chosen value. 
Richard Ohmann, "The Shaping of a Canon" 
As I have been arguing, then, texts are often ambiguous; even 
readers committed in principle to reading as authorial audience 
may find that in practice novels often provide insufficient guid­
ance for their own proper decoding and may apparently offer them­
selves up to contradictory interpretive keys. But it does not follow 
that they are infinitely open. If a text does not impose itself on 
readers, it is resistant to certain interpretations. Let me return to 
the swing-set metaphor of the first chapter. As I noted there, if you 
make a mistake in the process of constructing the swing set, you 
may erroneously produce something internally consistent—and 
hence never notice your error. But in the process of putting it 
together, you may also find yourself in a self-contradictory posi­
tion that forces you to rethink what you have done so far. 
There are two circumstances under which this can happen. First, 
the swing set itself may be defective—the author may have made a 
mistake, providing signals that encourage readers to apply inap­
propriate strategies. This can happen with respect to any of the 
four categories of rules. Thus, for instance, in The Idiot, Dos­
toyevsky seems to invoke the rule of notice that a character whose 
moral choice generates the primary action is to be read as an 
important character. Nastasya Filippovna throws a hundred thou­
sand rubles into the fire, in order to see if Ganya is venal enough to 
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pull it from the flames. At this point, the concentration on Ganya's 
moral choice—and particularly on his moral victory—confirms 
our initial impression that he is to be a major force in the novel. 
But he virtually drops out for most of the rest of the book, and his 
disappearance has no apparent rhetorical function—that is, the 
violation of the rule does not appear to be aiming at any particular 
effect. (Dostoyevsky compounds this flaw by a violation of a rule of 
configuration: he fails to follow through on the conflict set up in 
the first volume between Myshkin and Ganya.) Knowing the gene­
sis of the novel, one can well understand why Dostoyevsky shifted 
direction at this point, and why he could not rewrite part i (the 
novel was being published serially while it was being composed); 
as The Idiot stands, though, Ganya's flickering presence remains a 
weakness in its construction. 
Rules of signification can be badly handled, too. Leon Howard, 
for instance, criticizes Chandler's Long Goodbye for failing to con­
form properly to what I have called the rule of realism. 
The reader of course is given the same information that enables Mar­
lowe to infer that Terry's farewell letter is a fake—i.e., the reference 
to a mailbox which would not be found in a Mexican village. The 
validity of this clue for the reader, however, depends upon his faith in 
Chandler's conformity to a reality that exists outside the novel itself; 
and this faith cannot be claimed by an author who asks the reader to 
believe that Terry could be presumed dead and still maintain control 
over a substantial fortune which he could not have taken with him in 
his sudden flight.1 
Similarly, with configuration, it generally mars a novel when an 
author sets up expectations that are neither fulfilled nor effectively 
undermined, but simply unutilized. In Southworth's double-vol-
umed novel, The Changed Brides/The Bride's Fate, the victimized 
heroine, Drusilla, learns midway through the narrative that she is 
an heiress. There are, though, a number of potential obstacles 
standing between her and her considerable fortune; and the way 
i. Howard, "Raymond Chandler's Not-So-Great Gatsby," Mystery and Detec­
tive Annual (1973): 15, n. 1. 
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that they are mentioned in the text, combined with the abuse 
Drusilla has received so far, encourages the reader to expect her to 
confront them. In fact, she gets her rightful money with no diffi­
culty at all, denying us the anticipated pleasure of watching her 
rise to the challenges. 
Authorial failures respecting rules of coherence are most likely 
in those genres where the pleasure of the conclusion depends on 
shared notions of fair play. For instance, readers of classical detec­
tive fiction expect not only that a coherent solution will be offered, 
but also that it will be of a specific type—that is, rational. Without 
this assumed agreement between author and reader, the reader has 
no grounds for his or her guesswork. Under the circumstances, 
how is a reader likely to approach Reginald Hill's Killing Kindness! 
It opens with a medium talking to the spirit of a recent murder 
victim; later, much of what she says turns out to be true. Given the 
genre, we are entitled to assume that the supernatural cannot in­
trude, and we are therefore entitled to draw conclusions based on 
the assumption that the medium must have gotten her knowledge 
in some other way. The actual solution is therefore likely to frus­
trate any experienced detective story reader. Although nothing in 
the text signals the suspension of the convention of rationalism, it 
turns out that she really is a medium. 
If that were all there were to it, evaluating texts—at least, with 
regard to their technical competence—would be fairly easy. Unfor­
tunately, it is not always easy to distinguish between a defective 
swing set and a bumbling do-it-yourselfer—and when a text fails to 
respond to the rules applied to it, it is not always clear whether the 
text or the reader is at fault. To put it in other terms, there are two 
ways of rethinking your reading experiences when a text fails to 
respond to the strategies with which it is approached: You can 
keep the text and change the strategy, or you can keep the strategy 
and toss out the text on the assumption that it is thin or incoher­
ent. And when particular reading strategies—such as the New 
Critical strategies that dominated the 1940s and 1950s—are nor­
malized, the latter course is the more likely, regardless of where 
the problems lie. Indeed, David Daiches goes so far as to validate 
this procedure explicitly. For the New Critics (including himself), 
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he argues, value is a matter of the "degree to which the work lends 
itself to" the "kind of treatment" New Critical theory demands.2 
This, I would argue, is one of the major ways in which the 
academy makes its evaluations.3 Canonization is, at least in part, a 
process by which certain texts are privileged because they work 
with a normalized strategy or set of strategies. As Annette Kolodny 
argues, "Frequently our reading habits become fixed, so that each 
successive reading experience functions, in effect, normatively, 
with one particular kind of novel stylizing our expectations of those 
to follow."4 Thus, for instance, Leon Howard is able to denigrate 
Chandler's Long Goodbye, not only for the problem with significa­
tion cited above (which he relegates to a footnote) but even more 
because it fails to conform to the configuration he expects of a work 
of the genre he assumes it to be. More specifically, he starts out with 
the presupposition that the novel fits what I have shown to be 
popular patterns; when he finds an unexpectedly long epilogue, he 
blames the text rather than the bias with which he approaches it.5 
Such an evaluative procedure is far from atypical; as a result, canons 
are always ideological at base, not only in terms of their treatment of 
content, but even more in their treatment of form, since the reading 
2. Daiches, Critical Approaches to Literature, 303. 
3. Of course, the belief that, as Paul Lauter puts it, "Standards of literary merit 
are not absolute but contingent" ("Introduction,"xx) has become increasingly com­
mon in the American academy. See, for instance, Richard Ohmann, "The Shaping 
of a Canon": "Who attributed [excellence] to only some novels, and how?" 
Ohmann's concern in his essay is somewhat different from mine: he is looking at 
the social processes by which the choices of particular readers get institutionalized 
in the form of a canon. In contrast, I am interested in the ways that the process of 
reading itself helps lead to those initial choices. I view these approaches as comple­
mentary, not contradictory. For some other recent views, see Judith Fetterley, The 
Resisting Reader and "Reading about Reading"; Annette Kolodny, "Dancing 
through the Minefield" and "A Map for Rereading"; Jane Tompkins, Sensational 
Designs; and the special issue of Critical Inquiry (io, no. 1) in which Ohmann's 
essay appears, and which includes the essay by Barbara Herrnstein Smith, "Con­
tingencies of Value" (1—35). 
4. Kolodny, "Dancing through the Minefield," 11. See also Terry Eagleton: "Lit­
erary theorists, critics, and teachers, then, are not so much purveyors of doctrine as 
custodians of a discourse. . . . Certain pieces of writing are selected as being more 
amenable to this discourse than others, and these are what is known as literature or 
the 'literary canon7" [Literary Theory, 201). 
5. Howard, "Chandler's No-So-Great Gatsby," 1-15, esp. 6. 
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strategies to which they owe their existence always have ideological 
implications. 
The best way to see how politics puts pressure on readers as they 
evaluate texts is to look closely at a particular pair of texts: one 
that has succeeded and one that has not. For my first, I have chosen 
The Great Gatsby, almost universally—if sometimes grudgingly— 
recognized as a classic of American literature. For the second, I 
have picked Margaret Ayer Barnes; 1935 novel, Edna His Wife, 
since it deals similarly with the difficulties of the long climb up 
through the American class structure—and, coincidentally, with 
misplaced Midwesterners in New York. Edna is clearly a novel 
with something to offer, at least to some readers, since it was quite 
popular at the time it was written; even among scholars of Ameri­
can literature, however, it has been all but forgotten by now. The 
difference in their status, I would argue, can never be explained by 
what John Guillory aptly calls "the massively resistant tautology 
of literary history: that works ought to be canonized because they 
are good/'6 Rather, Gatsby has been canonized and Edna tossed in 
the can at least partly because of a political bias in the way we have 
been taught to read. But in order to see how this is so, it is neces­
sary to know something about Barnes' novel.7 
The story begins in 1900. Edna Losser, whose father is the sta­
tion master of the Blue Island depot of the Rock Island Line, seems 
about to marry her shy and clumsy railroad beau, Al. But while at a 
picnic with her almost-fiance, she meets the handsome and up­
wardly mobile young lawyer, Paul Jones. When her bicycle breaks 
down, he gallantly but forcefully takes her home on a tandem he 
manages to borrow and—to her shock—kisses her with the some­
what cynical claim, "I always do what I want."8 Whether by 
nature or by upbringing, Edna is a "romantic" at heart and is at­
tracted by his appearance, by his energy, and by his self-confi-
6. Guillory, 'Ideology of Canon-Formation/' 174. 
7. In my discussion of Barnes' novel, I am especially indebted to Nancy S. 
Rabinowitz, with whom many of these ideas have been jointly worked out. For a 
fuller discussion of the structure, meaning, and critical reception—such as it is—of 
Edna His Wife, see our "Legends of Toothpaste and Love." 
8. Margaret Ayer Barnes, Edna His Wife: An American Idyll (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1935), 45 (pt. 1, chap. 1.3). Further references to this edition will be made in 
the text. 
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dence—as well as by the fact that he is a foundling. At first, Paul 
doesn't consider the possibility of a lasting attachment, since mar­
riage does not fit into this stage of the life he projects for himself. 
But he is swayed by "her small mouth, quivering like a child's 
mouth . . . her blue eyes, shining with the silver iridescence of a 
woman's tears" (63; pt. 1, chap. 2.1). Since her parents raise ques­
tions about his background, they elope. The remainder of the novel 
chronicles their worldly rise in the wake of Paul's professional 
success. Starting in a small Chicago flat, they move to suburban 
Oakwood Terrace, then to a more fashionable residence on Chi-
cago's North Side, and finally to a chic, modernistic Park Avenue 
penthouse. But the more Paul succeeds, the less he has in common 
with Edna, and the more pointless Edna's life becomes. With abun­
dant financial resources and servants to do all her domestic chores, 
she has less and less intimacy with her family. Remaining very 
much the same working-class woman whose aesthetic values were 
derived from Gibson drawings, she finds herself increasingly cut 
off from the society in which she is supposed to move,- the final jolt 
to her self-esteem comes when Edna learns that, for the last fifteen 
years, Paul has been having an affair with Katharine Boyne, a fa­
mous sculptress of whom she has never heard. 
Behind the straightforward story is a strong demystification of 
democratic capitalist ideology, specifically of the myth of upward 
mobility—the belief that social advancement is both desirable and 
possible through shrewdness and hard work. Barnes undermines 
this myth—not by suggesting, as did many of her contemporaries, 
that such success is unattainable, but rather by showing that it 
comes at high personal cost and that the structure of society forces 
women to pay more than their share. This critique, in turn, forces 
Barnes into particular rhetorical maneuvers. 
For instance, Edna His Wife stands in sharp contrast to many 
apparently similar novels (particularly modern novels) that show 
how some extraordinary woman (usually artistically talented) is 
held back by social oppression: Erica Jong's Fear of Flying, Mar­
garet Drabble's Waterfall, Susan Fromberg Schaeffer's Falling. 
Powerful as those novels can be, they tend to sidestep one crucial 
aspect of Barnes' analysis. Democratic society, after all, is the­
oretically structured to protect the interests of the ordinary, not 
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the extraordinary; artists, male and female alike, have traditionally 
found it hard to adapt. Thus, in Fear of Flying, it is hard to tell to 
what extent Isadora Wing's problems result from her being a wom­
an and to what extent they stem from her being an artist. In order 
to make sure that her novel has no such ambiguity, Barnes focuses 
on a woman who is bland to her very core, and thus shows that the 
ungifted woman is crushed by social inequities, too, simply be­
cause she is a woman. 
For this reason, she has had to create a heroine whose limita­
tions are frankly crippling. Next to Edna, to paraphrase Vladimir 
Nabokov, Emma Bovary is a Hegel. Emma, at least, reads; since her 
world view comes from books, there is always the remote pos­
sibility that she might stumble upon one that could serve as a 
corrective. Edna, in contrast, prefers pictures, especially those that 
tell stories (e.g., 230; pt. 2, chap. 5.2); hence her love of movies. 
Early on, Paul lends her "a book called 'The Origin of Species', but 
she could make neither head nor tail out of even the first three 
pages" (58; pt. 1, chap. 2.1). She doesn't read newspapers, and her 
ignorance about serious art, music, and literature is almost total. 
Not surprisingly, Edna's limitations are reflected in a difficulty 
with words. She thinks in cliches, and stress renders her inarticu­
late. The best she can manage by way of conversation is a "compli­
cated pretence of interests utterly foreign to her nature, assumed in 
a passionate desire to please" (58; pt. 1, chap. 2.1). Even when 
trying to describe something as simple as Mount Vernon, she can 
only stumble out with, "It '  s somehow—American'" (318/ pt. 3, 
chap. 1.3). 
Now on the surface, neither Barnes' plot nor her aims nor her 
consequent rhetorical choices would necessarily seem to predeter­
mine the quality of her book—it ought to be possible to write a 
good novel within these parameters, just as it is possible to write a 
bad one. In fact, I think Barnes has succeeded in writing a good 
book. I am not going to try to prove that here,- rather, I am going to 
try to show that adequate assessment of the novel is rendered 
unlikely—not impossible, but unlikely—by a masculinist bias in 
the normalized techniques of reading most academics have been 
trained to use. 
We can see the mismatch between Edna and traditional reading 
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strategies if we look at how actual readers are likely to apply the 
various rules of reading to Barnes' and Fitzgerald's texts. Let me 
start with rules of notice. As I have pointed out, one way in which 
a given element becomes noticeable is through the placement of 
the text on an intertextual grid—that is, one of the effects of a 
literary tradition is that it provides a stock of familiar details, the 
echoes of which, in subsequent texts, become charged. As a conse­
quence, texts that partake of the academic tradition (which is pri­
marily male) will seem, to academic readers, richer in their details. 
And given our tendency to associate richness of detail with literary 
quality (as Brooks argues, "A poem . .  . is to be judged . .  . by its 
coherence, sensitivity, depth, richness, and tough-mindedness"),9 
such texts will, other things being equal, appear to be better. Thus, 
Letha Audhuy is able to justify focusing attention on a few appar­
ently invisible lines in Gatsby because they echo The Waste 
Land;10 T. Jeff Evans is able to center on the word "raw" by hold­
ing the text up to "Daisy Miller",11 John Shroeder can privilege 
certain details in Gatsby because they parallel (perhaps uninten­
tionally) certain details in Mardi;12 other critics can "notice" ele­
ments in Gatsby by holding it up to the tradition of Chaucer,13 
9. Cleanth Brooks, Well Wrought Urn, 256. 
10. Audhuy, "The Waste Land: Myth and Symbols in The Great Gatsby," Etudes 
anglaises 33, no. 1 (1980): 41-54, esp. 47, 51; Michael Pottorf, "The Great Gatsby: 
Myrtle's Dog and Its Relation to the Dog-God of Pound and Eliot," American Notes 
and Queries 14 (January 1976): 88-90. 
11. Evans, "F. Scott Fitzgerald and Henry James: The Raw Material of American 
Innocence," Notes on Modem American Literature 4, item 8 (1980). James E. Mil­
ler, Jr., also stresses the importance of "Daisy Miller" in "Fitzgerald's Gatsby: The 
World as Ash Heap," in The Twenties: Fiction, Poetry, Drama, ed. Warren French 
(Deland, Fla.: Everett/Edwards, 1975), 183. Michael A. Peterman, however, follow­
ing Henry Dan Piper, claims that "there is no evidence that he had read Daisy 
Miller prior to 1925" ("A Neglected Source for The Great Gatsby: The Influence of 
Edith Wharton's The Spark/' Canadian Review of American Studies 8 [1977]: 27). 
12. Shroeder, " 'Some Unfortunate Idyllic Love Affair': The Legends of Taji and 
Jay Gatsby," Books at Brown 22 (1968): 143-53. 
13. Nancy Y. Hoffman, "The Great Gatsby: Troilus and Chseyde Revisited?" 
Fitzgerald/Hemingway Annual 1971, ed. Matthew J. Bruccoli and C E. Frazer 
Clark, Jr. (Washington: Microcards, 1971), 148-58. 
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Coleridge,14 Conrad,15 and Citizen Kane16—to limit ourselves ar­
bitrarily to male texts centering around the letter C. . . . And be­
cause of such interpretive strategies, Gatsby is made to seem rich 
indeed. To be sure, there are occasional references to female texts 
in the studies of Gatsby. Michael A. Peterman, for instance, sees 
the influence of Wharton.17 But for the most part, to read the 
criticism, the novel appears to spring from fathers alone. 
A woman writer might very well not wish to partake of that 
tradition (although her novel may well be tied to a different and 
forgotten tradition of women's writing), especially if she is writing 
about a woman who has not been to college and does not read. Sly 
references, in a book like Edna, to Conrad and Eliot could only 
come from the narrator—and they could only serve the end of 
increasing the authorial audience's sense of distance from the her­
oine, which would seriously compromise the intended effect. Nor 
is Barnes able to use cataclysmic events as a way of attracting 
notice. This is a novel about a life "dulled by habit" and by "the 
monotonous recurrence of . .  . domestic cares" (128; pt. 2, chap. 
2.1). One of the points of the novel is that Paul's financial gener­
osity provides physical comfort only by cutting Edna off from any 
real engagement with life—and that includes engagement with the 
historical events that surround her. Being the wife of a successful 
and brilliant man, she is protected from the war and the Depres-
sion—she is "too busy hemming window curtains to hear the shot 
at Sarajevo" (243; pt. 2, chap. 5.3)—which therefore hardly appear 
in the novel except in terms of their effect on Edna's domestic life: 
14. Leslie F. Chard II, "Outward Forms and the Inner Life: Coleridge and 
Gatsby/' Fitzgerald/Hemingway Annual 1973, ed. Matthew J. Bruccoli and C. E. 
Frazer Clark, Jr. (Washington: Microcards, 1973), 189-94. 
15. Harold Hurwitz, "The Great Gatsby and Heart of Darkness: The Confronta­
tion Scenes/' Fitzgerald/Hemingway Annual 1969, ed. Matthew J. Bruccoli (Wash­
ington: Microcards, 1969), 27-34. 
16. Robert L. Carringer, "Citizen Kane, The Great Gatsby, and Some Conven­
tions of American Narrative/' Critical Inquiry 2 (Winter 1975): 307—25. 
17. Peterman, "A Neglected Source." Oddly, given Peterman's claims about 
"Daisy Miller," he provides no solid evidence that Fitzgerald had ever read The 
Spark. 
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the war, to a large extent, is a matter of using Crisco instead of 
butter. 
Of course, this failure to employ certain traditional rules of 
notice does not mean that other kinds of notice have not taken 
their place. In a novel based on different rules, however, crucial 
details may well be invisible to the reader without the proper key. 
Writing of a particular textual feature she finds in women's texts, 
Nancy K. Miller points out, "When these modalities of difference 
are perceived, they are generally called implausibilities. They are 
not perceived, or are misperceived, because the scripting of this 
fantasy does not bring the aesthetic 'forepleasure' Freud says fan­
tasy scenarios inevitably bring/'18 And Naomi Schor defines a 
whole school of feminist criticism in terms of rules of notice: "The 
clitoral school of feminist theory might then be identified by its 
practice of a hermeneutics focused on the detail, which is to say on 
those details of the female anatomy which have been generally 
ignored by male critics and which significantly influence our read­
ing of the texts in which they appear/719 And indeed, there is a 
great deal to notice in Barnes' book as well, but only if you are 
prepared to pay attention to the ways that Edna dresses or—even 
more important—to the fate of particular pieces of furniture amid 
the shifting interior decors as Edna moves socially. But men, at 
least—and canons are still formed primarily by men—are trained 
to prick up their ears at an echo of T. S. Eliot in a way that they are 
not trained to notice dining room tables. If no details stand out, of 
course, then all details are equally important. Readers who fail to 
apply proper rules of notice may well, therefore, think that Barnes' 
novel is written "in too great detail/'20 that in comparison to 
Fitzgerald's, it is undifferentiated and (what amounts to the same 
thing) boring. 
Let me give a particular example. I noted earlier that Edna had 
difficulty with language. At first, this might seem reminiscent of 
such characters as Akaky Akakievich in Gogol's "Overcoat" and 
Golyadkin in Dostoyevsky's Double—and for good reasons, since 
18. Miller, "Emphasis Added/' 42. 
19. Schor, ''Female Paranoia," 216. 
20. Rebecca Lowrie, "A Gibson Girl from the Middle West/7 Saturday Review, 
November 9, 1935, 7. 
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in our literary culture, a rule of signification almost inevitably 
makes linguistic failure stand for broader social incapacity. But if 
we simply compare Barnes to the male Russians, we are bound to 
be disappointed. Gogol and Dostoyevsky's own command of lan­
guage was so great that they were able to portray the stutterings of 
Akaky Akakievich and Golyadkin in a way that is colorful and 
amusing. 
"Well, you see, Petrovich, I—er—have come—er—about that, you 
know . . ." said Akaky. 
It might be as well to explain at once that Akaky mostly talked in 
prepositions, adverbs, and lastly, such parts of speech as have no 
meaning whatsoever. If the matter was rather difficult, he was in the 
habit of not finishing the sentences, so that often having begun his 
speech with, "This is—er—you know . . . a bit of that, you know . . ." 
he left it at that, forgetting to finish the sentence in the belief that he 
had said all that was necessary. [Ellipses in original]21 
Next to this, Edna's "It's somehow—American" seems simply 
drab. (So, for that matter, does Daisy's response to Gatsby's shirts: 
" They're such beautiful shirts. . .  . It makes me sad because I've 
never seen such—such beautiful shirts before.' "22 But Daisy is not 
the center of her novel.) 
There is, however, another perspective from which to look at 
this phenomenon. If we take our rules of notice not from tradi­
tional male texts, but rather from the female tradition, other ele­
ments are foregrounded. As feminist critics have pointed out, there 
is a special kind of denial of access to language that is peculiarly 
imposed on women. Lawrence Lipking puts it well: "A woman's 
poetics must begin . . . with a fact that few male theorists have 
ever had to confront: the possibility of never having been em­
powered to speak. The right to mythos is the first law of literary 
creation,- not even God could have created light without a word. 
And women have not been able to forget that law."23 It is not 
21. Nicolai V. Gogol, 'The Overcoat/7 in The Overcoat and Other Tales of Good 
and Evil, trans. David Magarshack (New York: Norton, 1965), 243. 
22. F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby (New York: Scribner's, 1925), 93-94 
(chap. 5). 
23. Lipking, "Aristotle's Sister/7 67. 
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accidental, for instance, that in Alice Walker's Third Life of 
Grange Copeland, when Brownfield wants to destroy his "tender" 
wife, "the first thing he started on was her speech/'24 
Awareness of this female tradition provides a different kind of 
notice, and makes certain aspects of Edna's inarticulateness stand 
out. We are more apt, for instance, to notice the small gestures that 
Paul makes just after their elopement, when it is necessary to send 
a telegram to Edna's parents telling them about their marriage. 
Edna finds it hard to write; Paul, in his efficiency, takes over the 
task, literally taking "the yellow blank from her flaccid fingers" 
and writing "firmly." 
She had read the message over his elbow as he was writing it and she 
did not dare to criticize. But the word "cordiality" dismayed her. It 
was an icy word. Broken phrases of excuse and love and explanation 
were stumbling through her head—simple phrases, more eloquent 
than Edna knew in their simplicity—"I'm sorry—I loved him so— 
forgive me—I love you"—but they were not phrases that she could 
conceive of confiding to a telegraph operator, or even to William 
Losser for that matter, a shy and inarticulate man. [88; pt. i, chap. 2.3] 
Paul has, in essence, taken over her right to the word—as he 
does again and again in the book. When Edna turns down an invita­
tion to the fashionable Wintringhams' in order to watch Jessie 
perform in the school play, Paul insists that they go to the party 
after all, and Edna is forced to substitute for her own note of regret 
an acceptance note written "on Paul's curt dictation" (201; pt. 2, 
chap. 4.2). 
Rules of signification work in a parallel way. First of all, in a 
move clearly linked to our dismissal of the so-called popular, aca­
demic critical practice teaches us to value works that stress sig­
nification (especially symbolism) over works that depend largely 
on, say, configuration. Cleanth Brooks, for instance, takes it as an 
"article of faith" that "literature is ultimately metaphorical and 
symbolic."25 And while New Criticism may no longer be in vogue, 
24. Walker, The Third Life of Grange Copeland (New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich/Harvest, ^77), 56 (chap. 14). 
25. Brooks, "My Credo," 72. 
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the critical revolution of the past two decades, whatever else it has 
done, has done little to counteract the stress on the figurative. As a 
consequence, there is a tendency to denigrate the real world; good 
works, we are told, should reveal another plane beyond our mun­
dane lives. Allen Tate, for instance, felt that literature was de­
meaned by the doctrine of relevance, which claims that subject 
matter should be "tested . .  . by observation of the world that it 
'represents/ "2 6 And Tate's position is still widely held. Highly 
wrought and abstract works are thus deemed better than works 
that deal more directly with the concrete aspects of our experience. 
Edna herself, though, casts some doubt on this mode of interpreta­
tion. At the fateful picnic, before she meets Paul, she listens to a 
sentimental song "written on a tragic plane/7 But she immediately 
rejects the gesture of abstraction, her thoughts "busy with Al. A 
brakeman had to be away a lot" (29; pt. i, chap. 1.3). And much 
women's fiction, including Edna itself, because it rejects that auto­
matic preference for the abstract, seems too immediate to be taken 
seriously. It is for this reason that Lloyd C. Taylor, Jr., is able to 
claim that "Barnes's reputation will rest upon her accomplish­
ment as a social historian rather than as a literary artist. . . . Her 
writing has none of the presently popular symbolic or poetic 
quality."27 
But in addition, even the signification that women's novels do 
possess is apt to be missed by academic critics. We have been 
taught, as Nina Baym puts it, that whaling ships are a better "sym­
bol of the human community" than the sewing circle,28 just as we 
have been taught simply not to notice the symbolic richness of 
women's worlds. As Annette Kolodny puts it, 
There was nothing fortuitous, for example, in Charlotte Perkins 
26. Tate, 'Th e Present Function of Criticism/' in Essays in Modern Literary 
Criticism, ed. Ray B. West, Jr. (New York: Rinehart, 1952), 151. 
27. Taylor, Margaret Ayer Barnes (New York: Twayne, 1974), unnumbered page 
(Preface). 
28. Nine Baym, Woman's Fiction, 14. See also Paul Lauter's claim: "Some of the 
most popular texts in United States literature present hunting—a whale or a b e a r  ­
as paradigms for 'human' exploration and coming of age, whereas menstruation, 
pregnancy, and birthing somehow do not serve as such prototypes'' ("Introduction," 
xvi). 
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Gilman's decision to situate the progressive mental breakdown and 
increasing incapacity of the protagonist of The Yellow Wallpaper in 
an upstairs room that had once served as a nursery (with barred win­
dows, no less). But the reader unacquainted with the ways in which 
women traditionally inhabited a household might not have taken the 
initial description of the setting as semantically relevant; and the 
progressive infantilization of the adult protagonist would thereby 
lose some of its symbolic implications.29 
In part, that is because we have grown up in a culture in which the 
phallus is the privileged signifier. In Ernest Jones7 phrase, "there 
are probably more symbols of the male organ itself than all other 
symbols put together/'30 Less literally, our culture still supports 
Thomas Dixon, Jr.'s claim that "war is always the crisis that flash­
es the search light into the souls of men and nations."31 In other 
words, we already have a well-developed arsenal of techniques for 
drawing out symbolism latent in male experiences and the objects 
of male interest. No college student has trouble writing a paper 
that takes off from the implications of guns,32 bootleggers, or a 
gambler who fixes the World Series. Gatsby has thus been a gold 
mine for critics predisposed to privilege its equation of woman as 
bitch33—or prepared to follow up the implications of its symbolic 
use of the automobile, a symbol that almost inevitably carries with 
it a certain attitude toward women (indeed, the Jordan automobile 
company, one of the apparent sources for Jordan Baker's name, ran 
ad campaigns that, even more than those of other manufacturers, 
"associatefd] automobiles with girls and young women").34 Writ­
29. Kolodny, "Dancing through the Minefield/7 13-14. See also her "A Map for 
Reading/' esp. 455-60. 
30. Jones, Papers on Psycho-Analysis, rev. ed. (London: Bailliere, Tindall, and 
Cox, 1920), 145. 
31. Thomas Dixon, Jr., The Leopard's Spots: A Romance of the White Man's 
Burden, i86$-i9oo (New York: Doubleday, Page, 1902), 405 (bk. 3, chap. 9). 
32. See, for instance, Alexander R. Tamke, 'Th e 'Gat' in Gatsby: Neglected 
Aspect of a Novel/' Modem Fiction Studies 14 (Winter 1968—69): 443—45. 
33. See, for instance, Bruce R. Stark, "The Intricate Pattern in The Great 
Gatsby/' Fitzgerald/Hemingway Annual 1974, ed. Matthew J. Bruccoli and C. E. 
Frazer Clark, Jr. (Washington: Microcards, 1974), 51-61. 
34. Laurence E. MacPhee, "The Great Gatsby's 'Romance of Motoring': Nick 
Carraway and Jordan Baker," Modern Fiction Studies 18 (Summer 1972): 208—9; F­
H. Longman, "Style and Shape in The Great Gatsby/1 Southern Review (University 
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ing an essay on the implications of such female experiences as 
child raising and homemaking, or such activities as "reversing a 
puffed sleeve, or turning a full skirt, or freshening a faded bodice 
with a new velvet bolero or a satin revere" (i6; pt. i, chap, I . I )— 
experiences and activities that form a crucial part of Edna—is 
more difficult for a reader trained in normalized techniques. 
Indeed, male texts—at least, American male texts from this peri-
od—are apt to parody such concerns. In Raymond Chandler's "Red 
Wind," Marlowe is having a beer in a bar when a man enters 
looking for a woman: " 'tall, pretty, brown hair, in a print bolero 
jacket over a blue crepe silk dress. Wearing a wide-brimmed straw 
hat with a velvet band.'" Before the man finds her, he is shot 
down; shortly thereafter, Marlowe meets a woman in his apart­
ment building. 
She had brown wavy hair under a wide-brimmed straw hat with a 
velvet band and loose bow. She had wide blue eyes and eyelashes that 
didn't quite reach her chin. She wore a blue dress that might have 
been crepe silk, simple in lines but not missing any curves. Over it 
she wore what might have been a print bolero jacket. 
I said: "Is that a bolero jacket?" 
She gave me a distant glance and made a motion as if to brush a 
cobweb out of the way.35 
It is not simply the academy's stress of male objects themselves 
that skews the issue; the process of symbolization itself, as taught, 
tends to be male. As Judith Fetterley has cogently argued, in can­
onical American literature universality is defined "in specifically 
male terms"36—a definition that automatically makes Gatshy a 
more "American" book than Edna, and hence more appropriate for 
teaching and research. But masculinization is not found simply in 
such broad critical maneuvers; the tendency to masculinize as we 
symbolize is found in our smallest interpretive gestures as well. 
of Adelaide) 6 (1973): 48-67; John J, McNally, "Boats and Automobiles in The 
Great Gatshy: Symbols of Drift and Death/' Husson Review 5 (1971): 11-17. 
35. Chandler, ''Red Wind/' in Trouble Is My Business (New York: Pocket, 1951), 
158, 163-64 (chaps, i, 2). 
36. Fetterley, Resisting Reader, xiii. 
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Glass objects in Gatsby, we're told by Robert Carringer, represent 
not only "the ideal West versus the corrupt East" and "childhood 
innocence versus adult experience," but also "the loss of a 
woman."37 
Third, let us turn to configuration. The canonical, we are often 
told, transcends the temporary and eccentric, revealing instead 
what is universal to "mankind." Once we accept this view, the 
patterns articulated by our traditional genres—tragedy, detective 
story, Bildungsroman—turn out to be more than merely formal. 
Since those canonical forms encapsulate the essence of being 
human, they imply what kind of life is worth telling about, and 
hence what kind of life is most worth living. 
Thus, for instance, the aesthetic value of well-roundedness, of 
consistently returning characters, privileges a certain kind of life 
and makes other kinds of social reality all but impossible to por­
tray without departing from "good" structure. Well-roundedness 
might therefore well be incompatible with a realistic slave nar­
rative, since the very point of that narrative might be precisely that 
you lose your friends and family—indeed, your whole past and any 
possibility of order, much less progress, in your life—as you are 
shuffled around. 
From a traditional aesthetic perspective, therefore, not only is a 
novel like Harriet Wilson's Our Nig episodic; in making that ap­
parently formal judgment, the very life portrayed in that novel— 
especially its final chapter—is implicitly devaluated in favor of a 
bourgeois story where relationships grow and develop. From a dif­
ferent perspective, though, one that sees the value of art partly 
through its ability to articulate social injustices, Our Nig would 
seem far more cannily composed. As Barbara Foley argues in her 
discussion of "the unremittingly episodic structure of most aboli­
tionist documentary novels," "the hero's destiny was intended to 
illustrate social trends and conflicts, but it was not conceived as a 
synecdochic reconciliation of those trends and conflicts. Rather, in 
the frequent arbitrariness of its conclusion, the abolitionist novel 
proposed that the conditions for formal completeness and closure 
were dictated by extratextual as well as textual considerations/'38 
37. Carringer, "Citizen Kane," 311. 
38. Foley, Telling the Truth 249. 
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Indeed, from this second perspective, a novel like Uncle Tom's 
Cabin might be downgraded, not because of its episodic nature 
(often held against it in the academy), but rather for the opposite 
reason, because Stowe tries too hard to round it off at the end, thus 
submitting to precisely those social values she is trying to critique. 
This coincidence between plot structure and implied social val­
ue means, among other things, that the actions of those with ac­
cess to power (with its corollary, violence) lend themselves to 
sharply outlined patterns of the sort we have been taught to seek in 
literary texts. It is easier, that is, to write a traditionally well-
formed story about a businessman or a cop than it is to write one 
about a housewife who doesn't seem to do anything. Such a do­
mestic story, because it will not fit the norms of the adventure 
story or the tragedy, is apt to appear shapeless and diffuse, or—as 
Hershell Brickell said about Barnes' Within This Present—"un-
necessarily long."39 It is not exactly that women's lives are inap­
propriate to narrative fiction. We have canonical plot structures 
that deal with women who ruin themselves in adultery (Madame 
Bovary, Anna Kaienina) or who remain self-sacrificially steadfast 
even under extreme adversity (Southworth's Changed Brides/The 
Bride's Fate). But the potential roles for women in such plots are 
restricted. As Alice Jardine puts it, "If the author is male, one finds 
that the female destiny (at least in the novel) rarely deviates from 
one or two seemingly irreversible, dualistic teleologies: monster 
and/or angel, she is condemned to death (or sexual mutilation or 
disappearance) and/or to happy-ever-after marriage. Her plot is not 
her own."40 In other words, traditional patternings, even though 
they may vary by genre and nationality,41 make it difficult to write 
about particular kinds of women. 
39. Brickell, 'Th e Literary Landscape/' Noith American Review (January 1934): 
93­
40. Jardine, "Gynesis," 56. 
41. Nancy K. Miller puts it well: "Now, if the plots of male fiction chart the 
daydreams of an ego that would be invulnerable, what do the plots of female fiction 
reveal? Among French women writers, it would seem at first blush to be the obverse 
negative of 'nothing can happen to me.' The phrase that characterizes the heroine's 
posture might well be a variant of Murphy's law: If anything can go wrong, it will. 
And the reader's sense of security, itself dependent on the heroine's, comes from 
feeling not that the heroine will triumph in some conventionally positive way but 
that she will transcend the perils of plot with a self-exalting dignity. Here, national 
constraints on the imagination . .  . do seem to matter: the second-chance rerouting 
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Because she is not one of those stereotyped female characters, 
Edna does not lead a life that fits the conventional patterns. The 
point of the book, as I have argued, is not only to describe the 
experiences of women and others with limited opportunities for 
action, but also to cry out against those limitations. Such sharply 
focused actions as Gatsby's violent death are thus ruled out, and 
one traditional means of producing what the reader will see as a 
well-structured story is unavailable. The plot of accepted self-de-
nial is equally ruled out. Barnes' problem is made more difficult by 
Edna's dullness—and especially by the combination of her dull­
ness and the novel's feminist perspective. There are surprisingly 
few novels about stupid people—and it is not accidental that most 
of those in that small pool succeed in achieving traditionally ac­
ceptable configurations in part because they have a masculinist 
perspective. For instance, Marquand's Melville Goodwin, USA 
(1951), about an unsophisticated general who, like Edna, is out of 
place in the chic social set in which he finds himself, might seem 
roughly analogous in certain ways to Barnes' novel. But that novel 
shows us what makes Barnes' task so difficult. Goodwin is a male, 
and since men (especially military men) have adventures in our 
society, even the most dull-witted among them have more novel­
istically shapely things to offer us. Edna is, to my mind, a well-
shaped book. But to see that shape, we have to be prepared to 
accept the possibility that the trajectory of a woman's socially 
determined decline from a useful and pretty young housewife to a 
fat, elderly cast-off might provide just as good a shape for a novel as 
the rise and fall of a self-made man chasing the American dream. 
Coherence, in many ways, is the most interesting of our catego­
ries, partly because it has until recently probably been the most 
highly regarded aesthetic virtue, but also because coherence is es­
pecially subject to prejudgment. As I said earlier, texts do resist 
some readings: not every critic can turn Hamlet into a comedy. 
But texts rarely resist imputations of coherence: any well-wrought 
academic who begins with a serious belief that a text is coherent 
will ultimately be able to make it so. This tends to perpetuate 
canons; we are more likely to assume (and hence to find) high 
of disaster typical of fane Austen's fiction, for example, is exceedingly rare in 
France" ("Emphasis Added/' 40). 
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levels of coherence in famous books, like Fitzgerald's, than in for­
gotten novels, like Barnes'. 
But the finding of coherence is not entirely a subjective process. 
Even a reader prepared, from the start, to find coherence in a text 
would have less trouble with Gatsby than with Edna, for two 
reasons. First, coherence, like notice, is often a function of the 
intertextual grid on which a text is placed; books that are like 
other canonized texts are deemed coherent by similarity, almost as 
if they shared a club membership. Indeed, it may not be accidental 
that critics often fall into figurative language that supports just 
this notion. David Daiches, for instance, notes that a work "is 
either admitted into the canon, as it were, or is not. Those admit­
ted have all an equal status."42 And as I have tried to show, we are 
more familiar with the male literary tradition. Second, and even 
more important, one way of finding coherence in a text is to apply 
rules of naming, specifically to find a universal theme—a central 
metaphor—that holds it together. Even today, in our supposedly 
post-structural world, this may still generate more critical writing 
than any other interpretive gesture. And if your stock of themes 
consists primarily of such goods as "The American Dream,"43 
"The Earth Mother,"44 "The Grail,"45 or "The Homecom­
42. Daiches, Critical Approaches to Literature, 302. See also George P. Elliott's 
discussion—tongue-in-cheek, to be sure, but nonetheless revealing—of "whether 
Chandler will ever be elected into literary history/' whether his "nomination for 
membership" will be "seconded" by those with "the power to vote him in" 
("Country Full of Blondes," Nation, April 23, 1960, 354). 
43. This is one of the most popular bits of glue used to hold The Great Gatsby 
together. See, for instance, Taylor Alderman, "The Great Gatsby and Hopalong 
Cassidy," Fitzgerald/Hemingway Annual 1975, ed. Matthew J. Bruccoli and C. E. 
Frazer Clark, Jr. (Washington: Microcards, 1975), 83-87; V. N. Arora, "The Great 
Gatsby: The Predicament of the Dual Vision," Indian Journal of American Studies 
8, no. 1 (1978): 1-9; Brian M. Barbour, "The Great Gatsby and the American Past," 
Southern Review 9 (Spring 1973): 288-99; Thomas E. Boyle, "Unreliable Narration 
in The Great Gatsby/' Bulletin of the Rocky Mountain Modern Language Associa­
tion 23 (1969): 21-26; Peter L. Hays, "Gatsby, Myth, Fairy Tale, and Legend," 
Southern Folklore Quarterly 40 (1977): 213-23. See Kolodny's critique of some of 
the implications of the landscape imagery connected to this theme in Lay of the 
Land, esp. 138-39. See also Peter Slater's discussion of some of its ethnocentrism, 
"Ethnicity in The Great Gatsby/' Twentieth Century Literature 19 (1973): 53-62. 
44. H. Keith Monroe, "Gatsby and the Gods," Renascence 31 (1978): 51-63. 
45. See, for instance, Robert J. Emmitt, "Love, Death, and Resurrection in The 
Great Gatsby," in Aeolian Harps: Essays in Literature in Honor of Maurice Brown­
ing Cramer, ed. Donna G. Fricke and Douglas C. Fricke (Bowling Green, Ohio: 
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ing"46—whether or not those themes are seen ironically, as many 
of them are in analyses of Gatsby—male-centered texts will al­
most automatically seem more coherent, since these themes are 
more appropriate to male experiences. The same is true if your 
cohering lens comes from Freudian psychology—for that, too, at 
least until recent feminist revisions, has presupposed certain lim­
ited roles for women.47 
Edna is held together in a radically different way. Yes, the book, 
like Gatsby, reflects back and forth on itself, repeating themes 
with subtle variations. But these themes are not "The Grail" or 
"The Homecoming"—the novel gravitates, rather, around chang­
ing attitudes toward birthing, methods of raising children, and the 
ways that middle age and domesticity can reduce a woman to 
invisibility. In our current critical climate, few nonfeminist critics 
are likely to take these as serious themes. It is thus not surprising 
that Barnes' felicities have gone unrecognized—or, even worse, 
have been viewed as flaws by critics who refuse to start with the 
assumption that she knew what she was doing. 
Of course, I do not pretend to have given a full account of the 
reasons behind the relative rankings of authors; canonization is a 
complex process, and our culture's preferences have multiple 
causes, many of which I have not even touched on. As I pointed out 
earlier in the chapter, some texts are, even from the standpoint of 
their authorial audience, less well put together than others, in the 
sense that they simply don't do what they're supposed to do when 
they are transformed by the interpretive procedures they them­
selves call for. Furthermore, the technology and the economic 
structure of the publishing industry have their roles in canon for­
mation, as does, in the words of Jane Tompkins, "an author's rela-
Bowling Green State University Press, 1976), 273-89. Emmitt puts his argument 
specifically in terms of the cohering power of thematic analysis. See also Arora, 
"The Great Gatsby"} and Audhuy, "The Waste Land." 
46. See, for instance, Ronald J. Gervais, ''The Trains of Their Youth: The Aes­
thetics of Homecoming in The Great Gatsby, The Sun Also Rises and The Sound 
and the Fury," Americana-Austriaca 6 (1980): 51-63. 
47. See, for instance, A. B. Paulson, "The Great Gatsby: Oral Aggression and 
Splitting," American Imago 35 (Fall 1978): 311-30. 
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tions to the mechanisms by which his or her work is brought 
before the public.'748 And it is probably the case that texts that 
disturb in certain ways are less likely to be canonized than others 
that are safer. Of course, we make a great show of our belief that 
the point of literature is to get us out of ourselves and to learn new 
experiences. And there is no doubt that many canonized novels do 
confront difficult issues in ways that can hardly be considered 
comforting. But there is a certain kind of repetition in the canon as 
well, at least in its focus. As Judith Fetterley provocatively puts it, 
"If a white male middle-class literary establishment consistently 
chooses to identify as great and thus worth reading those texts that 
present as central the lives of white male middle-class characters, 
then obviously recognition and reiteration, not difference and ex­
pansion, provide the motivation for reading/'49 To put it in other 
terms, we may readily canonize books that raise problems—but 
we seem to prefer it if those problems are the problems of a certain 
dominant group, for then at least the centrality of that group re­
mains an implicit assumption. 
Nonetheless, there can be little doubt that the canon grows as 
well from the interpretive principles we take for granted. Specifi­
cally, part of the preference for Fitzgerald stems from the ways 
we've been taught to approach literature; many of the criticisms 
leveled against Barnes—to the extent that she is mentioned at 
all—are likewise built into our prefabricated ways of reading. To 
say that the "range of her fiction appears extremely narrow" when 
compared to Fitzgerald's,50 much less to criticize her writing for 
appealing primarily to women,51 is to say less about the quality of 
her work itself than about the antifeminism implicit in our most 
familiar reading strategies. 
In arguing this way about Barnes' novel, however, I am not mere­
ly making a plug for a favorite text. Nor am I simply attempting to 
provide an explanation—however incomplete—for a particular 
canonical choice. Rather, I hope that my arguments will raise 
48. Tompkins, Sensational Designs, 32. 
49. Fetterley, "Reading about Reading/' 150. 
50. Taylor, Margaret Ayer Barnes, 129, 
51. Basil Davenport, "Safety First/' Saturday Review of Literature, December 5, 
1931, 345. 
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questions about how we should act in the face of our culture's 
evaluations. If canonization resulted merely from inherent quali­
ties in the text, of course, standard academic practice would be 
justified; we could continue, without worry, to read, study, and 
teach those texts that are inherently better. If such subjectivists as 
Robert Crosman and David Bleich were right that readers "make" 
the texts they read, then there would be no particular reason to 
change our practices either, since no choices would be demonstra­
bly better (or more harmful) than those that the academy has al­
ready made. But if, as I have tried to argue, reading strategies can be 
more or less appropriate to particular texts, and if there are valu­
able experiences to be gained from an authorial reading of Barnes' 
novel, experiences that have been blocked by the imposition of 
inappropriate interpretive moves, then another course of action 
suggests itself: to teach ourselves to read in new ways (not simply 
in a new way), ways that are self-conscious about how interpreta­
tion itself can be ideological, and ways that can thus help us to 
make the most of the rich literary heritage that has been passed 
down to us. 
In order to do this, we will have to break away from some strong­
ly entrenched notions—for instance, from the traditional reliance 
on close reading, which is valorized by New Criticism and post-
structuralism alike. Whatever its values—and close reading is cer­
tainly a useful skill—it can, if overemphasized, distort our literary 
experiences. To be sure, close reading is necessary for authorial 
readings of certain texts, especially a particular kind of lyric poet­
ry. But to the extent that canons celebrate texts that work with 
approved strategies, treating close reading as a synonym for good 
reading—as it is generally treated in this country—elevates that 
kind of poetry into the ideal literary type. As Terry Eagleton puts 
it, "To call for close reading . .  . is to do more than insist on due 
attentiveness to the text. It inescapably suggests an attention to 
this rather than to something else: to the 'words on the page' 
rather than to the contexts which produced and surround them/'52 
In so doing, it fosters the false belief that highly wrought works are 
necessarily the best, and that texts—even narratives—that do not 
share the virtues of Donne and Yeats are inferior, rather than just 
52. Eagleton, Literary Theory, 44. 
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different. As long as we privilege close reading as it is currently 
conceived, without questioning it, we will end up accepting, with 
but minor modifications, the canon erected on it, with all its ideo­
logical biases. 
Furthermore, the stress on close reading—which means, among 
other things, slow reading—tends to restrict the number of texts a 
reader is likely to be familiar with, and there is no reason to believe 
that this is inevitably a good thing. Receptiveness to new texts and 
new literary experiences, after all, does not depend solely on the 
care with which you approach them. If my arguments here have 
any validity, receptiveness depends as well on the range of your 
reading, on the variety of interpretive strategies that you have at 
your disposal. The best readers—at least among college students— 
tend to be those who were the most voracious readers as children; I 
am not sure that training them, as we do in high school AP classes 
and in college, to read not widely, but too well—that is, encourag­
ing them to substitute intensive for extensive reading—is an un­
mitigated blessing. New Critical dogma may insist that, in the 
words of Brooks and Warren, "before extensive reading can be prof­
itable, the student must have some practice in intensive read-
ing";53 but the opposite may well be the case: intensive reading 
may well be a worthless skill for someone who has not already 
devoured a large and heterogeneous collection of texts. Deep read­
ing, in other words, can complement wide reading, but it cannot 
replace it, for by itself it is not the magic key to literature; it will 
open some texts, but will shatter when turned in others. 
It is not simply that learning these new, more flexible, and more 
self-conscious modes of reading will increase the number of texts 
that we can enjoy and learn from. Indeed, were quantity the issue, 
we could rest content with the current canon, which has more 
than enough texts to fill up a lifetime. Rather, these new kinds of 
reading will allow us to enjoy a broader range of texts, texts that 
may give us a perspective on unquestioned cultural assumptions 
that canonical texts do not. Only in this way, I believe, can reading 
really serve the process of self-liberation, for only this kind of 
reading can make us aware of—and hence able to escape from— 
the limitations imposed by traditional interpretive practices. 
53. Cleanth Brooks and Robert Perm Warren, Understanding Fiction, xi. 
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